An operational research-based integrated approach for mass evacuation planning of a city by Nagarajan, Magesh
  
 
 Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions. 
 
If you have discovered material in AURA which is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either 
yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to 
patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please 
read our Takedown Policy and contact the service immediately 
  
 1 
 
AN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH-BASED  
INTEGRATED APPROACH 
FOR MASS EVACUATION PLANNING OF A CITY  
 
 
 
 
MAGESH NAGARAJAN 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
ASTON UNIVERSITY 
November 2013 
 
 
© Magesh Nagarajan, 2013   
Magesh Nagarajan asserts his moral right to be identified as the author of this thesis  
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who 
consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author 
and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement.  
 2 
 
ASTON UNIVERSITY 
 
An Operational Research-based integrated approach for mass evacuation planning of a city. 
 
MAGESH NAGARAJAN 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
2013 
 
Large-scale disasters are constantly occurring around the world, and in many cases evacuation 
of regions of city is needed. ‘Operational Research/Management Science’ (OR/MS) has been 
widely used in emergency planning for over five decades. Warning dissemination, evacuee 
transportation and shelter management are three ‘Evacuation Support Functions’ (ESF) 
generic to many hazards. This thesis has adopted a case study approach to illustrate the 
importance of integrated approach of evacuation planning and particularly the role of OR/MS 
models.  
 
In the warning dissemination phase, uncertainty in the household’s behaviour as ‘warning 
informants’ has been investigated along with uncertainties in the warning system. An agent-
based model (ABM) was developed for ESF-1 with households as agents and ‘warning 
informants’ behaviour as the agent behaviour. The model was used to study warning 
dissemination effectiveness under various conditions of the official channel.  
 
In the transportation phase, uncertainties in the household’s behaviour such as departure time 
(a function of ESF-1), means of transport and destination have been. Households could 
evacuate as pedestrians, using car or evacuation buses.  An ABM was developed to study the 
evacuation performance (measured in evacuation travel time). 
 
In this thesis, a holistic approach for planning the public evacuation shelters called ‘Shelter 
Information Management System’ (SIMS) has been developed. A generic allocation 
framework of was developed to available shelter capacity to the shelter demand by 
considering the evacuation travel time. This was formulated using integer programming. In 
the sheltering phase, the uncertainty in household shelter choices (either 
nearest/allocated/convenient) has been studied for its impact on allocation policies using 
sensitivity analyses.  
 
Using analyses from the models and detailed examination of household states from ‘warning 
to safety’, it was found that the three ESFs though sequential in time, however have lot of 
interdependencies from the perspective of evacuation planning. This thesis has illustrated an 
OR/MS based integrated approach including and beyond single ESF preparedness. The 
developed approach will help in understanding the inter-linkages of the three evacuation 
phases and preparing a multi-agency-based evacuation planning. 
 
 
Keywords: Agent-Based Models, Integer Programming, Warning Dissemination, Evacuee 
Transport Management, Evacuation Shelter Information Management 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Need for research 
Environmental disasters are constantly occurring throughout the world. The recently 
published ‘World Risk Report’ (WRR - 2012) states that “The balance sheet for the ten years 
from 2002 to 2011 is alarming: 4,130 disasters, over 1million dead and economic losses of at 
least 1.195 trillion US dollars” (Beck et al. 2012). For the same level of threat, the impact on 
the community could be very different in different regions and preparedness has a role in 
reducing this impact. For example, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake (2011) in New Zealand 
claimed 187 lives and 16 billion USD losses. On the other hand, a higher magnitude 
earthquake of 7 Richter units in Haiti (2011) claimed 220,000 lives and 8 billion USD losses 
(WRR - 2012, p 4). The ability of the society to respond to these disasters is contingent upon 
the public’s capacity to face and respond to it, the ‘Emergency Management Authorities’ 
(EMA) preparedness in mitigating these disaster impacts and developing disaster plans. The 
focus of this thesis is not on the way evacuation decision (whether and when to evacuate) is 
made by Government Organisations (GOs) rather on evacuation performance after the 
decision to evacuate. 
 
1.2 Disaster Definition 
 “Disaster is a crisis situation that far exceeds the capabilities” (Quarantelli as cited in CYEN 
2012) of both the public to continue normal life and the emergency responders. The following 
are two definitions on Disasters as given by World Health Organisation (WHO) as found 
relevant to this thesis: 
 A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the 
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (ISDR).  
 Situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to 
national or international level for external assistance (CRED). 
Disasters are caused by an agent/hazard - either ‘natural or man-made or a combination’ - by 
seriously impacting the community. This disaster agent/hazard is defined as “a threatening 
agent or probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within a given time 
period and area” (IFRC 2012). Table 1.1 presents some of the key hazards as classified by 
EM-DAT (IFRC 2012) and it is not an exhaustive list. Within these disaster agents, the 
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environmental hazard can be further classified into two types (UNEP 2012, p4) – ‘ongoing 
and rapid/sudden onset’ (refers to disasters occurring in a short time frame) and ‘slow-
onset/creeping’ (refers to incremental but long-term and cumulative environmental change).  
 
Table 1.1 List of key hazards (Data source: IFRC 2012 as cited from EM-DAT) 
 
1.3 Disaster Statistics 
Table 1.2 summarises key disasters that occurred around the world in a six month period 
between June and November-2012. The table highlights a typical impact of large-scale 
disasters. Disaster statistics of key events show that when a large-scale disaster strikes a 
community as large as 5 million people (August 2012 flood in Pakistan) could get impacted, 
some of them become homeless and inevitably to be evacuated. The means of evacuation 
could also get impacted during a disaster (e.g. Metro Manila flooded during flood and 
landslides June 2012) thus making evacuation to safety more difficult and delayed. The 
impacted population move to shelters, which are generally large safe buildings, such as relief 
camps (India October 2012), schools (Benin October 2012) and with host families (Cameroon 
August 2012). Even shelters identified at the planning stage could get damaged during 
disaster as the case in Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. 
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Table 1.2 Key disaster events between June-2012 and November-2012 only relevant information (synthesised from ReliefWeb, 2012) 
Disaster Country/Location Impact summary 
Drought (Nov-
2012) 
Sri Lanka Estimated 1.8 million people impacted due to second consecutive season with scanty rainfall and drying of 
natural reservoirs. 
Tropical Storm 
Nilam (Oct  2012) 
India Tropical storm Impacted states in Southern India, displacing 150,000 people and about 68,000 people are 
sheltering in 86 relief camps. 
Tropical Storm 
(Oct-2012) 
Philippines – Son-
Tinh 
About 15000 people evacuated to 27 shelters, killing 27 people and destroying 200 houses 
Hurricane Sandy 
(Oct 2012) 
Bahamas, Cuba, 
Panama, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Panama 
United States of 
America (USA) 
Affected 1.8 million, killing 60 people and impacting 18000 homes. Up to 18,000 people in temporary 
shelters were affected by Sandy and 5,800 shelters were damaged or destroyed. 
Floods (Oct-2012) Republic of Benin 
in West Africa 
Over 10,000 people have been displaced and reside in schools and other institutional buildings or in 
makeshift camps in the open air. It is unclear when the flood waters are likely to subside. 
Wild Fires (Sep-
2012) 
Ecuador 2900 wildfires destroyed over 15500 hectares of land and also caused interruption of water supply to 4000 
people  
Earthquakes (Sep 
2012) 
China Two earthquakes of magnitude 5.7 and 5.6 Richter scale in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces caused 100,000 
people to be evacuated, killing 60 and injuring 50. 
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Tropical Storm 
Isaac (Aug-2012) 
Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Cuba 
Haiti: 15000 people evacuated and 335 homes destroyed 
Dominican Republic: 4700 houses flooded and 2225 people took shelter in evacuation centres 
Earthquake (Aug-
2012) 
Indonesia A 6.2 Richter scale earthquake shook the eastern Indonesian island of Sulawesi, killing six people and 
damaging 1097 houses. Limited road access to earthquake victims has disrupted the delivery of relief 
supplies to the area. 
Tropical Storm 
Kai-Tak (Aug – 
2012) 
Philippines, 
Vietnam, China 
Philippines: Flash floods due to heavy rains killed 7 people, 86700 people were affected and 10650 people 
took shelter in 77 evacuation centres. 
Vietnam: Intense rain and strong winds killed 27, 12000 houses damaged and 23000 hectares of cropland 
flooded. 
China: 530,000 people estimated to be evacuated. About 4200 houses destroyed and 17300 damaged.  
Floods (Aug-
2012) 
Cameroon The rains and floods have destroyed or damaged many houses, leaving about 25,000 people homeless. 
Most of these have found shelter with host families, but 5,000 have sought refuge in school premises. 
Earthquake (Aug-
2012) 
Iran Rural villages in North-western Iran were impacted due to twin earthquake killing 306 people, injuring 
3000 and about 16000 left homeless. 
Typhoon Haikui 
(Aug-2012) 
China  In Jiangsu province, about 180,500 people were relocated. In Anhui province, about 26000 people were 
evacuated. In Zhejiang province about 4452 houses were destroyed and damaged.  
Floods (Aug-
2012) 
Chad In Rig Rig district about 3000 people were in need of shelter. In Sila region, 13000 houses were affected 
and the flood blocked major humanitarian supply routes. 
Floods (Aug- Pakistan Intense monsoon rain and floods impacted 5 million people. About 270,000 people are housed in 478 relief 
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2012) camps. 
Typhoon Darmey 
(Aug-2012) 
China Lianoning Province, about 1.46 million were affected, about 17000 houses were damaged and about 13800 
people were forced to evacuated. 
Tropical Storm 
Saola (Jul-2012) 
Philippines and 
China 
In Philippines about 16,000 took shelter in 73 evacuation centres. In Fujian region of China, 300000 people 
were evacuated. 
Earthquake (Jun-
2012) 
China In Xinjiang province, a 6.6 magnitude earthquake destroyed about 7500 houses and damaged 64000 
houses, resulting in evacuation of 48000 people and impacting 155,000 people. 
Flood and 
Landslides (Jun-
2012) 
Bangladesh Flash floods and landslides in Eastern Bangladesh caused 110 deaths and affected more than 400,000 
people. Due to landslides low-lying areas were inaccessible in Chittagong. About 290,000 people were 
evacuated to 602 shelters. 
Flood (Jun-2012) DPR Korea Heavy rain and resulting flood damaged infrastructure in nine provinces. A total of 62,889 people were 
affected by the floods, with 3,589 houses destroyed, 3,236 houses damaged, and 12,031 houses submerged. 
Floods and 
Landslides (Jun-
2012) 
Philippines In Northern and Central Luzon, about 4.4 million people were affected, over 1 million were displaced, 1.2 
million were living with relatives and friends while 135,308 people were residing in 431 evacuation centres 
across the affected areas in Luzon as of 31 August. Infrastructure including Metro Manila was also flooded. 
Flood (Jun-2012) South Sudan In Upper Nile State, Jamam camp, home to 120,000 refugees from Sudan’s Blue Nile State, was flooded 
and relocated to a new site in Gendrassa. Many roads within Abyei were flooded, restricting the possible 
return of people displaced from the area and hampering the movement of humanitarian actors. 
Flood (Jun-2012) India Due to monsoon rains, about 900,000 people were forced to leave their homes in the state of Assam. 
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For more information on disaster statistics pertaining to these key events and other disasters, 
readers are directed to EM-DAT (http://EMDAT.be) or ReliefWeb (http://reliefweb.int) 
websites. Even though all the hazards (Table 1.1) impact the community resulting in death, 
injury or disruption to their lives, evacuation is a response option only for some. This thesis 
pertains to evacuation planning for disaster situations that would lead to risking life of 
population when they continue living in their community, and hence take protective measure 
by relocating temporarily (evacuation) to a safer location. 
 
1.4 Evacuation Definition 
Evacuation helps in “transferring people from risky areas to safer ones” (Perry and Lindell 
2003). “Evacuation, regarded as a critical course of action to relocate people and property, 
helps to alleviate loss of life and property to a great extent.” (Chen et al. 2012, p207).  This 
section explains various terms used in the evacuation literature. Safeguarding - both the public 
and households - can influence the level of economic loss due to a disaster. However, 
relocation of property is not considered within the scope of this thesis.  This thesis pertains to 
evacuation planning of household population from region(s) of a city due to a disaster and not 
investigating evacuation from a building or a facility (e.g. football stadium, stations, etc). 
 
A large-scale emergency in city can risk lives of the households. In general, government with 
the involvement of various organisations both public and private (henceforth collectively as 
Emergency Management Authorities – EMAs) are legally responsible for preparing disaster 
response. Figure 1.1 presents disaster cycle with four phases (Alexander 2009, p5) and the 
following bullets present brief definition of these terms (Altay and Green 2006, p480). This 
four-cycle approach for comprehensive emergency management is widely used (Altay and 
Green 2006). 
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Figure 1.1 Four-phase disaster cycle (simplified and reproduced from Alexander 2009, 
p6) 
 Mitigation is the application of measures that will either prevent the onset of disaster 
or reduce the impacts should one occur.  
 Preparedness activities prepare the community to respond when a disaster occurs. 
 Response is the employment of resources and emergency procedures as guided by 
plans to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic and 
political structure of the community. 
 Recovery involves the actions taken in the long term after the immediate impact of the 
disaster has passed to stabilize the community and to restore some semblance of 
normalcy. 
Readers are directed to look at Altay and Green (2006, Table 2, p481) for comprehensive list 
of activities in each phase. It is important to look at evacuation planning as one of the key 
activities in the cycle rather than in isolation, and two examples are presented here as an 
illustration of this perspective. The infrastructure prepared for disaster mitigation could be 
impacted during a disaster and subsequently the evacuation could happen with an impacted 
support system/infrastructure (Sorensen 2000). For example during floods in the Sila region 
of Chad (August 2012) major humanitarian supply routes were blocked. A community in the 
recovery phase after a recent emergency might be less prepared for another evacuation. The 
disaster phase of the population will impact the next evacuation. Such dynamics indicate the 
need for looking at planning within four phases of disaster cycle and not in isolation. These 
dynamics could be identified as planning scenarios of impacts on critical infrastructure and 
further formulate evacuation plans. Understanding household responses during evacuation is 
fundamental to city-scale evacuation planning. 
 
Mitigation 
Preparation Response 
Recovery 
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Household evacuation responses  
During a large-scale emergency some of the city regions may be affected due to a disaster. 
The households have variety of response during an emergency depending on the scale, type 
and timeline of the disaster. Table 1.2 highlighted some of the recent disasters where the 
houses were damaged and may become unsafe to live. In such situations, these households 
need to relocate till their houses are deemed safe to live and hence may require ‘relocation’ to 
long-term accommodation in relief camps. Some of the houses may not be warned during 
emergency and even after warning they may choose to ‘stay in-situ’. In some cases of nuclear 
accident, staying closed doors (stay in-situ) is a key response option. In cases of flash 
flooding for a short duration, household response could be to move to higher floors (‘vertical 
evacuation’) or evacuate to a pre-identified safe-location within the neighbourhood 
(‘horizontal evacuation’) typically in a walk-able distance. Vertical evacuation during tsunami 
or flash flood assumes that higher floors of the building are safe for the level of disaster 
impact (Little et al. 2007). In many cases the household need to ‘evacuate’ out of the danger 
area and return when declared as safe. The safe location could either be one of the public 
shelters identified by the government or a private destination (friends, family) outside the 
evacuated zone.  
 
When the household’s departure is late during rapid-onset disasters, evacuees put themselves 
at risk for their safety. It was reported that about 75.7% of fatalities (Haynes et al. 2009, p291) 
during flash floods in Australia occurred when people were en route to safety. There is 
growing interest on sheltering-in-place for flash floods, due to its short warning time and 
rapid onset of disaster.  
 
Evacuation zones around nuclear power plant are chosen depending on the likely scale of the 
nuclear incident and the subsequent plume behaviour. A Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 
the United States (US-NRC) classified two evacuation planning zones (US-NRC, 2012) 
around nuclear facility namely ‘plume exposure pathway zone’ (10 mile) and ‘ingestion 
exposure pathway zone’ (50 miles).  Such ‘zone classifications’ for a planned evacuation 
scenario will help the authorities to estimate the endangered population and inform their 
preparedness efforts. The individual zone could map to any administrative unit (municipality) 
or specific classification for a hazard. A household in the disaster impact zone need to be 
notified by the authorities of an imminent threat or after an impact and advice on emergency 
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response. Some of the households may choose not to comply with evacuation order. Such 
diverse options at the household level are to be factored in the evacuation plan. 
 
In a complex disaster situation, some of these household response options are combined 
depending on the endangered zone. Personalising the impact on the household level will have 
influence on the evacuation response. For example, a forecasted storm flood due to torrential 
rain may result in flooding the low-lying areas and they may need evacuation. For other 
regions that are at higher elevation, households may adopt vertical evacuation or stay indoors. 
There are various types of household evacuation response choices available for the EMAs. 
 
1.5 Types of evacuation 
‘Preventive evacuation’ (or precautionary evacuation) is carried out ‘prior to’ actual 
occurrence of a predicted event and depends on the time window available from the 
evacuation decision to evacuees reaching safety (Alexander 2009, p151). ‘Post-disaster 
evacuation’ (or no-notice evacuation) is carried out when the disaster has already occurred, 
deeming it necessary for the households to evacuate immediately as a protective measure 
(Chiu et al.2007). Here, some of the households may already be warned directly by the 
disaster event and others need to be notified of the emergency situation. 
 
‘Staged evacuation’ is a plan of identified order/sequence of evacuating zones, beginning with 
the most vulnerable population and progressively suggesting a timeline for relatively lower 
vulnerable people (Chien and Korikanthimath, 2007). This vulnerability is often attributed to 
the proximity with the hazard epicentre indicating the earliest impacted zones. By staging 
evacuation, the household’s departure time is staggered based on the vulnerability level and 
thus the load (e.g. vehicle volume) in the infrastructure (e.g. evacuation road network) is 
reduced.   
 
‘Shadow evacuation’ is referred to “spontaneous evacuation by people outside of any official 
declared zones” (US-NRC, 2012). During Hurricane Floyd, about 35% of 2 million evacuees 
who did not have to leave evacuated and thereby contributed to enormous congestion in 
Houston (Wolshon 2006, p33). Such evacuees are referred in literature as ‘shadow 
evacuation’. Some households might perceive heightened risk of disaster impact. When some 
of the neighbour zones/regions are evacuated and not theirs, the household might evacuate 
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even though not needed. The role of EMAs in forecasting the likely impacted and also 
evacuated zones, and communicating it to the regions (including non-evacuated zones) would 
alleviate unnecessary fear that leads to shadow evacuation. 
 
Depending on the condition of the hazard impact, evacuation may not be an option at all. “A 
major fatality in flash floods is attempted evacuation in a vehicle” (Sorensen 2000, p120) as 
the evacuation time (ET) window is short and untimely/late departure can place the evacuees 
in serious danger like directly facing the flood. For example, when there is nuclear plume 
release in the atmosphere due to accident, the evacuees may have to stay indoors and remain 
fully closed. Evacuation during that circumstance may not be advisable. On the other hand, 
when it is life-threatening due to acute level of nuclear release the household may be advised 
to evacuate from the vicinity as a safer option. It is important for the evacuation planners to 
identify and design scenarios for planned threats. Such dynamics form as an input for EMA’s 
‘evacuation decision’ (whether to evacuate or not?) based on forecasted impact, only some/all 
of the zones may be evacuated. 
 
1.6 Mass evacuation planning and management - Overview 
Evacuation is a temporary relocation of population from endangered zones to avoid impact 
due to a disaster (Cabinet-Office, 2006). EMAs plan, prepare, exercise, train and respond to a 
disaster. In the context of evacuation due to emergency (natural or man-made disaster), the 
role of EMA preparedness initiatives in a complex disaster situation is inevitable. Not all 
disasters require evacuation as a response. Understanding about the phases in evacuation is 
the foundation for designing EMA level plans for supporting evacuation.  
 
“Japan is one of the few top-end-risk countries that have an effective warning and evacuation 
system, as well as excellent community education programme” (quoted from an article by 
Nakano et al. (1974) as cited in Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan 2000, p26). A massive 7.7 
Richter Niigata earthquake in 1964 caused damage to 20000 houses and resulted in 16 deaths 
along with injuring 315 people. “Due to the quality of its preparedness programme” the level 
of mortality was very low (Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan 2000, p. 26) during the Niigata 
earthquake. Though the quote is about four decades old, the impact of all the preparedness 
initiatives and their effectiveness needs a review, given the recent events in Fukushima 
disaster. The 2011 disaster in Japan had large-scale impact due to the compounded 
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catastrophes namely earthquake, subsequent tsunami leading to a power shortage and then the 
nuclear accident in Fukushima. In order to study large-scale evacuation planning, it is 
important to understand the phases of household evacuation. The following paragraphs 
provide examples from disaster statistics in order to ‘identify and briefly introduce phases of 
evacuation’. 
 
A fire broke out in the midnight (26-November-2009) in a residential sub-urban area Peckham 
in London and about 310 people self-evacuated by alerting each other. There was no death 
during this accident. One of the evacuees stated in a media report, “…knocking on all the 
doors of my neighbours to alert them” (Randhawa and Lydall, 2009). Official warning of 
evacuation order is disseminated to notify the endangered households of an imminent or 
ongoing disaster. Peckham sub-urban evacuation is an example where there was no official 
evacuation warning but the public were helping themselves to safety. A new national 
emergency alert system is currently under development in the United States called PLAN 
(Personal Localised Alerting Network). This will require a special chip to be fitted in mobile 
phones to receive official alerts (Merrett, 2011). Once a decision to evacuate is made or when 
the disaster has already struck, the endangered areas are warned for evacuation. 
Dissemination of warning message is the first phase of evacuation. 
 
During the evacuation of Hurricane Katrina (2005) about 100,000 evacuees had no access to 
transport and did not evacuate (Tate 2010). Evacuees use various means of transport namely 
cars, metros, evacuation buses and by foot to physically move from place of danger to safety. 
The physical movement of evacuees in evacuating vehicles often referred using the term 
‘evacuation’ is the second phase. The safe location or destination is referred as ‘shelters’ 
which is the third phase. 
 
During the fire accident in a processing plant in Nanticoke (1987), a midnight evacuation 
order was issued and about 2000 of 15000 evacuees sought to mass care shelters (Stambaugh, 
1987). Over half a million of residents in the regions of Miyagi prefecture and surrounding 
regions in Japan were evacuated for weeks during the tsunami (April-2011) and subsequent 
disaster in the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. About 2.6 million people from 14 
districts were affected by flooding due to continuous rainfall in West Bengal, India (August 
2011) leading to the death of 27 people and large-scale abandonment of flooded residence to 
makeshift shelters (NDTV, 2011). In such circumstances, EMAs have inevitable 
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responsibility of providing shelters to these impacted households. The following section 
presents a brief overview of fundamental aspects of mass evacuation planning.  
 
Evacuation from building facilities, aircrafts, stadium, railway stations and housing complex 
happens from restricted boundary/spaces (e.g. building floors), the evacuees are warned of a 
danger and leave the premise (generally by foot) until it is deemed safe for return. Building 
evacuation, though an interesting research problem, is not considered within the scope of this 
thesis. The term ‘evacuation’ in this thesis refers only to a scale of ‘region(s) or whole city’ 
evacuation due to a natural or manmade disaster. 
 
The primary purpose of evacuation is to ensure the safety of the population in case the 
disaster strikes. “Two essentials of this are warning and evacuation” (Alexander 2009, p146). 
In the literature often the word ‘evacuation’ is used to refer to the ‘transportation’ phase of 
emergency namely movement of evacuees from the place of danger to safety. EMAs based on 
the disaster forecast and monitoring of condition, make ‘evacuation decision’ and issue an 
order to evacuate (warning and informing). For implementing evacuation plan, households 
require various forms of support for evacuating to safety. “Evacuation support functions” 
(ESF) as defined in the thesis are response roles of GOs in implementing the evacuation plan 
and supporting the household to evacuate. From warning to safety, there are three ESF phases 
namely  
 ESF-1 warning dissemination (to disseminate the evacuation decision to the 
public),  
 ESF-2 transportation (to support and provide evacuating households use 
evacuation network to reach their safety) and  
 ESF-3 sheltering (to accommodate the evacuees needing public shelter as their 
destination during the evacuated period).  
Each ESF is typically managed by different organisations. The organisation-level evacuation 
plan enlists ESF’s role and tasks during evacuation. The thesis specifically focuses on the 
three ESFs that are common to many hazards. 
 
1.7 ERGO Project Overview 
ERGO (Evacuation Responsiveness by Government Organisations) project was funded by the 
European Commission under the Directorate-General Justice Freedom and Security 
(JLS/2007/CIPS/025). This thesis is focused on identifying how the EMAs use analytical 
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models to prepare for mass evacuation. There were 10 countries namely Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, Germany, Spain, Iceland, Bulgaria, Poland, United Kingdom and Japan. Ergo 
countries have nominated a senior level emergency manager to be a part of International 
advisory board (IAB) panel to oversee the project.  
 
Figure 1.2 presents the ERGO team’s integrated framework to be adopted for planning mass 
evacuation. The ERGO team proposed the integrated approach to planning mass evacuation as 
an overarching framework for planning mass evacuation. This framework would facilitate 
multilevel agencies to plan, train and exercise their design scenarios of mass evacuation. The 
focus of the project is to look at these six phases of evacuation and this thesis specifically 
contributes to phases 4-6 (Figure 1.2), and the remaining phases are covered by two 
researchers. 
 
Figure 1.2 Integrated approach for planning mass evacuation proposed by the ERGO 
project (Shaw et al. 2011a, p16) 
 
1.8 Examples of OR models 
‘Operational Research or Management Science’ (OR/MS) is defined “as a scientific approach 
to decision making, which seeks to determine how best to design and operate a system, 
usually under conditions requiring the allocation of scarce resources”. OR/MS has been 
widely used in various phases of emergency (Altay and Green 2006). This thesis focuses on 
generating model-based understanding of evacuation phases, its inter-relationships and further 
developing an integrated approach for large-scale evacuation of regions of a city.  
“Inefficiencies in planning translate very easily into loss of life, injuries or damage that could 
have been avoided” (Alexander 2009, p5). This summarises the inevitable need for EMAs to 
 31 
design evacuation plans for ‘planned threats’ and have confidence in their response 
capabilities through preparedness metric.  There are various methods in OR/MS that have 
been used in evacuation planning including optimization, simulation [agent-based modelling, 
discrete event simulation (DES)], cellular automata, and decision support systems. This thesis 
has chosen simulation and agent-Based modelling as the chosen technique. Details of OR/MS 
methods and the justification of choice of methodology are presented in Chapter 3. 
 
1.9 Aim and Objectives of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate how ‘evacuee behaviour-based large-scale evacuation 
planning of a city can be supported using OR/MS models?’ The objectives of the thesis are: 
 To understand evacuation phases and the dimension of evacuee behaviour that will 
affect overall evacuation effectiveness 
 To demonstrate how mass evacuation preparedness can be supported through 
integrated approach encompassing the three phases by using computer-based OR 
models. 
 To develop computer-based simulation models for the phases of mass evacuation 
namely warning message dissemination, evacuee transportation model and shelter 
management by incorporating the public behaviour in the analytical models. 
 To support evacuation planning from 'warning to safety' using OR models. 
The following are the research questions addressed in this thesis 
 Q1: What is the need for modelling ESFs'?  
 Q2: How do household evacuation behaviours impact different phases in 
evacuation?  
 Q3: How do household evacuation behaviours affect organisations' evacuation 
response plans?  
 Q4: How OR-based approach can help GOs in evacuation planning?  
 Q5: How OR-based approach can provide an integrated evacuation planning 
environment? 
1.10 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents analyses of literature grouped 
into three ESFs namely warning dissemination, transport, management and emergency 
accommodation. This chapter provides in-depth analyses of literature specifically looking at 
‘the existing OR/MS models, household behaviours and identified research gap’ for three 
ESFs.  
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Chapter 3 presents the research methodology available for modelling evacuation and 
analytical techniques are presented in the first section. The next section presents the overview 
of the ERGO project and the ERGO city case study. The chosen ABM and case study 
approach is justified in the next sections. This chapter ends with how the models were 
validated in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the findings on warning dissemination (ESF-1) from ERGO countries 
followed by gaps identified in this thesis. Development of an Agent-Based Model (ABM) 
warning dissemination including official channels and household as informants (unofficial 
channel) is described for a prototype model of 1000 houses and then for the city scale. The 
chapter ends with sensitivity analyses of various model parameters, simulation experiments 
and chapter conclusion. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings on transportation management (ESF-2) from ERGO countries 
followed by gaps identified in this thesis. Development of household behaviour-based ABM 
transportation model with evacuation using ‘car, pedestrian and bus’ is explained for the city 
scale. The chapter ends with sensitivity analyses of various model parameters, simulation 
experiments and chapter conclusion.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the findings on shelter management (ESF-3) from ERGO countries and 
followed by gaps identified in this thesis. Development of a holistic approach for evacuation 
planning is presented, followed by a generic model using Integer Programming (IP) for zone-
wise allocation of shelters. In the concluding section, sensitivity analyses of household shelter 
choice behaviour household behaviour are studied using experiments with the allocation 
model.  
 
Chapter 7 presents a zone-wise overview of evacuation performance of ERGO city and 
identifying interconnectedness of phases based on the model results. Over the ESF level 
evacuation plans, the need for integrated approach of evacuation planning is presented.  
 
Chapter 8 reviews the research questions addressed in various chapters. The next sections 
present discussion on the contribution of thesis to literature, further scope of research and 
implications to practitioners. Concluding section of the thesis summarises reflection on PhD 
experience.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Evacuation planning – An introduction 
The focus of this thesis is on the evacuation planning phase of an emergency. From the point 
of view of hazards, there are two broad approaches for emergency planning namely all-
hazards approach and disaster-specific approach. Quarantelli (1991, p97) believed that “it 
appears that the generic approach is most applicable in the emergency phases and somewhat 
less so in the mitigation phase”. A generic all-hazards approach is preferable “as it achieves 
greater levels of protection and economies of scale” (Alexander 2009 p95).   
 
EMAs often prepare for many hazards and design evacuation scenarios for each relevant 
threat to inform their evacuation response plans. Given the cost-effectiveness (Alexander, 
2009) and wide applicability (Quarantelli 1991), this thesis adopts an all-hazards approach for 
developing large-scale evacuation models. The impact on ESF response capabilities due to the 
disaster needs to be ascertained for each hazard scenario and further their evacuation response 
plans need to be evaluated.  
 
With increasingly complex disaster (e.g. 2011 Great East Japan earthquake), it is desirable to 
identify key threats for the planned area and design scenarios for evacuation planning. Firstly, 
EMAs could have generic evacuation plans common for all hazards for supporting 
evacuation. Evaluate the generic plan and build specific scenarios and responses for the 
identified threats and also complex disasters envisaged based on the experience. 
 
2.2 What is Emergency preparedness? 
One of the four stages of disaster cycle is preparedness (Figure 1.1). “Emergency 
preparedness means taking action to be ready for emergencies before they happen. The 
objective of emergency preparedness is to simplify decision making during emergencies” 
(US-NRC 2012). “Inefficiency in emergency planning translates very easily into loss of life, 
injuries or damage that could have been avoided” (Alexander 2009, p5). Preparedness 
initiatives are taken by the emergency responders at the planning stage of a disaster planning 
cycle to formulate each organisation’s response strategies to the planned threat in-case of 
eventuality. These are “actions taken in anticipation of an emergency to facilitate ‘rapid, 
effective and appropriate’ response to the situation” (Inter-Agency Contingency Planning 
Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance 2001) as stated in WHO (2012). “Preparedness 
 34 
measures can take many forms including the construction of shelters, installation of warning 
devices, creation of back-up life-line services (e.g. power, water, sewage), and rehearsing 
evacuation plans” (CYEN 2012). 
 
From the EMA perspective, an evacuation response is defined as “the set of actions conducted 
during the initial impact of these emergency situations, including those to save lives and 
prevent further property damage providing emergency relief to victims of natural or man-
made disaster” (Barbarosoglu and Arda 2004).  
 
This thesis will study the potential for supporting three ESFs preparedness for large-scale 
emergency using OR models. There are other evacuation supporting roles beyond evacuees 
reaching safety (see definition of Barbarosoglu and Arda, 2004), which even though 
interesting will not be considered within the scope of this thesis. Readers can refer to Altay 
and Green(2006) and Caunhye et al. (2012) review articles on ‘Disaster Operations 
Management’ (DOM) which covers ESFs including and beyond evacuation, to name a few, 
relief and humanitarian logistics, search and rescue operation, managing the supply chain for 
shelter operations (e.g. food, medicines, etc) and providing medical and social care for the 
evacuees. This thesis only covers the ESF preparedness between ‘Warning households to 
reaching safety’. The EMAs use various measures for supporting their evacuation plan. 
 
The following are common preparedness measures (CYEN 2012, p6) for the ESF: 
• communication plans with easily understandable terminology and chain of command 
• development and practice of multi-agency coordination and incident command 
• proper maintenance and training of emergency services 
• development and exercise of emergency population warning methods combined with 
emergency shelters and evacuation plans 
• stockpiling, inventory, and maintenance of supplies and equipment 
 
‘Evacuation Preparedness Assessment Workbook’ (Shaw et al. 2011b) has identified 
operational tasks for the EMAs to evaluate their preparedness. This workbook’s sections are 
aligned to the ERGO evacuation framework as presented in Chapter – 1. Ohio (2012) has 
devised a similar Preparedness assessment tool (Ohio, 2012) called “citizen evacuation and 
shelter-in-place”. Apart from workbook-based evacuation preparedness assessment, models 
are also used in evacuation preparedness. The next section will present brief introduction 
 35 
about the OR/MS and subsequent section will be on the models already used in evacuation 
planning. 
 
2.3 Operational Research and evacuation planning  
The definition of OR/MS has been presented in Chapter 1 (p30). In general, formal computer 
models are often a simplified representation of households in evacuation planning areas and 
further study the evacuation performance under planned threat scenarios. Evacuation planning 
of highly likely impacted environment based on expected disaster intensity could be studied 
in an evacuation model. The role of OR/MS models could prove vital for the EMAs to 
evaluate before-hand evacuation plans and strengthen their preparedness.  OR/MS is widely 
used in different phases of emergency (Altay and Green 2006). This section looks at how OR 
and analytical modelling techniques can help emergency planners to support their analysis of 
evacuation. There are many OR techniques that are used in the planning for evacuation 
management, and the following are few important OR methods. 
 
Optimisation is the use of mathematical modelling to find an ‘optimum solution’. It is used 
when the problem can be formulated in a quantitative manner with predefined structures. 
Optimisation techniques are widely used in traffic management for obtaining optimum 
evacuation routes for the evacuees (Chiu et al. 2007). Here the roads are represented as 
networks and the evacuation route is obtained for minimum travel time.  
 
Simulation modelling is the use of a computer-based representation of reality to study the 
changing behaviour of a system under different conditions. Simulation modelling allows the 
user to explore what-if scenarios, test the robustness of systems, experiment with different 
configurations and policies, and understand complex interdependencies between critical 
incidents.  
 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a type of simulation technique used mainly in social 
science, where the evacuees are represented as agents and defined using behavioural 
properties (e.g. response time) to measure the interaction among the other evacuees (agents) 
in order to obtain the overall behaviour. ABM has been used to study pedestrian evacuations 
from underground stations (Castle, 2006) as well as for planning evacuation of the city (Chen 
et al. 2006). In both the cases the evacuee behaviour is represented using ‘agents’ for 
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developing the model. “Multi-agent simulation is defined as a computational model for 
simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous individuals with a view to assessing 
their effects on the system as a whole” (Taubenbock et al.2009, p1522).  “An agent-based 
model is a computational method for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous 
decision-making entities in a network or system, with the aim of assessing their effects on the 
system as a whole. Individuals and organisations are represented as agents” (Dawson et 
al.2011, p172). 
 
There are many more OR techniques available in literature and key simulation techniques are 
compared in Chapter – 3. There are models developed by combining various techniques to 
take advantage of each modelling approach. For example, in order to distribute evacuees from 
different regions to safe areas, a ‘spatial multi-objective optimization problem’ (Saadatseresht 
et al. 2009) was formulated by combining the GIS model into multi-objective algorithms for 
evacuation planning. Critical infrastructure Modelling system (CIMS) is a DES model to 
study the interdependencies of various infrastructures and identify evacuation response 
strategies (Santella et al. 2009). A combined simulation and optimization model has been 
developed for evacuation planning of Ocean City, Maryland, United States (Zou et al. 2005). 
This model has been developed to test evacuation planning in advance and also as a system to 
support real-time operational decisions. A survey of OR models and its application to 
evacuation management can be found in Caunhye et al.(2012), Simpson and Hancock (2009), 
Wright et al.(2006), Altay and Green (2006) and Pidd et al.(1996). 
 
“Social science studies reveal that most socio-behaviour features of disasters are not agent- 
or class-agent- but are generally similar for different types of natural and technological 
agents” (Drabek 1986 as cited in Quarantelli 1991, p98). Hence developing an all-hazard 
approach that includes household behaviour is argued in this thesis as a suitable approach. 
The objective of this thesis is in studying the household dynamics for each of the phases 
‘warning to safety’ for a preventive evacuation during rapid-onset disasters using OR/MS 
models in order to support collective EMAs preparedness. 
 
2.4 Need for models in evacuation planning 
Emergency managers from various organisations are involved in developing evacuation plans 
for their local hazard scenario. These plans are to be aligned with the other factors like legal 
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restriction, availability of resources (personnel and equipment), demographic details of the 
population, type of hazard and its potential impact. GOs as a part of a preparedness initiative 
should identify evacuation response strategies. Evacuation models are purpose-built 
simplified representations of a city or regions of a city. The models can serve as a platform for 
testing and experimentation (Pidd et al. 1996, Green and Kolesar 2004, Simpson and Hancock 
2009) of the evacuation plans, various response policies, simulating worst-case scenarios and 
identify potential for further capacity development. 
 
Computer models are, ‘…well able to represent dynamic aspects of change’ (Gilbert and 
Troitzsch 2005, p13). In evacuation modelling, the dynamics of the disaster event (e.g. 
flooding) and its impact on the evacuation (e.g. road network disruption) can be represented 
conveniently as a computer model to support the decision makers. The robustness of the 
evacuation plan can be tested by harnessing the dynamic capability of the computer models. 
Thus modelling approach would serve as low-risk approach of testing compared to 
experimenting in real-life. 
 
Evacuation plans have assumptions about the evacuee behaviour (e.g. choice of evacuation 
transport) that forms the basis for evacuation response plans (Drabek 2007). The uncertainty 
in the assumed evacuee behaviour and the implication of these assumptions will impact the 
successfulness of evacuation. Some of the key model insights are “the latest possible start 
time of evacuation, the best evacuation routes or the most suitable traffic management 
measures” (Pel et al. 2010, p102). OR models could serve as a platform for the GOs to 
understand the implication of evacuee behaviour assumptions on the overall evacuation. The 
uncertainty of the evacuee behaviour is generally studied in the model using the sensitivity 
analysis of the evacuation performance. 
 
Using models: a health warning  
Evacuation models are abstract representation of the reality. Given the complexity of the 
disaster event along with the abstraction in the model, could lead to less reliable model 
results. An over-reliance on a model’s results, understatement of assumptions and ignoring 
the context-specific aspect on interpretation of the output results are some issues highlighted 
as reasons for failures of models in emergency management (Starbuck 1983, French and 
Niculae 2004). A carefully designed modelling approach needs to factor in these issues to 
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make the model reliable for the intended purpose. This highlights the need for validation of 
the evacuation models in order to increase their reliability in evacuation planning. 
 
2.5 Validation of the model 
The Emergency Managers using software models in evacuation planning need to know about 
two broad classification of software products namely ‘off-the-shelf (OTS) models’ and 
‘custom-built models‘. OTS product is ready to roll the minute you slide the installation CD 
in the drive, low priced, generic built and has revisions for updates (Voas 2002, Morris 2010). 
An example of OTS product used in evacuation planning is NAME – Nuclear Accident 
Model - developed by UK Meteorological Office (Maryon et al. 1991) and used to predict the 
dispersion of nuclear plume given the atmospheric conditions like temperature, wind speed, 
etc. On the other hand, Custom-built Models are developed in house with tailor-made 
specification, generally expensive and includes organisation-specific features. For example, 
‘Crowd Dynamics Inc.’ (Crowd-Dynamics, 2010) developed an agent-based simulation 
model to understand the external crowd movements of a stadium in Solna (Sweden) for 
planning the entrance and exit routes. 
 
Some OTS products have generic features that can be customized to the evacuation planning 
area. For example, GIS software like ArcGIS can be used for a wide range of purpose 
including evacuation modelling. Irrespective of the type of model used in evacuation 
planning, the end-users need to know about the underlying principles of the model, limitation, 
scope and various assumptions. This understanding will help in validation of the model and 
increasing the end-user confidence.  
 
There are four stages of modelling process namely conceptual Modelling, model coding, 
experimentation and implementation (Robinson 2003, p. 52). The conceptual model is defined 
‘…as a non-software specific description of the simulation model that is to be developed, 
describing the objectives, inputs, outputs, content, assumptions and simplifications of the 
model’. From the conceptual model stage, the description is converted into software codes or 
components that comply with the intended objective. Once the model has been coded and 
tested, the model requires experimentation to study the variation of input and output along 
with stability of the results. Quality or reliability of the model ‘…must be built in every 
portion of the software development process’ (Pressman, 2001). End-users when they are 
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involved in the model development will have better idea of scope, assumptions and principles 
in comparison to OTS models.  
The validity of a simulation model can be evaluated in three ways (Garson 2009, p274):  
1) Outcome validity is obtained by comparing the results from the simulation model with 
real-world results to ascertain the accuracy of the model results. In the evacuation 
modelling obtaining real-world data is limited hence doing outcome validation is 
considered difficult.  
2) Process validity is used to demonstrate “that the process that leads to outcomes in a 
simulation corresponds to processes in the real world” (Garson 2009, p275). 
Evacuation models are required to be aligned with various stages of the evacuation 
process and the internal sequence of events need validation. 
3) Internal validity demonstrates that simulation software validly represents the process 
being modelled along with the explicit statement of assumptions. For ascertaining the 
internal validity of the models, the evacuee behaviour, organisational response plans 
and assumptions need to be accurately represented.  
Even when the empirical data of evacuee behaviour are limited, quantification and simulation 
using models would outweigh the potential problems regarding the external validity of the 
models (Größler 2004). These validity tests help in measuring the reliability of the models to 
ensure the validity and acceptance of model usage for the intended purpose. 
 
2.5.1 Data sources in evacuation planning 
In evacuation modelling, quantifying the behaviour of evacuees is important and can affect 
the acceptability of the model by the end-users. Evacuee behaviour modelling can be done 
through different types of data collection namely post-evacuation survey, pre-evacuation 
stated preference survey, social sciences literature, practitioner experience, post-disaster 
reports, etc. Table 2.1 summarises these techniques and their key features. 
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Table 2.1 Different sources of obtaining evacuee behaviour data and its key features 
Data collection 
technique 
Key feature  Examples 
Evacuation preference 
surveys conducted pre-
evacuation 
Evacuees are sent survey questionnaire based 
on a scenario and evacuees respond to these 
questions. Evacuees may not act the way they 
say. In some cases detailed interviews are 
conducted to know how the evacuees will 
behave in case of evacuation. The drawback 
in this method is that the evacuee’s actual 
behaviour may be different from the 
response.  
Bird et al. (2009), 
Jóhannesdóttir and 
Gísladóttir (2010 
Post-evacuation survey After the evacuation, the evacuees are 
contacted to obtain how their evacuation 
experience was. This data will help in 
ascertaining how the successfulness of the 
evacuation and also to obtain lessons learned. 
These surveys rely on the evacuees’ ability to 
recollect and share their actual experience. 
Brodie et al.(2006) 
Social science literature Evacuee behaviours based on the previous 
disasters are used to formulate generalisable 
theories which can support evacuation plans.  
Drabek (1996) 
Practitioner Experience The knowledge from practitioner experience 
is held at key individuals within GOs. This 
needs to be documented and disseminated 
across agencies. 
 
Post-disaster report GOs prepare reports after a major disaster 
event to reflect on the successfulness of their 
response as well as to obtain generalisable 
lessons. 
Pitt (2008) 
 
For example, in order to evaluate transport plan after the Hurricane Katrina, authorities used 
“traffic volume and speed data, traffic videos, media accounts and interviews of evacuees” 
(Wolshon 2006 p28). As a part of preparedness initiative for Hurricane evacuation in the 
United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has conducted research with 
the public at the local county level. These behaviour analyses data form the basis for 
evacuation plans specifically on ‘sheltering analysis, transportation analysis, guidance in 
emergency decision making and public awareness efforts’ (FEMA, 2010).Thus GOs as a part 
of preparedness initiative could collect data about the evacuee behaviour from the available 
sources for their planning area and test evacuee behaviour uncertainties using the OR models. 
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2.6 Levels of Modelling 
Evacuation models can be developed at different levels depending on the smallest unit of 
analyses and purpose of modelling. There are three levels namely micro-level models, macro-
level models and meso-level models (Pidd 1996).  
 ‘Micro-level models’ are used to study individual entities (define entities and give 
examples) in the road network using simulation from the evacuation zones to safer 
destination (Pidd 1996). In micro-simulation the individual entities are treated 
independently and the interaction effects are generally discarded (Gilbert and 
Troitzsch 2005).  
 ‘Macro-level models’ do not track the individual entities in a detailed level instead 
aggregate the individual entities from the same evacuation zone as a group and study 
the overall evacuation behaviours.  
 ‘Meso-level models’ is a middle-line approach between other two categories and track 
individual as groups or packets of vehicles but at a more detailed level compared to 
macro-simulations.  
Table 2.2 Different levels of models 
Model details Level of 
model 
Reference 
NETSIM – Traffic simulation model Micro Rathi and Santiago, 
1990 
A behaviour based simulation model Micro Stern and Sinuany-
Stern (1989) 
Network simulation model for dam failure Macro Southworth and Chin, 
1987 
MASSVAC – Evacuation time estimation Macro Hobieka and Jamie, 
1985 
PACKSIM – real time traffic management Meso Barcello and Grau 
(1993) 
CEMPS – Configurable Emergency Management 
and Planning System 
Meso Pidd (1996) 
ArchSIM – multi-agent model for opportunity 
driving behaviour simulation in urban road 
junctions 
Micro Doniec et al.2008 
Dynamic traffic assignment model (DTA) to study 
moving bottlenecks 
Meso Juran et al.(2009) 
ABM based micro-simulation of urban traffic 
networks 
Micro Lopez-Neri et al.2010 
DTA model using DynaMIT for congested traffic 
in a megacity (Beijing, China) 
Meso Ben-Akiva et al.(2012) 
Multi-agent Transportation Simulation – MATSim Micro http://www.matsim.org/ 
TUNAMI-EVAC1 – Tohuku University’s 
Numerical Analysis for investigation of near-field 
Tsunami (TUNAMI) tool’s evacuation module 
Micro Mas et al.2012a 
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Table 2.2 presents the classification of different models available in evacuation literature. 
When EMAs need to manage people leaving facilities such as an underground station, 
shopping malls and stadia, there are many types of micro-level crowd modelling software 
such as VISSIM, EXODUS and MYRAID. For example, the Jamarat bridge pilgrimage 
facility in Hajj (Makka) has been modelled using mathematical models (Algadhi and 
Mahmassani 1990) as well using ABM software (Crowd-Dynamics 2010) for better 
management and to avoid overcrowding. This model was used to identify bottleneck within 
the system that slows down the overall exit time and streamlining it when there is 
multidirectional flow of crowd. Kerridge et al. (2001) provide more information on a detailed 
review of pedestrian modelling. Representation of households in the modelled area requires a 
different model development units compared to facility evacuation models.  
 
ABM is a social simulation technique that specifically looks at how the individual behaviour 
and their interactions will affect the overall behaviour of the system. ABM has been widely 
used in evacuation modelling of building facilities (Castle 2006) and regions of a city (Rogers 
and Sorensen 1991). For evacuation models in ABM, the behaviour of agents (e.g. a 
household) can be specified as ‘rules’ based on the process observed in the real-life 
evacuation situation. For example, each household can have attributes set to reflect its 
characteristics (e.g. access to warning channels like TV/radio) and behaviours (e.g. the need 
for public shelters), and these can be programmed as the properties of the agents. 
 
A detailed comparison of different levels of simulation techniques and its features is available 
in Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005, p13). The readers are cautioned about a different usage of 
terminology in evacuee transport modelling, where micro-level refers to tracking individual 
vehicles, meso-level refers to stream of vehicles and less detailed individual vehicle tracking 
and macro-level refers to the traffic flow (vehicles/hours) from different sub-regions of the 
city. Thus depending on the level of detail and the purpose of the model, EMAs could choose 
the appropriate modelling level for developing the model. 
 
In practise, EMAs use these measurements to set operational targets for their evacuation 
response plan. For example the ‘Shearon Harris Nuclear plant’ board decided a policy to 
notify 100% of the population within 5 miles surrounding the plan area within 15 minutes 
(Sorensen 1992). Here, the ‘notification target’ (100%), ‘warning priority zone’ (5miles) and 
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the ‘warning time target’ (15 minutes) are quantitative variables used as an operational 
performance measure. 
 
An evacuation model is generally used to measure evacuation performance for the simulated 
threat. This requires identification of key performance indicators (KPIs) for each ESF and 
collecting the values during the model run-time. The literature on KPIs for ESF is presented 
in the respective sections. 
 
2.7 Purpose of the models  
OR models have been used in all the four phases of emergencies namely Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery (Altay and Green 2006). Models 4-6 of the ERGO 
project looks at how analytical tools are helpful for ensuring the emergency preparedness and 
hence this review will focus on the OR applications in the preparedness stage only. 
Application of OR in large-scale evacuation modelling can be broadly classified as: disaster 
specific models; evacuation support models. The evacuation support models are discussed 
respectively in the three ESF sections. 
 
Disaster-specific models 
Disaster-specific models are also used as a forecasting tool to predict the potential areas to be 
evacuated and the timeline of when the disaster would strike. These models help in supporting 
the evacuation decision during the event. These models are developed by the respective 
scientific discipline and generally maintained by the lead organisations. For example, flood 
models are used by environmental agencies (or their equivalent) to predict the flood level 
during a disaster event. Table 2.3 (adapted from Altay and Green 2006, p482) highlights some 
references for various ‘disaster-specific’ OR models.  
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Table 2.3 Disaster-specific OR models (adapted from Altay and Green 2006, p482) 
Disaster Type Reference 
Earthquake Viswanath and Peeta (2003) 
Flood Wei et al. (2002), Dawson et al. 2011 
Storm surge – SLOSH model (Sea, Land 
and Overland surges from hurricanes) 
Zhang (2008) and SLOSH (2010) 
 
Nuclear incidents Barbarosogulu and Arda (2004), 
Ozdamar et al. (2004), Ishigami et al. 
2004 
Tsunami Charnkol and Tanaboriboon (2006);  
Mas et al. 2012a 
Wild fire Simard and Eenigenburg (1990) 
Glacial flooding model O’Connor and Baker (1992) 
Snow avalanches Schweizer et al. 2003 
Oil and chemical spill Wilhelm and Srinivasa (1997) 
 
The outputs of these disaster-specific models are used for identifying the evacuation zones, 
impact level of the disaster and when the zones will be affected. For example, SLOSH model 
(sea, lake and overland surges from hurricanes) provides levels of storm surge for various 
combinations of hurricane strength, forward speed of storm and direction of storm. SLOSH 
model is used for real-time forecasting of surges from approaching hurricanes in coastal basis 
in the United States. The focus of this thesis is evacuation planning not for a particular 
disaster. Wright et al. (2006) provide more information about disaster-specific OR models. 
Apart from these two purposes of model, the model can also be used as public awareness 
generation tool. For example, ‘Stop Disaster’ is an online game developed by UNISDR (Stop-
Disaster 2012) for school children to generate awareness on disaster impact on the 
communities due to tsunami, flood, hurricane, wild fire and earthquake. 
 
2.7.1 Models for evacuation support function  
Apart from the disaster-specific models, there are OR models used in the preparedness stage 
to develop and test the evacuation plans as well as identifying the relatively best strategies 
among the available options. The integrated framework proposed by the ERGO Model of 
evacuation shows six tasks in large-scale emergency planning for which the GOs prepare 
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themselves and the public. This framework has been used as a basis for classifying the OR 
models used for EMA preparedness. The disaster-specific models summarised above can help 
in understanding the evacuation zone (ERGO Model 2) as well as making the evacuation 
decision (ERGO Model 3). There are also OR models that can help in planning the warning 
dissemination (ERGO Model 4), evacuee transport planning (ERGO Model 5) and emergency 
accommodation management (ERGO Model 6). The next three sections (2.2 to 2.4) will 
discuss the literature associated with these three phases. 
 
Evacuation Timeline 
The previous section highlighted the various aspects that will affect when the evacuees 
receive the evacuation order. It is important to understand the sequence of events for 
managing the evacuation. Figure 2.1 represents the four separate components of events during 
the evacuation based on the definitions provided by Urbanik et al. (1980) as cited in 
Southworth (1991, p19). This classification is from the perspective of EMAs in evacuation 
phases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Components of evacuation process from ‘evacuation decision making’ to 
‘evacuation to safety’ 
Southworth (1991, p.19) defines terms that underpin Figure 2.1 : 
 Decision time is defined as the time between incident detection and an official 
decision to order an evacuation.  
 Notification time is defined as the time required notifying all the individuals in the 
area at risk of such an evacuation order.  
 Preparation time (or mobilisation time) is defined as the time required for individuals 
to prepare to evacuate the specified area.  
 Response time (or clearance time) defined as the time required for individuals to 
physically travel to safety.  
 
Evacuation planning is one of the key tasks in the preparedness phase of a four-phase disaster 
cycle and one of the main foundations for the field of Disaster Operations Management 
Decision time Notification time Response time Preparation time 
Incident 
detection 
Issue evacuation 
order/warning 
Receive 
notification 
Begin 
evacuation 
Reach place 
of safety 
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(DOM). “DOM is by nature multi-organizational, but organizations are only loosely 
connected leading to managerial confusions and ambiguity of authority” (Altay and Green 
2006, p484). This comment highlights a need for multi-organisation centric approach for 
evacuation planning rather that restricting to organisational level only or at times 
transportation.  
 
In infrastructure such as EOC (Emergency Operation Centres), Multi-organisational decision 
making already exists to serve as Evacuation Decision Support System. Even though the 
individual organisations respond to specific tasks pertaining to an evacuation phase/phases, all 
their concerted efforts contribute towards successful evacuation. ‘However, is there a system 
that provides a common platform for evacuation planning across organisation to analytically 
support their multi-agency response? Do these organisations base their evacuation plans on 
interrelationships between ESFs?’ To answer these there is a need to relook at the ESF phases 
from the perspective of evacuation plan and household behavioural choices of evacuees. 
 
2.8 Evacuation warning message Dissemination 
This section of the chapter will focus on the first ESF i.e. Warning message dissemination. 
The section begins with understanding of basic literature on evacuation warning and 
dissemination process, then the literature review of two major channels of warning (i.e. 
formal and informal channels) and modelling warning dissemination process. The section 
ends with summary of findings from the literature review and gaps for further research in this 
thesis. 
 
Introduction to Warning Dissemination 
Warning systems ‘warn’ the public under threat before/during an evacuation and some 
‘inform’ them of actions to carry out to protect themselves and others. The need for quick 
dissemination of warning message is essential for no-notice disasters like earthquakes, 
tsunamis, flash floods, tornadoes, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks. Importance of 
warning channels for rapid-onset events like tsunami has been highlighted after 2004 
Earthquake in South Asia (Samarajiva 2005; McCloskey et al. 2008). For example, during a 
preventive evacuation of a flash flood in Germany (August 2002), two upstream villages were 
warned by the television news of the onset of severe rain, yet, across those two villages only 
29% and 22% of residents managed to evacuate (Parker et al. 2009).  
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Although for these residents it would take a short time to evacuate to safe ground, evacuation 
efforts were compromised by a lack of official warning within a reasonable time, a loss of 
power supply, and various breaches in flood defence affecting evacuation routes. In this case, 
the official warning system did not have enough warning coverage and hence, did not suitably 
support the public in protecting themselves from harm. Effective warning and informing helps 
to save lives. 
 
What is Early warning system? 
An UNEP report on the state of art and future direction defines early warning as “the 
provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows 
individuals exposed to hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for 
effective response” (UNEP 2012). Early warning system (EWS) comprises systems and 
process that enable “risk analysis, monitoring, and predicting location and intensity of 
disaster; communication alerts to authorities and to those potentially affected; and 
responding to the disaster” (UNEP 2012, p3). Sorensen (2000) offers a dual definition of a 
warning system: “(a) detects impending disaster (b) gives that information to people at risk 
and enables those in danger to make decisions and take action" (p119). This thesis focuses on 
the second aspect, namely, the transmission of the warning message to households at risk. By 
linking the Sorensen’s definition with UNEP on EWS, it can be observed that sub-systems of 
EWS can be broadly grouped into (a) detection and (b) dissemination. 
 
During 2011 Earthquake in Japan the EWS was activated in 8 seconds after the detection of 
tsunami P-wave, and tsunami warning to the public was issued after 3 minutes of the 
earthquake (Mas et al. 2012a, p42). In the case of tsunami, various end-to-end warning 
systems cover many aspects such as “tsunami hazard and vulnerability assessment, 
perception studies, evacuation modelling, etc” (Taubenbock et al. 2009, p1510) and Table 2.4 
summarises examples of such systems used in different geographies. 
 
EWS covers events from the forecasting of disaster to the deliverance of warning of a rapid-
onset events or slow-onset events. It includes forecasting techniques and also organisational 
communication. The role of organisational structure from the level of decision makers to the 
grass-root level (general public) cannot be understated. Timely and accurate forecasting is the 
foundation of ‘effective warning information’ delivered to the public. This thesis focuses on 
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warning channels (communication means) that deliver disaster/threat information to the 
general public and specifically on the role of localised networks in warning dissemination. 
 
Table 2.4 Tsunami warning systems around the world 
Warning system Reference 
US NTHMP – ‘National Tsunami Hazard 
mitigation system’ in the eastern pacific 
Bernhard 2005, Titov et al. 2005 
UrEDAS – ‘Japanese Urgent earthquake detection 
and alarm system’ in the western pacific 
Saita and Nakamura 2003 as cited 
in Taubenbock et al. 2009 
GITEWS – ‘German Indonesian Early warning 
system’ in the Indian Ocean 
Lauterjung 2005 as cited in 
Taubenbock et al. 2009 
  
What is warning effectiveness?  
Effective warning during the large-scale emergency situation is essential for saving lives, by 
ensuring that the maximum proportion of population is well-informed about the threat. 
Miscommunication of the severity of the emerging flood warning message has been cited as 
one of the main reasons for the estimated death of about 10,000 people in river flooding in 
West Bengal (India) (Schware 1982, p. 210). The warning dissemination being the first stage 
of alerting the public will have cascading impact in the subsequent evacuation phases. This 
requires understanding of the warning dissemination process. 
 
2.8.1 Warning dissemination process 
Williams (1964) as cited in Schware (1982) has given a six-step process for evacuation 
warning as represented in Figure 2.2. These steps, though proposed for flooding, are generic 
and believed to be applicable to all other emergencies. This framework depicts the 
interconnectedness of various aspects of warning dissemination and this could provide an 
overall basis for designing warning dissemination plan. The preparedness of the public 
(Figure 1.2, Model-1) would have an impact on ‘how the warning message is perceived’, 
leading to their evacuation response. The role of evacuation decision making of GOs is 
elaborated in ‘making the evacuation decision’ (Figure 1.2, Model-3), from which the 
evacuation order (warning) is issued to the public. This section presents the literature findings 
on warning dissemination process from the stage of evacuation order to the beginning of 
evacuation (Figure 1.2, Model-4). 
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Figure 2.2 Six-step process for warning (Williams, 1964). 
‘Warning system should integrate social factors that affect public response to warnings and 
to understand its effectiveness’ (Schware 1982, p211). This reinstates the need for context-
specific message content that is pre-tested with the public. For a social science perspective of 
warning system, refer to McLuckie (1970). For pre-testing of the warning content the GOs 
could understand the individual response of the warning message and this has been modelled 
as a cognitive process (Lindell and Perry 1992) for flood warning.  
 
Sorensen (1991) studied the household dynamics of departure time using a post-evacuation 
study conducted after 1987 Nanticoke hazardous material fire accident (United States) and 
following were the conclusions based on quantitative estimates using factor analysis. The 
study also concluded that the factors ‘perceived threat, age and family size’ were not related 
to the mobilisation time. 
 
Table 2.5 Household attributes and factors affecting them (Sorensen 1991) 
 
In contrast, the post-evacuation study in Niigata (2004) found that elderly people due to their 
difficulty in mobility were killed (Tamura et al. 2006). The evacuees with difficulty in 
mobility - even though comprising less proportion in the overall population - are more 
vulnerable and needy from the first responder. As cited by Sorensen (1991, p156) “Older 
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people are less likely to hear a warning than middle-aged or younger people”. The EMAs as 
a preparedness initiative could identify areas where there are high proportion of senior 
citizens and people under social-care live in order to provide additional support during 
emergency. This entails a need for the lead organisation to work in collaboration with other 
agencies (e.g. senior and disability clubs). 
 
To know more about the individual behaviour during large-scale emergencies refer to Miller 
(1992). This thesis focuses on a household’s warning behaviour as the unit of analysis and not 
on individual micro-behaviour. GOs planning for the warning dissemination need to factor in 
the ‘emergency details’ - nature of the threat, location, guidance, time and source of the 
hazard - and also ensure the ‘message contents’ using style aspects like specificity, 
consistency of message across channels, accuracy, certainty and clarity (Sorensen, 2000). 
 
There are two phases within the warning dissemination process namely alert and notification. 
‘Alerting’ is defined as the ability of emergency officials to make people aware of the 
imminent danger and seek more information (Rogers and Sorensen, 1991). ‘Notification’ is 
defined as the interpretation of the warning message leading to appropriate evacuation 
response behaviour (Rogers and Sorensen 1991). “An extensive literature exists on how 
individuals and families interpret and respond to such warnings when they are received.” 
(Sorensen and Mileti 1987). There is enough literature (Sorensen and Mileti 1987) on 
designing an evacuation message content leading to the desired evacuee response 
(notification). The alerting phase would depend on the ‘means’ (i.e. warning channels) of 
reaching the public about the emergency situation, and this phase will be the focus of the 
thesis. 
 
2.8.2 Warning dissemination systems 
Warning and informing systems comprise official warning channels and unofficial warning 
channels. “Official systems are usually characterised by formalized, staged warning and 
communication process, involving a management hierarchy, an inter-agency liaison structure 
through which communications are transmitted and procedures for warning the public is 
implemented” (Parker and Handmer 1998, p46). Examples of official/formal channels are 
sirens, television, radio, text and pre-recorded messages to landlines/mobiles, mass messaging 
systems (e.g. UMS - unified messaging service) and door-to-door knocking by officials. The 
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effectiveness of these depends on the timing of the day (Stern and Sinuany-Stern, 1989) and 
the availability of the channel (Parker and Handmer 1998, Sorensen 2000). 
 
“Unofficial warning systems are processes whereby people warn those within their personal 
networks – whether this be within a government agency, those within other bodies or 
communities or those within their own communities” (Parker and Handmer 1998, p47). The 
unofficial warning channel is also described as a ‘contagion process’ where-by ‘people hear 
the message and then sequentially tell others’ (Rogers and Sorensen 1991).  
 
The National Steering Committee on Public Warning and Information, United Kingdom 
(NSCPWI 2003) has classified the official warning systems into:  
 audible systems (e.g. sirens, tannoys, route alert) 
 telecommunication systems (automated caller systems, emergency phone diallers, bulk 
messaging service) 
 mass communication systems (broadcasting through television, radio and ham-radios) 
 verbal information (door-to-door knocking by officials)  
In the literature various names are used to refer the warning message dissemination with the 
public as informants, like unofficial systems (Parker and Handmer 1998), informal systems 
(Sorensen 2000), ‘people-to-people’ (RedCross 2005), folk and personal systems (Schware 
1982, Werrity et al. 2007). The following section provides an overview of the features of 
various official warning channels and its limitations. 
 
Official warning channels 
Each public warning method has pros and cons as presented in Alexander (2009, Table 5.3). 
This will be helpful for the warning planners to choose channels during evacuation and also 
plan evacuation scenarios with availability of official channels.  
Table 2.6 highlights the important features as well as the limitations of various official 
warning channels. It can be noted that no single channel can cater all the public groups and 
hence a combination of the available channels is essential. Although there are official warning 
channels that are technologically sophisticated (e.g. mass broadcasting systems) for the 
general public, people with visual and hearing disabilities become more vulnerable during the 
disaster as they are not easily reachable using official channels.  
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As official warning system comprises combination of channels, the effectiveness of each 
channel will impact overall warning effectiveness. The effectiveness of official warning 
channels has been researched using simulation models to build findings that have practical 
relevance to emergency planners (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989, Rogers and Sorensen 1991, 
Southworth 1991). The effectiveness of each channel is represented as a time series value of 
cumulative houses warning (Sorensen 2000, Figure 1, p122). As one house can receive 
warning from more than one channel and the receiving of first warning message from any 
channel makes the house warned. Whether the house has access to the warning channel (e.g. 
with or without mobile)? Are they connected to the channel at the time of warning (e.g. TV 
may be switched off in night while sleeping)? The household’s attributes can affect whether a 
particular channel can reach that household.   
 
Table 2.6 Characteristics of warning channels 
Warning channel Feature Limitation 
Sirens Low cost. It has many 
sophisticated designs like 
electronic siren, sirens with 
voice capability and remote 
activation capabilities 
People don’t pay attention to it and people 
don’t understand the meaning of different 
sounding signals (Sorensen 2000) 
Electronic sirens with voice capability can fill 
this gap (Sorensen 2000); an example for this is 
Telegrafia (2010) 
Tone alert radio Personalised warning 
mechanism and remote 
operation (ASC 2010) 
Needs electric power through battery and needs 
dedicated system installation and support 
Media channel – 
radios 
One of the important media 
channel especially suitable to 
alert people who are driving 
The percentage of radio listeners depends on 
the time of the day and also on the activity of 
the evacuee during dissemination 
Media channel – 
television 
Video and voice to give 
elaborate warning message. 
Easier to give constant 
updates 
Depends on the TV viewing patterns (Sorensen 
2000), and there are models studying the 
diurnal variation (Tavakoli and Cave 1996) 
Mobile phones SMS text alert as well as 
voice-based alert to the 
subscribed users 
Requires collaboration with the 
telecommunication service providers 
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Warning channel Feature Limitation 
Mass dissemination 
systems/EBS – 
emergency 
broadcast systems 
‘Auto-dial’ feature for 
reaching large number of 
telephones in minutes 
Requires dedicated system installation and 
support which are expensive 
Landline telephones Auto-dialling systems 
predominantly use landline-
based alerting 
Only the evacuees who are in their house are 
likely to be reached in the channel 
Media channel – 
internet 
Social media and news feeds 
are increasingly popular 
source of warning 
dissemination (Sutton et al. 
2008). For example, AlertSU 
is an emergency alert system 
integrated mass-
communication systems with 
Facebook and Twitter feed in 
Stanford University area (San 
Francisco Bay) for 
earthquakes (Julian 2010) 
Public need to be connected to the service and 
also depends on the internet network 
availability. With increasing use of ‘smart 
phone’, this channel has the potential for 
including formal warning plans to reach the 
internet users 
Door-to-door 
knocking 
Personalised warning 
dissemination to each 
household by first responders 
(generally police). It is 
considered to be effective 
due to reliability of the 
warning source 
During the emergencies, the availability of 
resources for door-to-door knocking is limited 
by the availability of number of personnel 
(Sorensen 2000) 
 
Roger and Sorensen (1991) classified the location/activity of the household for different time 
into five fundamental activities namely: 
1. Home asleep  
2. Indoor at home or in the neighbourhood 
3. Outdoors in neighbourhood 
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4. In transit 
5. Working or shopping 
The study also used a time series of activity profile for the modelled area (Roger and 
Sorensen 1991, Figure 2, p125) and this data could be used in evacuation planning to develop 
scenarios. A threat/disaster event itself becomes a warning and is referred to as ‘natural 
warning’ in the literature (Muhari et al. 2012). For example in the case of tsunami, “a 
receding wave at the shoreline” (Muhari et al. 2012, p91) could serve as a signal for impeding 
tsunami and serve as a warning. It would be risky for the authorities to allow the natural 
warning as the only channel to be relied upon, as only the households that noticed the signal 
would be warned. For wide dissemination of warning message, the authorities use official 
channels to disseminate during an event. 
 
Hygo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015 (UNISDR, 2006a) calls for developing “early 
warning systems that are people centred, in particular systems whose warnings are timely 
and understandable to those at risk”. The warning system need be socio-technical systems in 
order to reach the public leading to a quick evacuation response based on the EMA’s warning. 
During the rapid onset of flooding, “the most commonly affected groups are those who are 
mobile at the time of flood” (Werrity et al. 2007, p3) and this mobile group cannot be reached 
by some of the official channels (e.g. TV, landline numbers) and rely on certain channels such 
as radios and text alert. Subscriber-based alert system like ‘Flood Watch’ can help only for 
the signed-up users, and the transient population, tourists and visitors are generally more 
vulnerable. Thus providing timely warning to the transient population and the tourists 
continues to be a challenge for the GOs. Thus the official warning channel forms a critical 
portion of the warning dissemination plan. 
 
Public with various disabilities are more vulnerable to receiving warning messages. Special 
telephone devices and strobe lights are used for warning people with hearing disability 
(Sorensen, 2000). ‘CAP-ONES’ is an emergency notification system that provides an 
approach of modifying warning message to different users and devices (Malizia et al. 2009). 
The proposed approach uses an open standard called ‘Common Alerting Protocol’ and 
tailored it for devices used by disabled people to receive messages. Evacuation warning plans 
require special procedures to reach the vulnerable population. More often the social network 
of these disabled groups could be the first source of information about an emergency. The role 
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of social network among these disabled groups is even more crucial in warning dissemination. 
Based on the literature reviewed, warning dissemination to the vulnerable people requires 
further investigation and the practitioners need to include this category in their evacuation 
plan. 
 
Unofficial Warning channel  
No official channel can reach all the people during the warning phase due to various 
vulnerabilities of the warning channel to failures, effectiveness of the channels used, etc and 
hence “one must rely on word of mouth for warning the residual population” (Alexander 
2009, p147). Even though the official channels form major portion of the formal warning 
dissemination process, the unofficial warning channel cannot be ignored. Parker and Handmer 
(1998) addressed the importance of unofficial communication (including personal network 
and direct observation) during floods. The personal networks (friends, neighbours and 
relatives) are used to share and interpret the message, increasing the understanding of the 
contents, aiding in the informed decision making. A survey conducted by the United States 
‘Centers for Disease Control’ (Sorensen 1992) found that about 40% of the respondents to the 
survey received emergency message from informal channels – friend or relative, either in 
person, or through telephone. Another study conducted by Sorensen (2000) specified that 
informal notification among the public plays an important role in warning dissemination in 
most emergencies. A tsunami warning study in Mauritius showed that about 15.4% public 
received face-to-face warning (Perry 2007). In this study, the significance of face-to-face 
communication was third behind TV and radio.  
 
Another study (Werrity et al. 2007) reported the results of questionnaire survey among the 
residents of a Scottish flood plain region to understand the social impact of flooding. The 
study found that, among the surveyed households, 32% received the warning message from 
neighbours and about 51% of the flooded households actually received the message from 
official channels. The empirical evidence shows the significance of informal communication 
channel, and also the possibility (about 49% in this case) of some residents not receiving 
timely information from official sources. 
 
A post-disaster survey after 2011 tsunami in Japan from 870 evacuees found that two main 
reasons for evacuation were strong ground motion (48%), and advice given by family 
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members (20%) and neighbours (15%) (Mas et al. 2012a, p42).This highlights the role of 
unofficial channels in household evacuation decision and particularly neighbours. 
 
Official messages that inform the public often request recipients to relay the message to 
neighbours and friends (e.g. Red-Cross 2005). For example Red Cross in Caribbean region 
had ‘Run to thy neighbour’ campaign as a means for increasing warning coverage. The role of 
young people and children as potential informants within emergency communication network 
is highly underestimated (Mitchell et al. 2008) and not directly accounted in the theoretical 
models of risk communication. This study (Mitchell et al. 2008) investigated the community 
initiatives in El Salvador and New Orleans, and demonstrated the possibility of using young 
people and children as trusted informants. They were imparted training in school clubs, and 
found to posses high understanding of local risk, communicate warning message and even 
state the actions for reducing risks. 
 
In order to use the public as informants of warning message, it is essential to understand their 
behaviour during emergencies. There are widespread misconceptions that the public panic on 
receiving warning message (Fritz and Williams 1957, Quarantelli 1990), behave as victims, 
are highly dependent on officials resources and are helpless (Fritz and Williams 1957, Dynes 
1990). There are various studies refuting such views, which also caution for developing 
emergency plans with these assumptions (Fritz and Williams 1957, Dynes 1990, Quarantelli 
1990, Sorensen 2000, Maxwell 2003). 
 
Mphunga community members in the republic of Malawi use community-based flood alerting 
system initiated with the help of Red Cross as a part of climate change adaptation strategies. 
Some community members were identified as ‘Action team’ who alert the public using 
whistles about the imminent flood (IFRC 2009b). They have identified a church that is at a 
higher elevation as a neighbourhood sheltering point. This is an example for planned/co-
ordinated unofficial warning system. 
 
The questionnaire survey conducted by Werrity et al. (2007) also investigated the local 
authorities for their warning and informing plans to various groups (p133) namely 
householders, landowners, and businesses (‘Do you have systems in place to warn 
householders, landowners, businesses, directly? If so, how do they work?’). Apart from these 
groups, tourists, commuters, people living in temporary sites (e.g. caravans) and socially 
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isolated are vulnerable (referred to as ‘residual risk’ groups in Werrity et al. (2007) and 
Handmer (2001), as they are less likely to be reached by the official warning channels and 
need to be included in the evacuation warning dissemination plan. 
 
Table 2.7 Proportion of people who received a flood warning from an unofficial source 
(Parker and Handmer, 1998, p52 and p55) 
 
Apart from relatives and friends, the role of neighbour is significant owing to their physical 
proximity (Parker and Handmer 1998). A survey by Tunstall (1992 as cited in Parker and 
Handmer 1998) after the 1990 Maidenhead (UK) floods indicated that over 40% of the people 
who informally detected the flood warned their neighbours – this was slightly lower (37%) for 
other local regions (Parker and Handmer 1998, p55). Another survey indicated that 22% of 
respondents warned their neighbours (Parker et al. 2009). An example of spontaneous and 
voluntary dissemination of the warning message by neighbours was a midnight sub-urban fire 
where approximately 300 London residents safely self-evacuated themselves (Randhawa and 
Lydall 2009).   
 
The primary warning was residents calling on their neighbours to confirm, personalise and 
interpret the warning message (Drabek, 1999). It is important to note in uncoordinated 
systems that not all people may warn the same number of neighbours, and the pattern of 
‘selection set’ (choosing which neighbours to warn, e.g. adjacent and/or opposite houses) 
could vary due to prior contacts with neighbours. 
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Not all the families or individuals respond in the same way during emergencies (Kreps, 1984), 
which leads to uncertainty in the behaviour of the public as potential informants. Moreover, as 
each individual takes different time period to assimilate (receive, understand and react) the 
warning message, there is a possibility of longer time taken for disseminating to public when 
solely relied on informal communication (McLuckie 1970). The ‘evacuation preparation time’ 
is the time between the evacuation decision and its enactment (Hui et al. 2008). Warning 
response will depend on these different timelines and the understanding of the uncertainties of 
these times is required for the GOs to know time the onset of warning dissemination as well 
as overall warning dissemination time. The reliability of a warning system is likely to be 
increased when there are multiple channels of communication, rather than relying on a single 
channel. These studies support the observation of rational and active community behaviour, 
and also that the public could be potential informants for disseminating the emergency 
message. The behaviour of the public as informal channel needs to be modelled along with 
the official channels.  
 
A report titled ‘Developing early warning system – s checklist’ contains useful information 
for the practitioners along with checklists for designing warning systems (UNISDR 2006a) 
and a comprehensive global review of EWS (UNISDR 2006b). An online forum called 
‘AWARE – Alert, Warnings and Response to Emergencies’ (Botterell 2010) has provided a 
detailed summary on a standard for practice of public warning as various policy-level 
questions and this requires validation from real-life events. In order to measure the overall 
performance of warning systems, various studies (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989, Rogers and 
Sorensen 1991, Southworth 1991, Hui et al. 2008) have used ‘overall warning level’ (% 
people warned) and notification time (in minutes) as effectiveness measures. EMAs could use 
these performance metrics to compare various alternatives, set operational targets and plan for 
various scenarios to test the warning plan. 
 
2.8.3 Modelling the evacuation warning dissemination process 
Modelling warning dissemination would involve computing dissemination levels using 
effectiveness of official channels and also unofficial channels. Warning system effectiveness 
is defined as “the ability of the warning system to provide population at risk with adequate 
time to respond appropriately to the situation” (Rogers and Sorensen 1991, p129). Coverage 
is the maximum penetration that can be achieved using a particular warning channel within a 
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specified time. Individual channel effectiveness will affect the overall system effectiveness. 
The ‘effectiveness of warning channels and its impact on overall warning dissemination’ has 
been modelled using two different approaches in the past two decades.  
 
‘A macro-simulation’ looks at the aggregate level by dividing the city into different localities 
(not individual households) to model the overall warning dissemination. The activities of the 
household (e.g. travelling, in home and sleeping) and its impact on overall warning 
dissemination, were studied (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989) using a behavioural simulation 
model. Another study has validated the simulation model results with the empirical data of 
warning system effectiveness (Rogers and Sorensen 1991). Here the diffusion of warning 
message was depicted as logistic equation. But parameters in the differential equation need to 
be validated prior to the generalisation of these results. 
 
Rogers and Sorensen (1991) took an OR approach to the modelling of the informal warning 
channel as ‘Contagion birth process’ using a logistic form of mathematical equation to model 
the official warning channel process. Even though the logistic parameters in their model were 
verified with a few empirical cases, their model does not capture the range of choices that 
households have (this thesis refers as ‘set selection’), for example whether households decide 
to warn a range of neighbours or not. Southworth (1991) used exponential form for the initial 
alert process and logistic form for the contagion process in the Regional Evacuation Model.  
 
Second, ‘micro-simulation approach’ is where the individual entity (house) behaviour and its 
interaction with other entities (houses) are considered as the basic principle of modelling (see 
Gilbert 2007 for more details). As the interactions among the evacuees become the key 
feature of this approach, ABM is a suitable technique for this. Hui et al. (2008) used an ABM 
approach to model the diffusion of warning message among two hypothetical communities as 
a function of trust. This study used axioms to model the behaviour of the individual 
households and study the overall warning effectiveness. 
 
These models (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989, Rogers and Sorensen 1991, Southworth 1991, 
Hui et al. 2008) use two KPIs for the warning process, namely ‘warning level’ (percent of 
population warned) and ‘notification time’ (time from the onset of the disaster to notify the 
population). The output of these models is depicted as warning response curves which is a 
plot showing the percentage of warned evacuees for various time duration.  
 60 
 
A post-disaster study using Buoys, run-up heights, eye witness accounts and stopped wall 
clocks were used to obtain tsunami arrival characteristics after 2011 Great East Japan tsunami 
(Muhari et al. 2012). Tsunami wave arrival time for Fukushima to Aomori prefecture was 
found to be in the range of 25 to 55 minutes except in the case of Sendai region (which had 
higher values). This data indicates that from the epicentre of earthquake the time needed for 
the Tsunami wave to strike this region is between 25 and 55, and this time window is the time 
available for evacuation (from onset of warning to safety). Beyond this window, the tsunami 
wave would have struck these areas risking lives of non-evacuees and evacuating population. 
 
As a planning estimate, utmost 30 minutes advance warning (notification time available) from 
the trigger of tsunami waves was used in Padang Indonesia (Taubenbock et al. 2009, p1521). 
However, the simulation experiments from MATsim model of Padang with inundation details 
showed that “only after 40 minutes the entire population was evacuated” (Taubenbock et al. 
2009, p1525). This highlights that within the advance warning may not be sufficient for every 
household to be safely evacuated for the Tsunami scenario studied. 
 
Micro-approach is data intensive as it requires information about the individual household 
details as well as warning channels. The warning channel and its effectiveness being a 
function of ‘time of the day, availability of the channel as well the connectedness to the 
evacuees’, can be modelled to answer policy-level questions like ‘how long does it take to 
warn the public?’ (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1991, Hui et al. 2008). On the other hand a 
macro-level simulation uses aggregate data (e.g. for zone level TV viewership details) for 
answering the same policy-level question. The output of these approaches would depend on 
the accuracy of the input parameters and validity of the model.  
 
One of the policy evaluation questions for warning dissemination is about “Will special 
arrangements be needed for night time warnings?” (Alexander 2009, p148). Households are 
mostly asleep during night-time and may not be connected to the main official channels (TV, 
radios) which are generally less effective in coverage at night. This highlights the need for 
evaluating warning dissemination for different time of the day and especially night-time 
conditions.  
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As there have been empirical evidences (Table 2.7) in the role of unofficial warning channels, 
there is a need for the EMAs to know how these unofficial channels will influence the overall 
dissemination. Though there was a simulation model developed for two hypothetical 
communities (Hui et.al 2008), there remains a research gap of exploring the use of agent-
based-modelling for large-scale evacuations combining official warning channels and 
unofficial warning channels. Apart from this evacuation model, the suitability of agent-based 
modelling as technique for evacuation modelling has been increasingly recognised (Cabinet 
Office 2009) and also been applied in various social-simulation problems namely 
epidemiological studies, pandemic flu spread modelling, and rumour propagation problems 
(North and Macal 2007). This requires further investigation in studying how an integrated 
warning plan is prepared and the scope of using models to support EMA warning 
preparedness.  
 
2.8.4 Research gaps on warning dissemination 
The literature that informs ESF-1 includes the warning dissemination process, warning 
channel system and the scope of modelling the warning dissemination. The following are key 
research gaps identified in this thesis.  
 The design of the warning message content was found to be well-established 
underpinning the social science literature (Sorensen and Mileti 1987) and the GOs 
could use this knowledge to design and test the sufficiency of content as one of 
preparedness initiatives. The review has highlighted the uncertainty of individual 
official warning channels in alerting the public as this could be studied using 
identified scenarios of failure. 
 Even though there are tools like CAP-ONEs and strobe light (Sorensen 2000, Malizia 
et al. 2009) to warn vulnerable people during evacuation, specific ways of increasing 
warning dissemination to vulnerable people (visual and hearing impaired, houses with 
elderly people living alone) requires further investigation and are considered to be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 Modelling warning dissemination will involve aggregation of official channel 
effectiveness and unofficial channel effectiveness. The role of informal channel has 
been highlighted in Parker and Handmer (1998) and corroborates with empirical 
evidence (Table 2.7). Hui et al. (2008) studied using ABM the informal warning 
dissemination between two hypothetical communities and not at a city scale. The 
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dynamics of household choices as warning informants particularly ‘their choice to be 
informant or otherwise’ and ‘selection of neighbours to inform’ requires further 
investigation. 
 The evidence demonstrates the importance of unofficial warning channel, and the 
EMAs need to formally exploit this ‘unofficial channel’ during emergencies. The 
delay in warning dissemination may have a cascading effect on evacuating to a safer 
place – and so it is closely linked to the analysis of ‘When/how do they evacuate to 
safety’ (ESF-2, Chapter 5) and ‘where do they evacuate to?’ (ESF-3, Chapter 6). 
2.9 Evacuee Transport Management – ESF-2 
Evacuee transportation model looks at the physical relocation of people from the hazard zone 
to the place of safety. There are various factors that would affect safe evacuation such as 
“time available before (or after) the hazard impact, the expected travel demand, and the 
consequence of not clearing the area in a timely manner” (Cova and Johnson 2003, p580). 
The authorities need an understanding about these factors to manage the traffic within the 
existing road infrastructure. The literature can be reviewed on two broad dimensions of 
Evacuee transport management. First is the household’s transport choices and behaviour, 
discussed in Section 2.3.1 to 2.3.3. Second is EMAs transport infrastructure management, 
presented in Section 2.3.5. 
 
After receiving the warning and complying with evacuation order, ESF2 covers the timeline 
from preparing to leave the household, departure, travel to safety.  Evacuation time (ET) is 
defined as “the time it takes for a person to start evacuating and get to a safe destination”. 
(Margulis et al. 2006). ‘Evacuation time estimates’ (ETE) have been widely as a means of 
measuring the effectiveness of evacuation used (Southworth 1991, Rathi and Solanki 1993, 
Lindell 2002, Han et al. 2007, Lindell 2008). Various key definitions on evacuation timelines 
were presented in section 2.1.1. The ET for a household is also referred using the terms such 
as ‘clearance time or response time or travel time’.  
 
Total evacuation time begins from the issuance of warning to the time a household reaches 
safety. There are various factors that affect when the evacuees receive the warning message 
and this is presented in Section 2.2. By preparing the public in advance (ERGO Model 1), 
having a household evacuation plan and providing them with supporting information during 
the evacuation, the preparation time can be reduced to facilitate the onset of relocating to the 
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place of safety. Households first decide ‘whether they will evacuate or not?’ ( or compliance 
to the evacuation order). 
 
During Hurricane Floyd about 65% of the residents in the mandatory evacuation zone 
evacuated to a safe location (Dow and Cutter 2002, p13). A post-evacuation survey indicated 
that among the 73% of people who heard the warning order about 38% evacuated during 
Hurricane Katrina (Brodie et al. 2006, Table 2). During Hurricane Katrina the same study 
found that, among the non-evacuees who heard the message, 34% indicated that the reason for 
not evacuating is due to the ‘lack of cars’, 28% underestimated the storm and 12% could not 
leave the house as they were “physically unable to leave or having to care for someone who 
was physically unable to leave as the main reason they stayed behind” (Brodie et al. 2006, 
p5). This illustrates the various reasons for ‘non-compliance’ to the evacuation order apart 
from not hearing the warning message. On ‘deciding to evacuate’ a household makes three 
travel choices (departure time, destination and means of transport) and the literature review is 
presented in these headings. 
 
2.9.1 Departure time  
Given that the warning time will vary across households (as explained in Section 2.2), not 
every evacuee will be able to leave at the same time. During evacuation, the household 
members could be in different location depending on their activity (Roger and Sorensen, 
1991) and this could have an impact on the departure time. The behaviour at the household 
level would impact on ‘when they will begin to evacuate’ as well as on their choices about 
their place of safety and means of evacuation. Transport planners in South Carolina have 
assumed three categories of evacuee departure response as a planning basis. Figure 2.3 
indicates the response curves for rapid, medium and long response (South-Carolina, 2010). 
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Figure 2.3 Behaviour response curve reproduced from South-Carolina (2010) 
Based on meta-analyses (Sorensen, 1991) of various rapid-onset evacuations like hazardous 
material accidents, flash flood and volcanic eruptions, the data showed that warning receipt 
and evacuation mobilisation times followed a logistic distribution (S shaped curve). The same 
study also summarised empirical evidences on departure time as presented in  
Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8 Summary of empirical evidence on departure time (based on Sorensen, 1991) 
Evacuation incident Details about departure time 
Mississauga train accident 90% of first group <= 60 minutes. 
Including 60% <= 10 minutes 
Confluence PA, Hazardous material release 85% evacuees <= 30 minutes on 
receiving warning. 
 
A post-disaster joint survey with 870 evacuees after the 2011 Tsunami in Japan was 
conducted by Japanese Meteorological Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency 
and the cabinet office. It was found that 57% evacuated immediately and 37% delayed their 
evacuation (Mas et al. 2012a, p42). Table 2.9 summarises the mobilisation time after being 
warned from the joint survey (as above) and another survey conducted in two cities (Kamaishi 
and Natori). For the Tsunami waves propagate from epicentre to the land there is time delay. 
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The ground motion (natural warning) and official warnings influence evacuees to depart as 
indicated in Table 2.9. 
 
Table 2.9 Mobilisation time from post-disaster surveys (summarised from Mas et al. 
2012a, p42) 
Post-disaster 
survey 
Participants Mobilisation time 
Joint Survey 870 evacuees 57% evacuated immediately. 
Kamaishi city  113 evacuees 60% evacuated in less than 10 minutes 
Natori city 107 evacuees 30% between 20 and 30 minutes. 
 
A prototype ABM for Bush fire evacuation was developed, incorporating household 
behaviour in MATSim modelling platform (Padgham et al. 2011, p7). The following are some 
of the scenario and assumptions about the household behaviour reported for the model: 
 Warning: A bush fire ignites at 1500 and at 1810 it is communicated to the impacted 
households. This is interpreted in this thesis as 70 minutes of notification time. 
 Departure-time: Onset at 1500 + delay time (normal distribution with mean = 30 
minutes and standard deviation 10 minutes).  
 Destination: It is assumed that one-third of them would move to second local address. 
 Evacuation response: All houses move to secondary local address or evacuation 
location identified by the authorities. 
 
In order to model the household’s departure time (i.e. warning + mobilisation time), based on 
exiting literature there are four main approaches as summarised in Mas et al. (2012a, p44): 
i) Simultaneous departure – All the households leave together in 0 to 5 minutes after 
warning. 
ii) Survey-based area-wise departure – A questionnaire survey results from the area are 
used for setting departure time for that area. 
iii) Using evacuee psychology - Based on questionnaires with evacuees considering 
individual’s psychological response to disaster and rational behaviour response. 
iv) Behavioural response curves - Sigmoid curves fitted to the historical evacuation data 
or theoretical Rayleigh distribution. 
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These ‘departure time behaviours’ indicate varied responses from evacuating immediately or 
after a mobilisation time. The following section presents the second household travel 
behaviour namely ‘choice of destination’. 
 
2.9.2 Choice of the evacuee destination 
There are two major destination groups namely ‘public shelters’ and ‘private destination’. The 
factors that affect sheltering are explained in Section 2.4. From the point of view of transport 
planners, any destination will act as a sink towards which the traffic moves. When households 
leave to a destination outside the evacuated area (e.g. to a neighbouring city), transport 
planners will identify these locations to major exit points along the evacuation route. In the 
literature the choice of ‘private destination’ is influenced by various factors and classified into 
four groups (Southworth 1991, p25) as follows: 
 Closest exit points based on travel distance or expected travel time 
 Personal choice (location of friends and relatives) 
 As per evacuation plan  
 Existing traffic conditions 
Evacuating to safety would involve relocation of the household members from the hazard 
zone to place of safety. This information of ‘destination choice’ is essential for the GOs to 
understand the flow of traffic during evacuation as well as providing sheltering support 
(elaborated further in the next section). The authorities in South Carolina, which is prone to 
Hurricanes conducted a stated-preference survey to know the destination choice of the 
evacuees. Table 2.10 indicates the choice of destination among the evacuating households 
(South-Carolina 2010). 
Table 2.10 Survey from South Carolina (2010) on evacuation destination choice  
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Table 2.11 demonstrates the planning assumption about the destination of the evacuating 
public during hurricane evacuation. As the evacuees leave the house towards safety, there 
may be a need for them to change their destination for various reasons. A post-evacuation 
survey after Hurricane Opal (1995) was conducted to know the reasons for changing the 
destination, and it was found that over half of the evacuated public changed due to traffic 
congestions. 
Table 2.11 Reasons for changing destination during hurricane Opal (NorthWestFlorida, 
2010, Table 4.28) 
 
The choice of route and destination goes together. Four route choice selections have been 
presented for the evacuating vehicles (Southworth 1991, p29) to be incorporated in the 
transportation model. They are as follows: 
 Myopic route selection behaviour, dictated by traffic conditions at each intersection 
 System optimal or user optimal route selection behaviour. 
 Combined myopic plus user route preference behaviour. 
 Route according to an established evacuation plan. 
2.9.3 Means of transportation and estimation of traffic volume 
From the current hazard zone to the evacuation destination (place of safety), the evacuees will 
leave to safety through various means. When there are safe places within the neighbourhood 
of the evacuated zone, the evacuees could leave as ‘pedestrians’ and in other cases evacuees 
use vehicles (cars and public transport) for evacuation. A post-evacuation survey after 
Hurricane Opal (1995) indicated that about 62-68% of the vehicles registered in that area 
were used for evacuation with 1.16 to 1.36 vehicles per household (NorthwestFlorida, 2010). 
In another study, a stated-preference survey found that about 20% of the evacuees would 
 68 
require assistance for evacuation and ‘need transportation or the person had a disability or 
medical problem’ (NYC 2005). A questionnaire survey was used to obtain stated preference 
from evacuees for the case of tsunami evacuation in Japan (Suzuki and Imamura 2005). A 
multi-agent simulation of Arahama village (Mas et al. 2012a) used 72% evacuating with cars 
and the occupancy level as 4 evacuees per car. 
 
In order to obtain the traffic volume on major roads, the authorities have used the O-D (origin 
and destination) studies as well as the ‘annual daily traffic data’. Apart from the vehicle 
traffic, the census data have been used to estimate the proportion of people at different zones 
(work zones, school and university and residential) in the city. For example, during the 
daytime, US census indicated (Southworth 1991) that 46.2% of population will be at work, 
18.2% in school or day care and 35.6% as population will be at home. Though these values 
are geography specific, such an estimate could be collected by the GOs in their respective 
countries to support the transport plans. 
 
In order to obtain a planning estimate for the ‘number of vehicles’, the authorities have used 
stated-preference surveys (FEMA 2010), and in another study (Southworth 1991), the number 
of registered vehicles in the area and number of licensed car drivers was used to obtain a 
planning estimate for number of cars. This estimate is essential to understand the expected 
vehicle loading at different zones during the evacuation. Finally, to obtain the number of 
evacuees safely evacuated, it is also essential to know the average number of evacuees per car 
and also how many vehicles per household. 
 
As receiving the warning message on official channels (TV, radio, etc) would depend on the 
“time of the day” (Roger and Sorensen, 1991, p125), there will be a difference in the warning 
levels for a daytime scenario versus night-time scenario. Apart from this difference, the 
potential evacuees will be involved in different activities during different time of the day 
namely at work, sleeping, in transit and awake at home (Roger and Sorensen 1991). Based on 
the time of the day, the number of evacuees per vehicle was used as 1.85 daytime evacuees 
per vehicle (Southworth 1991, p13) and another study used 2.5 evacuees per car as an average 
value (Wolshon 2006, p6). 
 
Apart from the traffic volume of the ‘resident population’, commuters and tourists form a 
major portion of additional evacuees. The proportion of commuter traffic could be obtained 
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from ‘travel survey data’ (Southworth 1991). The percentage of tourists is specific to 
geography and GOs have used secondary sources (tourist department) to obtain an estimate of 
tourists in the city for a given season (FEMA 2010).  
 
A two-stage linear programming approach was proposed (Murray-Tuite and Mahmassani 
2005) considering the ‘household travel pattern’ in order to obtain a prediction of TET. 
Drabek (1996) discusses tourist and transient evacuee behaviour. Table 2.12 summarises the 
percentage of tourist in the city that has helped EMAs to support their evacuation plans. 
Finally, there will be additional ‘transient vehicular traffic’ along the evacuation route due to 
regular motorway users. This transient traffic could be estimated by analysing the historic 
volume of traffic along the evacuating routes and identifying a means of re-routing during 
evacuation to make more road capacity available for evacuees. Southworth (1991, p7) 
provides detailed calculation of traffic loading values. 
Table 2.12 Average tourists (%) in different state zones (FEMA 2010) 
 
For households evacuating as pedestrians and using cars, Mas et al. (2012a) represented speed 
variability using one-tailed normal distribution with maximum speeds as 1.33 m/s and 8.33 
m/s (30km/h). This MAS model for studying 2011 Tsunami evacuation represented individual 
evacuees as agents with visibility cone of 60 degrees for both and visibility distance of 5m 
and 1m respectively for pedestrians and cars. 
 
One of the major findings after Hurricane Katrina revealed that about 112,000 people, who 
did not have personal vehicles and were socio-economically poor population, were not 
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evacuated. As the EMAs resources are over-stretched, the report advocated for “neighbour 
helping neighbour policies” (Wolfson 2006, p32). The report suggested that the poor people, 
who are generally more vulnerable during emergencies, “could arrange transportation with 
friends, family, neighbours and church members” (Wolfson 2006, p33). Apart from using 
community members as resource in the warning phase (Parker and Handmer 1998, Red Cross 
2005, Mitchell et al. 2008, IFRC 2009b, Randhawa and Lydall 2009), this is another example 
of encouraging altruism among the evacuating households within communities. 
 
2.9.4 KPIs for evacuation transport management 
Measuring traffic flow and regulating the flow to best utilize the road infrastructure capacity 
is a wide field with significant body of literature. ‘Highway Capacity Manual’ is guideline for 
managing transport facilities published by Transport Research Board of US. Similarly, 
transport planners from various countries have identified and adopted traffic measurement 
systems to suit their infrastructure informed with research. ‘Continuous Traffic Assignment 
Model’ (CONTRAM) is a widely used across Europe for transport planning on non-
emergency days. The interest of this thesis is to model the transport performance in the 
context of evacuation.  
 
With the advent and wide-spread use of vehicle tracking mechanisms and ITS (intelligent 
transport systems), planners can choose to invest in sophistication at a needed level for 
managing traffic during the normal days. The role of monitoring systems during evacuation 
for decision support is contingent upon the existing operation systems used by the transport 
authorities. However, the level of transport preparedness is in the strategies pre-planned by 
the authorities on using the existing monitoring system. Preparedness also includes evaluation 
of transport performance for the planned evacuation scenarios. Simulation models have been 
used to model traffic flow by collecting ‘measures of effectiveness’. For example, refer to 
Table 10.1 of Liebermann and Rathi (1992). 
 
These KPIs help in assessing the transport management as an estimate of dynamic interaction 
of factors namely evacuation routes, household behaviour and transport policy. The household 
transport behavioural choices are complex and have influence on the traffic assignment 
(timing and volume) during evacuation. Chen et al. (2012) emphasised that evacuation risk is 
a function of pre-disaster factors and post-disaster events. Transport planners monitor traffic 
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flow volume and monitor bottlenecks in the system during non-emergency days. This 
knowledge has a potential to be factored into evacuation planning. For example, an identified 
bottleneck could be a busy road junction or a road network that limits a quicker traffic flow 
rate.  
 
During evacuation when the road infrastructure is stretched, the volume of vehicles is quite 
high and the bottlenecks could prove to be vulnerable as well. ‘Evacuation transport models’ 
in the hands of experienced transport planners (with rich observational experience on the road 
infrastructure) can be a vital tool for strengthening evacuation preparedness. Models have a 
potential to study these bottlenecks under evacuation condition for various transport policies 
in planned evacuation scenarios. Table 2.13 presents various indicators among different KPI 
categories.  
 
Table 2.13 Various KPI categories for ESF-2 and corresponding indicators 
KPI category Measures 
Overall evacuation 
performance 
Departure time, travel time, total evacuation time. 
evacuation response curves for various means of transport 
choice 
Network capability Evacuation load distribution in various junctions, 
bottlenecks, traffic signals, key traffic entities (sinks) 
Resource Utilisation Public transport usage, occupancy, waiting times, etc 
 
 
What measures are used to represent traffic flow? (Lansdowne 2006, p6) 
1. Flow rate in a road section – Number of vehicles crossing an intersection per unit of 
time (vehicles per hour) 
2. Traffic density – Number of vehicles per unit length of a road lane (vehicles per km of 
road) 
3. O-D studies – Represents the origin (O) of vehicles to the destination (D) in order to 
obtain overall movement of traffic in a large network of roads. O-D is represented as 
matrix of size O x D. 
 
One of the KPI is traffic flow rate and the data obtained during Hurricane Katrina are 
presented in Figure 2.4. During Hurricane Katrina, it was found that about 430,000 outbound 
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vehicles were on major expressways, during the 48-hour period of evacuation (Wolshon 
2006). With the advent of real-time traffic monitoring and counting systems that collect the 
vehicle details (including vehicle registration)  through junctions, it is possible for the 
authorities to obtain an estimate of the ‘number of departed houses’ as the evacuation is 
ongoing. EMAs by measuring these KPIs for their road network will provide empirical basis 
for managing transportation during evacuation. 
 
Figure 2.4 Traffic flow volume in a major road segment during Hurricane Katrina 
(Wolshon 2006, Figure 4, p32) 
 
2.9.5 Supporting evacuation through transport management 
Transport infrastructure is generally planned/designed for normal traffic conditions and not 
for evacuation-level demand (i.e. evacuation of entire city/regions in a short time period) 
(Wolshon 2006, p28). This would entail transport authorities to evaluate the capacities of 
infrastructure (road network, public transport capacity, manpower, etc) under planned 
evacuation scenarios as a foundation for evacuation preparedness.  
 
A transport plan is a compendium of choices decided by the authorities on various transport 
infrastructures. For a transport response plan, the household evacuation choices (micro-
behaviour) can have considerable influence on the overall evacuation success (macro-
behaviour). Apart from the knowledge through personal experience, there is no other means 
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of gaining confidence on transport plans with ‘evidence base’ at the preparedness stage. The 
transport models can be helpful in studying the uncertainties in household choices and to 
choose relatively better transport option by measuring the overall evacuation KPIs. 
 
There are various means of supporting the evacuation by the transport officials in reducing the 
evacuation time, such as providing public transport (Schwartz and Litman 2008), regulating 
traffic flow through contra-flow plans (Kim et al. 2008), regulating traffic signal timings and 
providing routing plans to the evacuees. A technical report’s recommendation prepared by the 
GOs in the New York City indicated that ‘if officials aggressively urge evacuees to use public 
transportation rather than their own vehicles, approximately half the evacuees will comply, 
further reducing the number of vehicles used in the evacuation’ (NYC, 2005).  
 
As the number of evacuees per vehicle in a public transport (say bus or metro) is high, leading 
to lower number of vehicles on roads, this demonstrates a means of reducing traffic volume 
during evacuation. Apart from the resident population, tourists are vulnerable with respect to 
transportation and would rely on the public transport. For this, the GOs need an understanding 
about the transport resource capacity (number of buses), trip scheduling and capacity of the 
road networks. 
 
Public transport during evacuation 
A bus dispatch system was proposed to schedule the bus services for facilitating the 
evacuation (Margulis et al. 2006). The following were the operational and behavioural 
assumptions made while developing the system. 
1) The time it takes to go from a pick-up point to a shelter is fixed.  
2) There is a maximum amount of trips that a bus can make.  
3) Refuel delays are negligible or taken into account in the loading/unloading variable.  
4) People will go to the closest pick-up point. 
5) All bus demand is concentrated at the pick-up points. 
6) Demand at the pick-up points is present from the start of the model timeframe. 
Though the study has stated the underlying assumptions of the model, this requires validation 
of the transport organisational practices as well as the behaviour of the public as 
intended/assumed. For example, the authorities making assumption on the pick-up point (No. 
4) need to have identified the bus stop locations designated as pick-up points and, 
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importantly, to have communicated this information at the preparedness stage (e.g. through 
leaflets) as well as during the evacuation (e.g. media reports). 
 
Streamlining evacuation traffic using signals  
Modelling traffic signals using OR/MS methods is at least four decades old (Little 1966). 
During no-notice evacuation, vehicles leave in a short time window and hence the signal 
timing becomes critical. A simulation study to test signal policies found that ‘the longer the 
cycle length used, the better the performance in terms of the number of vehicles to escape in a 
given time period, but the worse the performance in terms of delay to vehicles on the minor 
roadways.’ (Chen et al. 2007). The performance measures namely maximising throughput 
(number of vehicles cleared) and ‘maintaining fairness in delays along major and minor 
roads’ were used to test the signal policies. For the existing road network and the estimated 
traffic flow, EMAs could test their signal system and identify a suitable ‘timing’ strategy to 
facilitate evacuation.  
 
For example, VISSIM is a micro-simulation multi-modal tool used for managing signals 
using prioritised policies for buses (Fellendorf 1994). An optimal phase length (green 
duration) was arrived at using the model by considering traffic flow conditions and the 
network design. ABM traffic simulation model was used to study the impact of different 
traffic signal plans on average delay time of vehicles (Jamshidnejad and Mahjoob 2011).  
 
Vehicle agents’ movement in a traffic system were studied with different green signal 
duration (25, 50, 75 and 100 seconds) on successive intersections in a synchronized manner. 
Signal groups along a particular road are synchronised such that the vehicles have lower 
likelihood of being stopped in ‘successive’ signals by using field observations from drivers 
(Shinar et al. 2004). In another study a ‘Mixed-integer programming problem’ was formulated 
and solved for obtaining phase length for urban signal groups (Little, 1966). Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) of the UK have developed SCOOT method for real-time 
optimization of signals in five cities (Robertson and Bretherton, 1991). As the volume of 
traffic is expected to be very high during evacuation, the role of signals when managed well 
can streamline the evacuating traffic and reduce congestion. For more information on signal 
controls, readers are referred to Lammer and Helbing (2010), Lin et al. (2009), and Mu et al. 
(2011). 
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Regulating routes to increase evacuation network capacity  
‘Contra-flow plan’ is a means of increasing the traffic flow capacity on a multi-directional 
road network, by altering the direction of traffic flows in the same direction to facilitate 
evacuation. Contra-flow plans are designed considering the expected traffic flows and 
existing road networks (Shekhar and Kim, 2006), and this is widely used in the United States. 
Based on the characteristics of Hurricane Ivan, a simulation model indicated that, compared 
with a plan without contra flow (the “do-nothing” alternative), the proposed plan of contra-
flow would nearly double the amount of evacuating traffic over this same period. Table 2.14 
based on Wolshon (2006) indicates that the contra flow plan is a very good response option 
for reducing the TET. 
 
Table 2.14 Performance of Contra-flow plan to reduce evacuation time (Wolshon 2006) 
 
Apart from contra-flow plans, there has been extensive studies on obtaining evacuation routes 
for different zones of a city by using ‘multi-objective evacuation routing’ (Stepanov and 
Smith 2009) and ABM (Chen et al. 2006). Another simulation study combined DES and GIS 
(Geographical Information System) to identify congestion management strategies (Wiley and 
Keyser 1998). Apart from the existing evacuation traffic performance metrics namely average 
traffic flow rate, average speed, link travel cost and TET, this study has proposed new 
measures of performance (MOP): ‘ratio of queuing vehicle to total vehicles on the link’ and 
‘simulated travel time as percentage of free flow travel time’. These metrics can be used by 
the GOs to devise transport response plans and measure their organisational preparedness. 
The evacuation routing information is either pre-designed or chosen during the response. This 
information will play a key role in influencing the behaviour of the evacuating public. For 
various traffic management strategies during major emergency situations refer to 
Wohlschlaeger and Ullman (1992) 
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2.9.6 Modelling of evacuee transportation process 
Transportation models can be broadly classified into two categories, depending on the level of 
detail included in the model. First, ‘macroscopic’ models treat every vehicle as the same and 
do not consider individual vehicular behaviour and evacuation route choices. On the other 
hand, ‘microscopic’ traffic models consider the individual vehicle behaviour and model their 
interactions as well as changes (Hamacher and Tjandra 2002). 
 
Generally optimization models are macroscopic transportation models widely used in the 
literature (Sherali et al. 1991, Hamacher and Tjandra 2002, Lindell et al. 2002, Barbarosoglu 
and Arda 2004, Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005, Han et al. 2006, Johnston and Nee 2006, 
Stepanov and Smith 2009, Bretschneider and Kimms 2011). Any evacuation traffic 
simulation model need to have ‘dynamic traffic assignment’ (DTA) component that enables 
modelling the departure of vehicles (loading) into the road network and its navigation in the 
system. Readers are referred to Juran et al. (2009) and Ben-Akiva et al. (2012) for more 
information on DTA models. As evacuation is often a response to a disaster with many of 
transport choices made at the household level and also influenced by EMA evacuation plans, 
evacuation models are special extensions of traffic simulation models. 
 
Santos and Aguirre (2004) reviewed the existing evacuation models and this thesis will adopt 
the same categories for grouping the models namely flow-based models, agent-based models, 
cellular automata-based models and activity-based models. Evacuation modelling of facilities 
has been used extensively to obtain evacuation plans. For example computer-based models 
have been used for football stadium evacuation modelling (Elliott and Smith, 1993), Haj 
Jammarh bridge (Crowd-Dynamics, 2010) and Kings Cross underground station evacuation 
(Castle, 2004). ABM has been extensively used to model pedestrian evacuation from the 
facilities (Kerridge et al. 2001).  
 
For representing a major evacuation in a city, both the spatial information (different zones in 
the city) and the road network details need to be combined for developing a model. Computer 
models provide a means for testing the ‘planning assumption’, measuring the ‘relative 
effectiveness’ of various response strategies and identifying ‘vulnerability’ in the network. 
For example, the proportion of public transport usage was tested using a Linear Programming 
model (Margulis et al. 2006) for 10% and 25% to understand the response capability of bus, 
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given the existing road infrastructure and number of buses (capacity). This will help the 
authorities to understand the implication of the assumption as well as to identify bottlenecks 
in the transport plan.  
 
Evacuation strategies were classified as simultaneous (all vehicles are evacuated 
concurrently) and staged evacuation (evacuation is done by prioritising different zones) in 
order to reduce congestion and minimise the evacuation time. Chien and Korikanthimath 
(2007) proposed a numerical method approach to measure the relative effectiveness between 
simultaneous and staged evacuation and it was found that ‘ET and delay can be significantly 
reduced if staged evacuation is appropriately implemented’. The model was also used to find 
out the optimal number of staging required along with the priority sequence for a road 
network.  
 
Another study by Chen and Zhan (2008) used an ABM for obtaining relative effectiveness 
among the two strategies, and it was found that “staged evacuation is good where population 
density is high and road network structure is a grid structure”. Murray-Tuite and 
Mahmassani (2005) proposed a game theory-based bi-level optimization problem to identify 
the vulnerable locations in the transport network by defining ‘vulnerability index’ for major 
roads. In terms of accessibility to highway system, a simulation model was developed to 
evaluate the significance of the road network links (Sohn, 2006) leading to reliability-based 
routing plans. 
 
There is a wide range of computer-based models that have been used by transport authorities 
for planning evacuation.  
 
A review of various modelling software are available in Pel et al. (2011, p168). Models 
provide a platform for testing response plans, training staff and exercising the preparedness 
strategies. For a review of transport policies and practices for hurricane evacuation refer to 
Wolshon (2006), Litman (2006) and Han et al. (2007). Though these studies have presented 
the findings for hurricane, the evacuation phases are applicable to other emergencies.  
 
Table 2.15 provides a summary of the important models. A comparison of various 
transportation models such as OREMS, DYNEV, ETIS, VISSIM, DYNASMART-P and 
MITSIMLAB, is available in Qiao, Ge and Yu ( 2009, p8) S-Paramics is another micro 
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simulation traffic flow modelling system that is widely used and the model for City of Almere 
evacuation has been presented in Tu et al. (2010). 
 
A review of various modelling software are available in Pel et al. (2011, p168). Models 
provide a platform for testing response plans, training staff and exercising the preparedness 
strategies. For a review of transport policies and practices for hurricane evacuation refer to 
Wolshon (2006), Litman (2006) and Han et al. (2007). Though these studies have presented 
the findings for hurricane, the evacuation phases are applicable to other emergencies.  
 
Table 2.15 Review of existing evacuation models 
Model Reference 
REMS – Regional Evacuation Modelling Tufecki and Kisko (1991) 
OREMS – Oak ridge evacuation modelling system Southworth 1991 
FIRESCAP Feinberg and Johnson 1995 
EXODUS Filippidis et al. 2003 
MASCM - Multi-agent simulation for crisis management Murakami et al. 2002 
SIMULEX Thompson and Marchant 1995 
Kings Cross Underground station simulation Castle 2004 
PACKSIM Barcello 1993 
EMBLEM2 Lindell 2008 
 
MATSim (Balmer et al. 2006) is another modelling platform for large-scale evacuation 
modelling. One of the applications of MATSim has been used to develop a prototype model 
evacuation due to fire in Breamlea, Australia by incorporating “individual household/Vehicle 
evacuation decisions” (Padgham et al. 2011). It is interesting to observe that for modelling 
evacuation process, an evacuation decision of household (agent) ‘prior to evacuation’ requires 
setting behavioural rules at the household level. Once they ‘depart’ using their chosen 
evacuation means/vehicles, the further phases of evacuation are transferred to a vehicle 
(agents) on the evacuation network. This bi-phased ABM (house – agent prior to departure, 
Vehicle – agent during transportation) is more suitable way of capturing different phases of 
evacuation and requires aggregation of evacuation behaviour in different agent units. 
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Car-following model provides an algorithm for deciding on car movement of a trailing car 
based on the leading car’s stated. Based on the model configuration of leader-follower pair, 
level of details and the variables included, there are many car-following models available in 
the literature, and the readers are referred to Zheng, Suzuki and Fujita (2012), Ossen and 
Hoogendoorn (2011, p186), Helbing et al. (2002) Brackstone and McDonald (1999, p185), 
Gipps (1981) and Gazis et al. (1961) for more detailed information. The following are key 
car-following models. 
1. The Gazis, Herman and Rothery (GHR) Model 
2. The Chandler, Herman and Montroll (CHM) Model 
3. Bexelius-modified CHM with two leaders 
4. Tampere Model 
5. Addison and Low model 
6. Gipps Model 
7. Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) 
8. Optimal Velocity Model (OVM) 
9. Lenz-modified CHM with two leaders. 
Driving behaviour of different vehicles (cars and trucks) was studied using trajectory data 
obtained by means of helicopter (Ossen and Hoogendoorn 2011). This data was further used 
to compare different car-following models and also the heterogeneity in driving behaviours of 
cars and trucks. This study found that the speed data of truck drivers showed less variation 
over time compared to car drivers. Also the headway gap of a passenger car while following a 
truck was higher compared to that while following another car. 
 
For the factors namely distance to the leading vehicle (headway) and speed, the range of 
difference values with the leading vehicle has been used and classified (Schulze and Fliess 
1997). These limits were used to define the vehicle’s state in a car-following model in 
successive iterations. The car-following logic using these two parameters has been used in 
Lansdowne (2006) and requires minimum data for the algorithm. 
 
2.9.7 Research gaps on evacuee transportation management 
Generally, in rapid-onset disasters, the evacuation window available is short (in order of 
hours) and the household time series of receiving warning dissemination is very critical. 
Depending on the official channel effectiveness and the level of unofficial channel, 
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households receive warning at different points in time. Further, for a rapid-onset event (e.g. 
flooding), the need for having short preparation time is essential for onset of household 
evacuation (departure) and travelling to their chosen safe locations (shelters/exits). The 
household’s evacuation travel time is influenced by their transport means, departure time, 
influence of transport policies and other evacuating vehicles. This highlights the need for 
multi-phased integrated approach for modelling evacuation, and it is argued in this thesis that 
for a realistic evacuation planning for ‘planned scenarios’, not incorporating warning 
dissemination phase in transportation models is treated as undesirable.  As the departure time 
is a function of warning time and the existing models use departure curves (Mas et al. 2012a) 
that do not specifically model the warning dissemination, this thesis would study the impact 
of warning dissemination including unofficial channels on transportation KPIs. 
  
As the volume of traffic during evacuation is very high due to simultaneous departures in a 
short window (Wolshon 2006), the role of existing traffic in the network, particularly 
transient traffic, will reduce the capacity available on evacuation routes. This thesis will study 
the impact of transient traffic on the evacuation times. The thesis will also identify from the 
existing literature various transport management measures available for the EMAs and 
illustrate how models can play a role in measure preparedness.  
 
Evacuee transport studies restrict to pedestrian and vehicular (cars) means of transport (Clarke 
and Habib 2010, Mauro et al. 2013). However, public transport using evacuation bus plays a 
key role in evacuation (Margulis et al. 2006); given the findings from Hurricane Katrina that 
‘lack of transportation’ was one of the reasons for evacuation, this thesis will investigate the 
scope of using transportation models to support bus dispatching operation. The next section 
presents the review of literature on public shelter management. 
 
2.10 Emergency accommodation planning: ESF-3 
Emergency accommodation, though the last phase in evacuation, is one of the important 
phases in the mass evacuation of a city, bridging the gap between evacuation and safe 
recovery/return. There are various terms used in the literature to denote emergency 
accommodation: sheltering, public shelters, mass care shelters, refugee centre, emergency 
accommodation and humanitarian assistance centre, and this thesis will refer to these as 
shelters. 
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 Hurricane Katrina and Rita displaced about 2 million people and more than 250,000 were 
sheltered for more than two weeks (Burkle 2009). The duration of sheltering could be as short 
as few hours (e.g. evacuation for unexploded bombs of World War II) or it could be for 
months depending on the nature of the emergency, immediate effect on their houses and 
proactive measures taken by the public. For example, the duration of sheltering during 
Hurricane Andrew evacuation was five weeks (Sattler et al. 1995). Thus GOs responsible for 
shelter management need an understanding of sheltering as well as identifying, allocating and 
managing the shelter for a city. 
 
2.10.1 Planning for sheltering 
This section reviews emergency accommodation planning, and is grouped into the following 
sub-sections: classification of shelters, estimation of demand, sheltering availability and 
allocation, relief supplies planning and support services.  
 
Classification of shelters 
Sheltering involves relocating evacuees from a hazard zone to a place of safety. There are 
many alternatives to be evaluated prior to issuing an evacuation order. The alternatives are 
(Xu et al. 2006): 
 In-sheltering (staying in a safe place within the premise),  
 Vertical evacuation (moving to the floor above especially used in flash flooding) and, 
 Horizontal evacuation (leaving the threatened location to safety).  
The detailed analysis of the ‘evacuation decision making’ by GOs has been presented in 
Model 2 (Shaw et al. 2011a). Once the evacuation decision is made, the warning message will 
provide information about evacuating to shelters. Shelters are broadly classified (Kar and 
Hodgson 2008) into ‘special facilities’ (specifically built for emergency accommodation) and 
dual-use public buildings (schools, colleges, churches and community centres).  
 
Depending on the relative location of the shelter from the evacuated zone, the shelters are 
classified into four categories based on ‘spatial scales’ (Xu et al. 2006, p183).  
Table 2.16 lists these categories along with their features. Each category of sheltering level 
will have different needs depending on the duration of sheltering. For example, when the 
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evacuees are relocated to a regional level shelter for long duration (say one week), there will 
be a need for lifeline support (e.g. food, bedding, medication, etc.) until safe to return. 
 
The choice of sheltering level would also impact the transportation aspects, namely the means 
of transportation, vehicles per household, departure time and role of information about 
evacuation routes (Dow and Cutter 2002, p13). This highlights the inter-relatedness of the 
three ESFs (warning dissemination, transportation and shelter management). As the shelters 
are located in different parts of the city, the spatial distribution will have an impact on TET. 
 
Table 2.16 Classification of shelters and its key feature. 
Sheltering level Feature 
Household Level Safe room within the house – for flooding, 
earthquake and some nuclear disasters (in-sheltering) 
Neighbourhood level Building in a higher elevation and safe – for fire and 
earthquakes - refugee point. 
Community level A shelter location identified in advance within the 
community (e.g. neighbourhood leisure centre). 
Regional Level When there is wide spread damage to the houses 
within the region, the evacuees are sheltered in the 
neighbouring region. 
 
2.10.2 Shelter demand estimation 
A city’s population can be broadly classified as ‘resident population’ and ‘transient 
population’ (Johnston et al. 2007). Resident population comprise people who live in the city 
area. The transient population includes commuters, visitors and tourists. Not all the evacuees 
will comply with the evacuation order. For example, during Hurricane Floyd only about 65% 
evacuated from the danger zone (Dow and Cutter, 2002). Among the evacuated people, the 
proportion of people who will require sheltering will vary. The demand (defined as number of 
evacuees needing shelter) for public shelters was explained in Mileti et al. (1992) by various 
factors and grouped into three categories:  
a) Characteristics of the disaster event. 
b) Characteristic of the emergency preparedness. 
c) Characteristics of the evacuees.   
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Table 2.17 Classification of factors that affect shelter demand (Mileti et al. 1992) 
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Table 2.17 summarises the findings from various published sources as presented in Mileti et 
al. (1992). Such a study could help GOs to understand the factors affecting the shelter 
demand. The ‘Nanticoke metal fire evacuation’ (1987) resulted in 15000 residents being 
evacuated including 250 hospital and nursing home patients (Stambaugh 1987), and shelter 
usage during this evacuation was about 43.2% (Duclos et al. 1989). The demand for shelters 
can be estimated based on the number of people exposed to the threat (Mileti et al. 1992). 
GOs can estimate these ‘expected evacuation zones’ using disaster-specific OR models (e.g. 
the flood model). Thus GOs could combine the demographic data of the area with the threat 
information (Ng et al. 2010) to determine the evacuation zone, which would in turn provide 
the number of evacuees. The synthesis of historical records detailing the ‘usage of shelters’ 
for different hazards is summarised in Mileti et al. (1992), but caution should be exercised in 
relation to the effect of other factors (e.g. severity of the disaster, socio-economic profile, etc.) 
on the generalisability of these observations. Table 1.1 can also be analysed to obtain hazard-
specific estimates of sheltering as percent of population and sub-divided into disaster 
intensity. 
 
The authorities responsible for shelters have used policy-level questions like, “What are the 
destinations of the evacuees and what type shelter will they be heading for?” (Alabama 2010). 
For the evacuees complying with the evacuation order, there are various alternative 
destinations. They are:  
 Evacuating to public shelters. 
 Staying with friends or relatives.  
 Go to a hotel or motel. 
 Go to church or workplace.  
In order to obtain data for supporting their plans, the Alabama authorities (FEMA 2010) have 
used stated-preference surveys from the residents living in the community. The data was 
collected in each county in Opal and grouped into four shelter destinations (public shelter, 
friends/relatives, hotel, others). ‘Staying with friends/relatives’ was widely stated preference. 
The evacuee behaviour data helps in estimating the demand for public shelters during an 
evacuation.  
 
The average demand for mass care shelters in United States was reported to be 15% (Sorensen 
2000). Depending on the socio-economic profile of the evacuated zone, the demand will vary 
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considerably in different zones (FEMA 2010). In order to understand the expected variation, 
the authorities have used post-evacuation surveys to create a planning estimate. Based on a 
post-evacuation survey conducted (Brodie et al. 2006) after the Hurricane Katrina evacuation, 
it was found that about 30% (8000 people) were sheltered out of the 27,100 resident 
population. This study also highlights the sheltering usage is influenced by ‘ethnicity’ 
(African-Americans were about 93% of Houston shelter residents), low income level, low rate 
of home ownership, health insurance, education level and marriage status.  
 
These findings, even though specific to geography (Houston area, United States) and a 
disaster type (Hurricanes), highlight the factors that would possibly affect the evacuees 
needing shelters (shelter demand). EMAs as a part of preparedness initiative could arrive at a 
planning estimate of ‘shelter demand’ considering these factors. EMAs could also identify the 
sheltering locations and document its capacity (how many people who can be sheltered). For 
theoretical basis of shelter demands refer to Mileti et al. (1992). 
 
Shelter availability estimation and allocation  
Shelters are often pre-identified and documented as a part of preparedness initiative. The 
names and addresses of existing shelters can be geo-coded to produce an existing shelter 
geographic database (Kar and Hodgson 2008). The responsibility of ‘identifying the potential 
sheltering locations and documenting them’ is an important preparedness task (Cabinet Office 
2006). For a large-scale evacuation, the database of shelters will be used to identify the 
available shelters, depending on the damage to shelter building by disaster, evacuation 
distance and life-line facilities available, etc. 
 
Table 2.18 highlights a variety of dual-use buildings identified for potential use as shelters 
(Kar and Hodgson 2008). The capacity of these shelters (number of people who can be 
accommodated) will be varied comparably in the list given below. As the identified shelters 
will be dispersed across different regions in the city, the available shelters need to be allocated 
for different evacuation zones.  
 
Kar and Hodgson (2008, p227) presented a GIS-based selection from the available location on 
the following policy level questions on ‘shelter suitability’:  
1) How many candidate shelters are located in physically suitable areas (e.g. not in a 
flood-prone area, not near hazardous facilities, etc.)?  
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2) How many existing shelters are located in physically unsuitable areas, but in socially 
suitable areas (situated in areas with demand)?  
3) How many alternative existing and/or candidate shelters with high/very high physical 
suitability are located near physically unsuitable existing shelters and thus, may be 
better choices for a shelter?  
4) How many existing shelters located in physically unsuitable areas are not near 
alternative existing and/or candidate shelters?  
 
Table 2.18 Facility type considered for sheltering (Kar and Hodgson 2008, p235) 
 
These suitability questions were used to obtain a ranking of candidate shelter locations and 
select the higher ranking ones for sheltering. Given that the shelters are identified in safer 
zones with different capacities, the evacuees from different zones need to reach different 
shelters. The GOs could allocate the shelters based on a priority. 
 
In order to understand the distributiveness and coverage of the shelters, OR models have been 
used to choose optimal shelter location. Sherali et al. (1991) used a mathematical modelling 
approach to formulate a location-allocation problem to select the best shelter locations among 
available shelters by minimising congestion and TET. The sufficiency of the number of 
shelters and its coverage to various zones (Chiyoshi et al. 2003) of a city can be studied as a 
‘location search problem’ (Brandeau and Chiu 1989) to help in identifying new shelters. For 
the case of flooding threat in Mozambique shelter planning was using GIS-based spatial 
analyses to identify shelter candidates outside the flood-prone areas with transportation route 
access to it from the living population (Gall 2004). Another study used GIS tool to do shelter 
site selection for Denton, Texas United States (Lea 2009). These OR models will help GOs to 
understand the coverage of shelters to different evacuated zones. 
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As the demand locations (evacuated zones) and supply points (shelter locations) are 
geographically spread out, the ET must be balanced such that the evacuees quickly reach to 
safety. This would entail understanding the behaviour of evacuees in evacuation route choice, 
travel time and speed and considering these while allocating the shelters. New Hannover 
County, which is prone to various disasters like flooding, wild fires, tornadoes and 
earthquakes, has publicised various evacuation shelters in their website using a map (NHC 
2010; NHC-S 2010).  
 
Mas et al. (2012a) used two alternatives for household’s shelter choice namely ‘closest 
shelter’ and ‘any random shelter’. The study also mentioned that “in many cases the 
preference is not necessarily the nearest shelter” but no empirical evidence was quoted. 
During the absence of any prior information about their allocated shelters, the evacuees might 
go to the nearest shelters or a convenient shelter. In some instances the evacuees were 
“assigned particular neighbourhoods to them” (Mileti et al. 1992, p33) and this will influence 
their ‘travel choice behaviour’ during the evacuation. Thus based on the literature, there are 
three choices available for households allocated shelters, nearest shelter, and any other shelter.  
 
“In many cases, not only the capacity of these shelters plays an important role, but the spatial 
distribution and the evacuee preference for the nearest shelter. Such preference and location 
creates conflict between capacity and demand.” (Mas et al. 2012b, p61).  A multi-agent-based 
simulation model for La Punta, Peru, modelled the pedestrians choosing nearest shelter from 
their residential zone and evacuate to it. It was found from 250 simulations that among 20 
shelters, 13 (65%) had arrivals exceeding capacity and 7 (35%) were under-utilised. This 
overall capacity-demand mismatch was due to independent shelter preference of the 
household. The dynamics of the household preference for ‘nearest shelter, convenient or 
random choice’ and shelter capacity management needs further investigation. 
 
The household’s shelter choice also affect the household’s travel time (or clearance time), 
traffic flow rate and other household’s ET. GOs responsible for allocating the shelter would 
aim at minimising the TET (sum of the evacuation time of all the evacuees) and this approach 
is referred to as system-level optimization (cooperative behaviour). The GOs’ decision could 
be divided into a ‘location problem’ (Sherali et al. 1991), with an objective of identifying 
zone-wise shelters. The evacuees choose their best shelter depending on the information 
available prior to the event (e.g. from leaflets), on instructions given in the warning message 
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stating shelter location as well as on evacuation routes and personal preferences (e.g. 
evacuating to nearest shelters). Failure to undertake these actions could result in non-optimal 
behaviour, which “could potentially lead to overcrowded shelters and/or severe traffic 
disruptions” (Ng et al. 2010).  
 
Kongsomsaksakul et al. (2005) proposed a bi-level ‘Stackelberg game’ by combining the 
GOs’ perspective as well as evacuee behaviour choice. This problem was solved using 
‘Genetic Algorithm’ which is a heuristic technique for solving optimization problems. A more 
recent approach for allocating shelters was using hybrid bi-level (Ng et al. 2010), which 
involves solving the optimal shelter allocation in two stages. First the problem was solved at 
the ‘authorities’ perspective’ and then the next level was solved at each evacuation zone. In 
all these models the TET of all the evacuees was used as a performance metric which was 
minimised by balancing various constraints:  
 Available shelters 
 Shelter demands  
 Evacuee behaviour 
 Travel time from the hazard zone to the allocated shelters.  
This section has explained how OR models have provided a means of understanding various 
aspects on shelter allocation.  Shelters also require lifeline supplies and staff to deal with 
evacuees. Some of the key shelter operation services are ‘managing evacuee registration 
process (CBC 2010, Chatham 2009), missing person information and hotline facilities (Mills 
et al. 2007), psycho-social support for handling post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) 
(Werrity et al. 2007) and managing the emergency logistics (Ozdamar et al. 2004)’. For 
detailed information on relief supplies to shelter and support services refer to Shaw et al. 
(2011a, p93).  
 
2.10.3 Research gaps in emergency accommodation management 
The previous section reviewed the literature on different aspects of ‘emergency 
accommodation plans’ namely understanding the factors influencing the demand and its 
estimation, identifying the shelters and allocating shelters during the evacuation and the 
shelter operations. The review also presented the application of analytical models for 
supporting the shelter allocation. The following are key research gaps identified from the 
literature: 
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 The level of household compliance to information in the context of evacuation has 
already been investigated (Pel et al. 2010). With respect to shelters, there are various 
preferences (Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005, Mas et al. 2012b) such as nearest shelter, 
convenient shelter, allocated shelter, etc, which influence household’s shelter choice 
behaviours. The relationship between ‘household’s shelter choice behaviours (which 
shelter they reach?) and its impact on the overall shelter arrivals need to be 
investigated further. Overseeing the management of capacities available in all shelters 
and its influence due to the household choice will be of interest to the lead EMA.  
 Literature is available on individual tasks in sheltering management; however no 
generalisable approach that enlists all the tasks for the practitioners is available in 
literature. 
 As the shelters are spatially dispersed across the city, how the EMA make optimal 
shelter allocation can inform other ESFs (like evacuation bus routes) and also 
influence the household’s travel choice behaviour? 
2.11 A need for integrated evacuation planning 
A study after the 1995 Kobe earthquake argued that “the response management in Kobe 
earthquake was non-optimal. Integration, coordination, communication and planning were 
insufficient to cope with large disasters” (Heath 1995 as cited in Ventura et al. 2010). Even 
though this study is close to two decades old, it corroborates with 2005 Hurricane Katrina’s 
findings (i.e. the need for coordinated multiagency response). The need for an integrated 
planning to large-scale evacuation is relevant even today. There is even more need to research 
on this topic, given the increase in complexity of recent disasters (e.g. the 2011 Earthquake-
Tsunami-Nuclear disaster in Japan), making multi-agency-based evacuation planning a 
necessity. An evacuation response plan from 'warning to safety' involves three ESFs as 
identified in this thesis, with each ESF having many individual organisations collectively 
responding during evacuation. The inter-dependency and inter-relationships among these 
phases during evacuation in terms of ‘evacuation time estimates’ need to be studied in this 
thesis. 
 
A tsunami risk reduction study using multi-agent simulation model of pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic was studied for the city of Padang, Indonesia (Mauro et al. 2013). The arrival 
time of tsunami is expected as approximately 30 minutes. It was found that “the evacuation 
rate in the first 30 minutes is strongly dependent on the presence/absence of evacuation 
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shelters, whose effectiveness is limited by the capacity of structures (referring to shelters)” 
(Mauro et al. 2013, p1). This highlights the inter-relationship of ESF phases between tsunami 
arrival time, real-time shelter availability, household behaviour and ET.  
 
The nature of relationship in the evacuation context is physical (one ESF follows the other), a 
household’s state changes (from warned, evacuated to safe) and these impact KPIs of ESFs. 
Household’s evacuation time (KPI) is additive value of ‘warning time’ (ESF-1’s KPI), 
mobilisation time, departure time (ESF-2’s KPI), evacuation travel time (ESF-2’s KPI). What 
is the direction of relationship among ESFs? Is there also information interdependency 
among the three ESFs? These are some of the questions that require further investigation in 
this thesis in order to understand the need for multi agency-based integrated evacuation 
planning. 
 
General findings on OR modelling for three ESFs 
As the emergency response requires coordination between various organisations on different 
aspects of emergencies (e.g. hazard forecasting, warning, traffic management, etc), a tool 
based on integrated simulation approach will provide a platform for holistic view (Jain and 
McLean 2003). The success of disaster response is substantially affected by effective inter-
organisational coordination among the emergency responders (Perry and Lindell 2003) and 
the OR models will facilitate different responding organisation to support their response 
planning using models as a test-bed.  
 
For the case of tsunami threat in the city of Padang Indonesia, Taubenbock et al. (2009, 
p1509) developed an interdisciplinary approach for tsunami evacuation preparedness. 
Evacuation information system has components of “inundation modelling, urban morphology 
analysis, population assessment, economic analysis of the population and a multi-agent based 
evacuation model”. It was found from the model experiment that “only after 40 minutes 
almost the entire population was evacuated from potentially inundated areas from the sample 
tsunami scenario“(Taubenbock et al. 2009, p1525).  
 
A multi-agent simulation model was developed for a case study of coastal town called Towyn 
in the United Kingdom for flooding using risk-based incident management (Dawson et al. 
2011). “The multi-agent simulation has coupled with a hydrodynamic model to estimate the 
vulnerability of individuals to flooding under different strategies” (Dawson et al. 2011, p167). 
 91 
The model was “used to evaluate the effectiveness of ‘flood incident management’ such as 
flood warning and location of shelters” (Dawson et al. 2011, p186). 
 
An integrated tsunami and evacuation simulation model (TUNAMI) was used in a post-
disaster study after 2011 great eastern tsunami in Japan (Mas et al. 2012a). The model was 
developed for Arahama village in Miyagi prefecture in Japan with population of 2704 
residents. This multi-agent simulation model had components on Tsunami wave inundation 
models, collision avoidance model for pedestrians and cars, and evacuation destination as 
identified tsunami evacuation buildings and two exits. This model however didn’t use the 
warning data instead compared departure times using stated preference surveys and sigmoid 
curves. 
 
An integrated tsunami inundation and evacuation model TUNAMI-EVAC1 (Mas et al. 
2012b) was developed for La Punta, Peru with a population of 4370 in order to estimate the 
ET, casualties and impact of household behaviours. The model has two modes of evacuation 
to shelters (referred as tsunami evacuation buildings) namely pedestrians and cars, and two 
exits. This study explicitly modelled evacuation travel phase (ESF2) and shelter choices 
(ESF3) and does not state about the warning dissemination using channels, instead a departure 
curve using Rayleigh’s distribution was used 
 
Based on the literature review, it was found that most of the models are specific to single ESF 
for example ‘traffic congestion models’ (Chien and Korikanthimathi, 2007), some have two 
phases of evacuation explicitly modelled (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989, Southworth 1991, 
Mas et al. 2012a) and other models were with disaster-specific models integrated to it 
(Charnkol and Tanaboriboon 2006, Lammel et al. 2008, Dawson et al. 2011, Mas et al. 2012a, 
Mauro et al. 2013). Household behaviour in the three phases can have an impact on the 
overall KPIs and modelling, this is further investigated in this thesis. However within the 
evacuation phases (warning to safety) there is potential for further research on developing and 
using integrated simulation approach for planning evacuation. The choice of OR-based 
integrated approach corroborates widely accepted purposes of simulation models namely 
understanding the variability of individual process, interconnectedness and complexity 
(Robinson, 2003). 
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Apart from OR modelling being used for evacuation responses, the role of models has been 
key in the training and exercise for the emergency responders. An integrated gaming and 
simulation model has been developed to help multi-agency coordination through interactive 
exercises (Jain and McLean 2005). These gaming tools have visually appealing interface 
along with the ability for multiple users to simultaneously interact with the system. Any 
model requires formal training in usage, customization to the evacuation study area and 
continuous upgrade with changes in study area and policies. Training to the end-users is 
needed to avoid over-reliance of model output without knowing the assumptions underlying 
the model (French and Niculae 2004).  
 
The models are not intended to replace the role of practitioner and their diverse experience in 
responding to emergencies, instead the models support their evacuation plans as an 
experimentation platform. By involving experienced practitioners in various stages of model 
development could possibly reveal the knowledge held at individuals to be accessible to 
others. 
 
OR models have been used for planning various phases of large-scale emergencies; for review 
see Pidd et al. (1996), Green and Kolesar (2004), Altay and Green (2006), Wright et al. 
(2006), Simpson and Hancock (2009).  As the different phases of emergencies (Figure 2.1) 
are inter-related and have a cascading effect on the evacuation effectiveness, the EMAs could 
develop an integrated approach for their preparedness and support the initiatives using 
analytical models, wherever appropriate. Some of the key gaps identified in literature review 
are modelling households as warning informants, the impact of ‘warning time and transport 
choices’ on travel time to safety, shelter information planning modelling various household 
shelter preferences on shelter allocation. Chapter 3 examines how these approaches informed 
the methodology used to address these research gaps. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Problem definition 
Modelling large-scale evacuation and particularly the three ESFs require choosing appropriate 
methodological approach for representing household behaviours and evacuation system 
(zones, road network, vehicle movement, etc). The aim of this thesis (restated from section 
1.9) is to evaluate how ‘evacuee behaviour based large-scale evacuation planning of a city can 
be supported using OR/MS models?’ In order to achieve this aim the following research 
questions have been addressed in this thesis. 
 
Research questions addressed in this thesis 
Q1: What is the need for modelling ESFs?  
The response to this question has been from the review of literature and gap analyses 
(Chapter – 2).  
Q2: How do household evacuation behaviours impact different phases in evacuation?  
The response to Q2 has been addressed using literature review, development of model 
to address literature gap and model results analyses (Chapter 4, 5 and 6).  
Q3: How do household evacuation behaviours affect organisations' evacuation response 
plans?  
The response to Q3 has been done using analyses of model results and scenario 
experiments (Chapter 4, 5 6).  
Q4: How OR-based approach can help GOs in evacuation planning?  
Literature review and ERGO findings are synthesised to answer Q4 and subsequently 
the model developed in this thesis addresses the research gap.  
Q5: How OR-based approach can provide an integrated evacuation planning environment?  
 Synthesised analyses of three model results to understand the interdependencies of 
ESFs are used to propose an integrated approach for evacuation planning (Chapter – 7). 
 
To address these research questions, key household behaviours have been identified in the 
literature review of each ESF (Sections 2.8.4, 2.9.7 and 2.10.3) and will be investigated 
further in this thesis for ‘these behaviours’ impact on evacuation KPIs’.  
 In ESF-1, the household’s role as warning informant is to be modelled to measure its 
impact on warning dissemination.  
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 In ESF-2, for better managing evacuation traffic what is the impact of household’s 
transport choices (means of transport and destination) on evacuation KPIs? What is 
the impact of regulating transient traffic on evacuation KPIs? 
  In ESF-3, household’s independent choice of shelter has an impact on the number of 
evacuees arriving at a particular shelter. This household shelter selection behaviour 
will have impact on available capacities in each shelter and will be of interest to the 
organisation responsible for allocating shelters to different zones.  
The above paragraph presented key household behaviour in each ESF and the performance 
measure of interest for evacuation planners. This chapter is organised in the following 
manner. The research methodological choices available for the aim of thesis are presented in 
Section 3.3. As the methodological choices are based on the philosophical position of the 
researcher, Section 3.3 begins with a discussion on key research paradigms and then the 
choice between quantitative and qualitative approaches is justified. As this thesis focus is on 
OR/MS-based evacuation planning, there are a number of techniques available within the 
field and the comparison of techniques is presented. Section 3.4 ends with the choice of 
modelling technique for the three ESFs followed by discussion on validation of the models. 
 
3.2 Research Methodology  
The Oxford dictionary defines ‘research’ “as a careful study of a subject especially in order to 
discover new facts or information about it”. “Research is about generating knowledge about 
what you believe the world is” (Lee and Lings 2008, p6).The word ‘research’ can be defined 
“as an activity undertaken in order ‘to find out things’ in a systematic way, thereby increasing 
their knowledge” (Saunders et al. 2012, p5). Systematic research suggests that it is based on 
logical relationship and not just beliefs (Saunders et al. 2012, p5). A research is conducted 
with a specific purpose and to describe/understand/explain/criticise/analyse certain aspects of 
the subject, and this makes research purposeful. Thus research is both systematic and 
purposeful.  
 
Experimental research is where the “causal variables are systematically manipulated to see 
its effect on the outcome” (Field 2009, p.15). Correlational research is “where the co-
occurrence of variables is measured without any interference to the system” (Field, 2009, 
p.15). One of the features of management research is to “develop ideas and relate them to 
practise” (Saunders et al. 2012, p8). Scientific methodology can be thought of as “a set of 
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techniques about collecting and interpreting evidences which are generally considered likely 
to illuminate differences in the plausibility of these declarative statements” (Lee and Lings 
2008, p40).  
 
3.3 Methodological choices 
In research design stage there are various choices that are made and this is summarised in 
Figure 3.1. The themes of research design (Saunders et al. 2007) are as indicated by the 
arrows such as philosophies, approaches, strategy, choices, etc. The following paragraphs are 
presented in the theme of the research design. 
 
3.3.1  Philosophical paradigms of research 
Ontology is concerned to “the nature of reality” and pertains “to the assumptions of the 
researcher about how the world operates” (Saunders et al. 2012, p130). There are two aspects 
of ontology namely objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivity represents “the position that 
social entities exist in reality external to and independent of social actors” (Saunders et al. 
2012, p131). Subjectivism is the position that “social phenomena are created from the 
perceptions and consequent actions of social actors” (Saunders et al. 2012, p132). Based on 
these two ontological positions there are two broad classifications of paradigms namely 
positivism and phenomenological. 
 
 Empiricism is based on the view that “the knowledge we have can come from our 
observations and that human have no innate ideas which are not from experience” (Lee and 
Lings 2008 p28). Positivism believes in obtaining generalizable conclusions based on the 
observations from the reality, and “can reach a full understanding based on experiment and 
observation” (Ryan 2006, p13). Post-positivism which is a neo-positivist approach focuses on 
the “science’s account of reality rather than on reality itself” (Fischer 1998, p135). 
Phenomenological approaches are based on the view that the world is not external and 
objective/measurable, rather socially constructed by the observer (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  
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Figure 3.1 The Research Onion (Reproduced from Saunders et al. 2007)
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Post-positivism is attributed to Kuhn's ideas on pragmatism and contributions from 
Feyerabend, Hanson and Toulmin, as cited in Alvesson and Skoldberg (2010, p18). It is also 
mentioned here that critical alternative world-views against post-positivism and also 
positivism exist, and readers can refer to studies like Lapid 1989, Patomaki and Wight 2000, 
etc. This thesis aligns to the strengths of post-positivism philosophy for scientific enquiry. 
The views of positivism and post-positivism are not opposing to each other (Ryan 2006, p15). 
There are considerable similarities between positivism and post-positivism (Gephart 1999, 
Gephart 2004, Table 1, p456). The following are some of the key similarities: 
 Both assume that the reality is objective. 
 The goal is to uncover truth or true reality. 
  The main tasks to achieve the goal are undertake explanation and control of 
variables; discern verified hypotheses or non-falsified hypothesis. 
Unlike positivism, post-positivism holds view that reality can be known only probabilistically 
and not fully (Gephart 2004). And falsification, not verification, of hypothesis becomes the 
basic task of research (Gephart 1999, 2004). In post-positivist view, ‘pure empiricism is too 
demanding as the observations and measurements are inherently imperfect, and the objective 
of science is to try and understand the real word independent of researcher's perception about 
it’ (Cook et al. 1979, Straub et al. 2004). Post-positivist believe that the reality can be known 
imperfectly and probabilistically (Robson 2002). 
 
Computer models are nothing but a simplified representation of social reality (not the reality 
itself) created to understand a social phenomenon (Gilbert, 2007). The thesis also believes that 
“the reality exists but can never be understood or explained fully, given both the multiplicity 
of causes and effects and the problem of social meaning...” (Fischer 1998, p143). This is the 
underlying principle of ‘post-positivism’ which has been chosen as the epistemological 
position of this research. In general computer models of social behaviours (social simulation) 
are abstraction of social reality to understand the complexity of a social phenomenon of 
interest, in this case household behaviour for mass evacuation planning of the city. These 
models are purposeful abstractions including only measurable behaviours of interest, and with 
reality ‘never be fully explained or understood’ inline to the post-positivism philosophy.  
 
Based on “hypothetico-deductive method” which describes the relation between data and 
theory, there are two broad methods and readers are directed to Figure 2 of Lee and Lings 
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(2008, p41). Deduction is “the process of drawing conclusions from rational and logical 
principles” (Lee and Lings 2008, p6), i.e. Theory Generate hypothesis Collect data. 
Induction is “opposite to deductive method, is the process of using specific observations 
(data) and making generalisations” (Lee and Lings 2008, p7), i.e. Data make 
generalisations from data Theory. The aim of the study, on the basis of ontological and 
epistemological position of the researcher, would lead to the choice of the methodology (Lee 
and Lings 2008, p11). 
 
The aim of the thesis is to measure the impact of household behaviours on evacuation 
planning and specifically using OR/MS tools. In this thesis, the world is considered as 
objective, reality as measurable though not fully (unlike positivism), with post-positivism 
philosophy and following a deductive approach. There are two approaches possible for 
studying the household behaviours of the public namely at a micro-level and at the macro-
level.  
 
At micro level the psycho-social behaviour of evacuees could be studied through cognitive 
modelling to understand the individual behaviours. This approach has been used in various 
studies (Mileti and Sorensen 1990, Mileti and Peek 2000, Sorensen 2000) to understand how 
the public would ‘understand, perceive and respond to warning messages’. This is broadly a 
subjective/interpretive approach-based understanding of the household behaviour. The other 
approach of studying social behaviour is by building models based on “theoretical 
understanding and then simulate its dynamics to gain better understanding of the complexity” 
(Gilbert 2007). As the household dynamics in the three ESFs are to be studied from the 
context of evacuation planning at a city level, the latter approach is chosen in this thesis.  
 
3.3.2  Choice between quantitative and qualitative approaches 
Quantitative research method is defined as the technique of systematically investigating a 
social phenomenon in terms of ‘measurements’ and their relationships in order to ‘describe, 
explain, predict, and/or control the phenomenon of interest’(NCREL 2010). Quantitative 
methods align with the empiricism as it is based on the assumption that reality is measurable. 
Qualitative research method is “defined as an array of interpretive techniques which seek to 
describe, decode and translate the meaning, not the frequency of certain phenomena in the 
social world” (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991, p71). Qualitative methods align with the 
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interpretivist philosophy.  As the thesis’s epistemological position is post-positivism and aims 
to measure the household behaviours’ impact on evacuation planning, the quantitative 
research method has been chosen compared to qualitative method. As a city contains many 
households, which require aggregation of behaviours rather than behaviour of one particular 
household, quantitative methods provide the framework for aggregation and measuring the 
relationship.  
 
In the context of evacuation management, this involves measuring various aspects of 
evacuation (e.g. the time when evacuees receive warning message, travel time required to 
evacuate, etc) as ‘variables’ and relationships among them, in order to understand and manage 
the evacuation process. The evacuee behaviour is represented as quantitative measurable 
factors at the household level (macro-approach) instead of individual evacuee level (micro-
approach). A similar approach of modelling at the household level instead of individual level 
has been adopted in earlier works (Southworth 1991, Hui et al. 2008, Dawson et al. 2011). 
This thesis would adopt macro-level approach by developing computer-based models with 
evacuee household behaviour in order to support the planning of mass evacuation. The micro-
level behaviour of the evacuees even though important is not currently addressed in this thesis 
and this is addressed by a different researcher (Mrs. Susan Anson) in the ERGO team to 
enable ‘public preparedness by using social marketing’ 
 
3.3.3  Research method adopted in this thesis 
There are various strategies/methods available within the empiricism philosophy, namely 
experiment, survey and case study. It is not feasible and ethically practical to study 
‘evacuation planning of a city’ through actual experiments. However, computer models 
provide an ethical means of conducting experiments (e.g. scenarios of disaster impact levels) 
and measuring the process of interest. Survey is another alternative of quantitatively 
measuring household behaviours using questionnaires with evacuees. Historical archival data 
could be studied for supporting evacuation plan on observing the past behaviours. All these 
three methods are alternatives available to study a particular city and to support an evacuation 
plan. The pitfall is the availability of survey/historical data with questions of particular 
interest and the cost of conducting a new survey. However, case study provides a possible 
alternative to use the data from surveys and archival records, and study household behaviour’s 
impact on evacuation KPIs for disaster scenarios planned. Based on the empirical data and 
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theories on household behaviours in the three phases, this thesis aims at a model-based 
understanding and prediction of overall evacuation process. 
 
 “The case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989, p 534). Case study method is widely used in the field 
of operations management (Voss et al. 2002). This thesis has taken a case of a city to present 
the evacuation preparedness in three ESFs supported by household behaviours. A similar 
approach has been adopted in various published literatures to demonstrate an evacuation 
modelling methodology (Rogers and Sorensen 1991, Southworth 1991, Dow and Cutter 2002, 
Murray and Mahmassani 2002, Kim et al. 2008, Doerner 2009, Ng et al. 2010, Mas et al. 
2012b). As the aim of the thesis was to use OR/MS-based evacuation planning, it is important 
to understand the choices of modelling techniques available within OR/MS. 
 
3.3.4 Choice of OR/MS technique: 
In order to model the mass evacuation system, the two broad alternatives available are 
‘optimization or mathematical programming’ and simulation. Mathematical programming or 
optimization provides the best option among available alternatives and would require a 
function (in general as an algebraic equation) to model the phenomena under study. There are 
studies related to evacuee transportation models using network optimization approach (Liu 
2006). But the household behaviours in the three ESFs cannot be directly incorporated into a 
single algebraic equation. Within social simulation there are different techniques namely 
System dynamics, discrete event simulation (DES) and agent-based modelling (ABM). 
Readers are directed to Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) for more information on the individual 
social simulation methods, its features and comparison. In comparison to ABM’s features, 
different social simulation methods are compared and presented in Table 3.1. 
 
System dynamics is a specific form of continuous simulation that represents a system as a set 
of stocks and flows (Robinson, 2003, p25). Micro-simulation represents individual units with 
a set of attributes and behaviours; however it does not have the interaction among the units. 
“Cellular automata” is a representation of modelled units into grids of cells. At every time 
step the grid changes its state depending on the neighbours’ states. There are transportation 
models using cellular automata (e.g. Zhang and Chang 2012). 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of various social simulation methods (Dawson et al. 2011 p171, 
Table 2) 
 
Comparison of OR/MS techniques and the choice 
System dynamics would be applicable if the overall performance of the system is aggregated 
through flow rates and levels. As the current level of study would look at the mass evacuation 
planning of a city considering the individual household behaviour, the system dynamics 
method is not very appropriate.  
 
The public would undergo different states during evacuation (namely uninformed public, 
received warning message, choosing the means of transportation and travelling to the shelter). 
Each of these states has associated behaviour that could be represented using simple if-then 
rules. DES technique is appropriate for addressing the state changes and not the interactions 
with other vehicles. In the transportation phase of evacuation, households choose their means 
of transport (e.g. cars) and enter road network along evacuation route. In this phase, 
movement of cars will be affected through interaction with other vehicles. Interaction of one 
household’s behaviour with others being the key will not be provided by DES modelling 
framework alone. Thus, system dynamics and DES are not appropriate for modelling the 
household behaviours with interaction. 
 
Simulation models are widely used as an experimental research technique where the input 
parameters in the model are systematically varied to study the performance metrics (output 
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variables). During large-scale emergencies there are two broad categories of uncertainties: 
behaviour of evacuating population and implication of EMAs response action on evacuation. 
“Simulation has been shown to be an effective method for handling this problem of 
unpredictability during evacuation and in anticipating and creating an efficient response 
procedure to it. “ (Chen et al. 2012, p207). For example, EMAs would want to know the 
effect of evacuee behaviours (e.g. means of transport) on the successfulness of evacuation 
measured using ET. In this case, a simulation model can be used to change this factor and 
study its impact. 
 
It can be observed from Table 3.1 that, ABM is the only framework that provides spatially 
explicit, heterogeneous capability with communication among agents. The choice of the 
Agent-based modelling is very appropriate for the aim of the study i.e. to model the 
behavioural aspects of the public during three ESFs. Mapping of agents to evacuating 
household provides an easy platform for modelling ESF phases. This approach has been 
adopted in earlier work to model evacuation of regions of the city (Rogers and Sorensen 1988, 
Mas et al. 2012a). The modelling of traffic has been adopted using network optimization 
approach (Cova and Johnson, 2003) by modelling road as ‘links’ and junctions as ‘nodes’. In 
this approach, the evacuee behaviour is depicted using flow rate (number of vehicles/time) 
instead of individual cars. This thesis would adopt combining network representation of the 
road (network model), evacuee state (represented as discrete states) and vehicle driving (as 
agents). Thus by combining various approaches to represent the evacuee behaviour makes the 
model more realistic unlike earlier approaches. The thesis would also propose an integrated 
approach for mass evacuation planning of the city instead of ESF-specific preparedness that 
does not explicitly consider inter-linkages.  
 
A critique on the ABMS is that the approach is based on methodological individualism where 
each agent represents an individual and reducing all social structures to individuals 
(O’Sullivan and Haklay, 2000). In cases where there is lack of theoretical underpinning of the 
social structure, the interaction of the agents in the model, and not explicitly identifying the 
assumptions of the model, would lead to incomplete representation of the society (O’Sullivan 
and Haklay, 2000).  This thesis will develop ABM with the behaviours identified in the 
available literature in social simulation on mass evacuation. A model is an abstraction of 
specific features of the real world. The models developed are from the practitioners’ 
perspective and would include the behaviours of the public identified as relevant by the IAB 
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panel. The three models characteristics were presented to the advisory board to review the 
appropriateness of variables chosen for evacuation planning. This will address the theoretical 
and practical relevance of the model. The model was further validated during the feedback 
visits to ERGO countries to present the findings as well as illustrate OR-based evacuation 
planning. The following paragraphs provide brief details of methodology choice for the three 
ESFs. 
 
Choice of OR/MS technique for ESF-1(Warning Dissemination) 
Evidence from the post-disaster evacuation suggests that the houses receive warning from 
their network including neighbours. Existing body of knowledge argues about the role of 
unofficial warning channel as voluntary or coordinated/planned system of warning 
dissemination. This thesis aims at answering ‘what is the impact of the household neighbour 
informant behaviour on warning dissemination?’ In order to support empirical evidence, a 
modelling approach has been chosen to incorporate the household behaviour (micro-
behaviour) and understand the warning dissemination of the communities/city regions 
(macro-behaviour).  
 
Agent-based modelling is often chosen to develop model-based understanding of individual 
units (say houses), their behaviour and its implication on the system’s (evacuating regions of 
a city) phenomena of interest (warning dissemination). This approach assumes that the 
‘behaviour of household in warning their neighbours’ is empirically measurable and 
represented in quantitative units, derives the aggregation process of understanding the 
‘system’ through development of behavioural analyses of warning response states through 
process maps and uses that process for aggregation from ‘units to system’. 
 
Choice of OR/MS technique for ESF-2 (Evacuee transportation) 
Simulation models for the movement of traffic could be classified (Southworth 1991) as 
‘micro-simulation’ (where the individual vehicles are tracked) and also ‘macro-simulation’ 
(looking at the stream of vehicular flow). ‘Dynamic Traffic Assignment’ models are 
macroscopic models where the departures are not decided at the household level instead they 
use zone-wise loading curves. On the other hand, microscopic models simulate evacuation 
phases at each household and after departure simulate the behaviour of vehicles on roads. One 
of the examples of microscopic and yet large-scale evacuation model is for the city of Padang, 
Indonesia, for tsunami preventive evacuation (Lammel et al. 2008). This thesis would adopt 
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the micro-behaviour of the individual vehicles but not the individual evacuees while 
developing the ABMs. 
 
The implementation of simulation clock advances is a key component in a simulation model 
including transportation models and there are two methods.  
 Time slice-oriented method uses pre-defined time unit for regularly monitoring the 
states of the model units (e.g. a vehicle) and update to a new state.  
 Event-oriented method computes the time needed for change in state (event) is 
computed for each unit and then the state is updated. 
Formulation of event-list for a transportation model involving few thousand vehicles in a city-
scale road network makes event-scheduling algorithm to be more complex. Hence, time-
slicing method is preferred in this thesis. Thereby, the states of ‘leader follower’ pair are 
regularly updated using the car-following logic.  For the transportation model, the time slice 
value in existing traffic simulators is often 1.0 seconds (Schulze and Fliess 1997, p1224). 
Smaller the value of tick, larger the number of iterations and more will be the model 
execution time. 
 
Choice of OR/MS technique for ESF-3(Shelter management) 
Traditionally, optimization techniques are used to obtain the best solution by solving the 
problems that follows standard structures. As there is a need for minimising the TET (time 
from departure to safety) of all the evacuating zones by optimally allocating the available 
shelters to the estimated demands from different evacuation zones, optimization is a suitable 
OR technique for solving the problem. Here the objective function and the constraints are 
linear in nature; thus the shelter allocation model formulation belongs to LP problems. This is 
in-line to the approaches used in the existing literature (Sherali et al. 1991, Kongsomsaksakul 
et al. 2005, Ng et al. 2010).  
 
It is anticipated that the results of this model will be a positive integer (whole number), 
indicating the number of evacuees among the estimated demand to be allocated to different 
shelters. As the decision variables are integers, this leads the problem to be of a special class 
of LP namely Integer Programming problem (IP). The solution space (comprising all the 
possible values for the decision variables) will be a grid of points in the IP problems on 
contrary to a polygon area in the LP problems. This highlights the computational need and 
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special algorithm for arriving at the optimal solutions in the grid within minimum 
computational time, though an interesting topic will not be covered in this thesis. This thesis 
will use the existing solver in the MS-excel for solving the IP problem. 
 
Incorporating the evacuee behaviour as quantitative factors into simulation models is 
acknowledged as a challenge in terms of model validation. The evacuee behaviours has been 
represented in the previous study (e.g. OREMS, Southworth 1991) using proxy variables such 
as delay time in preparing to evacuate, choice of evacuation transport and car-driving 
behaviour. All these quantitative variables serve as a proxy for the evacuee behaviour relevant 
to mass evacuation planning. Some of the numerical values will be identified from the actual 
events, academic and practitioner literature and would be used as a representative value in the 
model. The behaviour of the public can be studied using interpretivist approach to identify 
and group similar group behaviours. This thesis has incorporated such findings from 
published sources along with the expert panel judgement using IAB to identify the public 
behaviours relevant for planning mass evacuation and then develop the models. Any model is 
an abstracted representation of reality and hence it is important to test the validity of the 
model in comparison with reality. 
 
General principles of Verification and Validation of a model 
Model ‘verification’ and ‘validation’ are two important portions of model development 
process (Sargent 2005) for ensuring the reliability of the model findings (Sargent 2005) and 
increase the end-user confidence (Robinson, 1997). Model validation is defined as 
“substantiation that a computerised model within its domain of applicability possesses a 
satisfactory range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the model“ 
(Schlesinger et al. 1979). The model validation will be carried out at various stages (Kleijnen 
1995) namely  
i) Conceptual modelling stage (by identifying and using published modelling approaches 
to incorporate evacuee behaviours)  
ii) Model development (by one-to-one demonstration with senior practitioners in 
critiquing the validity and completeness of the model features. Apart from that, the 
model development during the feedback visit to the ERGO countries would also be 
used to measure the validity of the model, usefulness to the practitioners and to 
identify features for further development)  
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iii) Sensitivity analysis (for the factors with less reliable numerical value and also 
considering the cultural aspect of the evacuees, the model would be studied for a range 
of values to understand the sensitivity of the model input)  
Model verification is defined as “ensuring that the computer program of the computerised 
model and its implementation are correct” (Sargent 2005). In the coding stage, the model was 
verified through code review and unit testing of modules. After coding, the model was tested 
for each functionality through unit testing (individual modules) and system testing 
(collectively after integration). The rigorousness of the model development will ensure the 
reliability of the model results by the stakeholders as well as the contribution to evacuation 
modelling theory.  
 
Verification of model during development was done through recursively testing the modules 
and ensuring the implementation. Unit testing was carried out in each module of the three 
models. System testing was conducted after integrating all the modules of a particular ESF 
and repeatedly testing model through many runs. For ESF-1 and ESF-2, the implementation 
of behavioural modelling in ABM was done in two phase. The first phase involved 
implementation and testing code in a simplified case (prototype) and second phase was for 
ERGO city. This phased development provided control over the code development and 
improved accuracy by testing/debugging the logic in a smaller scale.  
 
The validation of the models was been done in thesis at various stages and can be broadly 
classified into three categories: academic review (AR), emergency practitioner review (EPR) 
and IT systems expert review (ITR). Managing simulation model development as a simulation 
project will ensure reliability of the model. The implementation of the conceptual model as a 
software code requires validation. 
 
AR and EPR were conducted with expert academics and practitioners provided opportunity to 
review the model development with the existing state of the art. The ITR was conducted in 
this thesis by an expert in the field of developing software applications. Given the conceptual 
model and model objective, the implementation of the code was reviewed. Inline to the three 
broad classifications, the validation of the model was carried out in various stages as 
presented in Table 3.2. 
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This thesis found that the overall experience of using ITR for the developed models provided 
considerable help in transferring good practices from an experienced IT specialist in helping 
to increase the reliability of the developed model. In a large-scale coding project, providing 
easy readable and meaningful names for variables and procedures is a good practice in 
software coding. During the initial review, the module names were not easily readable and 
hence changed, and this was one of the learning from this thesis and a valuable outcome of 
ITR. This thesis argues that such an approach has a potential for strengthening the reliability 
of the model by: benchmarking the research with academic rigour, ensuring good practices in 
IT to be implemented in evacuation modelling, and developing usable and realistic evacuation 
models for planning ESF response. 
 
The model interface was developed as a user-friendly tool to enable the practitioner for 
building and testing various scenarios and assumptions for mass evacuation planning. This 
thesis intends to develop a tool that would support the decision makers at the planning stage 
to test various scenarios, training and table-top exercises. The model is not intended to be 
used while responding to an emergency as the response is based on experience and standard 
operating procedure for various organisations.   
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Table 3.2 Validation of ABM in this thesis 
STAGES 
CLASSIFICATION 
AR  EPR ITR 
International Advisory Board - 1    
ESRC Seminar held in Aston University    
POMS Conference    
International Advisory Board – 2    
Master Class    
ICEM conference    
Proceedia Engineering – Journal Publication    
European Journal of Operational Research 
(EJOR) – Journal publications 
   
InterCEPT conference    
Feedback presentations in ten countries    
ESRC Seminar held in Cranfield University    
Peer Review by Dr. Adam Zageroecki    
Peer Review by Koen De Budt (IAB member: 
Brussels) 
   
Peer Review by Kevin Arbuthnot (IAB 
Chairman) 
   
Peer review by Senior Software Developer    
 
Choice of Modelling Software 
The integrated evacuation model (iEM) developed in this thesis has three modules 
corresponding to three ESFs. Three modules of the iEM use two OR/MS techniques namely 
ABM and optimization. In this thesis ABM was developed using NetLogo software. There are 
other ABM modelling platforms such as Repast Simphony, MASON, Core Java APIs, and 
StarLogo (Macal and North 2009, p94). The ease of use for the non-IT savvy emergency 
managers makes NetLogo appropriate. In their review of agent-based modelling platforms, 
Railsback et al. (2006) considered Netlogo as the ‘‘highest-level platform, providing a simple 
yet powerful programming language, built-in graphical interfaces, and comprehensive 
documentation". One of the disadvantages of NetLogo is the limited flexibility in generating 
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output graphs interactively by the user and this has been handled by writing 'standard output 
reports' as a sub-routine. 
 
There are various platforms for optimization such as Lingo, LPSolver, Matlab, etc that 
provide inbuilt functions for solving IP problem after formulation. However, the IP problem 
is to be formulated based on ABM outputs from ESF-1 and ESF-2 for a specific scenario 
experiment and hence Visual Basic Applications (VBA-Excel) provided a suitable 
programming framework and optimization solver for developing SIMS model. 
 
It was not feasible to integrate an ABM simulation model (NetLogo) and optimization in a 
single modelling environment. There are Java APIs available for many operational research 
techniques including ABM and optimization, which could have facilitated the integration by 
either developing iEM from scratch in core-java or possibly extending Repast. Since NetLogo 
does not provide interface for integrating optimization macros, the choice of NetLogo enabled 
only semi-integration. 
 
A case study provides a single setting (i.e. evacuation region) to understand dynamics (e.g. 
household behaviour) and study a process of interest (i.e. evacuation performance). ABM 
provides a framework for representing household behaviours as agent behaviour and studying 
the impact on the system (i.e. overall evacuation performance). The next section discusses 
how the data needed to address the research question was designed and obtained. 
 
3.3.5 Data collection and analysis 
An overview of the ERGO Project and the framework was presented in Section 1.3. The data 
collection for answering the objective of ERGO project was done through 97 semi-structured 
interviews conducted from November 2008 to May 2009, with each interview lasting around 
one hour. In the ERGO project, the interviews were analysed to identify metrics that could be 
used for measuring the government’s preparedness and also repository of analytical models 
that are currently used by the participant countries. As the thesis focuses on models used for 
ESF planning, the transcribed interviews were used to document findings for each participant 
country on ‘the models currently used, warning/transport/sheltering policies, and planning 
assumptions’. In chapters 4, 5 and 6, these ERGO findings are presented respectively on the 
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three ESFs. In addition to the gaps on ESF models identified in literature, these findings 
provided gaps for further model development in this thesis. 
 
This thesis makes an independent contribution by studying the potential for using computer-
based simulation models for evacuation planning for a city. This thesis focuses on developing 
computer models for warning message dissemination, evacuee transportation model and 
shelter management, namely elements 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 1.2. The other elements (1, 2, 3) in 
the integrated model would be addressed by other researchers in the ERGO team (Dr. Paul 
Kailiponi and Mrs. Susan Anson). 
 
Quantitative data – An introduction 
Quantitative data are represented in the form of measures (variables) that can be broadly 
classified as ‘independent variables’ and ‘dependent variables’. In the context of cause effect 
relationship, dependent variables are influenced by the independent variable. For example, in 
transportation management, the choice of evacuee transportation (independent variable) (e.g. 
using cars) will influence the TET (dependent variable). These variables form the basic unit of 
building quantitative models based on the relationship between dependent variable (ET) and 
independent variable (choice of transport). Quantitative data forms the basis of developing 
evacuation models. The Quantitative Modelling approach has been used for more than five 
decades (Simpson and Hancock 2009) in supporting evacuation management. These models 
are used to understand the variation of the independent variable and its effect on the 
dependent variable. The ERGO interviews and the literature were used to identify quantitative 
variables for modelling evacuation preparedness. For example, during the interviews, it was 
found that the EMAs in Hamburg specified that the 40% of the evacuating public will use 
public transport and others will be self-evacuating in cars. This quantitative data was helpful 
in identifying the ‘type transport usage (%)’ variable as well as a representative value for it.  
The variables and their interrelationships were identified for each phases of the evacuation 
and are elaborated in Chapter – 7. 
 
Sources of quantitative data 
Quantitative data were collected from different sources during the ERGO project namely 
transcribed interview data, evacuation plan documents, observations during site visits, 
secondary data from reports, surveys and model demonstrations. Coding schemes were used 
to analyse the transcribed ERGO interviews. For each phase of the evacuation model, the 
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content was further analysed to identify the evacuee behaviour and EMA response factors, 
and document representative values for these variables. In case the representative values for 
the variables varied to a wide range, descriptive statistics (e.g. mean and standard deviation) 
were used to represent the variation. The same approach has been used to analyse the 
evacuation plan documents and leaflets. 
 
Apart from the data collected from the participant ERGO countries, published literature (both 
academic and practitioner), post-disaster reports, pre-disaster studies and evacuation manuals 
form an important data source for identifying the variables as well as representative values to 
support evacuation modelling. Survey data forms an important data source for supporting 
evacuation preparedness. Table 2.1 presents different types of data source. During the ERGO 
data collection process, the countries were requested to provide survey results that they have 
used for evacuation planning, and this was used to identify the generalisable planning aspects 
and make it transferable to other countries. 
 
The sequence of events in the evacuation plan (e.g. warning dissemination phase) is another 
important data source. This data will be collected as a ‘process map’ for individual phases of 
the evacuation based on the interviews and evacuation plans.  A‘process map’ (or conceptual 
model) is defined as a “diagrammatic representation of process in order to provide better 
understanding” (Greasley 2004, p52) of the system under study. A process map consists of a 
set of variables and a set of logical and quantitative relationships between them (Lee and 
Lings 2008, p125). This process map would help in developing models of the evacuation 
process in order to support evacuation preparedness. For example, the sequence of events 
between warning message and evacuees leaving the house could be represented as a ‘process 
map’. An illustration of a process map based on the literature was presented in Figure 2.1. 
This following sub-section presents the ERGO city case study used to illustrate integrated 
evacuation planning. 
 
ERGO City Case study 
The three ESFs covered in this thesis are common across many disasters. However, as an 
example of a rapid-onset disaster, a flooding scenario was chosen for demonstration the 
models. This thesis has taken all-hazards approach for developing the model. The disaster 
impact is inputted to the model as ‘zones to be evacuated’. The disaster event is taken to be 
outside the boundary of the model. While using these models to a real-life city, the planned 
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threat/hazard and the scenario can be inputted as evacuated zones. The IAB members served 
as an expert panel in validation of the scope of the model. The findings from the ERGO study 
along with the models developed as a part of this thesis have been presented to the participant 
countries during subsequent visits. 
 
The ERGO city case study will be used to highlight some of the response strategies that could 
help the planners to contextualise the model to their city. ERGO city is a multi-ethnic modern 
city with a resident population of 1.6 million people. The city is well connected by three 
major expressways serving to the resident population and commuters (0.5 million) for the 
booming business district. The central area of the city indicated by A4-A5, B4-B5 and C4-C6 
(refer to Figure 3.2) is home to three universities as well as the business district. The city is 
prone to storm flood and the EMA have been preparing both the organisations and the public 
for potential large-scale evacuation. 
 
After considerable rain during the winter, the environmental agency (EA) had warned about 
the potential breach of dykes and they have been monitoring the water level very closely. EA 
using their ‘River Flooding model’ has identified the areas that need evacuation and sent the 
following message to the multi-agency committee for evacuation decision.  
 
There was a major emergency in the ‘flood zone’ areas of the ERGO city. The areas indicated 
in blue in the ERGO city map are likely to be inundated. There is high possibility of the flood 
protection dykes to break within 1.5 hours.  
 
Considering the flood forecast from the EA, the multi-agency decision-making team has 
decided to evacuate considering the safety of the public. This multi-agency team includes 
local authorities, police, transport officials, Red Cross and humanitarian organisations. The 
GOs are responsible for implementing the decision by supporting the evacuation. These 
EMAs as a preparedness initiative have developed an ‘evacuation plan’ as well as 
‘organisation level response plans’.  
 
For the context of ERGO city, other evacuation options such as in-sheltering and vertical 
evacuation are considered as infeasible given the high level of flood and duration to last for 
few days.  As the evacuation begins from relocating the public at-risk to safe place outside the 
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evacuated zone, this thesis will cover three EFSs namely: ‘dissemination of warning message, 
evacuation transport management and managing emergency accommodation’. 
 
Police officials in the ERGO city are responsible for dissemination the warning message for 
evacuation. In the warning preparedness section of evacuation plan, they have identified TV, 
radios, mobile messaging, landline message and sirens as the official channels used for 
warning the public during evacuation. As a policy, all these channels will be used in tandem 
to reach out as ‘everyone’ as ‘quickly’ as possible. 
 
There are 19 zones to be evacuated indicated by blue zones in the ERGO city map. There are 
about 32,000 households living in the evacuated region. The evacuees can evacuate using cars 
and the transport officials will also provide bus facilities for the needy. The transport 
authorities are responsible for managing the evacuating traffic and implement response 
strategies that support a speedy evacuation. 
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Figure 3.2 Snapshot of ERGO city with zones to be evacuated due to flooding 
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Local authorities have identified potential locations for ‘public shelters’ in advance 
throughout the ERGO city. Due to the level of flood in the evacuated zones, the shelters 
within that zone are considered to be unsafe. The shelters available in the neighbouring 10 
boroughs (represented by a star symbol S1-S10) are available for receiving the evacuees. 
Figure 3.3 shows the overall architecture of the model. The architecture enables a generic 
modelling platform to customize data from other cities. Further details on ‘the ERGO city 
relevant for each ESF’ are presented respectively in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Overall modelling architecture for parts 5 and 6 
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3.4 Research design of the thesis 
In line to the framework proposed by Saunders et al. (2007), Table 3.3 presents the choices 
made at various stages in research design of this thesis. Table 3.4 consolidates different 
techniques that were used for the three ESFs.  
Table 3.3 Research design choices 
Research design element Choice 
Philosophy Post-positivism 
Approach Deductive 
Strategy Case Study 
Method Choice Multi-method 
Data Collection Secondary data 
 
Table 3.4 Modelling techniques used for each ESF model. 
ESF Phase Techniques used Level of modelling 
Warning message 
dissemination 
Agent-based simulation Household - mesoscale 
Evacuee transportation 
model 
Network models and agent-
based model 
Household as a 
Vehicle/pedestrians – 
mesoscale 
Shelter management Optimization Household – mesoscale 
 
Warning, transportation and sheltering does not happen in isolation. Rather, these are phases 
for the household to move from danger to safety. This thesis will look from the perspective of 
evacuation preparedness of supporting GOs at the journey of the evacuees from the onset of 
evacuation warning to their relocation to safety. Evacuation is supported by different 
organisations (GOs) in various evacuation phases with separate organisation level evacuation 
plan. Instead of planning for evacuation as individual phases, this thesis will adopt an 
integrated approach of studying the interconnectedness of the GOs, their response plans, and 
cascading effects.  The ‘inter-agency coordination’ is one of the major pitfalls from Hurricane 
Katrina experience. This thesis does not recommend replacement of individual organisation 
level preparedness, which is essential, instead strengthening it further through OR models.  
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There are various planning assumptions about the evacuees that form the basis of evacuation 
plans. At times, the GOs hold some beliefs about the evacuee behaviour choices implicitly 
through their experience. Some of the evacuee behaviours are influenced by the existing laws 
(e.g. cannot evacuate using cars) and policies (e.g. no public transport support). There are 
uncertainties in the behaviour of individual evacuating household which can have an impact 
on the overall evacuation. An OR evacuation model will serve as a platform for the GOs to 
understand the implication of the various facets of evacuee behaviours including their 
planning assumptions, long-held beliefs, influence of laws and policies and uncertainties on 
the overall evacuation. 
 
On a contrary argument, there are uncertainties in the household behaviour, no accurate 
empirical evidence exists and yet EMAs require empirical evidence to support their 
evacuation plans. Acknowledging these limitations, the role of model is emphasised much 
more in the absence of enough information. Uncertainty in the modelled phenomena 
(parameters, behaviours, system boundary, etc) can be tested through sensitivity analyses with 
the model and develop model-based understanding. In general, “the purpose of models is to 
simplify complex situations so that they can be understood adequately”. (Alexander 2009). 
Once a model is developed and tested and conclusions/findings are generated about the 
phenomena of interest, it is not an end, but a beginning of the next cycle of model 
development.  
 
No model is a perfect representation of reality nor is the knowledge about evacuation process 
complete. With increasingly complex disasters (e.g. 2011 Tsunami in Japan) and the EMA’s 
ability to respond through better planning, designing response strategies and judicious use of 
resources, understanding about the evacuation is argued to be progressive. A model serves as 
an ethical means of testing the preparedness initiatives than trying during an actual event. 
With the ERGO city case study approach, chapters 4 to 6 present the model development for 
three ESFs, then followed by an integrated approach for evacuation planning (Chapter 7).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODEL DEVELOPMENT - WARNING MESSAGE 
DISSEMINATION 
 
4.1 Evacuation warning message dissemination – An introduction 
During the tsunami in Indian Ocean (2004) about 230,000 people died. ‘Telegrafia® warning 
system’ leaflet claims that ‘if there was a warning system, about 80% of them could survive’ 
(Telegrafia, 2010). The tsunami disaster has showed ‘what happens when an effective 
warning system is not in place’ (Sierra 2006, p.3). In a large-scale disaster providing timely 
notification to the public about the threat is very essential to save lives. This thesis focuses on 
the three ESFs namely ‘disseminating warning to the public’ (Chapter 4), ‘transporting the 
evacuees from evacuated area’ (Chapter 5) and ‘managing public shelters’ (Chapter 6), and 
supports these ESFs planning using ORMS-based approach. This chapter begins with the key 
findings from the ERGO project data and then followed by the model developed to support 
warning dissemination planning for the GOs. 
 
4.2 ERGO project findings on warning message dissemination (ESF – 1) 
The following section presents the findings on warning dissemination based on the data 
collection of the ERGO project. The organisation responsible for warning dissemination was 
commonly found to be the police in the ERGO participant countries. Depending on the nature 
of disaster, there are other organisations that provide key information for the warning content. 
For example, in the evacuation during the storm flooding in Germany, the ‘Hamburg Port 
Authority’ played a pivotal role in providing the severity information to the ‘Ministry of 
Interior’ for disseminating evacuation message. Warning systems are comprised of ‘formal 
channels’ and ‘informal channels’ as discussed in the literature review (Section 2.8.2). The 
ERGO findings on warning dissemination are grouped into these two categories and presented 
below. During the interviews, it was found that, in many ERGO countries, warning messages 
are disseminated to the public using a variety of low-technology ‘formal channels’, such as: 
telephones, television, radio, sirens, route alert using cars and public announcement (PA) 
systems. These formal channels are common across all the participant countries, and there 
were other formal channels too. These will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
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4.2.1 Findings on warning dissemination using ‘formal channels’ 
In Germany, ‘church bells’ were used as a warning channel to alert the public. As the density 
of population is low in Iceland, ‘fire crackers’ were also used in mountainous areas to alert the 
public as well as tourists about a potential emergency. It was also found that the billboards in 
prominent tourist places mentioned fire crackers as well as the nearest evacuation point. 
‘Door-to-door knocking’ by uniformed police officers was also used in highly vulnerable 
areas in Germany, United Kingdom, Iceland and Denmark. During the preventive evacuation 
for Cyclone Yasi (2011) in Australia, police officials employed door-to-door knocking in the 
low-lying storm surge areas of Townville and Cairns (Brisbane-Times, 2011).  
 
Belgium has ‘radio alarm receiver systems’ installed in the houses within the inner zone 
(within 10km) of the Tihange nuclear plant. These radio systems can be remotely activated 
and has a backup power using battery to switch-on automatically even if it is disconnected to 
power supply or there is electricity failure. A similar system was available in Sweden too. 
Japan has a network map that shows the coverage of PA alerts that use fixed speakers 
installed across a city. Based on the coverage, a higher number of PA systems are installed in 
densely populated areas in order to reach the public in urban and semi-urban regions. A 
similar system of PA networks is managed for typhoon threats in the region of Hallands Lan 
in Sweden. 
 
Apart from these conventional official warning channels, there are other technology-
sophisticated warning channels too. Belgium has the Domino-Gedicom system (Langloy 
2006, p.2) which is a telephone network-based warning dissemination service that can be used 
to disseminate warning message to landline phones for a selected evacuation area. This 
system has been used in training and exercises by testing the warning level using mass auto-
dial to telephones. During the ERGO master-class presentation it was found that, Norway 
uses a UMS ‘population alert’ system for quickly delivering alerts to ‘landline and mobile’ 
based on the location and address of the selected region. This product is sophisticated enough 
to identify and categorise the telephones of non-residents including foreign tourists and can 
disseminate warning message in their native language. It is observed that there may be 
privacy and legal restrictions in some countries (e.g. Data Protection Act in the United 
Kingdom) that may hinder adoption of such technology solution as a warning channel. 
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The Environment Agency (EA) in the United Kingdom has a ‘subscriber-based’ flood 
warning system where the residents of flood plains can receive free flood warnings to their 
landlines. The residents can additionally sign-up for receiving alerts to their mobile phones as 
well as email updates. The EA also has a dedicated ‘floodline’ telephone service to advice on 
queries from the residents regarding flood preparedness. Apart from these, the EA website has 
a facility for users to get detailed forecasts for their locality, and this information is updated 
every 15 minutes. Table 4.1 summarises ‘official warning channels’ found during the ERGO 
data collection. Broadly, the official channels can be grouped into conventional channels (e.g. 
media channels and warning network installations), localised warning units and technology-
based high-tech systems.  
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Table 4.1 ERGO findings on official warning channels in the ERGO countries 
Sl.No. Official channel Group Feature (if any) 
1. Television Conventional channel Media channel 
2. Radio Conventional channel Media channel 
3. Tone alert systems Conventional channel Voice and tone alert systems 
4. Telephones Conventional channel Auto-dialler systems 
5. Church bells Localised warning units  
6. Fire crackers Localised warning units  
7. Door-to-door knocking Localised warning units Manual warning of 
household typically by police 
officers 
8. Public announcement 
networks 
Technology-based 
systems 
Remotely controlled PA units 
9. Radio alarm system Technology-based 
systems 
Automatic remotely activated 
alarm system 
10. Domino-Gedicom system Technology-based 
systems 
Satellite-based auto-dialler 
for landline and mobile 
11. Unified messaging service Technology-based 
systems 
Location-based auto-dialler 
alert systems 
12. Subscribed based systems Technology-based 
systems 
User can opt in and out of a 
warning messaging service 
13. Flood line – hotlines Technology-based 
systems 
Hotline telephone numbers 
for providing information to 
the evacuees 
 
4.2.2 Findings on warning dissemination using ‘informal channels’ 
Apart from these formal channels, community-based informal channels, where the evacuating 
members act as informants, are also used in warning dissemination. It was found in the ERGO 
project that, Iceland uses community involvement in a ‘runner-follower’ warning network, 
where each evacuation zone has few runners (volunteers) pre-identified, who would verify the 
evacuation of neighbouring residents en route by checking for signboards left in the houses’ 
window after their occupants have left. During the preventive evacuation (April 2010) of 
volcanic eruption in Eyjafjallajokull, this runner-follower system was proven to be very 
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effective both by the emergency responders and by the evacuated public interviewed by the 
ERGO team from the Hvolsvollur region. This is a good example for using the community as 
a resource and a ‘coordinated unofficial channel’ for warning dissemination, and the 
successfulness of this system was evident from the recent evacuation. 
 
The use of informal social media such as ‘blogs, Face-book and Twitter’ was found during the 
2010 volcanic eruption in Eyjafjallajokull in Iceland among the evacuees. Apart from 
informal warning among the evacuees during the Cyclone Yasi evacuation (February 2011), 
Queensland police officials in Australia have reached out ‘instructions for evacuees’ through 
Face-book and Twitter. This illustrates the use of internet or social media as a means of 
informal warning dissemination among the general public. Table 4.2 summarises the ERGO 
findings on informal warning channels. 
 
Table 4.2 Findings on Informal warning channels in the ERGO countries 
Sl. No. Informal channel Feature 
1. Runner-follower Volunteer based 
2. Flood wardens Pre-identified and trained 
wardens 
3. Informal social media Blogs, Face-book and Twitter 
 
4.2.3 Testing evacuation warning systems as an evacuation preparedness initiative 
The EMA responsible for warning dissemination needs to test their warning systems at the 
planning stage to strengthen their preparedness. The testing is intended to measure the time 
needed for warning, generate awareness among the public and also ensure functioning of 
warning instruments. The Gedicom-Domino system used in Belgium has a facility to test the 
telephone-based warning dissemination within the software without actually dispatching the 
message. In Denmark, the sirens are tested every year, and the meanings of various sirens 
were conveyed to the general public. In Germany, during the annual flood day exercise 
official sirens were displayed to the general public and also tested. Japan has developed the 
OWASE software to model the tsunami warning dissemination as well as estimating the 
likely casualty for a chosen level of tsunami (OWASE, 2013). This model was developed 
based on ‘multi-agent simulation’ technique and was found to be helpful in planning warning 
dissemination. It was also found that the warning dissemination to the vulnerable population 
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(e.g. people with visual and hearing disabilities) requires further research. No single warning 
channel can fully provide timely warning and full coverage to the evacuees, and it was 
evident from the ERGO interviews that the GOs across the participant countries used as many 
official warning channels as available. 
 
Authorities responsible for warning the public use official warning channels to disseminate 
the warning message. Apart from the official channels, literature as well as the findings from 
the ERGO countries (particularly ‘runner-follower’ model of Iceland and Flood wardens of 
United Kingdom) highlighted the use of community-based unofficial warning channels. An 
OR based warning dissemination model has a potential to empirically study the effectiveness 
of warning systems (official and unofficial) and also the impact of uncertainties in timely 
warning. This thesis provides a modelling platform for measuring the effectiveness of 
warning dissemination by integrating official warning channels along with the unofficial 
warning channel particularly the warning dissemination among neighbours. The model will be 
used to illustrate the effect of time of the day on warning dissemination and the potential 
impact of using informal channels. This model will help the GOs to plan, test and exercise 
warning dissemination process as a part of preparedness initiatives.  
 
In summary, apart from the functional testing of warning channels and generating awareness 
to the public, it was found that there was no comprehensive testing plan for warning 
dissemination among the ERGO countries. During the literature review on warning 
dissemination, there were many studies that highlighted the potential for using simulation 
models for warning dissemination planning, and none of ERGO countries were found to use 
such analytical tools. There is evidence from the post-evacuation studies on the importance of 
the role of unofficial warning channel as well as community involvement in warning 
dissemination in the ERGO countries, but this has not been empirically studied to support 
unofficial channel as a warning channel with evidence base. Modelling the effectiveness of 
warning dissemination by integrating the official and unofficial warning channel remains 
unexplored. 
 
4.2.4 Research gap on planning for ESF-1 
In the city of Padang, Indonesia, ‘expected warning time’ is only 30 minutes for Tsunami 
waves to reach the shoreline (McCloskey et al. 2008). This is an example of rapid-onset 
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disasters with a very narrow time available from warning to evacuation. Using ABM 
developed in MATSIM, it was found that for the overall ET by foot was 75 minutes (with 30 
minutes warning time) for the evacuees to reach safety (Lammel et al. 2008). This highlights 
the role of models in warning time for evacuation preparedness. 
 
The literature review had highlighted various factors affecting the warning dissemination, 
namely: effectiveness of the warning channels, potential vulnerability of warning channels 
during the disaster (e.g. telephone network failure), scope of using ‘informal networks’ for 
warning dissemination, and ‘time of the day’ when evacuation order is issued. These are 
important preparedness aspects for the GOs responsible for providing timely warning and 
remain unaddressed in considering the factors in the warning plan. Official channels cannot 
reach all the members of a community, and hence unofficial channels are also important.  
Even though the ERGO findings indicate ‘coordinated unofficial channels’ (e.g. Runner-
follower model of Iceland) similar to the flood wardens of the United Kingdom  and the 
literature has already identified the role of unofficial channels including 
voluntary/Uncoordinated dissemination (Parker and Handmer 1998) and evidences for 
spontaneous message dissemination in absence of official channels (e.g. evacuation due 
London sub-urban fire accident), the level of the public as informants and its uncertainty need 
to be investigated as a potential informal warning channel apart from official channels. 
 
Parker and Handmer (1998) highlighted that the effectiveness of the unofficial warning 
channel ‘cannot be assumed to be the same across different cultures, levels of social and 
economic development’ and hence any quantitative estimates of dissemination need further 
examination through sensitivity analysis. Irrespective of either uncoordinated or coordinated 
unofficial dissemination of the warning message, the behaviour of households should be 
understood to inform emergency planning. 
 
For a household to be a warning channel, there are several choices to be made at the 
household level (e.g. whether to warn neighbour or not?), and these household choices would 
impact the overall warning dissemination at a city scale. This thesis will develop a simulation 
model integrating ‘official channels and unofficial channels’ that could support planning and 
testing the warning message dissemination to the public. The model will be used to 
investigate the uncertainties in unofficial channel and its impact on warning dissemination. 
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4.3 Model for warning message dissemination – An introduction 
Warning systems ‘warn’ the public under threat before/during an evacuation and some 
‘inform’ them of actions to carry out to protect themselves and others. The need for quick 
dissemination of the warning message is essential for no-notice disasters like earthquakes, 
tsunamis, flash floods, tornadoes, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks. Findings from the 
ERGO interviews and literature review highlighted the role of unofficial warning channels. 
There are limited studies except Hui et al. (2008) on formally incorporating the unofficial 
warning channel in evacuation warning plan. Moreover, in order for the GOs to test their 
warning dissemination capabilities and understand the impact of unofficial channels, a 
simulation model could support the preparedness initiatives. With this intent, this thesis has 
presented a ‘proof of concept’ of development and use of a simulation model to plan for 
warning message dissemination with unofficial channels. The developed model has been 
illustrated using a case study of ERGO city as introduced in the earlier chapter. The following 
section presents the details of the ERGO city’s evacuation warning details followed by the 
warning message dissemination model. 
 
4.3.1 ERGO city case study - An overview 
This thesis has adopted case study approach to explain the proof of concept on using OR 
based models for ESF planning. GOs need to understand the uncertainties in household 
evacuation behaviours for three ESFs and its implication on the success of evacuation. In 
order to explain the model developed, a hypothetical case called ‘ERGO city’ is used for 
illustrating the application of models and how it can help GOs to support their preparedness. 
It will be used to highlight some of the response strategies that could help the planners to 
contextualise to their city. Each of the ESF model development chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
presents only the respective ESF details of the ERGO city prior to elaborating on the model 
development and analyses. Section 3.3.5 of this thesis presents the ERGO city demographic 
details, flood inundation details and the evacuation shelters. 
 
ERGO city case study – Warning message dissemination scenario details  
There was a major emergency in the ‘flood zone’ areas of the ERGO city. The multi-agency 
committee has decided to evacuate designated areas indicated by blue colour in the ERGO 
city map. The flood is expected to breach the dykes within 1.5 hours.  
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The decision to evacuate was made considering the safety of the public in view. Police 
officials in ERGO city are responsible for dissemination the warning message for evacuation. 
In the warning preparedness section of evacuation plan, they have identified ‘TV, radios, 
mobile messaging, landline message and sirens’ as the official channels used for warning the 
public during evacuation. As a policy, all these channels will be used in tandem to reach out 
‘everyone in evacuated zones’ as ‘quickly’ as possible.  
 Will the people in the designated areas be warned within 1.5 hours prior to the dyke 
break?  
 Will the warning message reach ‘everyone’ and in a ‘timely’ manner?  
These are some of policy-level questions for this ERGO city context that the emergency 
responders will be answering as a part of preparedness initiative. Keeping these details about 
the ERGO city as a context, the following section describes about the model, how various 
factors of warning plans will affect the warning dissemination, how the warning informant 
behaviour dynamics of the household with impact overall warning and finally the illustration 
of simulation approach in supporting warning preparedness for mass evacuation. The same 
ERGO city will be used for the other two ESFs namely evacuee transport management 
(Chapter 5) and emergency accommodation planning (Chapter 6). 
 
4.3.2 KPIs for measuring evacuation warning preparedness: 
Warning dissemination effectiveness has two dimensions namely ‘delivery of the message’ 
and the ‘message content’. The design of warning message content was found to be well 
established underpinning the social science literature (Sorensen and Mileti, 1989). “An 
extensive literature existing on how individuals and families interpret and respond to such 
warnings when they are received” (Sorensen and Mileti 1987). As the focus of this thesis is 
on the ‘delivery’ of the warning message to the evacuating households, the message content 
and its effectiveness in triggering favourable response from the public though very important 
is considered to be outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
EMAs use measurable objectives to set operational targets in their response plans for 
providing timely evacuation warning. For answering the policy-level question on warning 
preparedness, there are two KPI metrics collected from the model results.  
i) ‘Expected level of warning’ is defined as the proportion of people who would 
receive the message under a given condition.  
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ii) ‘Notification time’ is defined as the time required for reaching a maximum 
proportion of the public (i.e. expected level of warning) under a given 
condition. Another output metric denotes the distribution of number of sources 
from which a single household receives the message.  
These metrics have been used in earlier evacuation simulation models (Stern and Sinuany-
Stern 1989, Rogers and Sorensen 1991, Southworth 1991, Hui et al. 2008) and has been 
adopted in this thesis. These two metrics are collected and analysed to compare various 
scenario to know whether the operational targets can be met for a chosen scenario and also the 
level of warning preparedness. The following section elaborates the model, its development 
and further experimental result analyses. 
 
4.3.3 Description of warning message dissemination model 
Agent-based modelling is widely used in social simulation particularly suitable where 
behaviour of the entities in a system needs to be modelled. Evacuee behaviour as informants 
will be modelled using software ‘agents’. The household behaviour of the evacuees like 
‘whether they have received the message?  and Will they disseminate to their neighbours?’ 
will be set as properties and behavioural rules for the agents. The warning message model will 
combine the effectiveness of formal channels along with the informal channels using agent-
based modelling in order to measure warning dissemination capability under various 
conditions. Warning dissemination model contains three aspects of the evacuated area: 
i) Evacuation household details and their properties 
ii) Official warning channel and their effectiveness 
iii) Behavioural rules for unofficial warning dissemination 
The ABM canvas contains the evacuated zone, households represented as dots, and 
evacuation road network represented using arcs. These properties are imported as coordinates 
into the ABM. A modelled household is represented as an ‘agent’ in the model with members 
of the household, ‘whether they are present in the house’ and evacuation details (e.g. warning 
channel available) represented as ‘properties/attributes of agents’ and their ‘behaviours’ (e.g. 
evacuation decisions) are implemented using rules for agents. Warning system comprises 
channels used for disseminating the evacuation message including official channels and 
unofficial channels. The latter is the focus of this thesis. Official warning channels and their 
respective efficiencies, which are one of the input parameters, are internally represented using 
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time series. Official warning channels such as TV, Sirens, Radio and Telephone have been 
implemented as channels for disseminating the warning message. The ABM contains logic 
that disseminates set percent households to receive message from each warning channel.  
 
The purpose of the model is to know the level of warning (% households who received the 
warning message) for the chosen warning system from the onset of disaster. As the focus of 
this thesis is to understand ‘household warning informant dynamics and its impact on the 
overall warning dissemination’, this behaviour is implemented as conditional rules. For 
example,  
IF a household RECEIVED a warning message 
AND decides to IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE 
THEN they will NOT warn others. 
In the example, a household having received a warning message (state variable/attribute) 
decides to ‘evacuate immediately’ (behaviour), which will lead to ‘not informing’ their 
neighbours (conditional behaviour). This example rule illustrates how an agent’s (household) 
behaviours are represented as a function of its state variable, behaviours and conditional 
behaviours in a simple conditional rule (IF-THEN). As the evacuated zone will have number 
of houses (agents), with varied evacuation warning behaviour (micro-behaviour) and the 
interaction among households (agents) will impact overall ET (macro-behaviour). The 
‘informant behaviour’ of the evacuees will require modelling the behaviour of the individual 
units (namely household and moving vehicle), its behaviour dynamics, the interaction among 
the individual units and its implication on the overall system. Agent-based Modelling 
technique’s features offer a suitable fit for behavioural simulation, and this has been adopted 
in designing the warning dissemination model. 
 
4.3.3.1 Model development phases 
For the GOs to use ‘informal warning channel’ within their warning dissemination plan, it is 
first important to understand what choices are made at a household level at the warning 
phase? Once a generalisable logic (considering various alternative choices) is presented for 
one house, then this can be scaled up to a region of a city or a city. As modelling a complex 
problem like large-scale evacuation requires accurate representation of modelling logic, very 
large-scale units to be modelled and numerous inter-related behaviours, this thesis has 
adopted prototyping for developing the model.  
 129 
 
In phase-1, a hypothetical community of neighbourhood with 1000 households in an equally 
spaced rectangular grid of 50 x 20 is modelled as a prototype. The logic of ‘household 
behaviour’ as informal warning channel was formulated, implemented as a software code in 
the prototype and tested. Readers are referred to Nagarajan et al. (2010, 2012) for more 
information on the prototype warning dissemination model. Such prototyping offers a 
controlled modelling environment that can be sequentially enhanced to contain additional 
features of interest in the subsequent model iteration. This prototype was experimented to 
understand the household informant behaviour dynamics through sensitivity analyses and 
simulation experiments.  
 
Once a validated and verified logic of household behaviour is programmed for a small 
community, phase 2 of the model implemented the warning dissemination at a city scale with 
details of the households in the ERGO city, access to various warning channels and EMA’s 
warning system capability. The following section presents phase 1 of the ABM development, 
experimentation of ABM and findings. Section 4.5 of this chapter presents the ABM for the 
ERGO city. 
 
4.3.3.2 Structure of ABM for a hypothetical community 
The ABM, which was developed using NetLogo software for a hypothetical community of 
1000 houses, incorporates one official channel along with the unofficial channel. There are 
other ABM platforms namely Repast Simphony, MASON, StarLogo, etc (Macal and North 
2009, p 94). Given the ease of use for the non-IT savvy emergency managers and 
customizable inbuilt functions, NetLogo is more appropriate. When the geographical 
coordinates of the city are available from GPS systems and when the evacuation zone details 
and impacted area are available as GIS layers, the evacuation city features can be imported 
into the model canvas as layers more easily in Repast Simphony software. However, for 
illustrating the proposed methodology, GIS maps of ERGO city data was available as point 
data and not in any standard GIS image formats linked with database. For importing 
evacuation zone data as ‘formatted’ coordinate files, NetLogo’s inbuilt features are 
reasonably powerful enough to build the model area during run-time the ABM.  
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The ABM setup routine has been designed to customise it for any other city with a formatted 
coordinate data file. The disadvantage of NetLogo is that it has a limited flexibility in 
generating output graphs interactively by the user, and this has been handled by writing 
‘standard output reports’ as a sub-routine. The problem under study could be modelled using 
excel spreadsheet, DES software or any other programming language. Any ABM software 
provides ‘building blocks’ for setting household level (agent) behaviours and interactions, 
which makes the model development considerably less effort. 
 
The model is of a hypothetical community of 1000 households represented as a rectangular 
grid. All the houses are assumed to be occupied at the time of warning dissemination. The 
unit of analysis is the individual household, which is modelled as agents. Each agent has 
attributes such as: identification number, media channels available (e.g. TV, radio, etc), 
‘defaulter variable’ (are they willing to communicate the message, or not) and state variable 
(informed, uninformed, disbelief). 
 
As presented in the literature review, warning dissemination has two phases namely warning 
and informing. Warning phase deals from the onset of evacuation warning till the household 
receiving the message. This phase pertains to the ability of the warning system (all the means 
of disseminating message – channels) to alert a household of the emergency situation. The 
informing phase considers how long it takes for the recipients to interpret the message. 
Warning capability is an aggregate function of the effectiveness of the channels in the 
warning system to reach households in the endangered zone. The response of a household to 
an evacuation message is a function of their threat perception, preparedness and believability 
of warning message. The warning message content plays a key role in influencing the 
response, and there has been considerable research already done in this field; this thesis 
focuses on successful delivery of the warning message only. 
 
4.3.3.3 Household agent’s unofficial warning behaviour 
The behaviour of households as informants to neighbours has various dimensions (Figure 
4.1). When the household receives a warning message, they move from an ‘uninformed’ to an 
‘informed’ state.  The public require time from receiving the warning message to doing 
something about it (responding) as it takes time to assimilate/understand/verify the message 
content. This time henceforth is called as ‘assimilation time’ (tb) as adopted by Rogers and 
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Sorensen (1991). In a post-evacuation survey by Balluz et al. (2000), 45.7% of people 
responded to a tornado warning, of which 90.6% took action within 5 minutes. There is 
uncertainty in this factor as some proportions of the public assimilate the warning message 
immediately while others take a longer time. As there was little published data on this factor, 
the uncertainty of the parameter tb has been tested in this thesis using sensitivity analysis on 
the mean value, the variation, and the statistical distribution of tb. The model considers the 
delay for the people to begin informing the neighbours ‘tb' as first input parameter for the 
model.  
 
A non-defaulter household, after the assimilation time (tb), would begin informing 
neighbours. The selection set of the neighbours around the house is modelled in this study as 
‘selection policy’. There are four different policies considered in this study namely:  
i) informing an adjacent house only,  
ii) informing an adjacent and opposite house,  
iii) informing four neighbours i.e. one in each compass direction,  
iv) informing between 1 and 4 houses (X) as represented as a discrete uniform 
distribution namely X = {1, 2, 3, 4}; the respective probabilities are given by p(X=x) 
= {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}.  
These four selection policies allow modelling the uncertainty in the neighbour selection set 
and the implication of this on the overall warning level. This behaviour will be studied using 
ABM and will enable the warning policy planners to know the relative impact on warning 
dissemination. The simple wording of selection policy enables easier communication to the 
general public to persuade them in informing their neighbours. ‘Selection policy’ is the third 
parameter for household warning behaviour in the ABM. 
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Figure 4.1 Various states of the public in receiving the warning message (based on 
Rogers and Sorensen, 1991, p120) 
Once the household has received the warning message and after a time lapse of tb minutes, the 
non-defaulter household inform a set of neighbours depending on any of the four selection 
policies discussed above. The time required to leave their house, reach a neighbour, and 
inform them about the warning message along with directing them to official source (if any) 
and then returning to their own house, is henceforth called as ‘time to inform’ (denoted by ti). 
This uncertainty in the ‘time to inform’ is due to various factors, e.g. the variation in the 
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distance to be travelled, duration of actual conversation and time to comprehend the urgency 
of the warning message. ‘ti’ is the fourth parameter for representing household informant 
behaviour in the warning dissemination model. This thesis has studied the uncertainty of ti 
using sensitivity analysis over a range of values, namely ti=2 to ti=10 minutes. 
 
Official messages that inform the public often request recipients to relay the message to 
neighbours and friends, e.g. the Red Cross (2005). However, not all households that receive 
the message will relay this message to their neighbours (Kreps 1984) – perhaps because they 
perceived urgency for themselves, leading to immediate evacuation and hence not warning the 
neighbours. These households are categorised as ‘defaulters’. Thus, two variables are needed 
to take account of the uncertainty in the proportion of people who warn their neighbours (Pw), 
and the uncertainty in the proportion of people who do not warn their neighbours (Pd) i.e. 
defaulters, where Pd = 1–Pw. ‘Pd’ is the second input parameter for household behaviour. 
 
On estimates for these variables, a survey by Parker et al. (2009, p106) reported that “22% of 
the respondents informed their neighbours, 16% telephoned other family members, 39.9% 
warned other household members, and the remainder did not pass the information”. Two 
studies reported in Parker and Handmer (1998, p55) found that the proportion of people who 
warned their neighbours (Pw) was found to be 22% and 40%  – suggesting that the Pd could 
vary between 60% (100%–40%) and 88% (100%–22%). The value of Pw will depend on the 
cohesion among the households within a community and could be different for different 
cultures; thus Pw=0.32 and Pd=0.68 are taken as values to represent the probability of 
warning/defaulting on disseminating the warning message. However, due to the uncertainty of 
Pd, its effect on overall warning level is studied using sensitivity analysis for a broader range 
of 20% to 90%, representing more cohesive societies to less cohesive societies, respectively. 
 
The unofficial source is modelled along with the four selection policies. The effectiveness of 
warning message dissemination will be measured using the KPIs presented in section 4.3.2. 
Table 4.3 maps the features of the ABM and the components in the warning dissemination 
model. Depending on whether a household is a defaulter or not, the timeline from evacuation 
order to evacuation (leaving the house) varies. The above figures present the timeline 
diagrams for a defaulter (Figure 4.2) and a non-defaulter house (Figure 4.3). 
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Table 4.3 ABM features mapping with Warning dissemination problem 
ABM Feature Informal dissemination 
Agent Household 
Agent behaviour Inform about the evacuation warning message to 
the neighbour 
Agent attribute Whether they will inform neighbours or not  
Decision On receiving the message and after 
understanding it, inform a set of neighbours. 
Interaction among 
agents 
Household-to-household warning 
communication 
Overall emergence Impact of the informal channel on the overall 
warning dissemination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 ‘Warning to evacuation’ timeline for a defaulter household 
 
                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 ‘Warning to evacuation’ timeline for a non-defaulter house 
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EMAs during their preparation stage could understand the warning capability and means of 
improving it by detailed understanding of the timeline at a household level. Warning time, the 
time when a house receives the message, depends on the warning system capability and also 
the access to official channels at the household. This time will possibly be reduced due to the 
presence of unofficial channels. For a household informing their neighbours, their selection 
policy (number of neighbours to inform) will influence the total time needed for informing. 
By having the warning message clear and directing the neighbours to the warning message 
than elaborately explaining, this total time could be reduced at a household level. Keeping the 
‘warning received time’ as a constant for defaulter and non-defaulter houses, the time when 
they will be ready to evacuate will be longer for houses informing their neighbours. However, 
the overall ‘warning received time’ (notification time) could possibly be reduced by 
encouraging households to inform their neighbours, and the prototype ABM developed in 
thesis will be experimented to measure the level of improvement in the notification time at the 
individual vs. community level. 
 
4.3.3.4 Implementation of household (agent) warning informant behaviour 
The input parameters for household warning informant behaviour (unofficial warning 
channel) has been summarised in Table 4.4. These parameters are entered in the NetLogo user 
screen at the setup stage prior to execution. As a first step in ABM, the household location 
details and its properties (e.g. access to warning channel, family size, etc) are to be loaded as 
agents and its attributes. A screenshot of the model is as shown in Figure 4.4. A household-
property file is a comma-separated formatted input file created for the hypothetical 
community and loaded in the setup stage. Each row in this file represents one household and 
the ABM creates an agent on the specified coordinate and assigns initial properties to the 
house. All the houses are flagged as ‘not warned’ at the time of loading. After loading the 
evacuation area, the input parameters set on the screen are loaded along with the official 
channel effectiveness.  
 136 
Table 4.4 ABM Warning dissemination model parameters 
Parameter 
Type 
Parameter Description 
Input Assimilation time (tb) in minutes Time to understand and react to 
the warning message 
Input Defaulter % (Pd) Percentage of people who will 
NOT inform neighbours 
Input Neighbour selection policy Number of neighbours that a 
person will visit to inform 
Input Time to inform neighbour (ti) Time taken to visit each neighbour 
and inform them 
Output Level of warning (%) Percentage of the population that 
has received the message 
Output Notification time (minutes) Time taken to reach a saturation 
point in the level of warning 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Snapshot of ABM warning dissemination model – prototype 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Code snippets for ‘defaulter houses’ selection sub-routine 
Based on the value of Pd, a random set of houses among the households are set as ‘defaulters’. 
The code snippet provided below presents the random selection of defaulter houses (Figure 
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4.5). When the evacuation advice dissemination begins, all the houses remain uninformed. 
When the simulation clock is at every 10 ticks (10 minutes), the percentage of coverage for 
the official channel is used to selected houses randomly to have received the initial warning 
message (initial seeds) as given in the code snippet lines 11 to 20 as presented in Figure 4.6. 
When there is more than one official channel, initial seeds are selected in each cycle for every 
official channel. This official channel cycle is executed every 10 minutes and incremental 
percentage covered is used to know how many houses will receive the warning message in a 
particular cycle. For example a siren has effectiveness of {10%, 25%, 70%} for time {10, 20, 
30} minutes, then at the time t = {10, 20, 30} the ‘official channel cycle’ sub-routine will 
randomly select {10%, 15%, 45%} houses to be warned. It must be noted that a house that 
was warned in one cycle could also be selected by random choice for warning, but the first 
warning message is set as ‘warning received time’. The initial seed selection has been 
presented in the code snippet lines 22 to 56 as presented in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.6 Code snippets for ‘initial seeds’ selection sub-routine 
 
Figure 4.7 Code snippet for official warning channel – intial seed selection. 
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The focus of this thesis is to model the unofficial warning dissemination to neighbours as a 
warning channel. Non-defaulter houses that received the warning message and have 
assimilated the message are considered to be ready for warning their neighbours. A list of 
household ids ‘ready to inform others’ is generated in every tick as a first step in the unofficial 
warning channel, and this has been presented in the code snippet in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Code snippet for selecting new houses ready to inform neighbours at t = tick 
 The time between warning onset and disaster strike will have a role on whether a household 
will inform neighbours or not. The time to disaster strike and its implication on defaulters has 
not been modelled in this thesis. For the houses ready to inform their neighbours, a neighbour 
selection policy is set at the household level and they warn the neighbours sequentially. If the 
neighbour has not received the warning message, then warning time is set for those houses. 
Depending on the number of neighbours chosen, the total time needed for the house to inform 
their neighbours is a multiple of ti (time to inform). This time is set for the household serving 
as an unofficial source and will not be selected for subsequent warning in the next cycles. The 
sub-routine for implementing unofficial channel in the ABM has been presented as a code 
snippet in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9 Code snippet for agent behaviour: unofficial warning channel
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4.3.3.5 Simulation experiment design for uncertainty in household informant behaviour 
The household informant behaviour is represented using four input parameters. The value for 
each of these parameters is uncertain for a household. The uncertainty in the input factors has 
been investigated here using 10 scenarios (Table 4.5). The analysis found that 100 replications 
of the model is sufficient to obtain stable output results without bias from (a) the initial 
selection of which houses receive the warning message and (b) the uncertainty of any of the 
four selection policies for a specific scenario.  
 
Table 4.5 Various scenarios for behavioural assumption of the public as an unofficial 
source  
Scenario Unofficial source Assimilation time (tb) 
Scenario – A No Not applicable 
Scenario – B Adjacent neighbours Deterministic (10 min) 
Scenario – C Adjacent and Opposite Deterministic (10 min) 
Scenario – D All four neighbours Deterministic (10 min) 
Scenario – E Number of neighbours (X) to be informed is 
chosen using discrete uniform distribution. X = 
{1, 2, 3, 4} p(X=x) = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25} 
Deterministic (10 min) 
Scenario – F Adjacent neighbours Normal distribution  
(tb = 10min, σtb= 4min) 
Scenario – G Adjacent and Opposite Normal distribution 
(tb = 10min, σtb= 4min) 
Scenario – H All four neighbours Normal distribution 
(tb = 10min, σtb= 4min) 
Scenario – I Number of neighbours (X) to be informed is 
chosen using discrete uniform distribution. X = 
{1, 2, 3, 4} p(X=x) = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25} 
Normal distribution 
(tb = 10min, σtb= 4min) 
Scenario – J Number of neighbours (X) to be informed is 
chosen using discrete uniform distribution. X = 
{1, 2, 3, 4} p(X=x) = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25} 
Deterministic tb = 10 min 
Stochastic ti = 2min and σti = 
1min 
 
Scenario – A represents the scenario where only official channel is available for warning 
dissemination. Based on the official channel effectiveness, a new set of houses are randomly 
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selected every 10 minutes as though ‘receiving warning message’. As the unofficial channel is 
absent in this scenario, the household receives the warning message and respond to 
evacuation.  For other scenarios (B – J) with unofficial channel, the official channel 
dissemination is similar to ‘Scenario – A’, i.e. a new set of houses are selected every 10 
minutes and these houses will be available for informing their neighbours after a time delay of 
tb. If the house has received the warning for the first time, then the house will be available as 
unofficial channel. Depending on the defaulter attribute of the house, selection policy of 
neighbours, the household will act as informal channel as presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
To determine the ‘run-time’ of the model (defined as the number of time units/minutes the 
model is run), the warning message dissemination model was executed for various ‘stopping 
criteria’. The stopping criterion (ts) is defined as the number of time units beyond which there 
is no subsequent dissemination of warning message among neighbours (warning level 
saturation). In other words, the number of houses informed at time t = (tn + ts) is equal to the 
number of houses informed at time t = tn. The time (t = tn) where the warning level attains 
saturation is nothing but the warning ‘notification time’. The run-time of the model would 
have an impact on the ‘level of warning’; hence this variable is chosen to compare various 
stopping criteria. For each run, the output results, namely mean and standard deviation (Std), 
were collected corresponding to stopping criterion ts = {5, 10, 20, 30 and 40 minutes} and 
tabulated in  
Table 4.6. It was found that the stopping criterion of 20 minutes is enough to obtain consistent 
results. 
 
Table 4.6 Simulation results for various stopping criteria for Scenario E 
KPI ts = 5min ts = 10 min ts = 20 min ts = 30 min ts = 40 min 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  9.55 0.2 83.2 1.52 83.08 1.8 83.08 1.5 83.34 1.6 
Notification 
time (in min) 0 0 104.6 9.84 109.10 14.6 109.96 13.7 109.72 13.4 
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4.3.3.6 Impact of unofficial warning channel estimated using simulation experiments 
The ABM prototype model was adapted to run each Scenario A-J. There are four input 
parameters used in the model, and the representative values were used for the base scenario 
(Scenario A). The uncertainty of the number of houses informed was represented as different 
behavioural policies (Scenario E to I). The approach used in developing the model is 
generalisable, and upon the availability of more reliable data the users can input this at the 
setup stage. The input parameters provided at the setup stage are: 
 ‘Assimilation time’ tb = 10 minutes, which is the amount of time it takes for a 
household to understand the warning message and decide how to respond. 
 ‘Proportion of defaulter’ Pd = 68%, which is the likelihood of a household not passing 
the warning message on to its neighbours. 
 ‘Time to inform the neighbour’ ti = 2 minutes, which is the amount of time it takes a 
household to go and tell its neighbour(s) and return to the household.  
The model is replicated 100 times with stopping criteria of 20 minutes to obtain the KPIs 
level of warning and notification time. Table 4.7 summarises the results of simulation for the 
Scenarios A to J.  Scenario A is the base scenario of having an official warning channel, no 
unofficial channel and a deterministic value for assimilation time tb. Comparing this to the 
other deterministic scenarios (B to E), results from running the model show that the highest 
difference in the warning level from the base Scenario A (51.4%) was for Scenario D (95%), 
an increase of 43.6% from the base scenario. For the stochastic scenarios, the warning level 
for the base scenario was Scenario E (83.2%) with the highest difference in the warning level 
for Scenario H (95.1%), an increase of 11.7% from the base scenario. The variation on the 
notification time from the base Scenario A (91 minutes) is found to be similar for all other 
Scenarios (B to I) with an average of 110.5 minutes and the highest for Scenario J (131 min). 
This suggests that the strategy for the unofficial warning dissemination to neighbours could 
have considerable impact on the overall warning level for the population. Hence, it might be 
suggested that GOs could influence dissemination by educating the public in advance on the 
merits of sharing the warning message as well as including instructions to do so in any official 
warning and informing messages during an evacuation. 
 
The range of variation in the level of warning is shorter in the scenarios with stochastic tb 
values than deterministic tb values. Scenario E (uniform distribution of number of neighbours 
informed per household) has an expected warning level between the pessimistic scenario 
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(Scenario B) and the optimistic scenario (Scenario D) of the effect of unofficial warning 
dissemination on the overall effectiveness. Scenario E takes longer for the notification time to 
reach the expected level of warning. Thus, Scenario E can be considered as moderate scenario 
for accounting the behaviour of public as unofficial source. 
 
The uncertainty in the behaviour of potential defaulters in informing the neighbour is studied 
using sensitivity analysis by varying the ‘likelihood to be defaulter’ Pd value from 20% to 
90% in steps of 10%. The number of neighbours informed per household is taken as discrete 
uniform distribution (Scenario E) with tb = 10 minutes. With all the other factors remaining 
constant, it was found that for every 10% increase in likelihood of defaulters (lowering the 
level of unofficial warning), the expected level of warning decreases by approximately 2.62%. 
 
Emergency managers have situations where they have specific operational target time set for 
warning dissemination. For example, if the government agency forecasts that a tsunami wave 
will hit in 90 minutes, the warning authorities may find it useful to know the percentage of 
population who can be warned. Considering 90 minutes as a cut-off point, the ABM was run 
once for different scenarios with the input parameters tb = 10 minutes, ti = 2 minutes, Pd = 
68%. Figure 4.10 shows the comparison of the warning level from the onset of dissemination 
for different scenarios listed in Table 4.5. For example, it can be observed that, at the end of 
the 90 minutes, the warning level is within the range 52% (Scenario A) to 95% (Scenario H). 
  
Among the scenarios including the unofficial warning channel, the lowest warning level is 
about 78% (Scenario F), which infers that the warning level will be underestimated by 26% 
(Scenario A) due to excluding the unofficial warning channel. For the emergency managers 
the warning level can be expected to increase at least by 26% by encouraging people to warn 
their neighbours irrespective of their neighbour selection behaviour.  
 
The comparative analyses show that there is pair-wise similarity among the scenarios with the 
same neighbour selection policies namely: Scenarios B and F (adjacent neighbours), 
Scenarios C and G (adjacent and opposite) and Scenarios D and H (All four neighbours). The 
impact of uncertainty of tb is more prominent between Scenarios E and I, where the warning 
level difference is about 7% (89% - 82%). Similarly, the impact of uncertainty in ti is about 
7% (89% - 82%) between Scenario E and Scenario J. 
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Table 4.8 summarises the results for various values of likelihood of defaulting (Pd) for 
Scenario E. Experiments tested the defaulter parameter from 20% to 90% and results suggest 
that the parameter is sensitive in affecting the level of warning (range 95.6-77.6% when the 
defaulter parameter increases from 20% to 90%). However, the defaulter parameter does not 
have considerable impact on the corresponding notification time (range 106.7 minutes to 
108.4 minutes for these experiments). 
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Table 4.7 Results on varying the unofficial warning channel and varying tb  
 
  
Performance 
metric 
Scenario 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  51.4 0.8 78.6 1.6 90.2 1.2 95.0 0.8 83.4 1.6 78.6 1.5 90.2 1.2 95.1 0.9 83.2 1.5 4 1.5 
Notification 
time (minutes) 91.0 0 111.6 14.3 109.9 16.8 105.2 14.3 110.3 15.0 111.5 12.2 111.3 14.8 112.4 18.6 112.1 13.3 131 11.8 
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Figure 4.10 Comparison of the changes in the ‘warning level’   
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Table 4.8 Sensitivity analysis of Pd (defaulter) on warning dissemination for scenario E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance metric Pd = 20 % Pd = 40 % Pd = 50% Pd = 60% Pd = 70% Pd = 80% Pd = 90% 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Defaulter houses (%) 18.1 0.4 33.0 0.6 39.4 0.8 45.2 0.7 50.3 0.9 55.0 0.9 59.3 1.0 
Level of warning (%) 95.6 0.9 91.0 1.2 88.4 1.3 85.6 1.5 83.0 1.8 80.3 1.7 77.6 1.6 
Notification time (mins) 106.7 12.8 108.0 11.6 110.7 12.7 111.1 13 110.6 13.5 109.9 14.3 108.4 12.8 
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i) Uncertainty in the assimilation time (t b) 
On receiving the warning message, each household would require time of tb to assimilate the 
information they have received and make a decision on how to respond to that. The 
uncertainty of the value of tb has been studied by conducting sensitivity analysis on various 
aspects namely  
i) the average value of tb in the range 5-30 minutes,  
ii) variation in the value of tb represented using standard deviation of tb in the 
range 2-8 minutes,  
iii) the ‘time to begin factor’ represented using various statistical distribution 
(normal, exponential, Poisson and gamma).  
The results of model experiments namely warning level (WL) and notification time (NT) are 
summarised using mean and standard deviation. The experiments on the three uncertainties in 
tb are given in Table 4.9, Table 4.10, and Table 4.11 respectively. 
Table 4.9 Sensitivity analysis of tb (delay time) on warning dissemination for Scenario E 
 
Results in Table 4.9 show that the assimilation time does not have a considerable impact on 
the overall level of warning in the model, but the overall notification time increases due to the 
longer delay time in assimilation. From Table 4.9, for every 5 minutes increase in the value of 
tb, the expected notification time increases in the range of 15.5 minutes to 24.5 minutes. The 
expected notification time almost doubles (from 93.8 minutes to 174.9 minutes) when the 
value of tb increases fivefold (from tb = 5 minutes to tb = 25 minutes). Thus, the assimilation 
time can have a considerable impact on the overall notification time – far beyond the added 
time that it takes to assimilate the information. 
 
The uncertainty in the value of the assimilation time is represented using the standard 
deviation σtb. Table 4.10 summarises that for the same average value of tb, with uncertainty in 
σtb (2 minutes to 8 minutes) the value of expected notification time changes by 6 minutes 
 
 KPI 
tb = 5min tb = 10 min tb = 15 min tb = 20 min tb = 25min tb = 30min 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
WT 
(%)  83.0 1.6 83.4 1.7 83.2 1.7 83.4 1.6 83.4 1.6 83.2 1.5 
NT 
(mins) 93.8 9.2 109.4 13.8 131.8 18.7 150.3 22.8 174.9 24 199.5 26.9 
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(from 109 minutes to 116 minutes). Thus, the variation in tb (σtb) is less sensitive and has 
considerably less impact on the overall notification time and no impact on the level of 
warning. 
 
Table 4.10 Sensitivity analysis of the standard deviation of the assimilation time (tb) for 
Scenario I 
 
The uncertainty in the distribution of the assimilation time factor was studied with four 
distributions (normal, exponential, Poisson and gamma). The uncertainty in distribution of tb 
will influence when evacuees begin to inform their neighbours and not whether they will 
inform or not. Hence, this uncertainty will only have an impact on the expected notification 
time and not on the expected warning level. The expected assimilation time was found to be 
pessimistic when using an exponential distribution.  
 
Results in Table 4.11 show that none of the other three distributions had a significant impact 
on the overall expected notification time with a highest variance of 3.5 minutes (between the 
deterministic and the gamma distributions). Thus, it was found that the normal distribution for 
tb had a moderate effect on the overall effectiveness of warning message dissemination (as 
expected). But, for the purposes of planning aiming to prepare for the worst-case scenario, 
adopting exponential distribution would provide a more pessimistic estimate (i.e. a longer 
time to assimilate the warning message).  
Performance 
metric 
tb = 10min,  
σtb =2 min 
tb = 10min,  
σtb =4 min 
tb = 10min,  
σtb =6 min 
tb = 10min,  
σtb =8 min 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  83.5 1.7 83.5 1.4 83.5 1.6 83.3 1.7 
Notification 
time (in min) 109.5 13.2 112.0 16.3 115.5 14.1 115.8 13.9 
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Table 4.11 Results for different statistical distributions of assimilation time (tb = 10 
minutes σtd= 4minutes) 
 
 
ii) Uncertainty in time to inform each neighbour t i 
The uncertainty in the factor ti (i.e. the time required to leave the household, inform the 
neighbour(s) and return to the household) was studied for a range of values between 2 and 10 
minutes, and the results are presented in Table 4.12. This factor will have an impact on the 
overall notification time as the error in ti will delay the informing of subsequent neighbours, 
but this should not have an impact on the overall level of warning. Results in Table 4.12 show 
that for every 2 minutes increase in ti, the expected notification time increases by an average 
of 12 minutes. Thus, the longer the time to inform each neighbour (either due to travel 
between household to neighbours or due to actually conveying the message), the 
disproportionately higher will be the overall expected notification time. 
 
Table 4.12 Sensitivity analysis of ti (time to inform) for Scenario E 
 
Performance 
metric 
tb as 
Deterministic 
uniform 
distribution 
tb as 
Normal 
distribution  
tb as 
Exponential 
distribution  
tb as Poisson 
distribution  
tb as 
Gamma 
distribution 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  83.4 1.6 83.2 1.5 83.3 1.6 83.2 1.6 83.2 1.8 
Notification 
time (in min) 110.3 15.0 112.2 13.3 125.4 16.8 111.3 13.9 114.0 13.3 
Performance 
metric 
ti = 2 mins ti = 4 mins ti = 6 mins ti = 8 mins ti = 10 mins 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  83.3 1.5 83.4 1.7 83.4 1.6 83.5 1.4 83.3 1.6 
Notification 
time (in min) 108.6 13.7 121.9 18.0 134.8 19.8 146.4 19.4 162.8 23.6 
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The uncertainty in the distribution of the ‘time to inform’ factor was studied with four 
distributions (normal, exponential, Poisson and gamma). This uncertainty will influence the 
‘time when evacuees leave to inform their neighbours’ whether or not they will inform or 
otherwise. Hence, this will only have an impact on the expected notification time and not on 
the expected warning level. The expected ‘time to inform’ was found to be pessimistic when 
using a ‘gamma distribution’ compared to the deterministic scenario (132.9 – 121.9 minutes). 
Results in Table 4.13 show that all the four distributions had almost similar impact on the 
overall expected notification time (average 131.8 minutes) with a highest difference of 11 
minutes (between the deterministic and the gamma distributions).  
 
Thus, it was found that among the three distributions (normal, exponential, and Poisson), the 
normal distribution for ti had a moderate effect on the overall effectiveness of warning 
message dissemination (as expected). But, for the purposes of planning aiming to prepare for 
the worst-case scenario, adopting ‘gamma distribution’ would provide a more pessimistic 
estimate (i.e. a longer time to inform the neighbours). 
 
Table 4.13 Results for different statistical distributions of ‘time to inform’ (tb = 10 
minutes ti = 2 minutes σti= 1 minutes) 
 
 
4.3.4  Summary of findings from the model 
The behaviour of households as an unofficial warning channel was represented by four 
parameters. Sensitivity analysis has been conducted to explore the effect of uncertainties in 
parameters. Table 4.14 summarises the results of simulation experiments. 
Performance 
metric 
tb and ti 
Deterministic  
(Scenario – 
E) 
ti as Normal 
distribution  
ti as 
Exponential 
distribution  
ti as Poisson 
distribution  
ti as Gamma 
distribution 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Level of 
warning (%)  83.4 1.7 83.4 1.5 83.4 1.7 83.5 1.6 83.4 14.4 
Notification 
time (in min) 121.9 18.0 131 11.8 131.6 13.8 132 13.1 132.9 15.0 
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Table 4.14 Summary of experiment results 
Scenario Impact on the 
overall warning level 
Impact on the overall 
notification time 
Including unofficial warning channel 
(Table 4.7 & Figure 4.10) 
Sensitive Less sensitive 
Uncertainty in Pd  (Table 4.8) Sensitive No impact 
Uncertainty in average tb (Table 4.9) No impact Sensitive 
Variation of tb (Tables 4.10 & 4.11) No impact Less sensitive 
Uncertainty in ti (Table 4.12) No impact Sensitive  
Stochasticity of ti (Table 4.13) No impact Sensitive 
 
 Even at high percentage of defaulters, the unofficial channel was found to have impact 
on the overall warning level (% warned). 
 Excluding unofficial channel will underestimate the warning capability. 
 Every 10% increase in defaulter houses, will result in 2.6% decrease in warning level. 
 On comparing various scenarios (Section 4.3.3.5), the scenario - E, {all four 
neighbours with uniform distribution, deterministic tb and ti} was found to be a 
moderate representation of unofficial warning behaviour of the household. 
 Model results showed that uncertainty in the 'assimilation time - tb' at the household 
level has an impact on the overall notification time and not on the warning level. 
 The 'time to inform' parameter uncertainty is found to be pessimistically represented 
using 'gamma distribution' and three other distributions 'Poisson, exponential and 
normal' are found to be having the same impact.  
Based on the evidence from the prototype ABM, this thesis argues that the role of unofficial 
channel, either voluntary or coordinated, will be a good means of augmenting warning 
capability. 
 
4.4 Configuration of ABM to ERGO city 
The previous section presented the ABM prototype model for warning dissemination in a 
hypothetical community of 1000 households. This ABM will be scaled up to have ERGO city 
evacuation details and further study the warning dissemination under various conditions. As 
the household level behaviour of warning dissemination has been implemented, tested and 
parameters of the model have been studied, the scale-up requires configuration of the 
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modelled world to have the city details. The overall architecture of the models has been 
presented in the methodology chapter (Figure 3.3). The ERGO city evacuation zone details 
consist of a) households and its properties within the modelled area and b) evacuation route 
details. The evacuation route details are relevant for the transportation model and will be 
explained in Chapter 5. 
 
Each household is provided a unique identification number. The properties of the household 
are id, location (x-coordinate, y-coordinate) and post-code. These household attributes are 
arranged as ordered comma-separated values in the input coordinate file ‘ERGO-Household-
Details.txt’. Each row in the input file represents one household detail.  The end-user can load 
these household details in the setup stage into the modelling world. In run-time, the 
coordinate file is parsed and further one agent is created per household with properties as 
specified in the input file. The NetLogo model world has been re-sized to configure the 
ERGO city modelled. The zones that fall outside the evacuated zone are provided with id 
‘999’ and the evacuated zones are indicated with a two-digit postcode. The aggregate 
information about the household (e.g. family size), warning system details and unofficial 
channel behaviour are input into the model as explained in the next section. 
 
4.5 ABM for warning message dissemination - ERGO city case study 
This thesis adopts a case study approach in illustrating the ESFs and the integrated approach. 
The ERGO city case details have been presented in Section 4.3. EMAs responsible for ESF-1 
will be keen to know the progression of warning dissemination from the onset of disaster 
(warning response curve) and the level of households warned within 90 minutes.  
 
In total, there are 31617 households in the modelled area. Among the 19 zones to be 
evacuated, there are 9214 households. The number of evacuees to each household was 
assigned with an average of five per household. Only the resident households within the 
modelled area are considered in this thesis and are represented as households.  
 
As a simplification, transient population and commuters are not included in the warning 
dissemination model. All the households are assumed to be occupied and the informant 
behaviour is represented using the parameters namely defaulter percentage, assimilation time 
and time to inform their neighbour. The ABM for city scale was developed using NetLogo 
software and Figure 4.11 is a screenshot of the ABM warning dissemination model. 
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Figure 4.11 Screenshot of ABM for warning dissemination – City scale 
Each agent in the model represents a single household unit. Multiple residential buildings 
(e.g. apartments) are not considered in this study as a simplification. From the onset of 
warning, the households states of warning and its behaviour prior to departure are described in 
Figure 4.1. Once the coordinate file is imported into the model canvas, the user can set the 
initial setup parameters namely time of the day, channel availability and level of unofficial 
channel. For each household, a parameter called ‘neighbourhood network level’ is provided at 
the set-up stage with a uniform discrete distribution of 4. During run-time, each household 
agent looks for neighbours in the eight pixels around it. For a non-defaulter household, the 
model would randomly select houses as many as ‘neighbourhood network level’ to be their 
neighbours. If there are only fewer houses available than the ‘neighbourhood network level’, 
the household would select all the available houses in 8 pixels as neighbours. The logic 
related to setting defaulter houses, initial seeds and informing their neighbours is similar to 
the description presented in the prototype model. 
 
4.6 Validity and reliability of simulation results 
ABM contains parameters that are represented using probabilistic distribution, for example 
percentage defaulters, uncertainty in the assimilation time and time to inform neighbours. 
During model execution, a set of households are selected to have household behaviour or 
attributes based on the probability distribution and random selection. For example, the initial 
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seeds for warning dissemination are based on the first instance of receiving official warning 
message and houses are randomly chosen to be warned. In general, the outputs from the 
models might be influenced by the random selection in the model logic. Moreover, a single-
run result has a potential to be biased by the random selection set. In order to understand the 
robustness of the solution and its reliability in providing a point estimate (one trial result) of 
the actual value of KPI, the model need to be executed for experimental trials and then the 
randomness in the results are to be observed. 
 
Two set of experimental trials with ‘official channel configuration’ were conducted by 
repeatedly executing the model, keeping other input parameters constant. The analyses from 
prototype model indicated that 20-minutes stopping time was enough to observe any 
significant incremental warning in the modelled community. It was assumed that this finding 
was applicable to city scale. The official channel effectiveness was available only for 90 
minutes. In many official channels, the incremental progression of cumulative coverage was 
small and diminishing beyond 60 minutes. Keeping this in mind, the stopping time was taken 
as 45 minutes, which includes an allowance of 25 minutes for variation due to scale-up from 
prototype to city. And the ‘run-time’ of the model was taken as 135 minutes (90 + 45) which 
is well above the ERGO city case of understanding warning dissemination within 90 minutes.  
 
It was calculated that 10 runs are enough to capture the variation in the model output due to 
uncertainty in model parameters. In each trial, the model was executed 10 times. All the four 
channels were used in the first trial and only ‘siren and public announcement’ in the second as 
scenarios for peak and moderate levels of official channel availability. In both trials, the time 
of the day for warning dissemination is noon and the value of defaulter percentage is 68%. 
Table 4.15a and Table 4.15b respectively show the results of individual trials for the two 
experiments. Mean and standard deviation of KPI as well as intermediate monitoring 
variables were obtained as descriptive statistics of each experiment. Additionally, the standard 
error of mean (SEmean) was computed for each KPI using the formula: 
       
 
  
      … (4.1) 
Where s – is the standard deviation of the sample mean 
 n – is the number of samples. 
 
The smaller the value of standard error, lower will be the spread of means estimated from the 
model and more reliable a single trial value is. As the EMAs will be interested in the KPIs of 
the evacuated zone, the standard error results are presented in Table 4.15c.  
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 The results showed that the values of ‘warning level’ had a standard error 0.00093 and 
0.00149 respectively for two set of trials, which is very low compared to the average 
values namely 80.24% and 61.95%. The coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean) was found to be 0.59% and 0.48% and these indicate that the spread 
of individual trial values is within these values for the two set of trials.   
 For the notification time, the standard errors were 1.03 and 2.06 respectively for two 
trials which are about 3.19% and 6.27% of the means 102.2 and 104.1 minutes.  
 Third, for the number of households in the evacuated zone which received first 
warning from the neighbours as a measure of unofficial channel’s impact, the standard 
error was about 8.57 and 8.94 houses which are about 3.17% and 3.01% of the means 
855.1 and 939.8 houses respectively.  
The loss of information/inferences from model results to the EMAs (end-users of the model) 
at this level of standard error is argued to be small and less impactful in changing evacuation 
warning response due to the error. All the three KPI values showed low values in error 
between the experimental trials, and this infers the estimated mean is robust from the ABM 
and one trial run is reasonably accurate for the purpose of planning warning dissemination.
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Table 4.15a Experimental trials of ABM to determine the accuracy between runs. 
All four official channels and Pd = 68% 
Experimental trial 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1. Model control variables    
         
    
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617     
  Number of houses in evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214     
  Total resident population 159063 158229 158629 159092 158596 158337 158340 158350 159074 158922 158663.2 346.83 
  Total number of evacuees 46395 46058 46107 46122 46334 46166 46290 46234 46365 46544 46261.5 152.40 
  Family size (average) 5.03 5 5.02 5.03 5.02 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.03 5.03 5.02 0.01 
  Overall ERGO city   
         
    
  Number of defaulter houses 15540 15506 15627 15538 15539 15612 15545 15675 15636 15552 15577.0 55.61 
  Number of houses warned 25428 25419 25559 25496 25595 25605 25396 25482 25559 25514 25505.3 74.41 
  Only evacuating household   
         
    
  Number of defaulter houses 4427 4512 4555 4492 4540 4529 4503 4630 4566 4541 4529.5 52.96 
  Number of houses warned 7363 7354 7436 7381 7422 7456 7418 7313 7376 7411 7393.0 43.28 
 
2. KPI - output metrics   
         
    
  Only evacuating household   
         
    
  Warning level 79.91% 79.81% 80.70% 80.11% 80.55% 80.92% 80.51% 79.37% 80.05% 80.43% 80.24% 0.00 
  Notification time 99 103 107 97 100 104 99 103 105 105 102.20 3.26 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 901 857 880 833 825 841 869 813 873 859 855.10 27.13 
  
 
  
         
    
  Overall ERGO city   
         
    
  Warning level 80.43% 80.40% 80.84% 80.64% 80.95% 80.98% 80.32% 80.60% 80.84% 80.70% 80.67% 0.00 
  Notification time 112 118 111 104 114 106 110 105 105 105 109.00 4.74 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 3181 3209 3224 3195 3148 3179 3119 3100 3143 3097 3159.50 44.97 
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Table 4.15b Experimental trials of ABM to determine the accuracy between runs. 
Siren + PA (official channels) and Pd = 
68% 
Experimental run 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1. Model control variables    
             Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
    Number of houses in evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
    Total resident population 158506 158150 158182 158413 159139 158998 159336 158846 157902 158343 158581.5 473.99 
  Total number of evacuees 46138 46104 45953 46170 46325 46427 46154 46308 45865 46196 46164.00 168.39 
  Family size (average) 5.01 5 5 5.01 5.03 5.03 5.04 5.02 5 5.01 5.02 0.01 
  Overall ERGO city   
         
    
  Number of defaulter houses 15611 15591 15547 15586 15624 15649 15675 15721 15665 15522 15619.10 60.65 
  Number of houses warned 19812 19812 19898 19887 19776 19683 19839 19770 19695 19781 19795.30 70.96 
  Only evacuating household   
         
    
  Number of defaulter houses 4520 4580 4449 4563 4517 4516 4555 4577 4531 4481 4528.90 41.95 
  Number of houses warned 5675 5688 5758 5738 5736 5685 5695 5692 5710 5706 5708.30 27.15 
 
2. KPI - output metrics   
         
    
  Only Evacuating household   
         
    
  Warning level 61.59% 61.73% 62.49% 62.27% 62.25% 61.70% 61.81% 61.78% 61.97% 61.93% 61.95% 0.00 
  Notification time 104 94 114 99 101 98 104 111 104 112 104.10 6.52 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 933 897 990 937 984 926 917 932 935 947 939.80 28.30 
  
 
  
         
    
  Overall ERGO city   
         
    
  Warning level 62.66% 62.66% 62.93% 62.90% 62.55% 62.25% 62.75% 62.53% 62.29% 62.56% 62.61% 0.00 
  Notification time 112 113 114 121 119 113 109 111 108 116 113.60 4.12 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 3458 3372 3501 3506 3465 3339 3521 3351 3354 3442 3430.90 70.64 
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Table 4.15c Summary statistics of ABM experimental trials 
Scenario 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
of variation 
All four channels system at noon with Pd = 68% 
Warning level (%) 80.24 0.00 0.00 0.59 
Notification time (minutes) 102.20 3.26 1.03 3.19 
Houses warned by neighbours  855.10 27.13 8.58 3.17 
Siren and PA at noon with Pd = 68% 
Warning level (%) 61.95 0.00 0.00 0.48 
Notification time (minutes) 104.10 6.52 2.06 6.27 
Houses warned by neighbours  939.80 28.30 8.95 3.01 
 
As there were no real-life data of actual evacuation results for the ERGO city (being a 
hypothetical case study), the validity of these results with the actual field observations could 
not be ascertained and has scope for further research study. Prior to implementing in the 
actual evacuation planning, it is desirable to evaluate with empirical field observations of the 
modelled area which is often expensive to collect during evacuation. The process map of 
household’s warning informant behaviour was formulated using literature and representative 
values were chosen from the existing evacuation studies. It could be argued that such an 
approach of ABM has a potential to provide robust estimates for warning dissemination 
performance, give greater confidence on single trial results and possibly support EMA’s 
warning preparedness initiatives using an ABM. 
 
4.7 Scenario on uncertainty in warning dissemination - results and discussion 
The role of unofficial channel needs to be studied in conjunction with official channel, as the 
household receiving the message from the latter form the initial seeds. In order to understand 
the impact of unofficial warning channel, its uncertainties on overall warning dissemination, 
various scenario experiments were identified as discussed below. The effectiveness of these 
depends on the timing of the day (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989) and the availability of the 
channel (Parker and Handmer 1998, Sorensen 2000). This thesis will investigate these two 
aspects on official warning channel along with the role of unofficial channel and its 
uncertainties. These scenarios presented in the following sub-sections would address the 
research questions (Q2 and Q3) of the thesis pertaining to ESF-1. 
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4.7.1 Impact of time of the day on warning dissemination 
Households within a city on a normal day are involved in different activities as summarised in 
the average time budget (Figure 4.12) reproduced from Roger and Sorensen (1991). This 
thesis focuses only on the residential household evacuation, and the warning dissemination to 
the commuters and transient population have been excluded from the model as a 
simplification. For understanding the impact of time of the day on warning dissemination, 
three scenarios were identified as representative for a day namely: midnight (0000 hours), 
noon (1200 hours) and evening (1900 hours). For each time, the proportion of people 
involved in various activities was measured from Figure 4.12 and tabulated in Table 4.16.  
 
Figure 4.12 Average time budget – location/activity of households (Reproduced from 
Roger and Sorensen 1991, Figure 2, p125) 
 
Table 4.16 Proportion of households in different activities for times of the day 
Household Activity Midnight Noon Evening 
Home asleep 90 5 5 
Indoors at home 5 40 50 
Watching TV 3 7 25 
Listening to Radio 0 4 3 
Others excluded – Transit and Outdoors 2 44 17 
Net Total = 100 - excluded 98 56 83 
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As presented in the literature review, there are five fundamental activities identified for 
indicating at the household level. This thesis assumes that the residential houses are occupied 
at the time of warning onset, and hence the activities such as in transit and outdoors have been 
excluded as a simplification. The unit of analysis is at the household level. If a member of 
family is at work or school, the possibility of them receiving a warning message is even 
though uncertain and has not been factored into the thesis as a simplification. As the thesis is 
focusing on the household level, the activity/location of the household is considered as equal 
for all the family members. It is assumed that when one member of the family receives the 
warning message, the household is considered to be warned. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 ‘Average dissemination time’ for alternative warning system technologies 
(Reproduced from Sorensen 2000, Figure 1, p122) 
 
No two warning channels are alike in their effectiveness (both coverage and notification 
time), which is contingent upon whether a household has access/connected to the channel and 
the capability of the warning channel to alert many households. For example, a siren can alert 
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a household even at midnight when they are asleep, although the time for the household to 
become awake and be warned is variable. From the graph, it can be observed that, for an 
average 10-minutes duration, the rate of sirens alerts (capability) is much higher than 
telephones.  
 
There are four warning channels for which the effectiveness was obtained (Figure 4.13) from 
the onset of warning. The channels are sirens, tone alert (PA), media (EBS – emergency 
broadcast system) and Telephone (mobile). This thesis will use these four channels as official 
warning system. Based on the average warning channel profile (Figure 4.13), the cumulative 
per cent of houses warned for each warning channel was obtained for every five-minute 
interval. Depending on the nature of warning channel, their warning average effectiveness 
needs to be scaled down/adjusted for different times of the day. When the user selects on/off 
switch indicating the availability of channel in the ABM screen, these effectiveness values are 
internally set. 
 
Table 4.17 presents a quantified estimate of adjustment (Roger and Sorensen 1991, Table 2, p 
126) for each warning channel depending on the activity of household. Each of the capability 
value is represented as Cij,  
where,   
i – is the index for household activity {1, 2, 3 and 4}  
j – is the index for official channel {1, 2, 3 and 4} 
 
Table 4.17 Channel effectiveness for different activities (Roger and Sorensen 1991, 
Table 2, p126) 
 
Even though these estimates were for Pittsburgh, United States, it is assumed to be applicable 
to the ERGO city. With the advancement of technology and sophistication in warning channel 
from the time of that study, these values may not be true representation to the present time. 
Conventional Sirens and PA systems have not changed. But some cities have modern 
remotely operated PA systems with voice-over capabilities (e.g. Telegrafia) which were 
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unavailable until recently, and the effectiveness of these systems needs to be measured in 
further work. These are some of the limitations of this thesis work, but the methodology 
proposed in this thesis is still valid. 
 
As the ‘time of the day’ will affect the activity of the household (Table 4.16), this would in 
turn affect their connectivity to the official channels. On the other hand, the impact of time 
will affect the outreach of warning channels as presented in Table 4.17. For each time of the 
day, the proportion of people at various activities Lj (Table 4.16) was multiplied with activity-
based channel effectiveness (Table 4.17) Cij to obtain the adjusted channel coverage. 
 
Channel effectiveness for an activity j 
                  … (4.2) 
Adjusted channel effectiveness 
            
 
         … (4.3) 
 
ACij indicates the maximum coverage that can be obtained from channel j for the chosen time 
of the day. As the warning effectiveness curve indicates the average value of cumulative 
coverage, this is adjusted/scaled down to obtain adjusted channel capacity as shown in 
Equation 4.3. And thus the impact of time of the day (activity of the household) has been 
obtained for each time step as presented in Figure 4.14 
 
Time-activity budget, channel capability, activity adjustment and the warning dissemination 
curves for different times were assumed to be applicable to the ERGO City for illustration of 
the proposed method of integrated warning dissemination planning. This thesis empirically 
quantifies the household informant behaviour using parameters and further studies the 
warning dissemination at a city scale. This methodology could generate evidence base for the 
EMAs on the role of household behaviour as informants and its implications for warning 
dissemination. 
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Figure 4.14 Warning channel coverage at average effectiveness (top left), midnight (top right), noon (bottom left) and evening
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The ABM was executed with all the four official warning channels for different time of the 
day. Each official channel’s effectiveness was adjusted from the peak value for the impact of 
time of the day, activity of household based on their location. This procedure was elaborated 
in the previous section and the estimated official warning channel values were internally 
selected with the model once the user selects ‘time of the day’ slider in the input screen. The 
value of defaulter percentage (Pd) was assumed to be 68% for all the cases. The results of 
model run for this scenario (time of the day) with and without unofficial channel has been 
presented in Figure 4.15 and Table 4.18a and Table 4.18b. 
 
When all the four channels are working, it can be observed from the figure that the 
progression of ‘cumulative pecent houses warned’ is high in all the cases within 30 – 50 
minutes from the onset of warning dissemination. There is very little increase beyond that 
time. Among the three cases, noon has the lowest level of warning given the higher 
proportion of households is not connected to media channels.  
 
From Table 4.18a and Table 4.18b, the difference between the warning level at ‘midnight’ 
(optimistic case) and ‘noon’ (pessimistic case) is about 7.87% (93.51 - 85.64 %) while 
unofficial channels were considered. The notification time is the same for noon and midnight 
and varies only by 4 minutes. In comparing of ‘time of the day’ with and without unofficial 
channel, the difference in the level of warnings is 3.11%, 6.13% and 4.54% respectively.  
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Figure 4.15 Warning response curves for the scenario ‘time of the day’ with and without 
unofficial channels 
The higher the ‘number of houses receiving the first warning from neighbours’ (FW) more 
will be the number of informants (for a constant Pd) and hence this parameter can serve as a 
KPI for measuring relative effectiveness of different scenarios. The average FW was found to 
be 712 houses. Number of houses receiving the first warning from neighbours is highest in the 
noon scenario (848) which is 35% [(848-551)/848] and 12.8% [(848-739)/848] more than for 
the scenario midnight and evening, respectively. 
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Even though the level of warning was the lowest for the noon scenario, the impact of 
unofficial channel is relatively higher during noon compared to midnight/evening. This also 
triangulates with the higher number of houses receiving first warning from neighbours during 
noon. For the purpose of planning, noon could be considered as a worst case on the time of 
the day variable. As all the four channels are functioning in these cases, the level of warning 
without unofficial channel is high enough to reach the household within the overall warning 
capability. Thus, when all the four channels are working, the unofficial channel at most could 
increase by 6.13%. This thesis will further investigate the level of unofficial channel impact at 
the worst case condition, i.e. only one official channel namely siren during noon time of the 
day. The results for this experiment are presented in Table 4.18b. 
 
In contrast to the earlier scenario of all four warning channels with unofficial channel, the 
difference between the warning level at ‘midnight’ (optimistic case) and ‘noon’ (pessimistic 
case) was about 13.89% (57.81 – 43.92 %). The difference (13.89%) is much higher 
compared to the result when all four channels were working, i.e. 7.87%. In comparing the 
‘time of the day’ with and without unofficial channel, the difference in the level of warnings 
is 9.26%, 7.72% and 9.13% respectively. 
 
The notification time results varied over the range 114-119 minutes for all the three times of 
the day. Number of houses receiving the first warning from neighbours is highest in the 
‘midnight’ scenario (1082), which is 20% ((1082 - 860)/1082) and 18.1% ((1082-886)/1082) 
more than the results of scenarios in ‘noon’ and ‘evening’, respectively. The average FW was 
found to be 942 houses. Number of houses receiving their first warning is almost double for 
midnight scenario between all four channels and worst case (i.e. only siren). When the 
‘official channel coverage’ is below sub-optimal levels (say due to failures/unavailability), 
‘the role of unofficial channel in midnight’ could be argued as prominent. 
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Table 4.18 a - Warning dissemination KPI comparison for the scenario ‘time of the day’ with all four channels 
  
Sl.No. 
  
Time of the day 
  
With unofficial channel  
  
Without unofficial channel  
Midnight Noon Evening Midnight Noon Evening 
1. Model control variables              
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses within evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 158511 157800 159093 158971 158184 158937 
  Total number of evacuees 46271 45675 46204 46165 46158 46224 
  Family size (average) 5.01 5 5.03 5.03 5.003 5.03 
  Overall ERGO city 
  
    
 
  
  Number of defaulter houses 15627 15620 15611 31617 31617 31617 
  Number of houses warned 29485 25493 27156 28572 23401 25577 
    
  
    
 
  
  Only evacuating household 
  
    
 
  
  Number of defaulter houses 4554 4535 4582 9214 9214 9214 
  Number of houses warned 8616 7428 7891 8329 6863 7473 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
  
    
 
  
  Only evacuating household 
  
    
 
  
  Warning level 93.51% 80.62% 85.64% 90.40% 74.48% 81.10% 
  Notification time 97 101 101 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 551 848 739 0 0 0 
    
  
    
 
  
  Overall ERGO city 
  
    
 
  
  Warning level 93.26% 80.63% 85.89% 90.37% 74.01% 80.90% 
  Notification time 107 115 106 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 2034 3152 2681 0 0 0 
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Table 4.18b Warning dissemination KPI comparison for the scenario ‘time of the day’ when only siren is working 
  
Sl.No. 
  
  
With unofficial channel  
  
Without unofficial channel  
Time of the day Midnight Noon Evening Midnight Noon Evening 
1. Model control variables              
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 159035 158882 158753 158109 158409 158457 
  Total number of evacuees 46386 46196 46174 46109 46015 46070 
  Family size (average) 5.03 5.03 5.02 5 5.01 5.01 
  Overall ERGO city 
  
    
 
  
  Number of defaulter houses 15580 15546 15608 31617 31617 31617 
  Number of houses warned 18451 12193 14005 15344 9456 11160 
    
  
    
 
  
  Only evacuating household 
  
    
 
  
  Number of defaulter houses 4507 4571 4484 9214 9214 9214 
  Number of houses warned 5327 3486 4047 4474 2775 3206 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
  
    
 
  
  Only evacuating household 
  
    
 
  
  Warning level 57.81% 37.83% 43.92% 48.56% 30.12% 34.79% 
  Notification time 114 117 119 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 1082 860 886 0 0 0 
    
  
    
 
  
  Overall ERGO city 
  
    
 
  
  Warning level 58.36% 38.56% 44.30% 48.53% 29.91% 35.30% 
  Notification time 124 119 119 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 3758 3066 3214 0 0 0 
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In summary, the role of unofficial channel is more prominent when the official channel is in 
‘worst case’ measured in terms of (a) warning level and (b) number of houses receiving first 
message from neighbours. As more houses will receive their message from neighbours, it 
takes a longer notification time in comparison between all four channels and worst case. The 
level of unofficial channel’s impact is highest for ‘midnight’ scenario in contrast to ‘noon’ 
when all channels are functional. In contrast to the findings from the prototype model, the 
difference in the level of warning between no unofficial channel (Scenario A) and uncertain 
assimilation time with unofficial channels (Scenario I) was 31.8% = 83.2% - 51.4% (Table 
4.7). The level of impact was much lower in the city scale and yet significant to support the 
role of unofficial channel during official channel failures. It must be observed that these 
results of warning dissemination are also dependent on the availability of warning channels 
and the percent defaulters (assuming a representative value Pd = 68%). This thesis will further 
investigate these two aspects in the following two sections. 
 
4.7.2 Official channel vulnerability and failure scenarios 
An article about the deadliest catastrophe tsunami 2004 with fatality over 200,000 describes 
the failure of EWS as "despite the presumed ubiquity and power of advanced technologies 
including satellites and the internet, no advance warning was given to the affected coastal 
populations by their governments or others" (Samarajiva 2004). This disaster has become a 
wake-up call for reviewing the EWS practises (including institutional structures) and making 
it a more ‘people-centred’ warning system (UNISDR, 2006a). There is also need to 
understand the propensity of failures of official channels and the reasons behind it.  
 
Official channels are often reported to be vulnerable and fail during disasters (Parker and 
Handmer 1998, Sorensen, 2000). “Communication problems, due to equipment and human 
failure, are the most significant causes of poor warning dissemination” (Sorensen, 2000, 
p122). A study after Hurricane Katrina (Banipal 2006) found that “breakdown of backhaul 
circuits, flooding of telephone exchanges and disruption of electricity contributed to failure of 
communication systems”. The impact on the warning system itself due to the hazard raises the 
need for designing a suitable combination of channels for the planned threat scenarios instead 
of taking an all-hazards approach. This entails an understanding of the vulnerability of each 
warning channel. Technology-sophisticated channels (like emergency broadcast systems; 
auto-dialler systems) are dependent on other critical resources like electricity and 
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telecommunication network function. These resources too are vulnerable in a large-scale 
emergency.  
 
For EMAs preparing for warning dissemination, a checklist prepared by the Early Warning 
Consortium (UNISDR 2006a) is a key and practical document for ensuring preparedness. One 
of the items about ‘Effective communication systems (refers to warning channel) and 
Equipment installed’ in the checklist (Key Element 3, p7) states that "Equipment maintenance 
and upgrade programme implemented and redundancies enforced so back-up systems are in 
place in the event of a failure." 
 
It is essential to understand the vulnerability of warning system level (including the clearly 
identified roles of transferring forecasting messages from scientists for dissemination to the 
public) and also at the individual channel level. The warning system’s institutional structure, 
although key, is considered beyond the scope of this thesis. Each channel depends on other 
resources (e.g. electricity) and even act as couplet to ‘notify’ the public with details. For 
example, a siren cannot be a standalone channel.   
 By merely raising loud tone, unless the public are trained to interpret, they may not 
understand the meaning of it. 
 A secondary channel (e.g. radio) is essential to provide details of the evacuation 
(location, intensity and timing) of the imminent/ongoing disaster.  
Hence, the EMAs must understand the vulnerability of individual channels and also 
understand the essential supporting role with other channels. The dependency and limitation 
of each official channel has been presented in the literature review ( 
Table 2.6). Some of the warning channels require installation of sophisticated machinery, 
software and personnel to operate such as UMS, Gedicom/Domino, etc. When telecom 
network-based mass broadcast system (e.g. UMS) is fully functional, it claims to alert all the 
households in a very short duration, and no time-series values of its effectiveness is currently 
available. Any failure in the equipment or technology system or not planning for backup 
systems could cause ‘technology failure’. These systems are dependent on telephone networks 
including routers, exchange units and satellites that add to the complexity of reasons why an 
official channel could possibly fail.  
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In Japan, a 2011triple-disaster event (i.e. earthquake-tsunami-nuclear power plant failure) has 
lead to shutdown of power plants and subsequent evacuation. Even though this was a 
controlled shut down, it does highlight the potential for critical infrastructure to fail during 
emergencies. During cyclone Yasi (2011) in Australia, about 61,000 households had no 
electricity (Taylor 2011a). During non-availability of official channels, the households to be 
evacuated without ‘evacuation information’ (location, intensity, etc.) could lead to confusion 
among the public even impeding their decision to evacuate. Un-warned household are subject 
to possible fatality. EMAs often prepare the public to have battery-operated radios in the 
emergency kit in campaigns like Go-in Stay-in and Tune-in. This serves as a precaution to be 
informed even during power outage. Some of the official channels that require electricity for 
operation could possibly fail due to ‘electricity failure’.  
 
On one hand, the household may not be able to access the channel (e.g. TV) and on the other 
hand a large-scale power-cut could disrupt even the technology-sophisticated channels. What 
could be the level of warning dissemination due to unofficial channels during these failures? 
These two failures and its implication on overall warning dissemination need to be 
investigated.  
Table 4.19 presents the failure scenarios of the four channels, and the dissemination of 
warning could be studied using ABM. 
 
Table 4.19 Official channels available during various failure scenarios 
Failure Scenarios Siren PA EBS Mobile 
Optimistic case On On  On  On 
Technology failure On On Off Off 
Electricity failure On Off Off On 
Worst case On Off Off Off 
 
The ABM was sequentially executed with these scenarios, keeping the time of day as noon 
and the other parameters constant, namely defaulter per cent (Pd = 68%), assimilation time 
and ‘time to inform a neighbour’. For each of these four scenarios, the model was executed 
with and without unofficial channel and the results are presented in Table 4.20 and Figure 
4.16. 
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Table 4.20 Impact of unofficial channel on ‘warning dissemination performance’ during ‘failures in official channel’ 
  
With unofficial channel Without unofficial channel 
Sl.No. Official channel Failure  No Technology Electricity Worst No Technology Electricity Worst 
1. Model control variables     
  
        
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  
Total number of houses (within evacuation 
zone) 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 157800 158504 158209 158529 158184 158474 158630 159070 
  Total number of evacuees 45675 46430 46164 46192 46158 46406 45987 46401 
  Family size (average) 5 5.01 5 5.01 5.003 5.01 5.02 5.03 
  Overall ERGO city    
  
    
    Number of defaulter houses 15620 15625 15543 15614 31617 31617 31617 31617
  Number of houses warned 25493 19604 15669 12066 23401 16889 12684 9426 
  
 
   
  
    
    Only evacuating household    
  
    
    Number of defaulter houses 4535 4548 4465 4571 9214 9214 9214 9214
  Number of houses warned 7428 5661 4521 3375 6863 4975 3701 2792 
2. KPI - Output metrics    
  
    
    Only evacuating household    
  
    
    Warning level 80.62% 61.44% 49.07% 36.63% 74.48% 53.99% 40.17% 30.30%
  Notification time 101 96 127 112 87 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 848 922 916 743 0 0 0 0 
  
 
   
  
    
    Overall ERGO city    
  
    
    Warning level 80.63% 62.00% 49.56% 38.16% 74.01% 53.42% 40.12% 29.81%
  Notification time 115 113 119 112 87 87 87 87 
  
Houses receiving first warning from 
neighbours 3152 3327 3358 2885 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 4.16 Warning response curves for various failure scenarios at noon 
From Figure 4.16, it can be observed that the progression and the level of impact are similar 
for pair-wise comparison of including or excluding unofficial channels. From Table 4.20, the 
results from the model show that for cases with unofficial channel, the difference in the 
warning level between the optimistic scenario (no failure) and pessimistic scenario (only 
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siren) was about 43.99% (80.62-36.63%). This highlights the wide range over which the 
failures overall warning level could be impacted due to failures. The ‘level of warning’ during 
technology failure and electricity failure scenarios was 61.44% and 49.07%, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, for scenarios without unofficial channel, the difference in the warning 
level between the optimistic scenario (no failure) and pessimistic/worst scenario (only siren) 
was about 44.18% (74.48 - 30.3%). The ‘level of warning’ during technology failure and 
electricity failure scenarios was 53.99% and 40.17%, respectively.   
 
On pair-wise comparison of including/excluding the unofficial channel, ‘level of warning’ 
results were lower for all the scenarios. The difference in warning level due to impact of 
unofficial channel was 6.13%, 7.45%, 8.9% and 6.33% respectively for the four failures with 
average of 7.2%. Even though the ‘difference between optimistic and pessimistic cases’ for 
including and excluding unofficial channel was almost the same (about 44%), the level of 
impact due to unofficial channel is about 7.2% increase in the coverage. 
 
The variation in the notification time for cases with unofficial channel was between 96 and 
127 minutes. On the other hand, the notification time was constant at 87 minutes when 
unofficial channel was excluded. By including unofficial channel, some of the houses 
receiving at later stages (e.g. after 60 minutes) from the warning onset will be available to 
inform their neighbours after 70-80 minutes. From the warning response curve (Figure 4.16), 
these houses though fewer in number cause the delay in the notification time value. 
 
Table 4.20 summarised that for cases with unofficial channel, the difference in number of 
houses receiving first warning (KPI-3), between the highest value for the 'technology failure' 
case and the lowest during 'no failure' was 105 houses (922 – 743). Number of houses 
receiving the first warning from neighbours is almost equal in ‘Technology failure’ (922) and 
Electricity failure (916). Compared to pessimistic (743) and optimistic official channel levels 
(848), the role of unofficial channel is more prominent in either of the failures based on 
warning levels and count of neighbour warned houses. 
 
In summary, the results from ABM showed that the failures in official channel availability 
will have significant impact on the overall warning level to the order of 44%. By including 
the unofficial channel, the warning level will increase on an average by 7.2%. The notification 
time was longer in general by including the unofficial channel. As the level of unofficial 
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channel (represented using Pd) might have an impact on the extent to which the warning 
dissemination happens, this thesis further investigates this by using the sensitivity of defaulter 
percentage variable. 
 
4.7.3 Impact of the unofficial channel on overall dissemination – sensitivity of defaulter 
percentage 
Not all houses will inform their neighbours. Two sets of analyses were studied using the 
ABM at defaulter level of 68%. When a higher proportion of people act as warning 
informants, more houses that might remain ‘un-warned’ may be receiving their first/only 
warning from neighbours. This cascading effect was investigated using the sensitivity 
analyses of the defaulter percentage variable. The ABM was executed sequentially by varying 
Pd = {0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%} representing six discrete values within continuum 
between ideal case (all houses are informants) and no unofficial channel (none of the houses 
are informants). The level of informal channel depends on the cohesion level of the 
community. 
 
Official channel combinations were so chosen to vary the ‘overall official channel coverage’ 
(OCoff) to vary between 30% and 80% when no unofficial channel was included. The 
combination of warning channel and the respective effectiveness was presented in Table 4.21 
leading to scenarios CA-CF. All the other parameters were kept constant in all these cases 
namely assimilation time and time to inform neighbour. The ABM was executed for each of 
the six scenarios (CA-CF) for different Pd values between 0% and 100% and the results are 
tabulated in Table 4.22a to Table 4.22f, respectively. 
 
Table 4.21 Scenarios of official warning system and its effectiveness without unofficial 
channel 
Scenario 
Official warning 
system 
Time of 
the day 
Overall 
effectiveness 
CA Siren Noon 29.74% 
CB Siren + Mobile Noon 40.72% 
CC Siren + PA Noon 52.63% 
CD Siren + PA + Mobile Noon 60.20% 
CE Siren + PA + EBS + 
Mobile  
Noon 74.16% 
CF Siren + PA + EBS + 
Mobile  
Evening 80.51% 
 
For the pessimistic official channel Scenario CA, the results from the ABM showed that 
(Table 4.22a) the impact of defaulter sensitivity measured as the difference in the level of 
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warning between the ideal households (Pd = 0%) and no unofficial channel (Pd = 100%) was 
12.35% (47.15 – 34.79%). The maximum number of houses receiving a warning from 
neighbour (FWmax) will occur in an ideal community with all household as informants (Pd = 
0%). FWmax was 1716 houses and FW decreased on an average by 267 houses when 
defaulter percentage increased by 20%. In comparison with the earlier results by keeping Pd = 
68%, the impact on warning level is higher at 12.35% compared to the average of 7.2% 
respectively.  The results of scenarios CB to CF are presented in Table 4.22b to Table 4.22f.  
  
 178 
Table 4.22a Scenario – CA Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
        Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 158111 158590 159363 158568 158813 158457 
  Total number of evacuees 46118 46250 46222 46057 46564 46070 
  Family size (average) 5 5.02 5.04 5.01 5.02 5.01 
  Overall ERGO city 
        Number of defaulter houses 0 5742 10427 14283 17443 31617 
  Number of houses warned 15299 14160 13227 12445 11790 11160 
    
        Only evacuating household 
        Number of defaulter houses 0 1712 3010 4211 5122 9214 
  Number of houses warned 4344 4039 3673 3627 3460 3206 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
        Only evacuating household 
        Warning level 47.15% 43.84% 39.86% 39.36% 37.55% 34.79% 
  Notification time 128 132 103 124 121 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1716 1399 1087 914 736 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
        Warning level 48.39% 44.79% 41.84% 39.36% 37.29% 35.30% 
  Notification time 128 132 131 124 121 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 6354 5115 4166 3309 2640 0 
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Table 4.22b Scenario – CB Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
     
  
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 158361 158993 158913 158810 158583 158617 
  Total number of evacuees 45968 46355 46718 46195 46526 46184 
  Family size (average) 5.01 5.03 5.03 5.02 5.02 5.02 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 5706 10394 14194 17472 31617 
  Number of houses warned 18851 17675 16741 16053 15417 12790 
    
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 1691 3015 4141 5150 9214 
  Number of houses warned 5423 4979 4820 4611 4398 3758 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Warning level 58.86% 54.04% 52.31% 50.04% 47.73% 40.79% 
  Notification time 111 109 120 111 97  87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1866 1501 1222 1008 786 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Warning level 59.62% 55.90% 52.95% 50.77% 48.76% 40.45% 
  Notification time 127 124 120 130 112  87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 6792 5584 4464 3698 2968 0 
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Table 4.22c Scenario – CC Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
     
  
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 157737 158489 158780 158691 158092 158480 
  Total number of evacuees 45877 46221 46023 46523 46259 46088 
  Family size (average) 4.99 5.01 5.02 5.02 5 5.01 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 5751 10423 14279 17384 31617 
  Number of houses warned 22475 21624 20712 20098 19375 16775 
    
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 1663 3042 4080 5051 9214 
  Number of houses warned 6472 6220 6020 5784 5628 4828 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Warning level 70.24% 67.51% 65.34% 62.77% 61.08% 52.40% 
  Notification time 128 108 105 105 109 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1781 1463 1256 1037 821 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Warning level 71.09% 68.39% 65.51% 63.57% 61.28% 53.06% 
  Notification time 128 120 111 105 109 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 6546 5413 4540 3810 2996 0 
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Table 4.22d Scenario – CD Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
     
  
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 158126 158273 158366 158275 158585 158862 
  Total number of evacuees 46322 46051 46317 46061 46290 46107 
  Family size (average) 5 5 5.01 5 5.01 5.02 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 5767 10407 14260 17409 31617 
  Number of houses warned 24182 23294 22622 21990 21502 19076 
    
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 1671 3038 4126 5066 9214 
  Number of houses warned 6981 6744 6517 6420 6189 5546 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Warning level 75.77% 73.19% 70.73% 69.68% 67.17% 60.19% 
  Notification time 113 89 98 112 102 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1675 1372 1133 970 814 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Warning level 76.48% 73.68% 71.55% 69.55% 68.01% 60.33% 
  Notification time 121 122 121 112 109 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 6121 5113 4228 3486 2958 0 
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Table 4.22e Scenario – CE Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
     
  
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 158632 158295 158315 158241 158117 158108 
  Total number of evacuees 46399 46134 46483 46048 45964 46196 
  Family size (average) 5.02 5 5 5 5 5 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 5706 10415 14226 17397 31617 
  Number of houses warned 27255 26564 26166 25676 25281 23383 
    
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 1677 3016 4062 5018 9214 
  Number of houses warned 7880 7705 7584 7514 7274 6856 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Warning level 85.52% 83.62% 82.31% 81.55% 78.95% 74.41% 
  Notification time 108 102 114 112 102 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1565 1349 1119 947 794 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Warning level 86.20% 84.02% 82.76% 81.21% 79.96% 73.96% 
  Notification time 108 104 114 115 106 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 5717 4812 4048 3399 2814 0 
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Table 4.22f Scenario – CF Impact of the ‘level of informant behaviour’ (Pd) on the overall warning dissemination 
Sl.No. Sensitivity of informant behaviour Pd = 0% Pd = 20% Pd = 40% Pd = 60% Pd = 80% Pd = 100% 
1. Model control variables  
     
  
  Total houses in the data file 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 31617 
  Total number of houses in the evacuation zone 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 9214 
  Total resident population 159364 158157 158354 158228 158462 158322 
  Total number of evacuees 46642 45882 46141 46303 46293 46267 
  Family size (average) 5.04 5 5.01 5 5.01 5.01 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 5759 10362 14218 17360 31617 
  Number of houses warned 28470 28165 27663 27433 27080 25484 
    
     
  
  Only Evacuating household 
     
  
  Number of defaulter houses 0 1653 3019 4070 5078 9214 
  Number of houses warned 8246 8203 7983 7975 7832 7398 
2. KPI - Output metrics 
     
  
  Only evacuating household 
     
  
  Warning level 89.49% 89.03% 86.64% 86.55% 85.00% 80.29% 
  Notification time 99 102 100 100 98 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 1366 1144 977 814 696 0 
  Overall ERGO city 
     
  
  Warning level 90.05% 89.08% 87.49% 86.77% 85.65% 80.60% 
  Notification time 110 117 103 107 106 87 
  Houses receiving first warning from neighbours 4897 4242 3631 2996 2527 0 
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The following are parameters that summarise the results for each scenario, and the summary 
statistics of these scenarios are presented in Table 4.23. 
 OCoff – Coverage due to official channels only (Pd = 100%). 
 WLmax – The maximum value of warning level (coverage) within one official channel 
scenario occurs at (Pd = 0%)  
 WLi-n – The difference in warning level between ideal community (Pd = 0%) and no 
unofficial channel within one official channel scenario. 
 NTi-n – The difference in notification time between ideal community (Pd = 0%) and no 
unofficial channel within one official channel scenario. 
 FWmax – The maximum value for ‘number of houses receiving first warning (FW) 
from neighbours’ within one official channel scenario 
 rFW – rate of increase in FW for every 20% increase in Pd 
Table 4.23 Summary of ABM results for each scenario under various official coverage 
Scenario OCoff WLmax WLi-n NTi-n FWmax rFW 
CA 34.79% 47.14% 12.35% 41 1716 267 
CB 40.79% 58.86% 18.07% 24 1866 286 
CC 52.40% 70.24% 17.84% 41 1781 248 
CD 60.19% 75.76% 15.57% 26 1675 235 
CE 74.41% 85.52% 11.11% 21 1565 206 
CF 80.29% 89.49% 9.20% 12 1366 184 
 
This set of scenarios synthesises the role of unofficial channel impact by studying the impact 
of level of household informant behaviour (Pd) under various levels of official channel 
coverage. Figure 4.17 presents a 3D frontier curve that synthesises overall warning coverage 
(WL) with the level of official warning coverage (OCoff) and the level of unofficial warning 
(Pd). Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19 present respectively the frontier curve for ‘difference in 
warning level’ WLi-n and the ‘number of houses warned by their neighbours’ (FW). 
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Figure 4.17 Frontier curve showing impact of unofficial channel (Pd) measured using 
warning levels 
 
Figure 4.18 Frontier curve showing impact of unofficial channel (Pd) measured using 
difference in warning levels WLi-n  
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Figure 4.19 Frontier curve showing impact of unofficial channel (Pd) measured using 
houses warned by neighbours FW 
It can be observed from Figure 4.18 and Table 4.23 that the maximum impact of unofficial 
channel occurs (measured using WLi-n) when the official channel coverage is in the range 40- 
50% and with an increase in warning level by about 18%. When the official channel coverage 
reduces below 40%, a low number of people will become initial seed and cascade the 
information to others and hence the role of unofficial channel reduces further. On the other 
hand when the official channel coverage is beyond 50%, the role of unofficial channel reduces 
further. This may be due to a reason that a household has higher likelihood of receiving the 
first message from any of the official channel than from neighbours. This frontier takes a 
concave shape with a peak in the range 40-50%.  
 
In comparison to the difference in warning level, the metric FW also shows similar trend as 
depicted in Figure 4.19. The maximum value of FW (around 1800) occurs in the optimal 
range of official channel availability (40-50%). The rate of decrease in FW (rFW) indicates a 
non-linear trend. EMAs will be able to better understand the dynamics between overall 
warning coverage, official channel and unofficial channel from the synthesised results. 
 187 
Keeping the Pd factor aside, the impact of unofficial channels (with no prior information) will 
be in the range of 9-18% based on the level of channel availability. 
 
4.8 Discussion of findings from ABM for warning preparedness of a city 
How will an EMA responsible for warning dissemination be able to gain more confidence 
through preparedness? For the ERGO city evacuation, will they be able to warn in 90 
minutes? EMAs are confronted to support their warning preparedness with evidence base in 
order to gain greater confidence in their capabilities. The following are some of the key 
findings on the warning dissemination theory based on simulation of ABM: 
 
 Based on warning coverage as KPI, ‘noon’ was found to have the lowest level of 
warning dissemination (at Pd = 68%), when the official channel is at optimistic level 
(all the four channels are functioning) and pessimistic level (only siren is working) 
 Based on the ‘number of neighbour warned houses’ (FW) as KPI, the impact of 
unofficial warning channel was more prominent in ‘noon’ and ‘midnight’ in the 
optimal and pessimistic official channel level, respectively. 
 When the official channel is at optimistic level, the impact of unofficial channel (at Pd 
= 68%) was found to increase the warning coverage by 6.13% in ‘noon’. The overall 
average impact in a day was found to be 4.59%. 
 When the official channel is at pessimistic level, the impact of unofficial channel (at 
Pd = 68%) was found to increase the warning coverage by similar proportion in 
‘midnight’ (9.26%) and ‘evening’ (9.13%). The overall average impact in a day was 
found to be 8.7%. 
 For residential households, noon is relatively vulnerable for warning dissemination. 
 For a low level (at Pd = 68%) of public acting as informants, the average impact of 
unofficial channel on warning level ranges between 4.6% and 8.7%. 
 Depending on the vulnerability of official channels, the level of warning dissemination 
impact could vary between 30% and 80%, and hence understanding and mitigating 
these failures is essential for a reliable warning preparedness. 
 The impact of unofficial warning channel (at Pd = 68%)  is more prominent during 
‘electricity failure’ by increasing warning level by 8.9% when average increase in all  
cases was 7.2% 
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 Based on the ‘number of first neighbour warned houses’ (FW) as KPI, the impact of 
unofficial warning channel was almost equally prominent in ‘technology failure’ and 
‘electricity failure’. 
 When the official channel coverage is near half (40-50%) of its average coverage, the 
role of unofficial channel is more prominent, leading to increase in the warning level 
by about 18%. When the level of coverage with only official channel is of the order of 
50%, these additional households warned could be vital in reducing fatality during a 
catastrophic evacuation situation. 
 When the official channel coverage is outside the optimal range (i.e. <40 and > 50%), 
then the impact of unofficial channel diminishes in a non-linear fashion. The cross-
section of the frontier curve is concave. 
Having a customisable simulation experimental test bed like the ABM enables the ability for 
EMAs to study uncertainty in household warning behaviour on warning dissemination. This 
simulation model also provided a platform to quantify the impact of various official channel 
failures on overall dissemination and particularly the role of unofficial channel in the same. 
The experience of developing the model in two phases (prototype and city scale) not only 
increased the accuracy but also highlighted the interpretation of results from different scales. 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is a contribution to the OR/MS literature in the class 
of behavioural simulation models and also to evacuation modelling practise. The uniqueness 
of the proposed thesis is in the demonstration of quantifying household informant to 
neighbours behaviour. Apart from physical proximity (neighbours), a household could have 
other forms of social networks like friends, family, etc within the evacuated area and beyond. 
The role of social network (including and beyond neighbours) in warning dissemination is an 
interesting problem for further research. With wide spread use of internet as a warning tool 
and social network in the electronic media (Twitter, Face-book, blogs etc.) as a warning 
channel adds another dimension to the warning system.  
 
Any model is an abstraction of reality, and the information lost due to assumption and 
implications’ limits the generalisability of the findings. The thesis focused on the residential 
household evacuation, and the warning dissemination to the commuters and transient 
population have been excluded from the model as a simplification. Apart from residential 
population, the transit population, commuters and family with visual and hearing disability 
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are more vulnerable groups and EMAs need to make additional/specialised targeted 
preparedness for each of these vulnerable groups. 
 
Only single dwelling household units were treated as agents and no distinction has been made 
for high-rise buildings. In reality, there are multiple dwelling units (like apartment complexes) 
and the warning dissemination within and across the neighbouring household will have much 
complex behaviour and is an interesting problem for further research. High-rise buildings 
have larger population density per unit and missing one building could mean 100s of 
evacuees. EMAs need to encourage the building associations to have internal evacuation 
warning plans and train evacuation wardens per building. For example,  
 If one of the resident house (agent) in the high rise received warning message by any 
means (official or otherwise), they could trigger their internal fire alarm to signal an 
emergency situation.  
 Whenever an internal speaker is available in the communal areas in each floor (e.g. 
lifts, parking spaces, etc) it could be used by the wardens to alert the households 
within their building.  
 Within the evacuation plan, warning agency must have contact details of security staff 
of these buildings to make them single-point-of-contact (SPOC) for warning 
dissemination. During midnight, if none of the houses are warned, such a SPOC 
system can trigger onset of warning dissemination. 
ABM needs various parameters for the planned city. Household level time-activity budget, 
channel capabilities and the warning dissemination curves for different times of the day are 
needed for customising these models to any other city. With the advent of new warning 
systems with faster dissemination capabilities, the empirical estimates used in the model need 
to be obtained for the city under planning. Only four activities are considered while adjusting 
the warning channel availability. Siren alone can alert on an emergency but cannot be a 
warning system unless the public are trained to interpret it. 
 
Keeping aside these limitations of the model, EMAs could obtain the following learning 
based on the ABM simulation experiments. Warning dissemination during noon is vulnerable 
for the evacuating resident population. The maximum impact of unofficial channel could be 
about 18% when the official channel coverage is within optimal range (40-50%). With 
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increase in official channel coverage, the neighbour informing behaviour has diminishing 
impact. 
 
Level of warning coverage will indicate how many houses will possibly respond to the orders. 
In a household level, a delay in the warning will lead to delay in mobilisation and departure 
from the house. The role of warning dissemination (ESF-1) will have cascading impact 
evacuation traffic (ESF-2) which is generally managed by transport authorities. This entails a 
need for multi-agency collaboration possibly through an integrated approach to simulating 
evacuation (onset to safety) with evidence-based preparedness. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MODEL DEVELOPMENT - EVACUEE TRANSPORT 
MANAGEMENT  
5.1 Evacuee transportation management – An Introduction 
During the Hurricane Katrina evacuation of New Orleans (2005), around 1 million people 
were evacuated with “up to 100,000 people of New Orleans in the US had no access to 
transportation and would have to remain here. An estimated 20,000 would go to the 
Louisiana superdome designated as the shelter at last resort” (Tate 2010). The role of 
transportation becomes very critical in ensuring the safety of thousands of lives during large-
scale disasters. This chapter focuses on the traffic management of the evacuees moving from 
‘the place of danger to a place of safety’. The first section presents the ERGO findings from 
the interviews and data collection process followed by the proposed model for managing 
traffic, illustrated using the ERGO city case study. 
5.2 ERGO project findings on Evacuee transportation management 
In all the ERGO countries, the transport authorities were included at the planning stage as 
well as during evacuation response. The impact of the type of disaster (e.g. rising tide, rapid-
onset disasters) on the time available for evacuation will have a direct bearing on the transport 
system. In ‘rapid-onset’ disasters, the role of traffic management is very critical. For example, 
glacial flooding in Iceland is caused due to the flow of erupted volcanic material over the 
glacial ice causing flood “within one to two hours” (Gudmundson 2008). In the case of 
tsunami threat in Japan, the time available for evacuation is even shorter. Depending on the 
distance of the resident population from the disaster epicentre, the time for completing the 
evacuation could be as short as one hour or less. This would require the EMAs to provide 
timely warning dissemination and manage traffic efficiently to facilitate a quick evacuation of 
everyone in the endangered areas. The following sub-sections summarise the key findings 
related to evacuee transport management which are grouped into three categories, namely: 
macro-level transport policies in the evacuation plan, policies related to evacuee destination 
and means of transport during evacuation, and use of models in evacuation traffic 
management. 
5.2.1 Macro-level transport policies in the evacuation plan 
A ‘transport operations centre’ was available in all the participant countries at different level 
of sophistication. Its usage during exercise and training for evacuation was explained during 
the ERGO visits. Transport officials who man these operations centres on a day-to-day basis 
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were involved in the evacuation planning and preparedness.  This facility has been used to 
provide live traffic updates to the decision makers during evacuation, and the same has been 
used for training and exercise. Transport officials collect traffic volume data also referred as 
‘origin and destination’ (O-D) data for their day-to-day operations to monitor the traffic 
volumes. There is potential for using the O-D data to understand the potential volume of 
traffic for different times of the day. The ‘O-D’ data and analyses of ‘traffic volume’ could be 
included in the evacuation plan. As the public commute between residential areas and 
commercial districts in different times of the day, this O-D data will prove to be critical for 
identifying potential traffic volumes in the transport network. Transport authorities could 
identify traffic management strategies for different times of the day and test them using a 
simulation model to identify the most effective option. 
 
As there are many ‘means of transport’ (e.g. buses, underground and over-ground metro, rail 
services) in large cities, there is a need for coordination among these authorities to provide 
needs-based distribution of resources. During the ERGO interviews, it was found that the 
umbrella transport agency in London, ‘Transport for London – TFL’ included a fulltime 
‘emergency planner’ who would foresee the coordination of different service providers during 
day-to-day emergencies as well as during preparing for large-scale evacuation. Having such a 
staff to ensure inter-agency coordination in the evacuation planning and response may prove 
to be crucial during evacuation. 
 
Transport officials in Germany use planning estimate of ‘public transport usage during 
evacuation’ to be 35% (all others are assumed to evacuate using cars). The transport 
authorities in Germany have identified bus stops to serve as evacuation ‘pickup points’, and 
this has been communicated in advance using billboards, preparedness leaflets and special 
symbols in the bus stops. A similar system was available in Japan as well. Denmark officials 
have also identified ‘meeting points’ for evacuees to board buses for evacuation. Having 
identified pickup points will provide flexibility for the transport authorities to operate ‘special 
evacuation routes’ for buses as well for the evacuees to know where to wait for transport 
support. 
 
Iceland traffic police did not observe any ‘panic behaviour’ during the preventive evacuation 
for Mt. Eyjafjallajokull eruption-related glacial flooding. An evacuated interviewee, who lives 
about 20 km from the Eyjafjallajokull eruption site, said that she was normal and not 
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panicking, and also that as a precaution, the car driving speed was slightly lower than usual. 
Through the preparedness leaflet, she knew the ‘nearest shelter location’ prior to the 
evacuation. The emergency officials had prepared in advance the evacuees in the Hollsvollur 
region using preparedness leaflet. Both the emergency officials and the evacuated public have 
cited the preparedness initiatives including the leaflet, information meetings and exercise as 
the key reasons for successful evacuation. The leaflet for the Hollsvollur region (Figure 5.1) 
provides information about: 
i) glacial flooding path for that region 
ii) potential inundated areas  
iii) evacuation routes  
iv) road closure points 
v)  Emergency aid centres.  
 
Figure 5.1 Screenshot of the ‘Evacuation preparedness leaflet’ distributed to the public 
in Hollsvollur region, Iceland 
In the evacuation plan for the Hollsvollur region of Iceland, the EMAs have taken 25-30 
minutes as the ‘evacuation preparation time’ or ‘mobilisation time’ (time between receiving 
the warning message and beginning to evacuate). Supporting this leaflet, the officials had 
shown the simulation model of flooding during ‘information meetings’ to the residents of the 
area prior to the event. The interviewed evacuee stated that showing the glacial flood 
simulation model to the evacuees residing in the area, helped them in understanding the time 
available for a potential flood to reach the zone and then heightened their risk perception. 
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In Japan, EMAs were using the ‘Tokai-Tonankai-Nankai’ earthquake as a planning scenario 
for large-scale evacuation that is expected to impact about 6 million evacuees and an 
estimated death of 250,000 (Chen et al. 2009). The Tokyo metropolitan authorities have a 
policy that the evacuation will be by foot and the evacuees will choose ‘in-sheltering’ 
(vertical evacuation – moving to higher floors within the building) and only as a last resort 
will go to the shelters within the zone. The use of cars during the evacuation is legally 
forbidden in some areas. On the other hand, Iceland, with a highly dispersed population, has a 
transport policy that the evacuation is only by cars as it is not feasible to send buses to the 
evacuation regions when the time available for evacuation is very short (in the order of a 
couple of hours). The authorities in Germany also believed that the proportion of car users 
will be high as it is one of the valued possessions. 
 
During the Jutland fireworks accident in Denmark, about 750 houses with 2000 people were 
evacuated, with about 22 dead in the incident. In the first stage of evacuation, the authorities 
decided to evacuate 500 m around the factory. When the situation worsened, the danger zone 
was expanded to 1.5 km and the second stage of evacuation was needed. The railway lines 
were closed due to safety concerns. In a large-scale evacuation, closing of a public transport 
system, for example a railway line, will have an impact on the capacity available for the 
public and hence affects the ET. Along with evaluating their transport policies, the EMAs 
could identify such scenarios and then test using simulation models as part of preparedness 
initiative. 
5.2.2 Policies related to evacuee destination and means of transport during evacuation 
During the ERGO interviews, it was found that shelter use is the last resort as a destination 
and the evacuees would prefer to go to friends and family, and private accommodation. This 
confirms the findings on evacuation destination found in the published literature. Iceland has 
used behaviour studies to improve risk perception, as well as for obtaining a planning 
estimate for shelter needs. Belgium’s medical service authorities believed that 5-10% of the 
evacuees will require sheltering, and this information could be used to estimate the traffic 
volume to different exits out of the evacuated area. Sweden had collected post-evacuation 
reports as well as research literature related to evacuation. As highlighted in the literature 
review section, the EMAs could use post-evacuation reports, stated-preference surveys, 
exercises, experience of the officials and social science literature to identify various 
destination preferences and devise traffic management plans accordingly. The choice of 
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destination will impact the direction of traffic as well as subsequent evacuation support 
services like providing ‘public transport support’ and ‘emergency accommodation’. 
 
Transport authorities need to have planning estimates of the means of transport (cars, 
pedestrians, and public transport) in the evacuation plan in order to identify the demands for 
transport infrastructure. During the ERGO project, there were diverse plans about the ‘means 
of transport’ used during evacuation.  
i) In Iceland, the ownership of cars is high and during the ERGO interview it was 
found that vehicle utilisation during evacuation was assumed to be 100% in the 
evacuation plan.  
ii) In Belgium, when people do not own cars, it was planned to provide buses 
from pickup points around the inner zone around the Doel Nuclear plant 
evacuation.  
iii) In the United Kingdom, Transport for London will run buses through normal 
bus routes as evacuation routes. This will reduce confusion among commuters 
who can take their normal bus routes during evacuation and help the bus 
drivers who know regular routes very well.  
iv) Transport authorities in Germany will run buses along ‘special evacuation 
routes’ through pre-identified ‘pickup points’ in different flood inundation 
zones.  
These different policies demonstrate diverse response options used by the transport authorities 
based on different priorities. The transport authorities in all the ERGO countries have formed 
collaboration with the neighbouring counties as well as with the private bus operators to 
support additional vehicle demands during evacuation. In Iceland, information about road 
traffic conditions was updated using a website as well as the information hotline number 
1777. Electronic billboards were widely used to provide live updates to the evacuees in the 
ERGO countries. 
5.2.3 Use of models in evacuation transport management 
Iceland has developed ‘simulation model of evacuation using cars’ which was used to 
estimate the ET for glacial flooding due to Mt. Katla eruption. This simulation model was 
developed in-house using ABM technique. Here, cars were represented as agents with pre-
specified driving behaviour (e.g. acceleration, braking, and distance from other cars). The 
evacuation plan of Iceland also assumed that the evacuees need a ‘mobilisation time’ (defined 
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as the time between receiving the warning message to leaving the house) of about 30 minutes, 
and this time has been included in the model. ‘Traffic loading points’ (points at which traffic 
will feed from minor roads into major roads) were identified for each evacuation zone. The 
authorities have also identified the evacuation route for each zone and then communicated it 
in the leaflet. Figure 5.1 is a screenshot of the ‘eruption emergency guidelines’ leaflet 
distributed to the residents living in the Hollsvollur region of Iceland for glacial flooding.  
 
The traffic simulation model developed in Iceland was used to obtain a planning estimate of 
the ET and this has been modelled as a two-step process, namely the first stage being 
evacuating from the house to the nearest ‘traffic loading point’ and the second stage is to 
drive in car from the traffic loading point to the nearest exit. This model was found to be 
helpful for the emergency officials to prioritise evacuation for different zones and test the 
chosen evacuation route. This model was primarily used to obtain a planning estimate for 
TET and to identify bottlenecks in the road network. The authorities also presented the model 
to the public during information meetings in order to raise their awareness. Iceland has also 
conducted risk assessment at the community level and then used the simulation model to 
prioritise the evacuation based on the expected time when flood will reach each community.  
 
In Sweden, the authorities in Uppsala County have used ‘Plume Behaviour models’ to 
prioritise the evacuation of inner zone (12-15 km) around the nuclear power plant. During an 
exercise it was found that 40 minutes was enough to warn everyone in the inner zone using 
official channels as well as the special radio alarm system. The evacuees will be leaving using 
car as well as using buses from key locations in the zone. The model is used to obtain ET. 
 
In Japan, the emergency officials have developed a model for underground station evacuation 
in Japan using multi-agent simulation. Another ABM was developed for traffic management 
around ‘Disneyland Tokyo’ in order to test traffic routing. During the interview, it was found 
that EMAs in Poland also use models for evacuation transport planning. Moto Grand Prix in 
Spain is an annual event that attracts people from around the world. The authorities managing 
the event have used a traffic simulation model to test exit routing plans, including contra flow 
initiatives, along with a field exercise. This model was used for egress simulation after the 
event as well to support evacuation plan.  
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Anna Bligh, the premiere of Queensland Australia announced that "No-one should be leaving 
home now" (Daily Telegraph, 2011) during the ‘Cyclone Yasi’ evacuation in February 2011. 
Though there is no information about the use of traffic model in this particular decision, to 
make such a decision with confidence - “whether to stop evacuation or allow for few more 
hours” - would involve combining the disaster prediction models (in this case cyclone model) 
with the transport management models (which will give an estimate of expected ET). A 
delayed departure of the household might expose them to the threat and make them unsafe. 
The readers are reminded that during Hurricane Rita (2005) “110 people were killed in the 
evacuation, compared to only nine in the storm” (Leonard 2008). Computer models combined 
with live update on traffic conditions will play a critical role to support evacuation decision 
makers to know ‘how long to delay the evacuation order’ and even ‘whether to stop the 
evacuation’ particularly during preventive evacuations. 
5.2.4 Research gaps on planning for ESF-2 
The findings from ERGO interviews highlighted diverse transport policies as well as diverse 
planning basis for transport management. The interviews also identified some of the transport 
models used among the ERGO countries. Similar to the ‘stated preference evacuation 
behaviour studies’ conducted by FEMA in the United States, it was found that such studies 
have been used by the EMAs in Iceland in collaboration with the academic community. There 
are two major findings based on the ERGO interviews and literature reviews.  
 
First, since there was no integrated system that covered all phases of evacuation, there is 
scope of using a model for integrating the transport network, evacuee behaviour and response 
strategies in order to evaluate ‘evacuee transport management’ as a part of preparedness 
initiative. Second, as different households receive warning and respond at different points in 
time, a realistic estimation of overall ET need to factor the warning time. EMAs need a 
platform to test their planning assumptions as well as to identify response strategies. Inline to 
these observations, this thesis will propose an evacuee behaviour-based transport management 
model. 
 
Iceland’s car simulation model accounts the car driver behaviours and was found to be very 
helpful. For EMAs there are additional modes of transport and traffic management strategies 
that are available to the planner. This could be tested in advance using a computer model.  
Simulation models, known for the richness of experimenting different scenarios, can provide 
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the transport planner more confidence in their response choices. The following section 
presents the overview of the model used for managing evacuation traffic. The capabilities of 
such model will be illustrated by using the ERGO city case study. The aim of this model is to 
help the transport authorities to obtain planning estimates for ET and its impact on various 
response choices. The model has been developed by combining network modelling approach 
with ABM. 
5.3 Model for ‘Evacuee transport management’ – Description 
This chapter on the ‘model for evacuee transport management’ (ESF – 2) covers the 
evacuation phase between ‘household receiving the warning message’ and ‘until they reach a 
place of safety’. Once the household receives the warning message, they will require some 
time to prepare for evacuation (referred to as mobilisation time) before departing. A delay in 
the warning message can have a cascading effect on the ‘departure time’ and hence the ‘time 
to reach safety’. Evacuation is complete only on the evacuees reaching their chosen safe 
location.  
 
An ABM is proposed in this thesis to study the household behaviour during transportation 
phase (ESF-2), given the level of warning dissemination scenario from ESF-1. Agents and 
agent behaviours are key components of ABM transportation model. The general principle of 
implementing key components is presented in Section 5.3 and the illustration using ERGO 
city is presented in Section 5.4. 
 
There are two classes of agents in the ABM transportation model: ‘household agents’ and 
‘vehicle agents’. Each household is represented as an ‘agent’ and the household level 
behavioural choices prior to their departure are set as behavioural rules for the agents. 
Vehicles in the model, namely cars and buses, are another set of agents that represent the 
household physical movement from the evacuated zone (origin) to the chosen destination.  
 
There are two set of behaviours relevant to ESF-2 namely ‘household behaviour’ and ‘vehicle 
driving behaviour’, which maps to the two classes of agents. Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 describe 
household agents’ evacuation decisions and its implementation in the ABM. Section 5.3.5 
describes the modelling of vehicle agents’ movement in the road network.  
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Figure 5.2 Household’s evacuation transport choices  
 
After receiving warning message, some of the houses may not comply with the ‘evacuation 
order’ and hence may stay in situ risking their lives. Figure 5.2 summarises the household 
level transport behaviour choices. For an evacuating household, there are four major choices 
made prior to leaving the place of danger:  
 Destination (Where to go?) 
 Means of transport (How to go?)  
 Evacuation route (Which roads to take?) 
 Departure time (When to leave?) 
5.3.1 Evacuation destination 
There are two major groups of destinations indicated in the transport model namely ‘public 
shelters’ and ‘private destinations’. In general, the shelter authorities (ESF-3) estimate the 
level of shelter usage and also location of shelters. ‘Public shelter’ provided by the authorities 
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is one destination group and the shelter information is needed for transport planning. ‘Private 
destination’ (e.g. family, friends and private accommodation) is represented in the model by 
various exit points in the road network. In general, destinations are discrete points in the 
evacuation network that attracts traffic volume towards it and acts as a ‘sink’ for vehicle 
agents during simulation. 
 
First, a household decides whether they want to move to public shelter or otherwise. In 
general, a house may pick a nearest, a close-by shelter or randomly any shelter based on their 
personal preference. A ‘shelter choice set’ is a discrete set of shelter-ids for each zone 
comprising of shelters in the vicinity and few random shelters. For households deciding on 
shelters, they select one from ‘shelter choice set’ as their destination. Detailed discussion on 
shelter choice behaviour is presented in the next chapter (ESF-3).  
 
In the literature, the choice of ‘private destination’ is influenced by various factors 
(Southworth 1991, p25) such as ‘closest exit points based on travel distance or expected travel 
time, personal choice (location of friends and relatives, speed of onset), as per evacuation plan 
and existing traffic conditions’. In this thesis, for each zone a set of exit points were identified 
based on the two classes ‘closest exit points’ and ‘few random ones as personal choice’.  
 
 If a household chooses private destination, they will randomly pick an exit point from a set of 
exit points for their zone. O-D matrix provides the route between the household location 
(origin) and the chosen exit (destination). The household agent will query the O-D matrix and 
prepare a route plan. When evacuees reach the selected exit point (their sink), they are 
considered to be evacuated safely and treated to be beyond the scope of the transport model 
(i.e. they leave the system). 
 
A model-based computation of outflow rate of evacuees for tsunami evacuation scenario was 
developed for the city of Padang using a micro-simulation model (Lammel et al. 2008). As 
key planning variables for shelter operations are the ‘proportions of shelter users among all 
the evacuees’ and ‘the arrival time at the shelter’, these were computed in this study using 
MATSim-based transportation models. The output of this model was used to obtain ET and 
outflow rate of evacuees from the inundated areas to the destinations. ABM provides a 
platform to implement household shelter choices as an agent’s behaviour and study its impact 
on overall evacuation performance. 
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It is assumed in this thesis that, the household’s decision of choosing a destination is 
appropriately represented using a simple heuristic of ‘choosing from the ones in the vicinity’. 
This heuristic will aim at minimising effort in travelling to the shelter/private destination from 
the household perspective. Alternatively, an optimization model can be formulated to 
represent household level shelter choice making as illustrated by Kongsomsaksakul et al. 
(2005). This thesis argues that, it is unrealistic that every household may use a sophisticated 
optimization approach for shelter choice and hence a heuristic is better representing at the 
household level. 
 
As the GOs in charge for allocating shelters will have information about the available shelters 
and estimated demand, such an optimization formulation is preferable from the GO 
perspective in order to arrive at ‘system level (or overall) optimal solution’ and issue a 
sheltering advice to evacuating zones. It can be observed that there is a need for integrated 
approach of ‘coordination and information exchange’ between EMAs managing ESF-2 
(transport authorities) and ESF-3 (shelter providers). Chapter 6 that covers the ESF-3 presents 
such a model along with sensitivity analyses of household shelter choice behaviour. 
5.3.2 Means of transport 
The second choice to be made by the evacuating household is the ‘means of transport’. A 
post-disaster report after Hurricane Katrina (Gutierrez 2011) found that, “Katrina’s 
evacuation plan functioned relatively well for motorists but failed to serve people who depend 
on public transit”. Transport authorities need to have an estimate of households using various 
means of transport in order to manage the evacuating traffic and also cater to public transport 
demands. In the model, three means of transport were modelled namely pedestrian evacuees, 
evacuation using cars and public transport using evacuation buses.  
 
A multi-modal Agent-Based transport model is proposed in this thesis for evacuation 
transport management. Three modes of transport namely pedestrians, cars and evacuation bus 
have been modelled in this thesis. In reality, there are other context-specific public transport 
systems such as metros, underground rails and ferries used during evacuation. Even though 
these transport means are important, they do not add to the traffic in the road networks, which 
is used as the predominant evacuation means (i.e. cars and buses). As a simplification of 
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ABM ‘the other means of transport’ were not included in the model and are considered to be a 
problem for further research.  
 
For households evacuating using cars, at the time of departure, a car agent will be created in 
run-time in the ABM. For each evacuation zone, a traffic loading point has been identified 
and a car will enter into the road network at ‘departure time’. The number of evacuating 
vehicles per household and the number of occupants depends on the vehicle ownership 
(Southworth 1991) and time of the day (Southworth 1991, Wolshon 2006). A household 
holding more than one vehicle can use one or all the vehicles while evacuating. As a 
simplification, this thesis assumes that one car is used by the household to evacuate all the 
family members together. 
 
Households evacuating as ‘pedestrians’ will reach their destination at time = departure time + 
travel time. The average value of pedestrian walking speed is used as 1.3m/sec. This walking 
speed is taken as a representative value from a cabinet office report of the UK (Cabinet-
Report, 2009 p.19). Another study used 1.33 m/sec as pedestrian walking speed (Mas et al. 
2012a). The travel time for pedestrians will be computed by multiplying ‘walking speed’ and 
‘linear evacuation distance from household to destination’.  
 
The third means of transport for the household is by using public transport buses. A two-stage 
process is used to represent evacuation behaviour using buses.  
v) Stage-1: On departure from house (place of danger), evacuees will move as 
pedestrians to the nearest ‘pickup point’ and will be in a virtual ‘ordered 
queue’ with FIFO policy (First In-First Out).  
vi) Stage-2 Evacuees will board the bus as a family in the order of arrival at the 
pickup. Once the next bus is available at the pickup point (with vacant space), 
the evacuees will be taken to safety (destination) at the last bus stop.  
Once the vehicles (bus and car) are on the roads, their behaviour is modelled using a widely 
used ‘car-following’ model principle and will be dynamically influenced by the existing 
traffic conditions, speed limit in the road and their evacuation route to destination. The 
behaviour of vehicle agents and its implementation is presented in Section 5.3.5. 
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5.3.3 Evacuation routes 
At a household level, there could be various evacuation routes from their house to the chosen 
destination (shelter or private). Authorities provide ‘planned evacuation route’ and road 
closures in advance through preparedness leaflets. For example, Figure 5.1, a preparedness 
leaflet of Iceland glacial flooding evacuation, indicates the evacuation routes by arrows. Any 
real-time information on the route availability and closures are generally made available 
through media channels. Apart from following the evacuation route provided by the EMA, a 
household could choose a convenient, familiar or regularly used route for evacuation. In this 
thesis, a household on deciding its destination will use the shortest path to destination within 
evacuation routes. 
 
For each traffic loading point and destination, a route-plan is pre-processed for the evacuation 
network, and a combination of these values is stored as route-plan matrix. In this thesis, the 
route-plan matrix is loaded as an input file. A similar architecture was used in the MASSVAC 
evacuation model. A route plan contains the order of junctions to be traversed in the road 
network from the origin (traffic loading point) to the destination (a shelter or exit point). At 
each household, a route plan is decided in the run-time at the time of departure from 
evacuation route-plan matrix. It is assumed that this route plan will not be changed further, as 
a simplification in the ABM. 
 
5.3.4 Departure time 
‘Departure time’ refers to the time when a household evacuates their residence and enters the 
evacuation model as a vehicle agent class based on ‘means of transport’. This household 
parameter is dependent on factors such as the time of receiving the warning message (warning 
time), personalising the threat and warning content, expected time of disaster impact/striking, 
preparation time (mobilisation time) for all the items to be carried, etc. There are four 
approaches specified by Mas et al. (2012a) for departure time. “The departure times are 
generally determined by applying an exogenous response curve stating the percentage of 
departures in each time interval” (Pel et al. 2011, p5). These response curves were assumed 
to follow various statistical distributions like uniform, Poisson and Weibull distributions. 
 
“Evacuation being disruptive and inconvenient, households often delays their travel decision 
until the threat appears imminent” (Wolshon 2006, p28). This would lead to simultaneous 
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late departures ‘closer to the actual time when disaster strikes’, risking lives during evacuation 
and enormous travel demand in a short period on transport infrastructure. Not all households 
receive warning message at the same time (refer to Figure 4.10 for a typical warning response 
curve), and hence houses depart at different points in time. A household may need time to 
inform their neighbours (unofficial channel) apart from preparing to leave, and the timeline 
was depicted in Figure 4.2 (defaulter) and Figure 4.3 (non-defaulter house). Departure time = 
Warning time + ‘time to inform neighbour’ + mobilisation time. As this thesis advocates an 
integrated approach for the three ESFs, departure response curves were developed for a 
specific warning dissemination scenario using the formula above. This thesis argues that in 
the absence of context-specific departure data, the computation of departure curve using 
warning curve provides a reliable estimate than assuming ‘time series of percentage 
departures’. In this case, the accuracy of warning response data will affect the accuracy of 
departure data. 
 
For transport authorities to understand ‘when the evacuees will reach safety’ (i.e. ET), it is 
important to understand ‘when a household will depart’ and the dynamic interaction of 
evacuating vehicles in the evacuation road network. The household’s ‘warning received time’ 
is obtained from the output of warning dissemination model (ESF-1). An estimated 
‘mobilisation time’ is added to the household’s warning time. In this thesis, 25 minutes is 
considered as a constant mobilisation time for household. This value is comparable to the 
evacuation plan for the Hollsvollur region of Iceland where the EMAs used 25-30 minutes.  
The departure time is set as an agent parameter (household) at the setup stage of the model. At 
the departure time, a household flag is set to indicate the onset of evacuation and a new 
vehicle agent is created for the house. 
 
5.3.5 Modelling driving behaviour 
During the ERGO interviews in Iceland (2010) after the preventive evacuation for Mt. 
Eyjafjallajokull glacial flooding, an evacuee shared that ‘she was following the traffic rules 
and her driving was cautiously slower than usual speed’. While developing the evacuee 
transportation model, this thesis assumed that the evacuating drivers will follow the traffic 
rules. In reality some of the drivers may panic during evacuation and disobey traffic rules and 
others may have rude driving behaviour. Such behaviours are realistic and yet no 
generalisable empirical evidence exists on the per cent drivers showing rude behaviour. A 
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rude driving behaviour can cause delay in the evacuation and endanger other road users; this 
requires further research on incorporating into the transportation model in order to study the 
potential impact of driving behaviours. This thesis is limited to ‘normal compliance driving 
behaviour’ and the following paragraphs present the modelling of behaviours. 
 
Household evacuation decisions as elaborated in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 are ‘travel choice 
behaviours’ independently made at each household. Once the household departs, a vehicle 
agent is created in the model; its interaction with other vehicles during evacuation travel in the 
transportation network is influenced by driving behaviours. For a leader follower pair, the 
leader influences the following vehicle’s state (new speed and distance to move) by its current 
speed and the gap/distance between them. Driving behaviour modelling predominantly 
focused on predicting movement of vehicles as a function of speed and distance of the 
predecessor. Car-following models provide the logic for computing the following vehicle’s 
state at each tick and readers are referred to Ossen and Hoogendoorn (2011) for a detailed 
comparison of car-following models. The literature review showed that the most of car-
following model theories used equations with parameters requiring calibration. This thesis has 
adopted ‘desired speed’ and ‘safe gap’ as two parameters for building a single-lane car- 
following model using simple conditional rules. As evacuation involves simultaneous loading 
of a large number of cars into the network, the speed and the distance between the cars to 
avoid collision is of more of a priority in single-lane traffic. 
 
Evacuating vehicles’ behaviour in the evacuation network forms the crux of the transportation 
models. “Drivers may behave hasty or anxious during emergency conditions, causing their 
driving behaviour to change drastically” (Tu et al. 2010, p68). This study modelled 
parameters such as acceleration rate, maximum speed, minimum gap distance and minimum 
headway for modelling driving behaviour. Here, “mean headway is the time in seconds from 
the front of the vehicle following (current vehicle) to the rear of the vehicle in front, excluding 
the time that the following vehicle travels” (Tu et al. 2010, p71). Though some drivers might 
drive rudely during evacuation, normal compliance driving behaviour is often used in 
transportation models (Pel et al. 2011).  
 
‘Vehicle/car-following model’ provides logic for the movement of vehicle in every simulation 
time step. In the proposed ABM there are three types of vehicles such as Cars, transient 
vehicles and buses. Transient vehicles volume refers to regular motor way users who are not 
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part of evacuating population. All these vehicle agents have two ‘behavioural attributes’ 
representing the driving behaviour namely desired driving speed and  perceived safe gap.  
 
Desired Driving speed 
In this thesis, ‘desired speed’ is defined as the top speed that the driver aims to achieve and 
maintain throughout the journey. The desired driving speed is unique to each driver and this 
uncertainty is represented by using an additive component in excess of the driving speed. 
Driver attributes such as age, gender, etc can influence the driving speed. However, these 
micro-attributes of evacuees though important have not been considered in this thesis.  
 
The aim of the vehicle agent is to accelerate/decelerate its speed to match the ‘desired speed’ 
depending on the condition of the road traffic. This desired speed parameter is set at the 
initialisation/departure stage of the evacuation. As this parameter is unique to each driver, the 
value is obtained by combining a deterministic component (average desired speed) and 
uncertain component (random within a range). It is assumed that the randomness of desired 
speed values can be represented using a random normal distribution. 
 
Perceived safe gap 
Perceived safe gap is a driver’s attribute that indicates the linear distance ahead in the road 
where any vehicles’ behaviour will have influence on the movement decision. A leader is the 
nearest car within the perceived safe gap for a vehicle. This gap is needed to avoid collision 
with the next vehicle ahead. In each time step, a car needs to decide on the distance to move 
and also adjust the speed.  
 
A crowded condition for car movement was specified as two cars in a 5m x 5m grid (Mas et 
al. 2012a) and this allows approximately 1 m gap between cars when the car-size is taken as 
2m. Contrary to the traffic movement on normal days, during evacuation there will be high 
volume of vehicles (Wolshon 2006); the speed of vehicle is highly influenced by the existing 
traffic, and hence maintaining safe gap would be of more priority for the drivers than 
maximising the speed. A minimum safe gap is large enough to suddenly stop a vehicle when 
the leader stops in the next time step and avoid collision. After maintaining the safe gap, a 
vehicle will adjust its speed to reach the desired speed. 
 
These two parameters are initialised for each agent using the relation below: 
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 Set ‘Desired speed’ = Average desired speed + uncertain speed component 
 Set ‘perceived safe gap’ = Average safe gap +  uncertain safe gap component 
 
Driving behaviour rules 
The current speed of the vehicle is adjusted using the ‘car-following model’ with simple 
conditional statements. When there are no vehicles ahead (within ‘perceived safe gap’), the 
vehicle always desires to maintain its speed to be the ‘desired driving speed’. If there are 
vehicles ahead, the vehicle will alter their speed to set a minimum of {current speed of vehicle 
ahead, desired speed}. Apart from the vehicles, the traffic signals can influence the movement 
of vehicles. If there is a traffic signal ahead, the vehicle proceeds only when it is green. These 
behavioural attributes are used in car-following model in deciding the speed and distance 
covered in every simulation time step (called ticks).  
 
Car-following models 
There are various car-following algorithms formulated in the literature, and readers are 
referred to Ossen and Hoogendoorn (2011) for a summary and comparison. This thesis argues 
that the drivers would aim to minimise the gap with the leading vehicle and never fall below a 
minimum safe gap to avoid collision. The speed of the vehicle is maximised subject to 
maintaining the minimum safe gap. Advances in surveillance technologies enable the 
transport planners to collect vehicle tracking information using trajectory data and further use 
in car-following models (Zheng et al. 2012). Lansdowne (2006) computed the speed of the 
vehicle based on safe-gap and max-speed possible. A car decides to set its speed to a 
minimum of these and then move its current position in the time step The simplified approach 
adopted in this thesis requires only three major sets of data car size, speed and safe gap, and is 
relatively less expensive to obtain for adopting the approach to any other city. Figure 5.3 
represents a flow chart of the car-following logic that will be executed for every car for every 
tick. Figure 5.4 presents the code snippet of car-following logic implemented in this thesis. 
For households evacuating using cars, the event flow from ‘departure to destination’ is 
presented in the next sub-section. 
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Figure 5.3 Flow chart of the ‘car-following model’ implementation 
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Figure 5.4 Code snippet of car-following model implementation   
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Event Flow – Evacuation using cars 
1. Compute departure time for the house using the formula  
Departure time = (warning time + assimilation time + informal warning time +                      
Mobilisation time). 
2. When simulation clock = departure time, set departure-flag property of household 
agent as ‘true’. 
3. Create a car agent and set  the following agent properties 
a. Starting-time = departure time 
b. House-id = id of the departed house 
c. Location (x-y coordinates) = traffic loading point (x-y coordinates) 
d. Set ‘heading’ of the car = ‘heading’ in the patch below it. 
4. Compute the time to reach traffic the ‘traffic loading point’ for that zone. 
5. Enter the loading point after checking the following 
a. If the loading point is free and no vehicles on loading queue, then enter the 
network. 
b. If the loading point is free and there are vehicles in loading queue, then join  
the virtual queue and wait for entering into the network by FIFO policy. 
c. If the loading point is busy, then enter the loading point virtual queue. 
6. Regulate ‘car speed’ at each time-step by repeating the following based on the 
changing traffic condition 
a. If there is a car ahead, progressively accelerate/decelerate the speed to match 
the car speed. 
b. If there is no car ahead, progressively accelerate the speed to match the top 
speed which is the minimum of ‘road speed limits and desired speed’. 
c. If the ‘car’s speed’ reaches top speed then maintain the same speed till the 
next. 
7. Always maintain the minimum safe gap with the leader vehicle ahead. 
8. Traverse to each junction in the route-plan. 
9. On reaching a junction along the evacuation route, change the direction to the next 
junction. Update the ‘next junction’ in the agent properties. 
10. Move towards the next junction along the evacuation route. 
11. While traversing, if there is a traffic signal indicating ‘red’, stop the vehicle or join the 
queue of the vehicles ahead. Wait for the signal to turn ‘green’ and then proceed or 
follow the car ahead. 
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12. In summary, a car agent must regulate speed, move along the evacuation route and 
follow traffic signals. 
13. Reach destination and update the ‘destination arrival time’ in the car agent properties. 
The car agent is hidden and will not interact with other vehicle agents. 
14. Compute evacuation travel time = destination arrival time – departure time. 
The event flow for transient vehicles and buses is the same as cars. The buses collect 
passengers from the pickup-points along route whenever there are vacant seats. For 
simplicity, the time needed for loading evacuees into the bus is taken as zero.  
 
5.3.6 Modelling of urban evacuation road network 
This thesis presents a multi-modal network-ABM evacuee transportation model in which 
houses and vehicles are agents, and the transport infrastructure is represented using network 
model. Evacuation using ‘cars, public buses and as pedestrians’ is modelled in this thesis. 
Movement of evacuating vehicles (agents) occurs in the road network. The objective of this 
model is to provide a platform for the EMAs to evaluate the household transport choices and 
the impact of transport policy on ET. This thesis advocates an integrated evacuation planning 
by understanding cascading implications of various ESFs on overall ET. The objectives of the 
proposed model are: 
a) To study the level of impact of unofficial warning channel & warning performance 
on ET.  
b) To model the impact of household behaviour in transport choices. 
c) To adopt a model-based multi-modal transport planning of evacuating public.  
d) To use analyses from model results for allocating evacuation buses. 
There are various transport models available for mass evacuation planning, to name a few 
OREMS (Oakridge evacuation management system), TEVACS (Transportation evacuation 
systems), DYNEV, MATSim and MASSVAC. Summary of evacuation models was presented 
in the literature review chapter section 2.1. In general, these models use network modelling 
approach to identify the best routes (Cova and Johnson 2003, Chen et al. 2012) transport 
planning and study the congestion during evacuation (Kwan and Ransberger 2010). In line to 
these models, the ABM transport model will use ‘network modelling’ principle to represent 
the road network. 
 
 215 
Basic building blocks in a ‘network modelling approach’ are arcs and nodes. In the network 
modelling approach, 
 Roads are represented by ‘arcs’. Lanes and directions of the road (as a heading angle 0 
to 359 degrees) are represented as properties of the arc.  
 ‘Road junctions, bus pickup locations, traffic loading points (i.e. location where a 
‘vehicle agent’ enters into the model road network), traffic signals, shelters and exit 
points’ are six key road features represented as ‘nodes’. 
The proposed ABM has been built in NetLogo software. The unit of modelling in the 
transportation model is individual vehicles (as agents). Vehicle agent’s movement on the road 
network and their interaction with transport infrastructure (including other vehicles) requires a 
suitable feature to represent the modelled area. The canvas, where the geographical position 
of agents is placed, is referred to as ‘NetLogo World’ in the NetLogo software. Patch is a 
square cell unit similar to a cell in a chessboard. The modelled world is divided into patches 
of equal size. The nodes as listed above are represented in one patch. The user of the model 
needs to load the coordinates of these nodes organised as input coordinates file as described in 
Section 5.3. An intermediate point in a road (i.e. road segment) is represented as a patch and 
Table 5.1 presents key patch variables. The following sections discuss the implementation of 
each transport element in the NetLogo model. 
Table 5.1 Key properties of a road segment in the ABM 
Variable name Description 
Xcor, Ycor Coordinates of the patch 
Road? Is the patch a road? 
Road speed limit in Km/hr 
Junc-id ID of the next junction 
Junc-xcor, Junc-ycor Coordinates of the next junction 
to-junc-dir Heading/direction to the next junction 
 
A junction is a point along the road where more than two road segments meet/leave. Each 
road junction is a patch in Orange colour and has an ID with format ‘J#’ (e.g. J16). The 
patches around the junction are grey in colour indicating a lower speed limit. As a vehicle 
approaches a junction (grey patches), it reduces the current speed. This is needed to change its 
heading at the junction towards next outward junction (as per route plan) and enable safe exit 
in sharp turns. Table 5.2 is a list of key variables in a junction. 
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Table 5.2 Key properties of a junction in the ABM 
Variable name Description 
Xcor, Ycor Coordinates of the patch 
Junction? Is this patch a junction? 
Junc-id ID of the current junction (Format J# e.g. J21) 
Junc-xcor, Junc-ycor Coordinates of this junction 
to-junction 
Ordered arraylist of outward junction IDs from 
this junction 
to-junc-dir 
Ordered arraylist of Heading/direction to the 
next junction 
 
How is the road network created in the ABM? A junction property coordinate file contains 
organised information about each junction. From the junction property file, the details such as 
‘coordinates, junction id and outward junctions (to-junction)’ are loaded for each junction as 
patch properties. First the ‘Junction?’ flag variable is set as TRUE indicating the patch as 
junction. During run-time, road segments are dynamically drawn by an inbuilt sub-routine 
from each junction using a tracer-car. This tracer-car is a vehicle agent that is used in the 
initial setup to create transport infrastructure from a blank NetLogo World. After completion 
of setup, the tracer-car is removed and not considered among evacuating vehicles. 
 
For example, the patches between two junctions J1 (x1, y1) and J2 (x2, y2) are to be created 
as road segments. A tracer-car moves from J1 (x1, y1) junction towards the next outward 
junction (J2) by moving one patch at one cycle. Each patch along the tracer-car is set with 
properties such as road speed limit, forth coming junction (to-junction=J2) and heading (to-
junc-dir). The colour of centre-line of the lane is indicated as white patches. This step is 
repeated for each outward junction of every junction.  
 
This completes the creation of ‘road network’ based on junction data for a modelled city. For 
preparing the junction coordinates, the users can use any digitising software and identify key 
junctions from an imported road map. It needs to be observed that only one lane of a one-way 
road is created in the transportation model. For two lanes, two tracer-car needs simultaneously 
to move in the procedure listed above. Each direction in a two-way road is treated as one 
separate road.  
 
Any exit point will have one or more inward road segments and no outward road segment. 
Exit points have an ID with format ‘X#’ (e.g. X10). Any origin point will have one or more 
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outward road segments and no inward road segment. Whenever a vehicle reaches its 
destination, the vehicle will be hidden and will not interact with any other agents in the 
model. There are other nodes in the road network namely ‘intermediate points, pickup-points 
and traffic signals’ and are discussed in the sections below. 
 
A road segment may not always be a straight line. A road segment between two junctions is 
better implemented in NetLogo using square patch units when it is nearly a straight line. This 
is needed to facilitate manoeuvring of moving vehicle patch by patch. The users while 
preparing the junction coordinates could identify ‘intermediate points’ indicating where the 
heading of the road changes and ensure road segment between two junctions is possibly a 
straight line. If needed, an intermediate point is added as additional node between two 
junctions. ‘Intermediate points’ have an ID with format ‘I#’ (e.g. I15). Intermediate points are 
also junctions and have properties as listed in  
Table 5.2. 
 
Pickup-points are specific location along the road where ‘evacuation buses’ stop to pickup 
evacuees waiting for public transport. Pickup-points have an ID with format ‘P #’ (e.g. P13). 
Pickup-points are also junctions and have junction properties as listed in  
Table 5.2. Apart from these variables, details about the waiting evacuees are listed as 
properties. This architecture is similar to DYNEV evacuation model (Qiao et al. 2009), where 
the evacuation bus route information is to be inputted as ‘route, schedule, and stopping 
locations’. Table 5.3  summarises key variables of a Pickup-point. 
Table 5.3 Key properties of a Pickup-point in the ABM 
Variable name Description 
Junction? Is this patch a junction? 
Junc-ID ID of a pickup point (e.g. P13) 
Pickup-Pt-Flag? Is this patch a bus pickup point 
Pickup-ID ID of a pickup point (e.g. P13) 
Waiting-evacuees Are there any evacuees waiting for bus? 
Queue-ID Sequence number of evacuees waiting in queue 
Queue-House-ID Arraylist of IDs of the house agent who are in queue 
Queue-Family-Size Arraylist of size of family waiting in queue 
Queue-Arrival-time Arraylist of household’s arrival time at the queue 
A traffic signal is another object in the evacuation road network. Traffic signals have an ID 
with format ‘T#’ (e.g. T13). Traffic signal coordinate file contains properties about each 
signal station. Key properties are location coordinates, signal ID, approaching junction ID and 
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signal sequence number. A traffic signal is typically located on each approaching road 
towards a road junction for safe movement of vehicles. Generally, signals of each junction are 
synchronised to sequentially change colour in an orderly manner. Each signal will have a 
sequence number (1, 2 … n) to indicate the order in which the signal will change its colour. A 
tracer-car creates these signal stations and sets the properties of signals during initialisation 
stage. The duration of green colour is specified in the phase-length variable. Table 5.4 
presents key variables of signal object.  
 
A signal station rests on a particular location coordinate (Xcor, Ycor). The patch below a 
signal station is yellow in colour and set with specific properties as listed in Table 5.4. About 
five or six patches on the road segment preceding a signal station is treated as ‘signal 
visibility zone’. Any vehicle entering this zone will be impacted by the colour of signal and 
respond to it accordingly. The patches in signal visibility zone are set with properties of the 
signal associated to it. 
 
Figure 5.5 is a screenshot of a typical junction in the ABM. In Junction J16, there are two 
approach roads from P15 and J14 (indicated by black arrows) towards the junction and one 
outward road towards J15. There are two signals namely T12 and T13. Red car agents are 
evacuating vehicles stopped ahead of a red signal. 
 
Table 5.4 Key properties of a signal station in the ABM 
Variable name Description 
 Breed? Signal 
 Xcor, Ycor Coordinates where the Signal station is located. 
 Colour Current Signal colour (Red/Green) 
 Time-to-change How many units to change the current colour? 
 Phase-Length What is the duration of Green? 
 Signal-Junc-Id What is the ID of the approaching junction? 
 Who Agent-ID for the signal object 
 
Signal-Junc-Order 
The sequence number indicating the order of this signal among
the signals in the same junction. 
 
Table 5.5 Key properties of a patch below a signal station in the ABM 
Variable name Description 
Signal? Whether the current patch is a signal? 
Signal-ID Agent-ID of the Signal posted in the current patch 
Signal-Code A unique ID for the signal (Format is T#. e.g. T42 ) 
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Figure 5.5 Screenshot of a typical junction (J16) 
5.4 ABM Transportation model - loading ERGO city’s evacuation details 
5.4.1 Overall architecture of the model 
The proposed multi-modal ABM in NetLogo can be configured to represent the road network 
of any city and illustrated using the ERGO city case study. The NetLogo programming 
language allows further customization to have context-specific features that were not included 
in the model (e.g. roundabouts). The approach adopted in building this customisable model 
enables the representation of transport features as points. In order to configure the ABM, all 
the transport infrastructures (road junctions, intermediate points, pickup-points, exit points 
and traffic signals) need to be organised as ‘point data’, formatted with suitable names and 
with relevant information pertaining to each feature. Detailed information on the sequence of 
variables for each file has been presented in Appendix A. Table 5.6 is the list of coordinate 
files. At the setup stage of the model, the users can load the evacuation routes after removing 
road closures and any unavailable routes. 
 
During an earthquake in Southwest China (September 2012) about 700,000 got impacted and 
100,000 had to be evacuated as there were damages to 20,000 houses. During the evacuation, 
an official from Luozehe Township claimed that “The hardest part of the rescue now is 
traffic. Roads are blocked and rescuers have to climb the mountains to reach hard-hit 
villages” (Rediffmail 2012). The damages to the road network can impact not only the search 
and rescue efforts, but also the evacuating population. This entails a need for understanding 
the vulnerability of road network to planning scenario and its impact on evacuation. 
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Table 5.6 List of Model coordinate files for configuring Modelled area. 
File Brief description 
"ERGO-City-Image.jpg"  Image of the modelled area. 
"evacuation-zone-coordinates-file.prn" Coordinates of each zone and bus pickup-points 
"household-warning-time-file.prn" Household information such as X, Y coordinates of 
household, warning time, departure time, means of 
transport, zone, etc 
"road-network-connectivity-file.prn" Coordinates of road junction points, heading and 
outward junctions from this junction. 
"traffic-signal-details-file.prn" Location of traffic signals 
"evacuation-route-to-exits.prn" O-D route plan from each zone (loading point) to 
exit-points. 
"evacuation-route-to-shelters.prn" O-D route plan from each zone (loading point) to 
Shelters 
"evacuation-route-loading-points.prn" Loading point for each zone 
“bus-route-file.prn” Route plan for each evacuation bus route. 
“transient-vehicle-routes-file.prn” Route plan for each transient vehicle route. 
“shelter-coordinates-file.prn” Location of each shelters 
 
These coordinate files can be sequentially loaded into the NetLogo model in the setup stage as 
information/data layers. This architecture of the model allows customisability of the model to 
other cities by organising data in pre-formatted coordinate files. A temporary car (tracer-car) 
dynamically reads the coordinate file and creates (draws in the model canvas – NetLogo 
World) road features along with its properties. This setup module has been written in 
NetLogo to load the modelled area information.  
 
Users of the model will input at the setup stage ‘percentage of resident population who will 
not comply with the evacuation order’. Additionally, the user will input the proportion of 
evacuees who need public shelters and others will be considered leaving outside the city to 
friends, families or private accommodation. The latter type of evacuees are assigned the 
nearest exist point as their destination. The shortest route from the origin (evacuated zone) to 
the destination (both shelters and exit points) is inputted along within the coordinate file.  The 
summary of input data provided to the model and key output metric is presented in Table5.7. 
Once the setup is complete the model is initialised with setup values and ready for execution. 
The next section elaborates on the setup stage configuration of model area and calibration. 
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 Table 5.7 Input and output parameters of the transport model.  
Parameter Type of Parameter Description 
Road network Input file Coordinate file-1  as nodes (junctions and 
traffic loading) and arcs (roads) 
Evacuation route Input file Specify the directions and lanes as a 
property for roads in the coordinate file -1  
Evacuation zone details Input file Coordinate file-2 details of the zones to be 
evacuated, vehicle ownership, number of 
residents and warning received time 
Means of Transport (%) Input [Evacuee 
Behaviour] 
Select the percentage of car users, 
pedestrians and public transport (bus) users 
on screen 
Evacuate-or-Not (%) Input [Evacuee 
Behaviour] 
Select the proportion of evacuees who will 
not evacuate. 
Evacuee destination (%) Input [Evacuee 
Behaviour] 
Choices for each zone are specified in 
evacuation-routes to exits/destination file.  
Desired Safe speed Input [Driving 
behaviour] 
Select on screen whether ‘desired safe 
speed’ is modelled as uncertain or 
deterministic. 
Perceived safe gap Input [Driving 
behaviour] 
Select on screen whether ‘perceived safe 
gap’ is modelled as uncertain or 
deterministic. 
Time of the day Input [Scenario] Defines the initial location of the vehicles 
prior to evacuation. User will select either 
it is night-time or daytime. 
Transient traffic 
condition (vehicle/hour) 
Input [Transport 
policy]  
User can select the volume of transient 
traffic in expressways in the screen. 
Evacuation Bus Input [Transport 
policy] 
User can select yes/no for including 
‘Evacuation bus’ in the screen. 
Evacuation time (min) Output Time between the departure from the 
household and reaching the chosen 
destination. 
State of evacuation Output (Graph) % Evacuees who are i) on transit to 
destination, ii) reached destination iii) not 
evacuated/ in-situ 
 
5.4.2 Configuration of model environment to ERGO city 
The contribution of this thesis is to integrate the household transport behaviour choices, 
performance of warning dissemination and subsequent evacuation (as vehicle agents) to safety 
(shelters). This enables the study of inter-relationships among the ESFs for the modelled area. 
The model area’s boundaries are identified and the rectangular coordinates are specified as 
NetLogo world corners. The modelled area is divided into square units called patches. By 
iterations on the accuracy of road network traced, the unit size of patch has been iteratively 
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determined. One patch length = 16.67 m (1000/60 m). The overall modelled area is 39.3 km x 
50.7 km. 
 
Calibration of ERGO city to NetLogo World 
Apart from the patch, another basic unit is time referred as ‘time slice’ or a tick. Shorter the 
tick, the more will be the number of iterations and the longer will be processing time. 
However, when one tick is too large, there will be loss of accuracy in the model as a large tick 
will result in longer distance to move in the next time step when a car is at its peak speed and 
hence might miss a junction point.. Such errors can lead to cars missing a junction where it 
needs to change its heading and might stop on the sides of road. Unit tick is computed 
iteratively by checking tracer-car traversing through the road network and was found that 1 
tick = 0.02 minutes is a suitable value. The unit tick value used in this thesis is slightly higher 
than the ‘time slice’ (1 second) of existing traffic simulators (Schulze and Fliess 1997, 
p1224), which is the mean reaction time of drivers. Any value below this will increase the 
processing time. And any value above this will result in inaccuracy. Once these basic units 
(patch and ticks) have been calibrated for the modelled area (ERGO city), the other dependent 
units and conversions were computed and are given in Table 5.8. Key driving behaviour 
values namely speed and safe gap are presented in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.8 Calibration of model values to actual values of ERGO City 
Variable Value Brief description 
Basic Units 
1 patch length = 16.67 Meters or (60 patches = 1km) 
1 tick =  0.02 minutes 
Conversion Multipliers 
one-patch-to-km 0.017 Converting 1 patch into km 
one-patch-to-m 16.67 converting 1 patch into m 
tick-to-minute 0.02 Converting 1 tick to minute 
tick-to-hour 0.00033 Converting 1 tick to hour 
distance-km-to-patch 60 Converting 1 km to patches 
distance-patch-to-km 0.0167 Converting 1 patch to km 
minutes-to-ticks 50 Converting 1 minute into ticks 
hours-to-ticks 3000 Converting 1 hour into ticks 
speed-kph-to-
patchpertick 0.02 distance-km-to-patch / hour-to-ticks 
accl-mpsec2-to-
patchptick2 0.0864 
(distance-km-to-patch / 1000) / ((minutes-
to-ticks / 60) * (minutes-to-ticks / 60)) 
accl-mpsec2-to-kph2 12960 (1/1000)*(3600* 3600) 
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Table 5.9 Key driving behaviour parameters and values 
Variable Values 
Vehicle driving speed behaviour 
 Vehicle Speed limit (km/h) 70 
Desired speed average (km/h) 40 
Desired speed std-dev (km/h) 10 
Minimum desired speed (km/h) 30 
Car acceleration rate (m/sec
2
) 2 
Car deceleration rate (m/ sec
2
) 2 
Vehicle safe gap uncertainty 
 Average (m) 15 
Std dev (m) 5 
Minimum  (m) 10.1 
Maximum (m) 20 
 
ERGO City case study - Transport network details  
The flood inundated regions of ERGO city need to be evacuated as indicated by Figure 5.6. 
The model will include three expressways and all the major roads in the ERGO city. Alleys 
and streets will not be within the scope of the work, as the evacuation from the household to 
the traffic loading point is assumed to be uniform within an evacuation zone. Arrows indicate 
the direction of roads between two junctions. Dotted arrows at exit points indicate traffic 
moving outside evacuation zones and considered to be beyond the boundary of the modelled 
area.  
 
Table 5.10 presents the overview of ERGO city evacuation characteristics, evacuation 
network and volume of traffic. It can be observed from the table that only 9214 houses are in 
the inundated zones (indicated as blue in Figure 5.6) and need to be evacuated. However, 
depending on the level of warning, warning scenario and level of compliance with warning, 
the actual number of evacuated houses will be lower.  
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Table 5.10 Overview of ERGO city evacuation characteristics and values used 
Model characteristics Value 
i) Demographic details  
Number of houses 31617 
Resident population of the modelled area 129021 
Number of zones to be evacuated 19 
Number of houses in the evacuated zone 9214 
Resident population to be evacuated 37619 
Number of shelter locations 10 
ii) Road network details  
Number of major roads 4 
Number of road intersections/junctions 28 
Number of traffic signals 10 
iii) Evacuation traffic  
Number of evacuating cars One per household 
Number of evacuation buses One per route 
Number of bus routes 4 
Bus is dispatched after onset of warning 30 minutes  
Frequency of bus Every 10 minutes 
Number of destinations (or exit points) 14 
Number of ‘destination choices’ per evacuation zone 3 to 7    (average 4.7) 
Number of ‘shelter choices’ per evacuation zone 1 to 6    (average 3.7) 
Number of evacuation bus pickup points 16 
Number of evacuation bus routes 4 
Number of transient vehicle routes 4 
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Legend: 
X1… X14 Exit points    P1… P16 Pickup points for evacuation bus. 
J1 … J28 Junctions              I 1 … I 25 Intermediate locations along roads. 
           Traffic signal                 Shelters 
Figure 5.6 Evacuation road network of ERGO city 
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Transient traffic is due to commuters who travel via the ERGO city, delivery trucks and other 
road users. There are four transient routes in the ERGO city and has been presented in Figure 
5.7. For a single-lane roads, the vehicle flow rate at peak hours typically is in the range 
between 500 vehicles per hour and 2000 vehicles per hour (Wolshon 2006, p4). When this 
transient traffic in the expressway is diverted from the evacuation routes in order to have more 
capacity available for evacuation, it could possibly reduce the overall ET and requires further 
investigation using the model.  
 
In this study, there are three classes of transient vehicle conditions as a ‘transport policy’ 
which the user can select on the screen. They are 0 – No transient vehicle, 1 – Low volume 
(300 vehicle/hour vph) 2 – High volume (600 vph). User can select this data on the input 
screen depending on the scenario to be tested using ABM.  The selected flow rate will be 
applied to all the transient routes. In run-time, new transient vehicles will be loaded on each 
route at the specified flow rate, and the vehicles will traverse along the transient route plan. 
Once the vehicle reaches their exit points, these vehicles will be treated to be beyond the 
scope of the model. 
 
There are four bus routes as indicated in Figure 5.8. Buses stop at pickup points along the 
route until it reaches the destination. The return leg was not modelled in this thesis. Each bus 
carries evacuees to public shelters and assumed that no evacuees will off-board en-route. Bus 
route 1 has final destination in J9 and serves shelters S5, S6 and S8. Bus route 2 has final 
destination in J15 and serves shelters S4, S5 and S6. Bus route 3 has final destination in X10 
and serves the shelter S10. Bus route 4 has final destination in J15 and serves shelters S7 and 
S9. The following are the model assumptions and simplifications. 
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Route-1 (J13 to X8)  Route – 2 (J12 to X7) 
Route – 3 (J28 to X6)   Route – 4 (J1 to X12) 
Figure 5.7 Four transient routes within the evacuation network. 
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Bus Route 1  (P12 to X6)  Bus Route 2 (P14 to J14 to J15) 
Bus Route 3 (X12 to X2)   Bus Route 4 (J7 to X1) 
Figure 5.8 Four evacuation bus routes. 
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Model assumption and simplification  
1) Alleys and streets were excluded as simplification of road network. 
2) Evacuation using bus, pedestrians and car has been considered in this model. 
Other means of transport has not been included which can provide additional 
capacity to the evacuating traffic. 
3) When the model begins execution, the condition of traffic is to have only 
transient vehicles. 
4) Night-time evacuation is considered in the model and hence evacuation begins 
from the household to destination. During day time, some of the family 
members will be in places other than residence (e.g. office, school, etc) or on 
transit. This scenario has not been considered in this thesis and can be taken up 
in further research. 
5) Pedestrian movement has no influence on the road traffic movement (car, bus 
or transient vehicle). 
6) The houses evacuating as pedestrians have destination as shelters. 
Figure 5.9 is a screen shot of the transport model. At the input stage, EMAs need to import 
this information for their city into the transport model. There are transport policies in the 
evacuation plan and the details of the evacuee behaviour which the users can select on screen 
at the setup stage. The user will select the planned estimate of different modes of transport 
and the estimate of number of evacuees who will require sheltering.  
 
Once the user has completed the setup stage, the simulation model can be run to obtain 
aggregated results. This multi-model agent-based traffic network model will provide a 
platform for the transport authorities to understand the interplay of the existing road network 
configuration, public transport usage and the evacuee behaviour by their choice of mode as 
well as destination. The following sub-section elaborates on the implications of diverse 
transport management options available for the authorities to plan for evacuation traffic 
management. Understanding these response choices and their relative performance in 
ensuring a safe evacuation will be an important consideration for the evacuation transport 
preparedness. In summary, the approach taken in the ABM model will be customisable to any 
city and illustrated using the ERGO city. 
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Figure 5.9 Screenshot of the evacuee transport model 
5.4.3 KPI for measuring evacuee transportation 
The ET is defined as the time for each household from leaving the house after receiving 
warning message to the time when they reach the destination. Clearance time is defined as the 
“time required to get evacuees out of hazardous areas to a place of safety” (Chen et al. 2012, 
p207). The ET is chosen as the key performance metric for measuring the effectiveness of a 
transport plan. This has been used as output metric in the published literature as well. An 
example policy question from Chen et al. (2006, p.325) is, “What is the minimum clearance 
time needed to completely evacuate 92595 persons (residents plus transient tourist 
population)? 
 
“The evacuation clearance time is one of the key indicators in an evacuation plan and is 
determined by the expected behaviour of the endangered residents and roadway network 
characteristics“(Tu et al. 2010).  Based on the review of literature on KPIs for evacuation 
transport management, this thesis has been summarized in Table 5.11 basic KPIs for 
monitoring evacuation traffic performance into three broad categories. 
 
These KPIs will be collected after each simulated run. Implementing transport policies like 
alternative routing strategies, signalling, capacity enhancers (like contra-flow plans), etc can 
increase the network capacity of the transport infrastructure. It can be noticed that for 
evacuation transport planners, the interest lies in the first set of KPIs. However, there is a 
close link between the existing network capability (KPI-2) and public transport resource 
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allocation (KPI-3). Many organizations are involved in the overarching transport management 
such as ‘transport operators’ (bus owners) and transport regulators (managing traffic including 
signalling and policing). This entails a need for co-ordination and a purposeful collaborative 
working among these organizations for evacuation preparedness and subsequent response. 
Household choices influence the direction of traffic and hence understanding the interplay of 
household behaviour and transport policies. 
 
Table 5.11 KPI measures for transportation model 
KPI group Measures 
Evacuation performance Overall evacuation time, clearance time, 
departure time and evacuation speed.  
Network capability Hourly flow rate, flow density, busiest 
junction and busiest road segment 
Resource allocation Evacuation bus usage on different routes, bus 
utilization on various trips, number of trips to 
complete evacuation.  
 
Depending on the household choice of shelters, public shelters could serve as a concentration 
point for traffic flow with evacuating vehicles moving towards them. What % of households 
need shelters? Will a household use car(s) or wait for public transport? These are typical 
questions of interest not only to shelter operators but also to transport planners. In general, 
these shelters are identified and operated by local authorities. The impact of transport 
management has a direct bearing on the safety of evacuating public including their timely 
reaching to safety/public shelters. The focus of evacuation preparedness should not be 
restricted within the ESF organizations’ preparedness rather on a collective and coordinated 
preparedness. This thesis advocates the need for an integrated approach for evacuation 
preparedness beyond an ESF with special emphasis on the role of OR-based models as a 
means for strengthening preparedness. 
 
5.4.4 Simulation experiment design 
For the same initial setup of agents’ parameters (e.g. means of transport), there could be 
variation of KPIs between runs due to randomness in the agent parameters (e.g. desired speed) 
during model execution and agent behaviours (e.g. destination choice and evacuation route 
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plan). For example, a household’s ‘means of transport’ remains the same across runs, but the 
destination and evacuation route plan are agent’s decisions at the time of departure. This 
could influence the travel time and evacuation time to safety. 
 
In order to design simulation experiments, the following are key questions to be answered: 
 What is the impact of initial state and transient phase on the model results? 
 How many runs are needed to obtain unbiased KPIs? 
 What is the run-time of the model (or) how long should a model be executed in a 
single run? 
An introduction of the concepts on validity and reliability of simulation model results used in 
this thesis was presented in the warning dissemination model (Section 4.6). Similar to the 
ABM warning model, the transportation model was studied for validity and reliability.  
 
Initial state and transient phase of the model  
As discussed in the Section 5.4.1, the details of evacuating households are set using the 
various coordinate files. The following (set – 1) are the properties of a household and 
evacuation system that will remain constant across simulation runs.  
 A household’s mobilisation time (time required for the house to prepare for evacuation 
after being warned) 
 Which means of transport to use for evacuation? {Car, Bus, Pedestrian} 
 Whether the household will use public shelter or private accommodation (exit point)? 
 Evacuation road network (road network length, direction, loading points, speed limit, 
signal location and signal phase length) 
 Evacuation bus system (bus route, pickup points, capacity, first dispatching time and 
frequency). 
The following (set - 2) are the evacuation decisions and agent properties that will be set in 
run-time and will change across simulation runs. 
 A household’s warning time (either with or without unofficial channel) 
 A vehicle’s driving behaviour (desired speed and perceived safe gap) 
 Route to destination (evacuation route plan based on the chosen exit point). 
 Route to shelters (evacuation route plan based on the chosen shelter). 
 Transport policies. 
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The first set of household characteristics is considered to be independent of the model 
scenario and hence set as initial state of the model. The second set of properties are set 
depending on the scenario of the model and will not be exactly the same for a household 
between two runs. In order to study the impact of various factors using simulation model, one 
parameter is changed at a time in a controlled experiment and incrementally quantify the 
impact in comparison with a base case. 
 
Household evacuation decisions are made prior to departure. For example, {Which exit- point 
to select as private destination?, Which shelter to select as a destination?} These initial 
evacuation decisions of an agent will have an influence on evacuation traffic namely which 
loading point the car will enter based on evacuation plan to destination. In the model, about 
15% were assumed to seek public shelter during evacuation.  
 
Table 5.12 Number of zone-wise choices available for a household 
Zone Destination Shelter 
A4 7 
 
6 
A5 6 
 
5 
B4 6 
 
4 
B5 5 
 
4 
B6 4 
 
3 
C3 5 
 
4 
C4 5 
 
4 
C5 4 
 
4 
C6 4 
 
4 
C7 5 
 
5 
D1 4 
 
4 
D2 5 
 
4 
D3 5 
 
4 
E1 5 
 
4 
E2 4 
 
4 
E8 4 
 
3 
F2 5 
 
1 
F3 4 
 
1 
F8 3 
 
3 
 
 
For households choosing ‘public shelters’ as their destination, column-2 of  
Table 5.12 indicates the number of shelter choices available for each zone. For households 
choosing ‘private accommodation’ as their destination, an exit point (column-1) is selected by 
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a house as its destination. This will influence the volume of traffic moving towards that 
particular exit point and also on roads leading to it. This zone-wise data has been used while 
executing the transportation model. The average number of destination choices available for 
each zone was about 4.74, and correspondingly the average for shelters was 3.74. As 
households choices are generally influenced by convenience of access to the facility, the 
individual choices were identified for each zone using its proximity to the zone. These 
average choices indicate the number of options available for a household to choose from in 
each run. 
 
Number of runs and run-time of the model 
It is important to study the variation between runs due to initial setup conditions and the state 
changes as the model executes. Similar to the warning dissemination model, it is assumed that 
ten runs are enough to capture the variation in the model output due to uncertainty in model 
parameters. The ABM was executed for 10 runs under the same initial setup conditions [such 
as warning time, means of transport (%), mobilisation time, agent behaviour parameters, etc]. 
The same configuration files of household properties, warning time and departure time were 
used across various trials and ‘model control variables’ are shown in the first column of Table 
5.13. KPIs of the evacuated zones were collected for 10 runs and presented in Table 5.13. For 
one run in the transportation model, a typical processing time (model execution time) in the 
laptop was found to be 4 hours and 36 hours for runs with scenarios of ‘no transient vehicles’ 
and ‘high volume of transient vehicle’ respectively. The model was executed till the last 
evacuating household reaches safety (i.e. completion of evacuation). 
 
Summary descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation and standard error (Equation 
4.1) were measured for 10 experimental trials. Table 5.14 summarises the variation of 
evacuation KPIs between runs. 
 
The results showed that: 
 The average clearance time was the highest for houses using evacuation bus (131.16 
minutes) followed by pedestrians (106.69 minutes) and the least time while using cars 
(79.14 minutes). The standard error was found to be small (0.16) and varies between 
0.16 and 0.41. In comparison to the respective means, the highest standard error 
expressed as percentage of mean was 0.67% for cars with the overall value of 0.33%. 
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 The average ET was the highest for houses using evacuation bus (178.38 minutes). 
The standard error for average ET was found to vary between 0.16 and 0.41. In 
comparison to the respective means, the highest standard error expressed as 
percentage of mean was 0.24% for cars with the overall value of 0.16%. 
 The average evacuation speed of cars was 24.29 kmph with a standard deviation of 
0.14 kmph, standard error of 0.43 and standard error as percentage of mean as 0.18%. 
 The average waiting time for households using evacuation bus was 85.82 minutes with 
standard deviation of 1.34 minutes, standard error of 0.43 and standard error as 
percentage of mean as 0.49%. 
Even though the model was executed only for 10 trials in comparison with Schulze and Fliess 
(1997)’s thumb rule of 20 runs for unbiased conclusions, the error in the KPIs was low and 
the highest standard error as percentage of mean was 0.67%. The low error indicates that in 
spite of variation in household evacuation choices (Table 5.12), the overall KPIs obtained 
from a single model run are comparable across runs.  
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Table 5.13 KPIs of transportation model for each experimental trial 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Average warning time :                                Cars 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 
Bus 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 11.42 
Pedestrians 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 12.92 
Overall average 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31 
Average departure time :                             Cars 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 48.20 
Bus 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 47.22 
Pedestrians 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 48.90 
Overall average 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 49.89 
KPI: Model runtime (minutes) 348 360 363 357 351 368 364 360 361 360 
KPI: Average clearance time  
          Cars 28.21 28.03 29.20 28.21 29.13 27.74 28.71 28.03 27.92 29.38 
Bus 132.09 130.60 133.85 131.47 129.27 130.11 130.17 130.90 132.06 131.03 
Pedestrians 58.93 58.58 57.87 58.20 57.82 57.13 56.78 57.75 57.02 57.81 
Overall 49.14 48.73 49.97 48.93 49.18 48.24 48.88 48.66 48.67 49.63 
KPI: Average evacuation time  
          Cars 78.91 78.71 79.91 78.89 79.81 78.40 79.40 78.70 78.61 80.08 
Bus 179.30 177.86 181.07 178.69 176.49 177.34 177.40 178.13 179.28 178.25 
Pedestrians 107.80 107.48 106.77 107.10 106.72 106.03 105.68 106.65 105.92 106.71 
Overall 99.03 98.61 99.86 98.81 99.05 98.10 98.76 98.53 98.54 99.52 
KPI: Average 'waiting time' for evacuation bus 87.19 84.74 87.73 86.53 84.28 84.91 84.62 85.45 87.73 85.01 
KPI: Average speed of evacuating cars 24.36 24.34 24.23 24.37 24.20 24.32 24.06 24.33 24.58 24.15 
 237 
Table 5.14 Summary statistics of KPIs from 10 experimental trials 
KPI - Output metrics Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Model runtime (minutes) 359.21 5.96 1.88 1.66 
Average clearance time (from 'loading point' to 'safety')         
Cars 28.46 0.60 0.19 2.10 
Bus 131.16 1.29 0.41 0.99 
Pedestrians 57.79 0.68 0.21 1.18 
Overall 49.00 0.50 0.16 1.03 
Average evacuation time (from 'warning onset time' to 'safety')         
Cars 79.14 0.61 0.19 0.77 
Bus 178.38 1.29 0.41 0.72 
Pedestrians 106.69 0.67 0.21 0.63 
Overall 98.88 0.51 0.16 0.52 
Average 'waiting time' for evacuation bus 85.82 1.34 0.43 1.57 
Average Speed of evacuating cars 24.29 0.14 0.05 0.59 
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KPIs for one household (say house-id = 5042) across 10 runs are unlikely to match exactly. 
However, evacuation planners design transport policies for overall KPIs of all households in 
evacuating zones. And hence the ET of a particular household is less important as the unit of 
analysis for KPIs is one or more evacuation zones. Thus based on the low level of error, this 
thesis argues that the findings on ‘overall KPIs’ from one simulation run are robust.  
 
As there were no real-life data of actual evacuation results for the ERGO city (being a 
hypothetical case study), the validity of these results with the actual field observations could 
not be ascertained and has scope for further research study. The behaviour of household’s 
travel choices, implementation of transport infrastructure using network modelling approach  
and driving behaviour using car-following model were built using existing established 
literature. It can be argued that the approach of ABM is rigorous and has a potential to 
provide robust results to support transportation preparedness. Loss of information due to the 
low standard error is likely to be small and less impactful in changing a transport policy 
decision. Hence, the results from one simulation run of ABM are reliable and the ABM is 
purposeful for overall transport modelling. The following section presents in-depth analyses 
of model results from one trial and scenario experimental results. 
 
5.5 Scenarios executed in the model 
The focus of this chapter (ESF-2) is to illustrate model-based estimation of evacuation 
performance using interactions of household travel choice behaviours, transport policies and 
resource allocation. First, detailed analyses of one simulation trial results are presented below 
followed by scenario experiments. 
 
The initial setup characteristics of the model and driving behaviour parameters were given in 
Table 5.10 and Table 5.9 respectively. The model was executed with ‘no transient traffic’ and 
having warning dissemination system of ‘siren, PA system and unofficial channels’. Analyses 
from Section 5.4.6 found that the KPIs from one trial run are robust and hence results from 
one trial will be used for detailed analyses of evacuation performance. Trial 1 (first column) 
data from Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 are analysed further and the following are key findings. 
 It can be observed in Table 5.13 that from the onset of warning dissemination (time t = 
0) the overall evacuation was completed in 348 minutes (run-time). 
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 The overall average travel time (clearance time) was 49.14 minutes. The lowest 
average was for the car users 28.21 minutes and the highest was for the bus users 
(132.09) about 4.68 times more than average clearance time of cars.  
 Based on ET, it was found that the ‘evacuation using car’ was the quickest among 
other means. The second quickest ET was for ‘pedestrian evacuees’ of 107.8 minutes 
about 8.8% more than the overall ET (99.03 minutes) and about 36.6% more than the 
quickest means (car users). The waiting time for evacuation bus was about 87.19 
minutes which resulted in household using bus being the slowest.  
 On boarding the bus, on an average the travel time to destination (final bus stop) is 
within 44.9 minutes. This was computed by excluding waiting time from clearance 
time (132.09 - 87.19).  
 The average car evacuation speed was found to be 24.36 kmph, which is lower than 
the average desired speed of 40 kmph and road speed limit of 60 kmph (initial setup 
parameter). This implies that even though drivers desire higher speed, the speed of the 
leading vehicle, volume of traffic on road (evacuating vehicles and transient vehicles 
if any) and traffic signals reduced the average evacuation speed. 
The response curve is a time-series plot of three components such as percentage of houses 
‘warned, departed and evacuated to safety’. Figure 5.10 presents the ‘evacuation response 
curves’ for three means of transport and overall evacuated zones. Table 5.15 presents the time 
at which discrete evacuation completion percentages {25, 50, 75, 95, 100} are reached. By 
looking at Table 5.15 and insets in Figure 5.10, the trend of evacuation levels is broadly an S-
shaped curve across transport choices. However, depending on the type of transport, the 
‘clearance time’ and in-turn the ‘evacuation speed’ varies the gradient/slope of evacuation 
level curve. 
 
Table 5.15 Comparison of the ‘time needed to reach various evacuation levels (%)’ for 
various means of transport 
Means of Transport 
Evacuation time in minutes 
25% 50% 75% 95% 100% 
Cars 60 71 93 132 160 
Bus 114 167 239 319 352 
Pedestrian 85 102 126 166 225 
Overall 65 81 116 216 352 
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 For all the cases, the slope below 50% evacuation level was higher than the slope 
above 50% evacuation level and asymptotically approaches between 95% and 100%. 
When the density of traffic increases (% evacuated > 50%) with more number of 
vehicles on the network, the clearance time increases and hence ET is longer. 
 On average, car users complete their evacuation quickest (in 160 minutes). To 
complete evacuation, the bus users take 120% (352/160) more and pedestrians take 
about 40% (225/160) more than car users. 
 As evacuation buses carry many households (seating capacity of 60) from various 
pickup points who simultaneously reach safety/destination, the evacuation curve 
shows step-wise trends. 
 As the volume of traffic will affect the ET, one of the busy road segment (P8 to J5) and 
junction (J5) was selected for monitoring during evacuation time. For every minute, the 
number of vehicles along the chosen busy road is counted as traffic density. Figure 5.11 
presents the time-series data of a busy road.  
 
As a vehicle moves outward from J5, a traffic counter in the junction is incremented by one 
count. Using the cumulative traffic count, the number of vehicles in 5-minute interval was 
obtained and the hourly vehicle flow rate (vph) through the junction was calculated as 
presented in Figure 5.12. This scenario did not have any transient traffic and hence it can give 
a better understanding of traffic propagation for monitoring.  
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Figure 5.10 Evacuation response curves for different means of transport 
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From Figure 5.11 it can be observed that the traffic density is low ‘before 60 minutes’ and 
‘after 140 minutes’. The density values between 60 and 140 minutes vary between 95 and 120 
vehicles in the road segment. By triangulating with the departure curve (Figure 5.10) of cars, 
it can be observed that this time window is where the major portion of evacuation occurs and 
the density of traffic is high (Figure 5.11) in the same period. 
 
From Figure 5.12, it can be observed that, the hourly flow rate increases drastically beyond 50 
minutes, reaching a peak value of 972 vph at 100 minutes, subsequently decreases gradually 
to 720 vph in 130 minutes and then drastically reduces. Similar to traffic density, the flow rate 
is at peak between 50 and 100 minutes. 
 
An evacuating car and the bus will enter into the road network at loading point at their zone. 
When there are near simultaneous departures, there is a possibility of delay in entering the 
moving traffic and a virtual queue will be formed based on arrival time in order to enter the 
network whenever the loading point is free. The model developed in this thesis uses a FIFO 
principle for allowing queued vehicles to enter road network. By analyses of the model 
results, Table 5.16 presents the number of houses in various delay categories. The cumulative 
traffic volume along J1 to J5 was more than 1100 vehicles and the highest 1296 vehicles was 
for the junction J5. Maximum delays were experienced by households having loading point 
near J5. The delay to enter loading point will increase the ET of these households. 
Table 5.16 Categories of delay time to enter loading point 
Delay category Number of cars Average delay (minutes) 
No delay 1433 0 
< 1 minute 1411 0.15 minutes 
Between 1 and 5 minutes 65 2.21 minutes 
> 5 minutes 690 27.07 minutes 
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Figure 5.11 Time series of ‘traffic density’ along a busy road segment J5-P8 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Time series of ‘outward hourly flow rate’ through a busy junction J5 
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It can be logically argued that the density and flow rate in the peak evacuation window has 
influence on the delay to enter the loading point, clearance time and hence the overall ET. The 
experimental trial above was without transient traffic. When the transient traffic is included in 
the experiment, it will affect the flow rate and density of all roads including the busy roads. It 
is likely to shift the major evacuation time window and hence delay the evacuation. ‘The level 
of impact on evacuation KPIs due to additional volume of transient traffic’ as a scenario is an 
interesting question for investigation.  
 
It can be logically argued that, during the evacuation window, an increase in road capacity by 
freeing vehicular traffic will reduce the clearance time. ‘Stopping/Diverting transient traffic 
from using the busy road segment and the junction during this evacuation window’ (60 to 140 
minutes) could be a traffic management policy. This would prioritise evacuating vehicles to 
use the road capacity in the busy road.  
 
Clearance time for car users is a function of departure time and traffic volume during 
evacuation. Departure time is a sum of mobilisation time and ‘when the household receives 
the evacuation message’ and hence a function of warning system (ESF-1). It is reminded that 
warning dissemination is generally managed by other EMAs (police, environmental agencies, 
etc) and has a direct bearing on ET. This highlights the need for multi-agency based 
integrated preparedness.   
 
High waiting time for bus made that means of transport as the slowest. Whether the demand 
for bus (number of evacuees) was same for all the routes? ‘Whether and how’ can the waiting 
time be further reduced for bus users? These are preparedness questions of interest to 
transport authorities for further investigation. 
 
To understand evacuation transport dynamics, scenarios were designed and sequentially 
executed in the model. There are three perspectives of transport dynamics studied as scenarios 
in the model namely household travel choice behaviours, transport policies and resource 
allocation.  
 The first scenario will study the travel choice behaviour by understanding ‘how will 
the household’s warning time and departure time impact the evacuation performance?’   
 The second scenario will study an illustrative example for transport policy scenario by 
answering ‘how will controlling transient traffic improve evacuation performance?’  
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 The third scenario on resource allocation will be studied by understanding ‘How the 
evacuation bus route can be planned using response curves?’ 
These three scenarios were taken as key perspectives of evacuation performance and 
supporting preparedness. There are some more implications of model for the transport 
planners, and Section 5.6 briefly presents some more scenarios for further research.  
 
5.5.1 Impact of warning dissemination on evacuation performance 
The earlier the household receives warning, the sooner will be the departure time and the 
lower will be the ET. As presented in Section 5.3, departure time is a key household attribute 
that will influence the loading of evacuating traffic into the road network. The departure time 
was taken as independent of the ‘means of transport’ and influenced only by warning time and 
mobilisation time. Mobilisation time is the time taken from receiving message to departing 
from the house. This time is needed to prepare the items needed during evacuation and 
depends on ‘household’s evacuation plan’ and preparedness.  
 
The results from two experiments in the transportation model for warning dissemination 
results (ESF-1) with unofficial (Case A) and without unofficial channel (Case B) are listed in 
Table 5.17. The houses that only received message from official channel were separately 
tabulated as second column for case ‘with unofficial’. These results are relevant for direct 
comparison between two experiments and the following interpretations are by comparing 
column-2 and 3. The following are the key findings from the experiment: 
 Without unofficial warning channel, the number of warned houses reduced by 15% 
(4376/5142). This highlights that about 15% of the households are un-warned and left 
behind to be in the danger zone even after the evacuation is complete.  
 From a different perspective, the transport authorities when using ‘warning response 
curves’ without factoring unofficial channel, are likely to underestimate the ‘departure 
time’ without accounting for ‘time to informing neighbours’. 
 Warning-time, a ‘model control variable’, is the same across the two sets. 
 As the houses need not inform their neighbours, the departure time (=warning time + 
mobilisation time) average is lower in case B than case A.  By pair-wise comparison 
of departure time, the difference in values between case A and B was 10.68, 10.6 and 
10.93 respectively for car, bus and pedestrian evacuees. 
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 There was marginal decrease in clearance time by 2.82 minutes and 6.56 minutes in 
cars and buses respectively from case B to A, due to higher volume of traffic in case A 
compared to case B. 
 Waiting time for bus was 7% more in case A. There are more number of vehicles 
(houses receiving message from unofficial channel) on evacuation network for case A, 
and this resulted in more time for buses to reach respective pickup points.  
 With delayed departure due to informing neighbours and marginal decrease in 
clearance time, the ET values were higher in case A compared to case B with 
difference in values being 11.02, 17.16 and 10.78 respectively for cars, bus and 
pedestrians. This results in underestimation of ET by 11.95 minutes which is about 
12% of overall evacuation time. 
In conclusion, having accurate warning response curves (from ESF-1) by including unofficial 
channel will result in: 
a) More number of houses warned and evacuated. 
b) Avoiding underestimation of traffic volume of evacuating vehicles and 
underestimation of ET.  
This highlights the need for ‘transport planners’ to work closely with the ‘warning 
dissemination agencies’ and use more representative warning curves as input to transportation 
model for preparedness. The sensitivity of mobilisation time and its impact on departure time 
and further on evacuation performance is another important question for further research. 
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Table 5.17 Impact of warning dissemination (with/without unofficial channel) on 
evacuation performance. 
 
Case A Case B 
With unofficial 
Without 
unofficial 
1.      Model control variables  
All 
houses 
houses 
common 
to both 
cases    
Number of evacuating houses       
Cars (70%) 3599 3036 3063 
Bus (16%) 823 676 700 
Pedestrians (14%) 720 594 613 
Overall  5142 4306 4376 
Average warning time       
Cars 12.39 10.18 10.18 
Bus 11.42 9.22 9.22 
Pedestrians 12.92 10.48 10.48 
Overall average 12.31 10.07 10.07 
Average departure time       
Cars 48.20 45.86 35.18 
Bus 47.22 44.82 34.22 
Pedestrians 48.90 46.41 35.48 
Overall average 49.89 45.77 36.82 
2.      KPI - Output metrics       
Model runtime (minutes) 349   315.06 
Average clearance time       
Cars 27.44 30.15 27.33 
Bus 129.36 126.73 120.17 
Pedestrians 57.46 57.27 57.42 
Overall 47.96 49.05 46.05 
Average evacuation time        
Cars 78.13 76.01 64.99 
Bus 176.58 171.55 154.39 
Pedestrians 106.36 103.68 92.90 
Overall 97.84 94.77 82.87 
Average 'waiting time' for evacuation bus 85.10 81.85 76.33 
Average speed of evacuating cars 24.59   23.55 
 
5.5.2 Reducing evacuation time by controlling the transient traffic 
The second scenario is to study the impact of transient vehicles on evacuation performance. 
The base experiment presented in the section was executed without transient vehicles. The 
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expressways in the city are used by vehicles of ‘resident population and commuters’ and 
vehicles transiting to some other location. The latter vehicles referred to as ‘transient vehicles’ 
will be included in the model in this experiment.  
 
Two categories of transient volume are tested in the ABM transportation model. ‘Low-level’ 
category will have flow rate of 4 vehicles per minute (240 vehicles per hour) and ‘High-level’ 
category will have eight vehicles per minute (480 vehicles per hour). The category of transient 
vehicle volume was set in the initial setup stage and the model will dispatch transient vehicles 
along four transient routes in the specified volume. Similar to the base case, the KPIs of 
evacuation were collected and tabulated in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18 Impact of transient vehicle volume on evacuation time 
 
  
 
Without 
transient 
Low-
Level 
High-
Level 
1.      Model control variables       
Average warning time       
Cars 12.39 12.39 12.39 
Bus 11.42 11.42 11.42 
Pedestrians 12.92 12.92 12.92 
Overall average 12.31 12.31 12.31 
Average departure time       
Cars 48.20 48.20 48.20 
Bus 47.22 47.22 47.22 
Pedestrians 48.90 48.90 48.90 
Overall average 49.89 49.89 49.89 
2.      KPI - Output metrics       
Model runtime (minutes) 359 355 356 
Average clearance time       
Cars 28.46 34.70 41.78 
Bus 131.16 133.51 137.23 
Pedestrians 57.79 60.43 56.97 
Overall 49.00 54.12 59.18 
Average evacuation time       
Cars 79.14 85.38 92.46 
Bus 178.38 180.74 184.46 
Pedestrians 106.69 109.33 105.87 
Overall 98.88 103.99 109.06 
Average 'waiting time' for evacuation bus 85.82 85.94 86.02 
Average speed of evacuating cars (kmph) 24.294 22.25 20.85 
Average speed of transient vehicles N/A 28.46 27.34 
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The following are key findings from this scenario analyses: 
 The model run-time for completing evacuation was almost the same in all the three 
cases. 
 Overall clearance time from 49 minutes has increased by 10.4 % and 20.7% for cases 
with low level and high level of transient vehicles. The average clearance time for car 
users from 28.46 minutes increased by 21.9% and 46.8% respectively for two cases. In 
case of households using bus, the average clearance time from 131.16 minutes 
increased by 1.8% and 4.6%. 
 The average car evacuation speed from 24.29 kmph, has decreased by 8.4% and 
14.2% for the two cases, respectively. These averages are much lower than the 
average desired speed of 40 kmph and road speed limit of 60 kmph (initial setup 
parameter). 
 In comparison to car’s evacuation speed, the speed of transient vehicle within the 
modelled area was found to be 28.46 kmph and 27.34 kmph. With increase in transient 
volume traffic, the impact on transient vehicles was marginal and yet the speed was 
much lower than the average desired speed of 40 kmph and road speed limit of 60 
kmph (initial setup parameter). 
 Pedestrian clearance time has no impact due to transient vehicles as these agents do 
not use the road network and do not interact with other vehicle agents as assumed in 
this thesis. However, the variation in average clearance time for pedestrians was in a 
narrow range (56.97, 57.79 and 60.43) due to the uncertainty in destination choices in 
the three runs.  
In conclusion, increase in transient vehicle traffic increases the clearance time and delays 
evacuation. The level of impact on clearance time was considerably higher in the case of cars 
compared to households using bus. The impact on households using bus was very marginal 
due to less overlap of bus routes and transient routes. The further reduction in car’s 
evacuation speed by 8.4% and 14.2% is directly due to the transient traffic as all other factors 
were constants in the three cases. If the transient volume is further increased to a value closer 
to road capacity, then there is a possibility of increased congestion, resulting in more 
clearance time and further delayed evacuation. 
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5.5.3 Evacuation bus dispatching and monitoring plans 
Figure 5.2Figure 5.2 presents the flow chart of household decision making for all the means 
of transport. Relative failure of evacuees dependent on the public transport compared to 
motorist was highlighted during Hurricane Katrina (Gutierrez 2011). As the ET is the highest 
for bus users due to high waiting time of about 87 minutes, evacuation bus resource allocation 
will be of considerable interest to the transport planners. 
 
In this scenario, detailed analyses of evacuation KPIs of bus are made to support resource 
allocation plans for dispatching evacuation bus. There were four bus routes as shown in 
Figure 5.8 and evacuees reach the nearest pickup points from their house. Government 
transport authorities can have resource sharing agreements with the local private bus 
operators, travel companies, transport services of the neighbouring regions, etc. This will 
increase the number of evacuation buses available. It is assumed in the model development 
that ‘there is no limitation in the number of buses available for evacuation’. As a 
simplification, the return leg of the bus is not modelled.  
 
Each row in a ‘trip sheet’ contains information about the travel information of each bus along 
a route such as Bus-ID, travel time (departure-time, time of arrival at destination) and 
capacity utilisation (number of houses transported, number of seats/evacuees filled and vacant 
seats). An example trip sheet for route 0 is shown in Table 5.20 and trip sheets for remaining 
three routes are provided in Appendix – B. Such trip sheets help the supervisors at transport 
operations centre to monitor the bus utilisation across routes. Once a bus reaches the 
destination, the ‘trip sheet’ is updated and the bus is removed from the scope of the model.  
 
Some of the transport policy assumptions are as follows: 
 All routes will have regular bus dispatched every 10 minutes and the first bus will 
leave after 30 minutes from the warning onset. 
 No zone-wise estimates of bus demand are available and hence it is assumed that all 
routes are equal in their demand.  
 As a planning assumption, 16% of houses needed bus and the households were 
randomly allocated from evacuation zones. 
 Some of the routes are overlapping and hence served by more than one bus. 
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As the evacuees live in different zones, analyses of model output will be able to provide the 
level of demand in different routes and the results are presented in Table 5.19. It can be 
observed from Table 5.20 and Appendix-B that about 15.7%, 6.38%, 35.95% and 41.96% 
evacuees are from routes 0 to 3 respectively. The demand for buses was highly staggered with 
major demand from route 3 and route 2.  
Table 5.19 Route-wise demand for evacuation bus 
Route Number of evacuees Number of houses 
Route 0 633 128 
Route 1 282 52 
Route 2 1407 293 
Route 3 1680 342 
Total 4002 815 
 
The population is not the same in all the zones and hence demand for bus is unequal. Bus 
routes cover different evacuation zones and evacuees reach the pickup point in their zone. 
However the bus dispatching scheme was the same (every 10 minutes) across all the routes 
and could be the reason for high waiting time. In order to understand the trends of waiting 
time across routes, the bus trips across the four routes need to be reviewed. Trip sheets were 
generated as a report from the transportation model. The summarised key observations of trip-
sheet data are presented in Table 5.21. Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16 present the evacuee arrival 
profiles and bus seat utilisation for the four routes.     
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Table 5.20 Trip-sheet from the model for route 0 
Trip-
Sheet 
Sl.No Bus-ID 
Departure-
time 
Arrival at 
destination 
Clearance 
time 
Evacuees 
transported 
Houses 
Evacuated  
Vacant 
seats 
3 5167 30 65.72 35.72 0 0 60 
8 5680 40 80.4 40.4 26 4 34 
12 6946 50.16 92.76 42.6 58 13 2 
16 7640 60.18 101.78 41.6 60 9 0 
18 8175 70.18 104.74 34.56 59 13 1 
24 8452 80 123.36 43.36 58 11 2 
25 8626 90 123.4 33.4 60 12 0 
32 8660 100 141.3 41.3 60 10 0 
33 8708 110 141.34 31.34 60 15 0 
40 8743 120 153.36 33.36 60 16 0 
41 8797 130 159.4 29.4 59 11 1 
47 8808 140 172.18 32.18 60 12 0 
51 8813 150 184.3 34.3 13 2 47 
57 8817 160 196.64 36.64 0 0 60 
63 8821 170 208.18 38.18 0 0 60 
65 8825 180 217.28 37.28 0 0 60 
66 8829 190 220.46 30.46 0 0 60 
70 8833 200 224 24 0 0 60 
75 8837 210 241.54 31.54 0 0 60 
80 8841 220 251.12 31.12 0 0 60 
83 8845 230 259.74 29.74 0 0 60 
91 8849 240 281.18 41.18 0 0 60 
92 8853 250 281.2 31.2 0 0 60 
97 8857 260 296.18 36.18 0 0 60 
102 8861 270 311.56 41.56 0 0 60 
106 8865 280 320.66 40.66 0 0 60 
107 8869 290 320.68 30.68 0 0 60 
110 8873 300 329.66 29.66 0 0 60 
115 8877 310 341.86 31.86 0 0 60 
 
Table 5.21 Route-wise key observations of trip-sheet data 
 
Route 0 Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 
Number of trips needed 13 8 24 29 
Number of vacant trips 16 21 5 0 
Clearance time 
    Minimum 24 19.64 22.7 24.36 
Average 35.02 27.47 29.75 36.99 
Maximum 43.36 34.44 35.66 59.7 
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Figure 5.13 Evacuee arrival profiles in shelter and bus capacity utilisation for route 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Evacuee arrival profiles in shelter and bus capacity utilisation for route 1 
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Figure 5.15 Evacuee arrival profiles in shelter and bus capacity utilisation for route 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Evacuee arrival profiles in shelter and bus capacity utilisation for route 3 
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It can be observed from Table 5.21 that: 
 The number of vacant trips was extremely high in route 0 and route 1. The last trip 
needed for completing evacuation in these routes was 13 and 8 and the subsequent 
trips (16 to 21) were vacant and hence could be re-distributed to major demand areas 
namely route 2 and route 3. 
 The average clearance time was relatively higher for routes 3 and 0 than other two 
routes. The variation in clearance time value was very high in route 3. Table B-3 infers 
that the clearance time for route 3 was very high initially and decreased with the 
passage of evacuation.  
 From evacuation response curves (Figure 5.10) and Table 5.15, it can be observed that 
75% and 95% of car evacuation were completed within 93 minutes and 132 minutes, 
respectively. From the departure curves of car (Inset 1, Figure 5.10), it can be seen that 
75% and 95% of departure occurs about 60 minutes and 85 minutes, respectively. 
Hence the volume of vehicles on road is considerably high in this time span, and this 
could have resulted in very high clearance time for Route 3. Beyond 110-120 minutes, 
the clearance time drastically reduces in Route 3. Other routes had considerably less 
impact on clearance time due to other evacuating cars. 
 90% of departures to bus pickup points occur within 60 minutes and 100% within 143 
minutes. However, the evacuation response curve (inset 2, Figure 5.10) clearly 
indicates that there is large time gap between departure and completing evacuation and 
this corroborated with the average waiting time of 85.42 (Table 5.14). From the trip-
sheet analyses, the mismatched bus demand and dispatching along routes 3 and 2 is 
attributed as reason for very high waiting time. 
 Routes 3 and 2 had considerable overlap; this implies that the pickup points in these 
zones were highly serviced. Even then, the utilisation of bus seating capacity is very 
high (above 55/60) in route 2 and 3 (Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16) in spite of 
overlapped routes. In bus roster if the vacant trips of route 1 and 0 are re-routed to 2 
and 3, there is considerably high possibility of reducing waiting time for these 
households. This will also reduce the wastage of invaluable bus trips to the needy 
zones. 
 Major evacuation bus route (route 3) that drops to Shelter S7 and S9 passes through 
the busy road segment (P8-J5) and the busy junction J5. Any reduction in traffic along 
this route by ‘stopping/diverting transient traffic’ in the evacuation window (as 
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concluded in Section 5.5) will also reduce the clearance time of evacuation buses and 
hence the waiting time of evacuees. 
 Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16 present the route-wise bus utilisation and vacant seats on 
various routes. As the buses ply to public shelters, the time series of bus ‘arrival to 
destination’ also indicates the arrival profiles of evacuees to public shelters. 
 It can be observed from Table 5.20 and Appendix - B (Table B.1, B.2 and B.3) that 
some of the departure time had delays for the vehicles entering the loading point. The 
decimal value indicates delay time in minute for that trip. 
In summary, ABM showed that single-run observations have low standard error on KPIs and 
hence robust for analyses. The zone-wise population data could be helpful for the transport 
planners to estimate the level of demand for bus in different zones. The dispatching could be 
in such a way that more buses are sent to the zones in need to reduce waiting time. When 
there are no or low waiting evacuees along a route (data obtained through CCTV or from 
personnel in the field), buses should not be dispatched along that route and instead diverted to 
routes with higher demand. 
 
Not including unofficial channel would underestimate the percentage of houses warned and 
also reduce the departure time without factoring the 'time needed to inform neighbours'. ABM 
showed that the lower estimate of departure time will result in under-estimation of ET by 12 
%. From scenario -2, it can be concluded that increase in transient vehicle traffic (low and 
high levels) reduces the evacuation speed by 8.4% and 14.2%, increases the clearance time by 
21.9% and 46.8%  and delays evacuation. 
 
Combining the two policies namely re-routing of buses to ‘Routes 2 and 3’ from ‘Routes 0 
and 1’ and ‘Stopping/diverting transient traffic in transient route - 3’ has scope for reducing 
waiting time for buses and also clearance time of buses respectively. These two policies could 
be included in the transport plan and the implementation of these policies during evacuation 
requires further investigation.  
5.6 Implications of various transport management measures  
The previous section illustrated the transport model using ERGO city. The architecture of the 
model is designed using coordinate files and models to facilitate customization to other cities 
by including road features like round-abouts, multiple lanes, flyovers, etc can be programmed 
 257 
further. Transport planners of ‘Ocean City’ in Maryland United States studied six 
combinations of altering lanes and evacuation routes as alternatives for Hurricane evacuation 
routes (Zou et al. 2005, Table 1, p146) and studied using simulation model for overall 
evacuation performance. Transport officials can use OR/MS model as a platform to test 
various response plans, and it was illustrated in scenarios (Section 5.5.1 to 5.5.3). 
 
The following sub-section presents a brief note on ‘transport management measures’ with 
illustrations from literature which are available for transport officials for improving 
evacuation KPIs. These measures can be implemented further in the model for measuring its 
impact. As a part of transport preparedness, EMAs could identify measures relevant to their 
transport infrastructure and then use the model to understand its implication on the overall 
evacuation. 
 
A. Testing the impact of vulnerability in transport infrastructure on the 
Evacuation effectiveness 
In the Hollsvollur region of Iceland, there is a bridge near the Skogar Township along the 
major evacuation route. After the evacuation was complete during 2010 Eyjafjallajokull 
glacial flooding, this bridge was flooded with volcanic ash. In that evacuation instance, it did 
not affect the evacuees’ safety but highlights the vulnerability of that bridge. During the Gjálp 
eruption in 1996, a bridge on Highway-1 on the Skeiðarársandur outwash plain was destroyed 
(Gudmundson et al. 2008, p.252). In similar circumstances, the vulnerability of transport 
infrastructure, namely road closures due to the disaster or road accidents, collapse of bridge, 
etc could be identified and tested using simulation models in order to 
 estimate the potential delay because of such eventuality  
 identify alternative evacuation routes based on relatively lower ET. 
Such models have been used in the literature (e.g. OREMS) and the proposed model could be 
used to test such scenarios and experiment which is one of the key purposes of developing 
simulation models. The transport officials as a part of preparedness initiative could indentify 
such vulnerability in their transport infrastructure and then represent its impact as a ‘new road 
network configuration’. The users of the model will have to input the coordinate file of the 
disrupted road network and also change the input setup settings (e.g. speed limitations on 
particular evacuation routes) as needed and then re-run the model. The performance metric 
(for example TET) from the initial condition could be compared with the disrupted road 
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infrastructure condition to identify the potential impact. By having indentified the alternative 
routes, the previous procedure could be repeated to obtain the performance metric for each 
route combination, and this can be compared to identify the relative best option. 
 
B. Testing the potential of using contra-flow routes during evacuation 
Well-chosen ‘contra flow’ routing plans have been found to be helpful in increasing the 
available road capacity for evacuation thereby reducing the overall ET. It must be emphasised 
that the ability to implement contra flow plan on a particular route depends on the field 
conditions (e.g. no round-about or over bridges) as well as infrastructure namely accessible 
feeder roads along the contra flow route direction.  
 
For example, the central district in the ERGO city has high-rise residential buildings, 
commercial establishments, as well as educational institutions. Being a high-population 
density zone that needs to be evacuated, the sudden surge of traffic in the road junction could 
be expected from the onset of disaster warning. As an illustration in the ERGO city, the lanes 
of the expressway bringing traffic towards the central district could be converted as a contra-
flow as illustrated in Figure 5.17. Transport authorities could identify feasible contra-flow 
locations as well as routes and test the potential improvement in the overall ET using a 
simulation model. 
 
Figure 5.17 Snapshot of a contra-flow routing plan in ERGO city 
C. Testing the capacity of public transport (e.g. buses) on evacuation 
effectiveness 
The capacity of public transport will affect the number of buses available for evacuation and 
the transport officials could use simulation models to determine the implication of additional 
buses as well as their routing plan. The number of buses available with the public transport 
authorities could be enhanced by borrowing from the neighbouring regions and private 
companies. The capacity available with EMAs for response is limited and dispatching plans 
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are pre-decided. The proportion of households choosing public transport for evacuation will 
increase pressure on bus operators to make round trips between pickups and destination, and 
possibly lead to longer bus waiting time. EMAs could identify the limiting proportion of bus 
users based on their capacity and dispatching plans and test their assumption using the model. 
 
D. Identifying bottlenecks in the transport network  
Transport planners will have information about bottlenecks in the road network by analysing 
the O-D data from operations centre, field data or by experience. The bottlenecks could be a 
road junction, a major expressway that could increase the overall ET. When context-specific 
transport elements are identified as critical/bottleneck using ABM experiments, day-to-day 
observations or experience, improving ET can be studied further. Having a model of the 
transport system enables such studies by the transport authorities.  
 
For example, a transport plan might have contra flow of major expressways to have additional 
capacities. The contra-flow initiation point (Wolshon 2006, p29) might be critical for the 
contra-flow to function and it is possible to evaluate the designs using a simulation model. By 
identifying these locations for the city in the model and then analysing the evacuation KPIs of 
the evacuees through these points of interest, the planners will be able to know which among 
the locations will hinder more during evacuation and possible identify response strategies for 
the same. 
 
E. Experimenting with the traffic signal system of the evacuated area to 
support evacuation. 
Traffic signal timing is an adaptive response strategy for the transport planners during 
evacuation for dual purposes namely: a way of balancing the volume of traffic and prioritising 
roads in a junction in order to streamline the traffic. Managing ‘traffic signal units’ in 
continuous junctions in isolation rather than a system, will lead to sub-optimal ET because the 
signal phase length will be influenced by the volume of traffic in the connected road 
segments. On the other hand, by looking at the traffic signals along the same evacuation 
routes as a ‘system of individual units’, the authorities will be able to identify the signal 
length that minimises the overall ET and not only the ET of the connected road segments 
alone. The ABM model will be helpful for the planners to experiment different phase lengths 
of the traffic signal ‘simultaneously’ and obtain an optimal traffic signal strategy. 
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F. Impact of controlling the transient traffic on evacuation time.  
Transient traffic is defined as the volume of non-local vehicles (vehicle/hour) using the 
expressway for a given time of the day. The transport authorities monitor this information for 
their day-to-day operation. In order to reduce congestion, “spatial and temporal loading 
strategies of freeways” (Wolshon 2006) was one of the transport policies. By diverting the 
transient traffic from the expressway, the authorities will be able to free the capacity available 
along the evacuation route. This will also avoid the vehicle entering the danger zone during 
evacuation. The proportion of transient traffic has been represented as an input parameter in 
the ERGO simulation model. Stopping/reducing transient traffic on select routes can be tested 
by the transport authorities to measure the impact on reducing the overall ET. 
 
These are some of the diverse traffic management measures available for the transport 
planners to support evacuation and the simulation model serves as a platform for them to 
estimate the performance of these choices, leading to choosing relatively better response 
strategies.  
 
Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter begun with summarised ERGO findings related to evacuation traffic 
management followed by the development of model to support evacuation preparedness. The 
multi-modal agent-based traffic model provides a platform for the EMAs to test evacuee 
behaviour factors for the existing road networks. Impact of warning time and particularly the 
informal warning channel was tested using the model and highlighted the need for transport 
planners to work with warning dissemination agency for reliable departure data. As the means 
of transport is a household evacuation decision, the implication of it on the evacuation KPIs 
of the household and resources needed to support were studied using the model. Comparison 
of evacuation KPIs for three means of transport provided insights into the way of reducing the 
clearance time (for cars) and waiting time (for buses).  
 
This model has potential to be used in plan evaluation, training transport officials as well in 
conducting exercise. The traffic management measures (Section 5.6) namely ‘A-F’ have not 
been implemented in this thesis and considered for future development of the model. On 
implementing these options as needed for the users, the model has stronger potential for in-
depth testing of transport management options. 
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Limitations and Further scope of research. 
The following are some key assumptions and limitations of ABM transportation model 
1. Lane changing, overtaking and non-compliance to traffic rules (e.g. skipping red 
signals, violating speed limits) are not included in the model. 
2. Travel behaviour (e.g. route, destination, etc.) is set at the time of departure and will 
remain unchanged in the model. Real-time traffic updates (e.g. digital signboards) and 
their influences in changing travel plan are not modelled.  
3. A typical urban road networks will have over-bridges, round-about, tunnels, spaghetti 
junctions, etc. These features have been excluded from the transportation model as a 
simplification. 
4. It is assumed that all the family members will evacuate together from their house. i.e. 
one car is used for evacuation per house. 
5. Information about route is available to the evacuating household through media 
channels (e.g. news, internet, household evacuation plan, and evacuation plan of GOs).  
6. Evacuating household decides the evacuation route prior to departure and do not 
change it after embarking. 
7. Even though over-taking of cars happens during the normal traffic, it is assumed that 
the cars will not over-take, not exceed road speed limit and follow traffic regulations. 
These assumptions are based on the view that evacuees will comply with evacuation 
plans and traffic regulations. The level of compliance and the role of information in 
ensuring compliance were found to play a key role (Pel et al. 2011) and can be further 
researched by incorporating this variable in the model. 
ABM transportation model was developed for three commonly used means of transport (car, 
bus and pedestrian). There are other context-specific ‘means of transport’ which are available 
and widely used in city-scale evacuation, but have not been included in this model. The 
overall KPI values will be different when these means of transport will also be included in the 
model, and this is a limitation of the model and its findings related to evacuation KPIs. 
 
During evacuation there may be a possibility of accidents due to collision, vehicle break down 
and influence of real-time traffic information (such as traffic congestion, unexpected road 
closures, etc.) which can influence the evacuation route plan prior to departure and even 
change the plans after departure. These events will require revising the evacuation route. Pel 
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et al. (2011) has presented a method to factor in the dynamic changes in route plans due to 
traffic information particularly for models that are executed only once. As a simplification, 
the dynamic route change is excluded as a simplification and the model assumes that the route 
is decided before departure remains unchanged. The likelihood of these disruptions needs to 
be estimated from the existing transport records or estimated with the help of experienced 
transport planner. The evacuation model needs further modification in order to know the 
impact of disruption during transit on the overall ET. 
 
Driving behaviour modelling involves complex dimensions including profile of the driver, 
age, gender, personality factors, type of vehicle, etc. that affect ‘response to stimuli’ in a 
leader follower pair. In this thesis, driving behaviour has been modelled using two major 
factors such as desired speed and perceived safe factor. However, the impact of other factors 
requires further investigation. 
 
Pedestrians were modelled using collision avoidance method (Karamouzas et al. 2009; Mas et 
al. 2012a) in a grid space. This thesis simplified that the pedestrians will not interact with the 
road network and also other pedestrians. The evacuation time is computed using walking 
speed and linear evacuation distance. However, the pedestrians do travel along groups and 
will influence the road traffic wherever there are pedestrian crossings in an urban 
environment. The simplified representation of pedestrians is a limitation of this thesis. 
 
The ‘car-following model’ could be compared with empirical evidence (refer Ossen and 
Hoogendoorn 2011) to formulate representative parameter values for driving behaviour for 
various categories (cars, trucks and buses). For example, evacuation data collected from 
CCTV images, trajectory observations, etc are a useful data source. The video analyses of 
longitudinal driving data could provide reliable empirical evidence to the ABM. This thesis 
has adopted a simple car-following model with only two parameters namely desired speed and 
perceived safe gap. The choice of car-following model will have an influence on the accuracy 
of KPI findings from transportation model and this is a limitation for this thesis. 
 
Situational or environmental conditions in the road network along with personality type are 
some of the key causes for aggressive driving behaviour (Laagland 2005, p2). There are 
various forms of aggressive behaviour beyond exceeding speed limits and running traffic 
signals during non-emergency circumstances. During large-scale evacuation with large 
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number of evacuating vehicles, there are possibilities of some drivers displaying aggressive 
driving behaviour. Aggressive driving could risk the lives of self and others during 
evacuation/normal situation. Two major driver behaviour uncertainties were modelled in this 
thesis namely desired driving speed and perceived safe gap, and the primary goal of the 
drivers is modelled through ‘anti-collision logic’ by regulating two modelled variables. This 
thesis bases an opinion that the drivers display ‘responsible’ driving behaviour during 
evacuation as a simplification. The level of aggressive driving behaviour and its influence on 
non-aggressive drivers will be an interesting problem for further research and for which the 
ABM  would be suitable. 
 
As a large proportion of evacuating vehicles are going to depart in a short evacuation window, 
there is a possibility of the queue getting built up in major routes as the signal turns red. When 
the signal duration is longer, it is possible that that junction will become a bottleneck, 
resulting in reduced flow rate and congestion in the trailing roads. “The longer the cycle 
length used, the better the performance in terms of the number of vehicles to escape in a given 
time period, but the worse the performance in terms of delay to vehicles on the minor 
roadways” (Chen et al. 2007). The delays on the adjoining roads observed in this thesis 
corroborates with the observation made by Chen et al. (2007). This is similar to a bullwhip 
phenomena observed in a supply chain or a bottleneck moving upstream from the congested 
junction upwards to the roads that lead to it. The chances of cars built up can be reduced by 
choosing a, low-signal cycle time (duration of red) and have more number of green phase per 
hour. For the same overall green phase per hour, it is better to have as much short green signal 
duration than fewer long green phases.  
 
Even though these learning were based on an illustrative case study in a single-lane multi-
modal evacuation traffic system, the observations are argued as relevant to be further 
investigated even for complex multi-lane evacuation traffic system. Loading time into the 
evacuation bus is excluded. It can be recollected from Figure 5.8 that bus routes are designed 
to serve specific evacuation shelters. Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16 present the route-wise arrival 
profiles of evacuees to their destination (public shelters). This data will be helpful for the 
shelter operators (ESF-3) to plan for the registration process and also know the trend of 
shortage/available accommodation. If the buses are re-routed to high demand routes, the 
waiting time will get reduced and the arrival profile will need to be re-computed. This again 
highlights the need for shelter operators to work closely with transport authorities for more 
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evidence-based preparedness and design shelter allocation plans. Chapter 6 presents the third 
ESF i.e. shelter management. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MODEL DEVELOPMENT - SHELTER INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
6.1 Emergency Accommodation Management 
The third ESF is managing the emergency accommodation for the evacuated public. In the 
recent 5.7 earthquake (September-2012) in Yilang County in Yunnan province China, around 
100,000 people were evacuated. More than 20,000 houses were damaged or got collapsed 
(Rediffmail 2012). These evacuated residents were expected to need sheltering for weeks till 
their houses are rebuilt. During ‘Cyclone Yasi’ (February 2011) in Australia, over 400,000 
resident populations were in danger. Based on the meteorological department’s prediction of 
cyclone route, a large number of people needed mandatory evacuation as well as public 
sheltering. For unprepared EMAs, such situations could prove catastrophic, including loss of 
lives.  
 
This chapter of the thesis has been organised into two sections. This first section summarises 
the key findings from the ERGO project on sheltering. The second section of this chapter 
presents the model development of ‘Shelter Information Management System’ (SIMS). 
 
6.2 Key findings based on the ERGO project data 
Data from various sources such as interviews, feedback visit, evacuation plans and 
practitioner reports were analysed in the ERGO project. There are various aspects in shelter 
management which came to light:  ‘who among the evacuees need shelters?, where and how 
large are the public shelters? And how are these shelters to be allocated to different 
evacuating zones?’ The mere identification of the shelters by the EMAs will not enable 
supporting the emergency accommodation during evacuation. The EMAs responsible for 
supporting the evacuees to identify a place of safety during the evacuated period can take a 
holistic approach to ensure preparedness. The following sub-section of this thesis will 
summarise the key findings into three different sub-topics, namely  
1. Sheltering policies in the evacuation plan,  
2. Sheltering location - capacity (where to shelter?),  
3. Shelter demand (how many people will require sheltering?). 
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6.2.1 Sheltering policies in the evacuation plan 
Across ERGO countries, there are various categories of shelters with different purposes 
identified during the project:  
 ‘Emergency aid centre’, Rest centre or ‘Reception Centre’ (United Kingdom and 
Iceland), where evacuees will be registered for safe evacuation, providing information 
to the public and then taken to safety.  
 ‘In-sheltering’ is widely used for flash flooding in Japan.  
 Apart from flash flooding, the evacuees also need to evacuate (as pedestrians) to the 
neighbourhood community centre (‘horizontal evacuation’) for fire caused by 
earthquakes in Japan.  
 During the data collection, it was observed that evacuating to higher floors within the 
same building (‘vertical evacuation’) was a widely used evacuation alternative in 
Germany, Iceland and Japan.  
These categories, though referred using different names in practice, are similar to the 
classification presented by Xu et al. (2006, p182) based on duration of evacuation. In Japan, it 
is a legal obligation for evacuees to move to shelter by foot and cannot use cars in certain 
zones, and this policy has been communicated to the public in the preparedness stage. An 
evacuation public sheltering plan needs to identify various evacuation alternatives available 
for the planned threat. 
 
6.2.2 Sheltering locations and capacity  
Across the ERGO countries, it was observed that the local authorities in coordination with the 
Red Cross identify and operate the shelters. During the ERGO data collection, it was found 
that schools, community centres, public buildings, churches, indoor sports complexes, cinema 
theatres, gyms, farm houses, tourist homes and colleges were identified and used as sheltering 
locations.  
 
Shelters (Fjoldahjalparsod) are identified by the local authorities in Iceland, and this 
information is shared in the ‘Mt. Katla Volcanic eruption preparedness leaflets’ (Figure 5.1) 
and communicated to the public. As per Iceland’s evacuation plan, evacuees need to report to 
the ‘emergency aid centre’ and they will be moved to shelters from there. Some locations 
serve as both registration centre and a shelter. 
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Regarding the location of the shelters, the province of Liege (Belgium) has identified four 
potential locations for shelters around the Doel nuclear plant, but outside the inner zone. In 
case of eventuality, the inner zones will be evacuated to these identified safe locations. The 
scenario used for planning in London is the evacuation of parts of London to neighbouring 
boroughs, where the evacuees will be sheltered. During a fire accident in Denmark, the 
authorities decided to evacuate about 400 residents to a school within the neighbourhood. In 
few hours as the situation got beyond control, the sheltered evacuees needed to be evacuated 
to another place as the school building was within the danger area. These indicate variety of 
evacuated zones and the location of shelters. 
 
During the evacuation due to volcanic eruption in Iceland (March 2010), this information was 
crucial as the evacuation needed to be completed within 30 minutes. The interviewed 
evacuees shared that they knew in advance ‘where to go for evacuee registration’. During the 
evacuation, the specific shelter details are provided as a part of warning message in Doel 
Nuclear plant evacuation Belgium, as well as in Hamburg and Iceland. This practise of 
communicating details of shelters to the general public in the warning message makes it 
actionable during evacuation. 
  
The emergency planning officials in the Harburg district in Hamburg have identified shelters 
in schools, gyms and public buildings. Additionally, they have collected details such as bed 
capacity, address and contact numbers of the people in charge of opening the shelter. This 
information was stored within the evacuation plan and will be helpful during evacuation 
decision. Each sheltering location will accommodate a limited number of people when they 
need to stay overnight. In this thesis, the number of people who can be accommodated in 
shelters will be referred to as ‘capacity of shelter’. 
 
All the shelters identified during planning may not be available during evacuation. Some 
reasons are due to direction of wind during a nuclear incident (Belgium), sheltered location 
may be within danger zone (Denmark) and the location could be in flooded area (Hamburg). 
The actual shelter capacity available may be less than the overall planned capacity. The 
EMAs will have a challenge of managing the sheltering needs with a reduced capacity during 
response. Thus, EMAs need to base the decision of ‘which shelters to use’ based on the 
prevailing circumstance, and the sheltering details collected at the preparedness stage will 
prove to be vital. In order for the authorities to identify and communicate available shelters 
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during evacuation, it is important for consolidating/storing shelter details in an accessible 
database. 
 
6.2.3 Demand for the public shelters 
The province of Liege in Belgium has divided the potential evacuation zones into ‘sectors’ 
around the nuclear plant to facilitate easier communication of the evacuation zone to the 
authorities as well as to the residents. This will help in understanding the potential demand for 
shelters in each evacuated zone depending on the population and socio-economic factors. 
Estimating the number of people who require shelters (demand), though useful in aligning 
with the capacity, is challenging for the EMAs.  
 
During a preventative evacuation for the detection of World-War – II bombs in East Flanders, 
about 330 people were warned and evacuated. Among them 70 residents (about 21%) went to 
public shelters and others evacuated to friends and family. During the volcanic eruption in 
Eyjafjallajokull in Iceland (March-2010) around 800 had to be evacuated, out of which 110 to 
135 required accommodations (about 16.8%) on three evacuation instances (Shaw et al. 
2011a, p258). 
 
During interviews with the Ministry of Interior in Germany, an official estimated 10-20% as 
the shelter demand (Shaw et al. 2011a, p258). The interviews during ERGO project showed 
that there was no generalizable value for shelter demand and it varied between 3-20% (Shaw 
et al. 2011a, p258). Post-evacuation reports are one source of obtaining planning estimate for 
demand. 
 
Apart from shelter location planning, there were various shelter operations support services 
found during the ERGO interview such as evacuee registration process, planning for 
decontamination capacity after a large-scale nuclear incident evacuation, psycho-social and 
medical support, Search and Rescue, etc. (Shaw et al p259).  
 
In summary, the following are the key findings of this thesis on emergency accommodation. 
 Alternatives available for evacuation such as in-sheltering, vertical evacuation and 
horizontal evacuation were widely used in many countries. 
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 It was found that shelters have been identified by the local authorities in various 
countries but not widely documented with capacity details to support the evacuation 
decision. 
 Literature on evacuation shelter management highlighted that the socio-economic 
factors (Mileti et al. 1992) will influence the proportion of evacuees seeking shelter 
(shelter demand) among the evacuated population. Post-evacuation studies (Brodie et 
al. 2006) after Hurricane Katrina in the United States have indicated the highlighted 
high shelter usage by the ‘ethnic minorities and immigrant population’ and the people 
from low-economic strata. Mileti et al. (1992) has also provided estimates for public 
shelter usage for various types of disasters based on historical records. During the 
ERGO interviews, there was no evidence of explicit assumption about the impact of 
socio-economic factors on the likely shelter demand. 
 Apart from resident population, tourist places requiring evacuation might have large 
proportion of tourists needing shelter. This need to be included while estimating 
shelter demand. 
 There was no well-developed systematic practise among the ERGO countries on 
estimating the shelter demand and allocating the available capacity, and this topic 
requires further investigation. 
 Providing information about the shelter locations and evacuation routes through a 
leaflet was well developed in Iceland, and this was found to be effective in the recent 
evacuation for glacial flooding (April 2010). 
 Operating shelters with the help of NGOs like Red Cross is widely practised, but the 
logistics of managing lifeline supplies at a ‘safe inventory level’ and delivery of these 
items from warehouse to various shelters require further investigation. As this thesis 
is limited to the evacuees reaching shelters, this problem could be investigated in the 
future. 
 
During mass evacuation situations involving many local authorities, the centralised decision- 
making team need to collate and allocate the shelters on a rational basis in-order to quickly 
move the evacuees to safety. This thesis will present a holistic approach in shelter information 
management and develop a tool that can help managing the public shelter information and 
allocation. There are various shelter allocation studies considering the allocation of shelters 
assuming the compliance of evacuees (Ng et al. 2010, Pel et al. 2011), but the implication of 
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this assumption requires further investigation. This thesis investigates the implication of 
shelter choice behaviour on the allocation of available shelters. 
 
6.3 Shelter Information Management System – A holistic approach 
EMAs support evacuees in reaching safe locations during evacuation and ‘Shelter 
management’ is the last ESF. There are different destination options available for the 
evacuees to move to safety namely going to friends and family outside the evacuated zone, 
hotels or private accommodation and public shelters. This thesis has proposed a holistic 
approach for managing the shelter location information that will help the EMAs to effectively 
allocate shelters to different evacuating zones. 
 
The SIMS tool proposed in this thesis will  
i) Provide a platform for organised collection of data required for public shelters. 
ii) Support in optimal allocation of the shelters to various evacuated zones.  
 
The illustration of this tool will be presented in the next section using the ERGO city case 
study. Figure 6.1 presents the holistic approach proposed in this thesis which will be 
elaborated in the following paragraphs. In line with the other two ESFs, the model presented 
in this chapter for shelter management will be organised into preparedness tasks, analysis and 
response plans. At the outset, the inner dotted rectangle in the figure specifies the boundary of 
the SIMS tool. Tasks specified as the rectangles are to be carried out at the ‘preparedness 
stage’ by the EMAs to provide information for a particular step of the SIMS tool.  Tasks 
specified in the oval boxes are the potential measures for the ‘response stage’ based on the 
allocation model of the SIMS tool. The following section elaborates the holistic approach in 
the order of using the SIMS tool.  
 
Obtain zone-wise ‘Shelter demand’ [Step  1] 
The number of evacuees seeking public shelters for safety for the duration of evacuation is 
referred to as ‘Shelter demand’. The level of need for public shelters is primary information 
needed for shelter management. EMAs prepare an evacuation plan for a highly likely hazard 
or threat. The authorities identify potential evacuation zones for the planning scenarios by 
using computer models (Wright et al. 2006) specific to disasters (e.g. nuclear plume 
dispersion model). The demographic (e.g. resident population, number of houses and family 
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details) and socio-economic (e.g. ethnicity and economic status) details about the public 
living in the region are collected at the preparedness stage, and this can be analysed further to 
obtain the zone-wise evacuee profile for the potential evacuation zones. GIS is a widely used 
tool for managing spatial information about the evacuation zone (Pal et al. 2009) and shelters.  
 
There are various sources for obtaining evacuee behaviour data as elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Depending on the access to information and cost of data collection, EMAs can analyse the 
level of shelter usage data from varied sources, to name a few: stated-preference surveys 
(FEMA 2010), post-evacuation reports (Brodie et al. 2006) and detailed cross-sectional 
studies of historical records (Mileti et al. 1992). These studies provide guidance and evidence 
base for estimating the shelter demand as a function of independent variables like resident 
population, vulnerable population (elderly, public under medical care, etc.), tourists, 
proportion of ethnic minorities and people in the low-economic status. Humanitarian 
organisations such as Red Cross maintain records of shelter usage for their past evacuation, 
and this could serve as another source. 
 
Each of these data source has its own reliability, as well as cost, and in the absence of any of 
these data sources the EMAs could estimate the demand for shelters by senior practitioner’s 
experience. By identifying the potential evacuation zones for the planning scenario, the 
shelter demand can be estimated for each zone based on socio-economic details. This estimate 
will serve as key information for the Step 1 of the proposed SIMS tool.
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Figure 6.1 Holistic approach to shelter management and the role of SIMS tool
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Ascertain ‘Shelter capacity’ [Step  2] 
Data collection showed that, there are various public buildings and schools used as potential 
location for shelters. Each of these facilities can accommodate only a fixed number of 
evacuees and this is referred to as ‘shelter capacity’. This is important data for managing 
emergency accommodation. Not all the buildings may be suitable for sheltering evacuees for 
many days. For example, though a warehouse can accommodate many beds when empty, 
without lifeline support (e.g. enough number of toilets) it will not be suitable as shelter. Kar 
and Hodgson (2008, Table 3, p235) presented a broad classification of facilities that are 
candidates for identifying shelters among potential buildings. This study has also developed a 
multi-factor method based on weights for prioritising shelter features and selecting suitable 
shelters using a GIS tool. In another study, a GIS system was used to identify the optimal 
location for building shelters for river flooding in India (Sanyal and Lu 2009).  
 
Shelter buildings are generally identified by the local authorities and documented in the 
evacuation plan. Apart from documenting the accommodation capacity, details such as 
address, telephone contact details, owner or single-point-of-contact, etc. can be documented in 
a systematic way across all the local authorities. This has been practised in Hamburg 
Germany, as tables within the evacuation plan. This thesis argues that developing a template 
in ‘spreadsheet software’ can facilitate standardisation of practise across the regions. When 
the shelter details are stored in an organised format, this information can be easily analysed to 
know the shelters in the safe neighbouring areas to receive evacuees. It is easier to mobilise a 
coordinated effort, when ‘the shelter details (including capacity) along with the spatial 
information’ (location, address, contact details) are stored in computers such as spreadsheets 
or GIS map, instead of tables in the evacuation plan.    
 
A shelter may not be suitable for all disasters. For example, a building may be suitable for 
flooding due to high ground level but may not be structurally safe for sheltering during 
tornadoes. Likewise, a shelter can become unavailable during a disaster. For example, a 
shelter facility may be along the nuclear plume direction. By overlaying the location details of 
the shelters on a flood inundation map, the suitable shelters can be identified. A similar 
approach has been illustrated in Kar and Hodgson (2008). EMAs can adopt such an approach 
by overlaying the locations of shelters in their disaster models to know the potential 
vulnerabilities. By verifying the ground realities during evacuation, only the shelters that are 
safe and available are to be considered for evacuation by the decision makers. Apart from the 
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building details of each shelter, the capacity of shelter and spatial location details will serve as 
a key input for the Step 2 of SIMS tool. 
 
Compute ‘Travel time’ between zones and shelters [Step  3].  
The zones to be evacuated are identified based on the disaster impact. The potential demand 
of public shelters can be estimated at the zone level [Step 1]. Shelters are buildings with 
specific capacity located in the regions receiving evacuees. The spatial distributiveness of the 
evacuation zones (sources) and the public shelters (destinations) will lead to movement of 
traffic towards the latter. There are various means of transport used by the evacuees such as 
cars, public transport and as pedestrians, and the time required to reach the shelter will vary 
accordingly. For example, Stern and Sinuany-Stern (1989) developed a behavioural 
simulation model considering various means of evacuation for different times of the day. As 
the emergency accommodation is defined as a place of safety for days, it is assumed in this 
thesis that the evacuees will evacuate to shelters using cars to carry their personal belongings 
needed for few days, and the travel time using cars will be computed accordingly.  
 
Results from the transportation model (Chapter 5) showed that, the travel time or clearance 
time for evacuation is the lowest using cars, followed by public transport (buses) and the 
slowest evacuation is by foot. During disruption in the road network due to traffic congestion 
or accidents, it might take longer to evacuate in cars. This thesis adopts the travel time using 
cars as a representative value from the evacuated zones to the shelters. The simplified 
assumption of evacuation using cars is an optimistic scenario for planning, and the uncertainty 
in the travel time will be an interesting topic to be explored in the future. EMAs can develop 
scenarios for evacuation (e.g. day-time versus night-time) considering the volume of traffic on 
roads (Stern and Sinuany-Stern 1989), leading to a various travel time scenarios between the 
evacuation zones and shelters. Here, the transport models with behavioural components as 
presented in the Chapter 5 can help in providing reliable planning estimates for travel time to 
the shelter managing authorities, and this further corroborates the interconnectedness of ESFs.  
 
The ‘travel time’ estimates can be obtained from various sources depending on the intended 
accuracy of the results as well as on the availability of data.  
i) Transport officials will be able to provide an estimate of travel time based on O-D 
studies. These are collected for day-to-day operation as well for traffic 
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management during evacuation. O-D data are widely used in the evacuation 
transport models for example OREMS (Southworth 1991).  
ii) Evacuee transport models will be another source of travel time data by obtaining 
the values for a planned scenario. 
iii) In the absence of these, the EMAs can collect approximate travel time values from 
websites (e.g. maps.google.com) and then scale them by an appropriate congestion 
factor.  
The estimated travel time between the potential evacuation zones to the shelters will serve as 
a key input to Step 3 of the SIMS tool. 
 
Run SIMS Allocation model [Step 4] and Analyse allocation Results [Step 5] 
The mere identification of shelters will not complete the role of EMAs in providing shelters to 
the evacuees. It has been found that evacuees choosing the shelters by themselves will lead to 
sub-optimal ET (Ng et al. 2010). Detailed information about the number of evacuees from 
each region as well as the capacity of each shelter is available only with the EMAs and not 
with the public. The overseeing authorities need to allocate the shelters by balancing the 
evacuees of all the regions (demand), the available capacity at each shelters and the time 
needed to reach the shelters. There are various allocation models proposed in the existing 
literature (Sherali et al. 1991, Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005, Ng et al. 2010) but the 
implication of household choice behaviour on evacuation performance is yet to be 
investigated. This thesis investigates the impact of ‘evacuee shelter choice behaviour’ using a 
generalised formulation for optimal allocation of shelters.  
 
Using the SIMS tool, the users can input the evacuation zone details, shelter information, and 
the travel time for the chosen scenario and run the model to obtain optimal shelter allocation 
results. Comparison of estimated demand for public shelters and the identified shelter 
capacity can indicate any potential shortages. A detailed presentation of the allocation model 
and subsequent behaviour analyses is presented in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.4, respectively. 
Once the zone-wise shelter allocation is available, the EMAs can develop localised 
preparedness materials such as leaflets that indicate the shelters and evacuation routes. For 
example, ‘Mt. Katla Volcanic eruption preparedness leaflets’ (Figure 5.1) prepared by 
Iceland; and New-Hannover county’s multi-hazard preparedness website and map (NHC 
2010) are very good examples. It is important for the local authorities to generate awareness 
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about the shelters at the preparedness stage and the results from the SIMS model will support 
EMAs with the allocation details. 
 
Apart from supporting the planning of shelter management, outputs of the model can provide 
guidance for response strategies in implementing the allocation results.  
a) First, the authorities during response can develop zone-specific warning messages 
with the respective ‘shelter allocation advice’. The model output can serve as a 
reliable evidence base for developing public preparedness leaflets and campaigns. 
This will persuade the public to consider moving to the allocated shelters.  
b) Second, the overseeing authorities can mobilise transport facilities for taking the 
evacuees from the evacuated zone to the allocated shelters. Section 5.14 presented bus 
routes to pick up evacuees from zones to public shelters and scope managing arrivals 
based on vacancy available was elaborated in the third scenario.  
These two tasks are illustration of developing response plans based on the analyses from the 
SIMS tool. This concludes Steps 4 and 5 of the SIMS tool. 
 
It can be observed that the tasks outside the SIMS (indicated by dotted lines) are a research 
field in itself with a considerable body of knowledge, and this thesis contributes in proposing 
a holistic approach of integrating multiple sources of data in order to better manage 
evacuation shelters. The SIMS tool proposed in this thesis provides a structured approach and 
a platform/aid for the practitioners to organise relevant information, share with regional 
authorities and enable further in arriving at optimal shelter allocation policies. It can be 
observed that the supporting data for shelter management are obtained from very diverse 
sources (e.g. O-D data are collected by transport planners), and for effective management of 
shelters there is a pressing need for multi-agency collaboration, or at the least to have access 
to these information for the overseeing authority. 
 
6.3.1 Purpose and scope of the model  
The previous section of this chapter presented the holistic approach for managing shelter 
information. The SIMS tool usage will be illustrated below with the ERGO city case study. 
The model has been developed for collecting the key information about public shelters in the 
planning phase of evacuation. There are other key details about shelters such as owner of the 
building or single-point-of-contact, address, contact number, etc. These can also be collected 
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for each shelter to quicken the opening and running of shelters. The spreadsheets can be easily 
customised based on the available information.  
 
In general, MS-Excel spreadsheets are widely used for organised management of data. This 
thesis assumes that MS-excel spreadsheet is relatively familiar and easier environment for the 
EMAs, leading to potential adoption of SIMS tool and hence MS-Excel has been chosen for 
developing this tool. 
 
6.3.2 Illustration of SIMS tool using ERGO city case study  
The following section illustrates the usage of SIMS tool for the ERGO city case, and it is 
argued that the proposed holistic approach is generalisable to any other city. As discussed in 
the earlier chapter (Section 3.3.5), there are 19 zones to be evacuated indicated by blue zones 
in the following ERGO city map (Figure 6.2). There are shelters identified in advance 
throughout the ERGO city by the local authorities. Due to the level of flood in the evacuated 
zones, the shelters within that zone are deemed as unsafe. The shelters available in the 
neighbouring 10 boroughs (represented by Star symbol S1-S10) are available for receiving the 
evacuees. 
 
As there are 19 evacuated zones to be accommodated in 10 boroughs with shelters of different 
capacities, the decision maker at the regional level need to collate the information at a 
centralised place. Considering the overall ET of all the evacuees, the EMAs responsible for 
shelter need to arrive at optimum allocation policy, and in this context the model proposed by 
this thesis will be able to support the decision makers. The users of this model will be 
required to enter the details in five steps and run the model in order to obtain optimum 
allocation results. The screenshot of the main page of SIMS model is presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.2 Shelters and evacuated zones in the ERGO city 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Screenshot of Shelter Information Management and Allocation System 
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Figure 6.4 Details of the evacuated zones and estimated demands for shelter (Step-1) 
Step 1 is to collect the population details of the evacuated zone grouped using different 
postcodes along with the estimated demand for shelters. The EMAs could use socio-economic 
data to arrive at this estimate along with their experience of managing previous evacuations. 
The total demand for shelters was found to be 12,500 for 19 evacuated boroughs on an 
average of 8% of the population. Figure 6.4 summarises the shelter demand for the evacuated 
zones. 
 
Step 2 is to collate the information about available shelters from neighbouring boroughs. It 
can be observed (see Figure 6.2) that the local authorities have identified suitable buildings as 
sheltering locations in advance within their evacuation plan. Some of the shelters within the 
evacuated zone (blue squares) are unavailable. There are two key data required about the 
shelters:  
i) Number of evacuees accommodated in each shelter and location (Step 2) 
ii) Travel time for each available shelter from each evacuated zone (Step 3) 
 
Figure 6.5 presents the summary of available shelters along with their capacity. Figure 6.6 
shows the travel time matrix (in minutes) for the combinations of various evacuated zones and 
available shelters. For each origin (zone) and destination (shelter) pair, the travel time values 
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were computed using the website www.maps.google.com for evacuation using cars. 
Alternatively, the output of the transportation model can be another data source. 
 
Figure 6.5 List of shelters available and its details in the ERGO city (Step 2) 
 
Figure 6.6 Estimated travel times (in minutes) from the different evacuated zones to the 
available shelters (Step 3)  
Figure 6.7 summarises the data of the ERGO city shelter allocation problem. When the 
capacity available for allocation is more than or equal to the estimated demand, then the 
authorities will be able to arrive at optimum allocation using the allocation model. How does 
the model allocate evacuation zones to shelters? This is discussed in the next section. When 
the estimated demand exceeds the total available shelters, the model will allocate to the 
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available capacity. In such a situation, the EMAs need to identify alternative avenues for 
accommodating the excess evacuees.  
 
Number of zones to be evacuated       = 19 
Total evacuees who need public shelter       = 12500 
Number of public shelters available       = 10 
Total number of evacuees who can be accommodated in public 
shelter = 12900 
Is there a shortage of shelters?         = No 
Figure 6.7 Summary of ERGO city shelter allocation problem 
 
6.3.3 Generalised formulation of shelter allocation model 
Having collected the information in the SIMS tool about the potential shelters and estimated 
the demand using a holistic approach, the centralised team need to have strategies for 
allocating the shelters. The interactive nature of SIMS tool will enable the authorities to 
update the unavailable shelters due to the disaster impact or inaccessibility. The following 
section of this chapter presents the generalised formulation of the shelter allocation model. 
The formulated model serves as a basis for allocating shelters as well as subsequent analyses 
of shelter choice behaviour. 
 
Let there be ‘n’ zones to be evacuated to ‘m’ shelters. Let ‘i’ be the variable indicating the 
evacuated zone and ‘j’ indicates the allocated shelter. Let Xij represent the ‘decision variable’ 
indicating the numbers of evacuees from zone ‘i’ to be allocated in the shelter ‘j’. The 
evacuation travel time for each evacuee from zone ‘i’ to the shelter ‘j’ is represented using the 
variable Tij. The proposed model will allocate the evacuees from different zones based on the 
objective of minimising the overall ET (i.e. sum of ET for all the evacuees from evacuated 
zones to the allocated shelters). This has been widely used in the existing shelter allocation 
models (Sherali et al. 1991, Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005, Ng et al. 2010). This objective 
function is represented mathematically as follows: 
              
 
   
 
        (6.1) 
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Shelter allocation is influenced by two aspects, namely the demands for shelters from each 
evacuated zone and the availability of shelters. Each of these is represented as constraint as 
given below. 
 
Constraint -1: Demand constraint (for each zone) 
The allocated shelters for zone ‘i’ should either equal or exceed the estimated demand 
represented as Di. There will be one constraint for each zone to satisfy the estimated demand 
of evacuees from the zone. The following equation is an illustration for zone – 5 and followed 
by a generalised expression.  
      
 
   
     
In general,  
      
 
                       For all i = 1,2,3…n evacuated zones.              (6.2) 
 
Constraint – 2: Shelter capacities (for each shelter) 
The number of evacuees allocated to a shelter ‘j’ from all the zones should not exceed the 
shelter capacity represented as Sj. There will be one constraint for each shelter to limit the 
allocated evacuees from all the zones. And this has been illustrated for shelter – 3 and 
followed by a generalised expression.  
      
 
   
    
In general,  
      
 
                 For all j = 1,2,3…m available shelters.                  (6.3) 
By solving the allocation model, the decision variables (Xij) represent the optimum shelter 
allocation results and the EMAs will be able to interpret the results as described in Chapter 8. 
This shelter allocation model will serve as a basic platform to further investigate the impact of 
varied shelter choice behaviours on the ET. Figure 6.8 summarises the generalised 
formulation of the shelter allocation model. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Decision Variable  
Xij = Optimal allocation of evacuees from the zone ‘i’ to the shelter ‘j’. 
Objective Function To minimise the overall evacuation time of all the evacuees (Z) 
                   
 
   
 
   
 
Subject to 
      
 
              For all i = 1,2,3,…n evacuated zones.           [Evacuee demand constraint] 
      
 
               For all j = 1,2,3…m available shelters.           [Shelter capacity constraint] 
                                                             [Integrality constraint] 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 6.8 Formulation of shelter allocation model 
As the decision variables are integers, and the objective function and all the constraints are 
linear, the formulation of the problem indicates an ‘Integer Programming’ (IP) problem 
structure. The suitability of the choice of the method has been elaborated in Section 3.3.4.  
 
The flooding scenario is used for illustration that results in the evacuation of 19 zones and 
with estimated shelter demand varying between 300 and 1000 with a total of about 12,500 
evacuees. There are about 10 shelters in the neighbouring communities with ‘total 
accommodation capacity’ of 12,900 evacuees. The shelter allocation problem was formulated 
and the SIMS model was run (Step 4) to obtain the optimal allocation as given in Table 6.1 
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Table 6.1 Zone-wise shelter allocation results obtained from the SIMS allocation model 
 
 
SHELTERS 
   S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Total 
E
V
A
C
U
A
T
E
D
 Z
O
N
E
S
 
D1                   300 300 
E1                   350 350 
D2                 800   800 
E2               450     450 
F2         110     240   50 400 
C3                 450   450 
D3                 550   550 
F3         700           700 
A4             320   580   900 
B4             800       800 
C4           630     220   850 
A5     470       530       1000 
B5           750         750 
C5       280   670         950 
B6 500                   500 
C6   160   370 70           600 
C7   800                 800 
E8   650                 650 
F8           700         700 
Total 
Allocated 
500 1610 470 650 880 2750 1650 690 2600 700 12500 
The total evacuation time (TET) for these evacuees was about 231,630 minutes with an 
average household level ET of 18.5 minutes. It can be observed that some of the evacuation 
zones are allotted to more than one shelter and vice versa. Overseeing authorities can run such 
analyses for various evacuation planning scenario and severity of threats where the % 
evacuees to shelter (demand) varies. Apart from organising the required information for 
allocating shelters, EMAs can implement the results from SIMS tool in the following ways.  
 Communicate to each local authority of evacuation zones, their corresponding 
‘allocated shelters’ for overseeing evacuation. 
 Evacuation preparedness materials such as leaflets were prepared specific to each 
geography in Hamburg, Iceland (Figure 5.1) and New-Hannover County (NHC 
2010). For example, while preparing the leaflet for C6 zone, the allocated shelters 
namely S2 and S4, S5 can be specifically mentioned to encourage evacuees to 
choose these shelters. EMAs could also design ‘allocation message’ template to be 
used during evacuation.  
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 Some evacuees may need public transport for evacuation. Local authorities in 
collaboration with bus operators can organise buses from the pick-up points in 
different zones to the allocated shelters. This will streamline the number of 
evacuees to allocated shelters and indirectly increase the allocation-advice 
compliance percent. For example, the evacuated zone A5 (McCrea Way) with 
estimated shelter demand of 1000 evacuees will be allocated to two shelters 
namely Fineview (S3) and Climax Street (S7) about 470 evacuees to S3 and 530 to 
S7, respectively. Assuming the capacity of bus to be 60 passengers, the authorities 
could send six buses between A5 to S3 and seven buses between A5 to S7 
respectively. 
 Coordinate with the transport officials in ascertaining optimal evacuation routes 
for different zones to the allocated shelters. This ‘evacuation routes’ can be 
indicated in the preparedness leaflets similar to NHC (2010). 
When all the evacuees comply with the shelter allocation advice, though ideal, it will lead to 
optimal evacuation in the shortest possible time (ET = 18.5 minutes). In reality, there are 
uncertainties in the sheltering choice, leading to some evacuating population showing non-
compliance behaviour (NCB). The following section presents the impact of uncertainty on 
allocation effectiveness. 
 
Apart from presenting a SIMS tool based on a holistic approach, this thesis investigates the 
effect of shelter choice behaviour of evacuees on the allocation. Thus, the IP model 
formulated in this section will serve as a ‘simulation test bed’ for quantifying the implication 
of shelter choice behaviour of the evacuees. The existing ‘excel solver’ in MS-office 2007 can 
handle utmost 200 decision variables in an optimization problem and in the case of ERGO 
city it is 190 (19 zones and 10 shelters). Moreover, the formulation of shelter allocation model 
is generalisable to any number of evacuation zones and shelters combinations. When this limit 
of 200 is exceeded, the users need to use some other ‘IP solver’ for obtaining optimal 
allocation, and this is a limitation of developing SIMS tool in the MS-excel 2007. 
 
6.3.4 Impact of the evacuee shelter choice on shelter allocation 
The objective of shelter allocation using IP formulation was to minimise the overall ET and 
subsequently the EMAs issue evacuation advice to respective zones. Not all the evacuees may 
follow the allocation message issued by the officials. Evacuees may choose the shelter as a 
personalised choice (e.g. closer to workplace) which could be different to the allocated 
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shelters.  Findings from the ERGO data collection did not indicate any allocation models 
considering the evacuee choices currently used in practice. There are three main approaches 
for allocating shelters in the existing literature, namely: 
i) Assuming that the evacuees will follow allocation advice (Sherali et al. 1991) and 
solved as location-allocation problem from the EMA perspective. 
ii) As a bi-level allocation model, at the first level the EMAs will allocate from the 
overall evacuation and in the second level evacuees will choose a convenient 
choice (Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005). 
iii) A hybrid model (Ng et al. 2010) of evacuation of combining system optimal 
behaviour of evacuees (cooperative behaviour) as well as the selfish behaviour of 
evacuees (non-cooperative behaviour). 
Will uncertainty in behaviour impact the overall ET and disrupt operating the shelters? This 
thesis investigates the impact of evacuee shelter choice on the overall success of evacuation. 
The shelter choices of evacuees will be discussed in more detail to identify various behaviour 
classes in the next sub-section. The last sub-section presents the approach adopted in this 
thesis for performing the ‘sensitivity analyses of these behaviours’ on the evacuation time to 
shelters. 
      
Behaviours of evacuees in choosing shelters  
Shelter allocation policies and the advice inherently assume a certain level of compliance of 
the evacuees to the shelter allocation. During a post-evacuation interview in the Iceland after 
Mt. Eyjafjallajokull eruption, an evacuee recollected that the ‘information meetings’ 
heightened the awareness of shelters and evacuation routes. The household reported to have 
evacuated to the allocated shelter for their zone. Such ‘compliance behaviour’ (CB) cannot be 
generalised to all the evacuees. Such an assumption is an ideal case resulting in a more 
‘organised and controlled evacuation’ with lowest overall ET.   
 
When the evacuees receive the warning message, believe it and choose to evacuate with the 
family members, there are various factors that will affect their destination choice. Some 
proportion of evacuating population will choose private accommodation for sheltering and the 
remaining may require public shelters. Mileti et al. (1992) presented a synthesis of meta-
analyses from historical data on the role of socio-economic and demographic factors of the 
evacuees in choosing public shelters. The household level preferences will lead to different 
behaviours in choosing a particular shelter among the available.  
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Apart from the preparedness leaflets and the household evacuation plans, the news updates in 
the media such as television, radio as well as internet will provide real-time information about 
the emerging disaster situation. This will have an influence on the shelter choice of the 
household. When the threat is rapid and imminent, the nearest shelter is a more convenient 
choice. When a household decides themselves on which shelter to go, some of them might 
choose the ‘nearest shelters’, as that will require shortest evacuation time to safety. Such 
behaviour is referred in this thesis as ‘selfish choice behaviour’ (SC). SC behaviour is 
modelled in this thesis by selecting a shelter that has the shortest travel time for that zone.  
 
During the day time some members of the household may be in their workplace away from 
the evacuated zone and possibly choose a common meeting point and mutually convenient 
shelter for evacuation. Other evacuees may choose a convenient place or known locality. As 
shelters are generally public buildings, some shelter may have more relative appeal than 
others. For example, an indoor stadium with lifeline as well as recreational facilities may be 
more appealing than a community building. Based on their ‘personal choice’ (PC) an 
evacuating household might choose a shelter, and this has been modelled in this thesis using a 
random distribution function. 
 
The behaviour at the ‘household level’ (SC or PC) need not be in-line with the allocation 
advice which is chosen as an optimal policy at the ‘overall city level’. The priorities at the 
household level (as presented above) may be different from the EMA’s perspective. EMAs 
have information such as the capacity of each shelter and estimated demand for each zone. On 
the other hand evacuees do not have this information and possibly might choose a shelter 
other than the allocated shelters. Thus from the EMA preparedness perspective, the evacuee 
shelter choice behaviour has two broad categories namely ‘compliance behaviour’ (CB) and 
‘non-compliance behaviour’ (NCB). CB is modelled in this thesis as an evacuating household 
who will follow the EMA’s optimal allocation advice.  
 
Considering all the evacuating zones and with the objective of ensuring everyone’s safety, 
when EMAs allocate shelter they will aim at maximising the overall evacuation success. As 
there will be travel time required from the danger zone to the ‘allocated’ shelter based on the 
distance as well as on the average speed of evacuation, the authorities will be able to allocate 
shelters by minimising the TET from zones to shelters as elaborated in 6.3.3. This thesis will 
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use the generalised formulation as a basis for measuring the sensitiveness of shelter choice 
behaviours. 
 
6.3.4.2 Design of Experiments for measuring the impact of uncertainty in evacuee 
behaviour 
As elaborated in the previous sub-section, there are three behaviours namely SC, PC and CB. 
The behaviour of all the households in the evacuating region will fall into one of these three 
categories.  NCB has two components namely PC and SC. In an extreme situation, a city can 
comprise of evacuees choosing using SC (SC = 100%, PC = 0%) or PC (SC ~ 0%, PC ~ 
100%).  Such an extreme value for non-compliance behaviour (NCB ~100%, CB~0%) is a 
possible case where the trust in the authorities and their preparedness initiatives is abysmally 
low, leading to extreme non-compliance. On the other hand, an assumption of all the evacuees 
to comply with allocation advice (NCB ~0%; CB ~100%) is ideal. In reality, the aggregate 
behaviour of evacuees can be expected to be in the middle range of purely non-compliance to 
compliance behaviour. As the shelter choice will affect the successfulness of shelter advice 
and response plans, this uncertainty in the behaviour is investigated further by conducting 
sensitivity analyses. The three behaviours can be within the following closed range (includes 
the boundary values).  
Selfish choice behaviour  SC ~ [0, 100] 
Personal choice behaviour  PC ~ [0, 100] 
Compliance behaviour  CB ~ [0, 100] 
Non-compliance behaviour NCB = PC + SC    (6.4) 
 
The ‘integrality condition’ represented in equation 6.5 restricts the values of CB and NCB 
such that the overall behaviour of all the evacuees is aggregated within these two behaviours.  
CB + NCB = 100%        (6.5) 
The experiment of behavioural uncertainty is designed as a discrete and repetitive process. An 
experimental set of aggregate behaviour is represented as {SC, PC, CB} subject to satisfying 
the equations 6.4 and 6.5. A discrete step size for behaviour is chosen as 5%, as this thesis 
assumes that anything lower than this may not be measurable in reality within a reasonable 
cost. For each of these variables complying with the conditions mentioned above, a shelter 
choice behaviour is sequentially obtained as an experimental set. 
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As this thesis will investigate the impact of uncertainty of sheltering behaviour on the shelter 
allocation, the ET becomes a logical output metric which is the basis for ‘optimal’ allocation 
in the generalised formulation. Apart from the overall evacuation time (TET), the components 
of household level ET with different behaviours will be helpful to quantify the relative 
sensitivity of the behaviours. The average evacuation time of the households with SC, PC and 
CB behaviours is represented using ETSC, ETPC and ETCB, respectively. For a particular 
aggregate behaviour, the allocation is done sequentially.   
1. A household is chosen randomly to have SC behaviour from different evacuating 
zones and the demand from the zone is reduced by one unit. For each of the zones, the 
nearest shelter is identified, and this is used to allocate the selected household’s 
shelter. Subsequently, the shelter capacity is reduced by one unit. This step is repeated 
such that SC% of evacuating population has SC behaviour. ETSC (travel time to the 
nearest shelter) is collected at each iteration in order to obtain the SC component of 
overall evacuation time (TETSC). 
2. After adjusting the demand and capacity for SC behaviour, a household is chosen 
randomly from the remaining houses in different evacuation zones and then allocated 
to a random available shelter. The demand for the selected zone and the capacity of 
the selected shelter is reduced by one unit. This step is repeated such that PC% of 
evacuating population has PC behaviour. ETPC (travel time to the randomly selected 
shelter) is collected at each iteration in order to obtain the PC component of overall 
evacuation time (TETPC). 
3. After further adjusting the demand and capacity for SC and PC behaviours, the 
remaining demands from evacuation zones and the remaining available capacity in the 
shelters are used in the generalised formulation to obtain optimal allocation. This 
optimal allocation is used to set evacuees with CB. The SIMS model will provide the 
overall evacuation time of the evacuees with compliance behaviour (TETCB). 
For a particular set of behaviours (SC, PC, CB), the performance metrics such as household 
level average ET and the overall evacuation time components are collected. By running the 
SIMS models repeatedly, the experimental results will be further analysed to obtain 
generalisable conclusions. The value of CB is interdependent on the value of other two 
behaviours (100% – NCB = 100 – SC – PC). Thus, a ‘behaviour-performance frontier’ can be 
plotted for the independent ‘behaviours’ (SC and PC) on the X-axis and Y-axis and the 
dependent ‘performance’ metric (e.g. Overall ET) on the Z-axis. Figure 6.9 presents the flow 
chart of steps for obtaining ‘behaviour-performance frontier’. By generating different valid 
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combinations of (SC, PC and CB), the above procedure (Figure 6.9) is repeated to obtain TET 
and Average ET. Behaviour-performance frontier is drawn for TET and ET respectively in 
Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Flowchart of steps in developing ‘behaviour-performance’ frontier 
Develop                                                     
‘behaviour-berformance’ frontier 
 
Align                                                     
shelter allocation plans 
 
Run       
SIMS model 
Collect                          
Performance Metrics      
[TET, Avg ET] 
Reduce                                             
‘shelter demand & capacity ‘                          
by SC and PC 
Set                              
‘shelter choice behaviour’      
[SC, PC, CB] 
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Figure 6.10 Sensitivity of non-compliance behaviours (SC, PC) on TET
Figure 6.11 Sensitivity of non-compliance behaviours (SC, PC) on ET 
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The following are key findings from Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11:  
 The minimum (optimum) value of ET is when the behaviours of households are within 
SC is within 40 to 60%, CB is within 40 to 60% and PC is 0%. At this optimum range 
the household average ET is around 17 minutes.  
 When PC is in the region 0 and 30, ET value is around 18.5 minutes.  
 When PC is in the region 30 and 60, ET value is around 20 minutes.  
 When PC is in the region 60 and 80, ET value is around 22 minutes.  
 It can also be observed that PC behaviour has a higher impact on ET compared to SC. 
Beyond a particular value of NCB, the evacuees will reach shelters without vacant places, and 
on the other hand some shelters will remain largely unoccupied. These evacuees may have to 
relocate (referred as hopping) to another vacant shelter on direction by the staffs with their 
own vehicle or by a pooled transport facility (e.g. bus). This would mean additional expense 
of transportation and time to reach safety due to non-compliance behaviour of the evacuees. 
For instance, during the preventive evacuation due to Cyclone Yasi in Australia (2011), an 
electronic media report indicated that the shelters were full and “Police blocked desperate 
people trying to get into overcrowded shelters in north-eastern Australia” (Taylor 2011b). 
Though this is an evidence of one occurrence, the authorities proactively needed to anticipate 
and prepare response strategies for better management of evacuating population. ’How can 
EMAs manage the redistribution of excess evacuees to vacant shelters?’ ‘What does it mean 
to the overall shelters operation?’  
 
These require further study, and the sensitivity analyses from the model results can provide 
some guidance on this issue. This corroborates the need for generating awareness about the 
suggested shelters at the preparedness stage and providing enough information during the 
evacuation, thereby building trust with evacuees leading to more compliance to shelter 
allocation advice. GOs need to take a systemic view on understanding the implications of 
evacuee behaviour as well as managing the existing shelter capacities.  
 
Number of evacuees reaching a non-vacant shelter who need to be relocated to a vacant 
shelter is referred to as hopping. For illustration, the ‘level of hopping’ needed has been 
presented for a particular combination of household behaviour {SC = 15%, PC = 70%, CB = 
15%} in Table 6.2 and the results from the optimal allocation are presented in Table 6.3 
. 
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It can be observed from Table 6.3 that the total number of evacuees to be relocated is 2480. 
The shelter S3 has about 30% of evacuee arrival beyond the capacity. Totally, there are five 
shelters (S1, S3, S4, S8 and S10) with evacuees who need to be relocated to vacant shelters. 
Three shelters (S2, S6 and S9) have vacancies. Table 6.4 summarises the shelters with excess 
evacuees and shelters with vacant capacity.  
 
Table 6.2 Model results for (SC = 15% PC = 70% CB = 15%) 
 
 
  
Shelter S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Total 
Capacity 770 1740 470 650 880 2750 1650 690 2600 700 12900 
No. of NCB 
evacuees arriving 
at this shelter 
901 871 1228 1293 871 1051 1050 1225 1022 1113 10625 
No. of evacuees to 
be relocated 
131 0 758 643 0 0 0 535 0 413 2480 
Available capacity 0 869 0 0 9 1699 600 0 1578 0  
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Table 6.3 Optimal allocation of the remaining evacuees with compliance behaviour (CB 
= 15%) using the model 
 
 
SHELTERS  
   S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Total 
E
V
A
C
U
A
T
E
D
 Z
O
N
E
S
 
D1 
          
 
E1 
          
 
D2 
        
171 
 
171 
E2 
          
 
F2 
          
 
C3 
          
 
D3 
          
 
F3 
    
9 63 
    
72 
A4 
      
107 
 
190 
 
297 
B4 
      
151 
   
151 
C4 
     
195 
    
195 
A5 
      
342 
   
342 
B5 
     
99 
    
99 
C5 
     
342 
    
342 
B6 
          
 
C6 
          
 
C7 
 
134 
        
134 
E8 
          
 
F8 
     
72 
    
72 
Total 
Allocated 
 
134 
  
9 771 600 
 
361 
 
 
1875 
Total vacant 
0 735 0 0 0 928 0 0 1217 0 
 
2880 
 
Table 6.4 Relocation of evacuees from non-vacant shelters to vacant shelters 
 
Three shelters (30%) were under-utilised and five shelters (50%) were over-crowded in the 
above example. This was due to independent shelter preference of the household conflicting 
to the overall allocation as planned by EMAs. The dynamics of the household preference for 
‘nearest shelter, convenient or random choice’ and shelter capacity management needs further 
investigation. The relocation of evacuees (hopping) is also an allocation re-distribution 
Shelter S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Total 
Excess evacuees 131 0 758 643 0 0 0 535 0 413 2480 
Available 
capacity 
0 735 0 0 0 928 0 0 1217 0 2880 
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problem that can be formulated as an IP with objective of reducing total relocation time. The 
network of hopping shelters is as indicated in Figure 6.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Hopping network diagram of ‘excessively occupied shelters’ and ‘vacant 
shelters’ 
 
(S9, 1217) (H10, 413) 
(H8, 535) 
(S6, 928) 
(H3, 758) 
(H1, 131) 
(S2, 735) 
(H4, 643) 
Shelter with vacant capacity                           
(Id, Capacity available) 
Shelter with excess evacuees                           
(ID, Number of relocated evacuees) 
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Figure 6.13 Impact of non-compliance behaviours (SC, PC) on the evacuees reaching 
non-vacant shelters (HOP) 
From Figure 6.13, it can be observed that 
 When the household behaviours are in the region {SC <=30%, PC <=40%}, the level 
of hopping is lowest and below 5%.  
 When the household behaviours are in the region {SC <=40 to 60%, PC <=40 to 
60%}, the level of hopping is about 20%.  
 When all the households choose their nearest shelter (SC around 100%, PC =0%, CB 
= 0%), i.e. SC, the level of hopping is highest about 50%.  
 It can be concluded that the sensitivity of SC behaviour is high above 60% and can 
influence overall shelter allocation. 
As mentioned earlier, the hopping relocation is also a transportation problem. Shelters with 
excess evacuees and vacant shelters are indicated with prefix S and H respectively. On 
solving this optimization problem to finding an optimum redistribution of the hopping 
evacuees, Table 6.5 contains the results of the optimum redistribution. 
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Table 6.5 Optimum re-distribution of ‘hopping evacuees’ 
 SHELTER 
HOP S2 S6 S9 
H1 131 0 0 
H3 604 154 0 
H4 0 643 0 
H8 0 131 404 
H10 0 0 413 
 
In conclusion, this thesis proposed SIMS holistic approach for managing emergency 
accommodation as a preparedness initiative for ESF-3. The second section of this chapter 
studied the uncertainties in household behaviours, its impact on allocation policy and the level 
of hopping. The chapter concluded with re-distribution of hopping evacuees to available 
shelters in an optimal manner. Overall, this highlights the application of ORMS methods such 
as IP and sensitivity analyses for managing ESF-3.  
 
The evacuation preparedness leaflet distributed in Iceland contains routing plans to the 
shelters and was found to be effective. Providing enough information (e.g. routing plans) and 
supporting evacuees to move to shelters (e.g. sending buses from evacuated zone to allocated 
shelters), the authorities will be able to influence the behaviour. The traffic conditions during 
evacuation and transport management measures (ESF-2) will affect the travel time value, 
which is a key input in shelter allocation (ESF-3). Any delay in warning the public (ESF-1) 
will have a cascading delay in evacuees reaching to safe shelters. This further corroborates the 
need for an integrated approach to evacuation planning as advocated by this thesis and will be 
presented in the next chapter (Chapter 7). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AN INTEGRATED MODELLING APPROACH TO 
EVACUATION PLANNING 
The first section of this chapter summarises ERGO findings on the usage of analytical models 
for evacuation preparedness in two categories namely disaster-specific models and strategic 
planning models. The inter-relationship among the variables among ESFs has been 
established in the previous three chapters. The second section synthesises the inter-
relationship among ESFs using consolidated results from the three models. Subsequently, 
integrated modelling approach is defined and elaborated in the last section of this chapter.  
 
7.1 ERGO findings on ‘the usage of OR/MS models for evacuation planning’ 
Research question 4 is “How OR based approach can help GOs in evacuation planning?” (in 
p31). Previous chapters presented the summary of conclusions from the three ESFs and the 
respective use of analytical models used in preparedness. Apart from ESF models, there are 
other tasks in the planning phase that can be supported using OR models. Chapter 2 classified 
the analytical models into two groups: ‘disaster-specific models’ that help in identifying the 
zones to be evacuated as well the time when it will strike and ‘strategic policy planning 
models’ that help the policy makers to evaluate the strategic decisions as well as helping the 
EMAs to evaluate response options. This sub-section of the chapter summarises along these 
two categories the application of analytical models, modelling technique and the country 
where it is used based on the ERGO project findings. 
 
i) Disaster-specific models:  
These are simulation models that study a specific threat. Most of the models under this 
categories deal with natural disasters (flooding, tsunamis) and nuclear threat. These models 
are mainly used to identify the areas affected during the disaster. During ERGO interviews it 
was found that EMA in Hamburg, Germany, has a flooding model (Shaw et al. 2011a, Figure 
8.28). It is a GIS-based hydrological simulation model that helps in identifying the areas 
likely to be inundated.  
 
Japan has the Owase tsunami wave propagation model (Shaw et al. 2011a, Figure 8.29) that 
estimates the likely number of fatalities during a tsunami. Iceland uses a meteorological 
model to evaluate avalanche risk. Sweden and Belgium have models to estimate the hazard 
zone (plume area) in the case of a release of radioactive material. Norway developed the 
‘Severe Nuclear Accident Programme’ to model the plume behaviour and plan for large-scale 
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nuclear incidents like Chernobyl. The Netherlands have developed an integrated model for 
evacuation traffic management for flooding disasters to simulate potential failures of dyke 
protection structures. Depending on the planning hazard, EMAs can investigate the relevant 
models further to explore the potential use in their evacuation plans. 
 
ii) Strategic policy planning models  
These models are used for planning response strategies and resource allocation. For example, 
the United Kingdom developed a simulation model to analyse the implications of centralising 
or decentralising resources to respond to three simultaneous major emergencies happening in 
the country. Belgium use an Excel model to estimate casualties and plan a response to large 
incidents e.g. aircraft accidents, accidents at music concerts. Iceland used ABM transport 
model of evacuation only with cars to estimate ET and bottleneck in the system. Table 7.1 
summarises the models found in the ERGO countries, as well as models from other parts of 
the world.  
 
i) Innovative use of models to generate awareness with the public:  
A tsunami simulator and earthquake simulation platform are available in the Bosai Disaster 
Centre in Shizuoka (Japan) with life-size visuals and audio demonstration. This provides an 
opportunity for the public who have not experienced the disasters to raise their awareness, 
risk perception and be more prepared. Awareness of a nuclear emergency among the public 
could be generated in Belgium and Sweden by using a ‘simplified form of computer model’ 
to illustrate the evacuation plan to the public. Flood level simulator was used in Hamburg 
during an exercise to provide experiential learning of possible flood levels in tanks for the 
public living in inundation areas. The success of using models to generate awareness about 
glacial flooding in Hollsvollur region in Iceland was evident from the interviews after the Mt. 
Eyjafjallajokull eruption in 2010. These innovative applications of the OR model indicate an 
additional purpose, namely generating awareness with the public. The following section 
presents the consolidated results the ESF models developed in this thesis. 
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Table 7.1 Models used for mass evacuation preparedness 
Sl. 
No. 
Purpose of the model Classification Modelling Technique  Country 
1 Flood and tsunami wave propagation 
models 
Disaster specific models GIS and multi-agent 
simulation 
Germany, Japan, UK, 
Netherlands 
2 Snow avalanches Disaster specific models Meteorological model Iceland 
3 Disaster viewer (earthquake relief 
planning) 
Disaster specific models Web-based GIS tool Developed in UK, used around 
the world 
4 Nuclear plume dispersion models to 
ascertain hazard zone 
Disaster specific models Meteorological model Sweden 
5 CAMHIE – Dispersion modelling 
system 
Disaster specific models GIS and Meteorological 
model 
Belgium 
6 Estimation of casualty in case of 
aircraft accidents, large events (music 
concert) and planning for the response. 
Strategic policy planning 
models 
Excel based simulation tool Belgium 
7 Mathematical model for policy making 
(Wein et al. 2009) 
Strategic policy planning 
models 
Optimization USA, Netherlands 
8 Resource allocation for simultaneous 
incidents 
Strategic policy planning 
models 
Discrete event simulation UK 
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Sl. 
No. 
Purpose of the model Classification Modelling Technique  Country 
9 Operations in planning mass 
decontamination 
Strategic policy planning 
models 
Discrete event simulation UK 
10 Mass warning messaging service 
through mobile telephones  
Warning dissemination 
models 
Commercial product 
(Domino, Gedicom) 
Belgium 
11 Area and location based emergency 
warning system (landline, mobile)  
Warning dissemination 
models 
Commercial product 
(Unified Messaging Service) 
Norway 
12 Public announcement system (PA) for 
coverage of evacuation warning 
message 
Warning dissemination 
models 
Map with coverage details Japan 
13 Traffic congestion management Traffic management 
models 
Agent-based model and 
network model 
Iceland, Spain and Japan  
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7.2 Consolidated results from Evacuation models 
Zone-wise consolidated table of model results will be helpful to understand the need for zone-
level multi-agency planning and has been presented in Table 7.2. Information about the 
demographic of evacuated zones such as number of houses, population, number of vehicles 
owned and location are needed commonly across the three ESFs. It can be observed from the 
table that the population is not the same across the zones. Zones D1 and F2 have about 14% 
each out of the evacuated households (5142). The total population of these two zones alone is 
7290 out of 25,744 evacuated households, and hence the demand for ESFs (e.g. evacuation 
bus) is higher. EMAs require an understanding of population distribution in the potential 
evacuation zones.    
 
Warning time depends on various factors as elaborated in (ESF-1) Chapter 4 and mainly 
‘warning channel characteristics, access to the channel and role of informal channels’. 
Average warning time of the evacuated households is uniform across the evacuated zones. 
Zone ‘A4’ has 15.17 minutes slightly higher than other zones and overall average was 12.39.  
 
The household’s departure time values are dependent on whether the informal warning time is 
included or otherwise. This serves as a linkage between ESF 1 and 2. Departure time, means 
of transport and destination are household decisions that play a key role in household's ET. In 
addition to these, driving behaviour of cars, transport policies on regulating traffic and 
dispatching evacuation buses to various routes influences overall evacuation KPI values.  
 
It can be observed from Table 7.2 that the number of car users is very high in the highly 
populated zones namely D1 (514 houses) and F2 (526 houses). It can be observed that 
‘average clearance time’ for car users in D1 was 44.18 minutes compared to other zones. The 
loading point for D1 is along the busiest road network J1 to J5. As only one loading point is 
present in each zone, the queue at D1’s loading point during departure would have been 
longer, leading to higher evacuation time. 
 
In spite of having lower than average clearance time (27.04 minutes), zone C3 had the highest 
ET. The waiting time for buses was very high for this zone about 233.1 minutes which 
increased the overall evacuation time. Following C3, the zones D1, D2, E2 and F2 with high 
number of car users had very high average ET such as 120.44, 109.63, 103.98 and 101.22 
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minutes respectively. Zones D1 and D2 have loading points along the busy road J1 - J5, 
which would have had resulted in delays to enter loading point. 
 
Among houses using bus (823 houses) about 53% of bus users are from five zones C3, D1, 
D2, E2 and F2 and the remaining percent of bus users are from the fourteen zones. Bus routes 
are also linked to public shelter locations, and hence the level of high bus usage in these zones 
will be useful for respective shelter planners as well. Zones having very high population (D2, 
F2) were the ones with highest demand for public shelters. Consolidated result analyses in 
conjunction with findings from individual models highlighted inter-relationship among ESFs. 
Table 7.3 presents the inter-relationships at a metric level. It can be observed that certain 
operational metric have forward and backward linkages with different ESFs.
 304 
 
Table 7.2 Zone-wise consolidated evacuation metrics from models developed in this thesis 
 
Zone Houses Population 
Warning 
time 
Evacuation 
time 
Clearance-
time (cars) 
Waiting-
time (bus) 
Means of Transport Houses 
needing 
Shelter 
Evacuees 
needing 
shelter Car Bus Pedestrian 
"A4" 162 797 15.17 90.73 29.98 6.23 113 23 26 19 96 
"A5" 86 469 11.06 82.14 17.86 5.11 57 14 15 7 35 
"B4" 167 860 11.75 80.98 25.17 12.15 127 22 18 17 77 
"B5" 172 873 13.11 77.86 19.17 12.07 132 19 21 18 96 
"B6" 195 1001 11.89 77.42 17.54 8.53 141 35 19 15 68 
"C3" 340 1786 11.85 130.82 27.04 233.1 224 72 44 38 181 
"C4" 82 400 13.95 83.79 17.52 19.29 52 12 18 12 49 
"C5" 342 1633 12.58 84.81 19.41 10.89 236 56 50 33 143 
"C6" 142 739 13.15 74.95 17.23 7.07 101 19 22 14 69 
"C7" 283 1438 12.25 80.44 16.72 26.52 202 43 38 37 199 
"D1" 719 3640 12.02 120.44 44.18 162.22 514 113 92 70 368 
"D2" 377 1878 11.54 109.63 32.23 146.53 259 71 47 37 184 
"D3" 192 965 10.59 84.41 27.05 16.92 129 37 26 16 77 
"E2" 398 1994 12.38 103.98 32.06 81.3 255 81 62 45 229 
"E8" 211 1043 12.78 87.54 16.05 53.29 148 30 33 13 71 
"F2" 746 3650 12.8 101.22 29.79 98.67 526 103 117 69 350 
"F3" 371 1778 12.16 87.33 25.85 22.65 272 53 46 38 200 
"F8" 157 800 11.65 87.1 15.1 60.85 111 20 26 16 69 
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Table 7.3 Inter-relationship among ESFs explained using operational metrics 
Operational metric Lead agency – 
Information provider 
Downstream stakeholder - 
Recipient 
Usefulness of the information 
Departure time  curve 
(cumulative % 
departure vs time) 
Warning and Informing 
group (ESF – 1) 
Transport authorities (ESF-2) To know the onset of evacuation 
vehicles at loading points at each zone. 
Mode of transport (% 
car users) 
Transport authorities 
(ESF-2) 
Shelter Information 
management authority (ESF-3) 
To manage parking space for car users 
and arrival patterns. 
Travel time to shelter 
(cumulative % 
arrivals to shelter) 
Transport authorities 
(ESF-2) 
Shelter Information 
management authority (ESF-3) 
To estimate arrival time profile of 
evacuee at shelters. 
Public transport routes 
to shelters 
Transport authorities 
(ESF-2) 
Shelter Information 
management authority (ESF-3) 
To manage evacuee registration 
process on arrival. 
Zone-wise shelter 
location and demand  
Shelter Information 
management authority 
(ESF-3) 
Transport authorities (ESF-2) One component of traffic volume 
estimation is to know the traffic 
movement to sinks/destination 
(shelters)  
Vacant capacity in 
shelter (during 
evacuation) 
Shelter Information 
management authority 
(ESF-3) 
Transport authorities (ESF-2) To send buses with evacuees only to 
vacant shelters. 
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ESF level preparedness – Generic tasks to be performed 
An evacuation plan describes an ESF’s role and response during emergency for a planned 
threat. An ESF plan is developed for an identified threat scenario and elaborates the 
organisational response in case of eventuality. Disaster impact scenarios are used to evaluate 
the ESF plan for various evacuation KPIs. Evacuation planning does not stop at preparing 
‘plan documents’ at the ESF level. It also does not stop at making a compendium of ESF 
plans into another bigger plan. There is a need for an ESF to develop evidence-based 
understanding of their preparedness, uncertainties in household behaviour and ESF’s ‘inter-
relationships with other ESFs’ in terms of information exchanged and impact of other ESF’s 
role on their plan. In this task, Table 7.3 provides an understanding of interrelationship at the 
operational metric level. Further to this understanding, a need for developing a system to 
enable collective response during a large-scale emergency is argued as very essential. Such a 
system has a role to facilitate inter-agency coordination, communication and decision making. 
Figure 7.1 presents the generic activities to be conducted by all the ESF organisations.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Evacuation planning cycle 
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The evacuation plan is implemented during an actual emergency by evacuation responder 
organisations collaboratively. Some of the organisational resources could be impacted during 
an emergency. For example, a major evacuation route might be blocked and hence 
inaccessible during emergency. Such an impacted organisation having reduced resources, 
needs to implement their plan and hence will influence the next phase responder’s plan in the 
overall evacuation. After evacuation, any damaged capacity (e.g. highways) need to be re-
built as capacity building initiatives. The learning from the actual response results in changes 
in evacuation plan and further behaviour research. Apart from practising the implementation 
of evacuation plan during exercises, model provides a platform for evaluation of evacuation 
plans and testing alternative strategies.  
 
7.3 An Integrated approach for evacuation planning 
One of the overarching objectives from the previous chapters (chapters 4 to 6) was to answer 
the research question Q4: How OR-based approach can help GOs in evacuation planning? 
By developing ESF-specific OR models, running scenario experiments and analysing results 
and sensitivity of parameters, each ESF developed ‘model-based understanding’ of 
preparedness by measuring its KPIs. Thus, each of the three models respectively supported 
evacuation planning of one support function. However evacuation is a collective response of 
all the ESFs put together beyond their individual organisation preparedness.  
 
Three ESFs are phases that sequentially follow in timeline of evacuation and are hence inter-
related. Some of the existing evacuation models (predominantly transportation models) 
focused on individual phases (e.g. OREMS). In the literature, impacts of one phase over the 
other were studied using sensitivity analyses in transportation models. However, the analyses 
in the Section 7.2 highlighted the linkages at an operational metric level. This is of high 
importance considering the finding that lack of multi-agency coordination is one of the major 
pitfalls found after Hurricane Katrina.  
 
An integrated approach is defined in this thesis as “an OR model-based multi-agency 
approach of evacuation planning, additional to single agency preparedness, that considers 
‘the inter-relationship/inter-connectedness of various evacuation support phases’ “. How can 
this integrated approach be implemented? 
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London Resilience Partnership comprises more than 170 organisations for 
ensuring/supporting London’s preparedness to emergencies. A three-tiered Gold-Silver-
Bronze ‘Command and Control protocol’ provides ‘a strategic response of the partnership to 
a major emergency’ (Source: London Prepared website, 2012). The OR model-based 
approach advocated in this thesis will be of interest to the ‘nodal EMA agency’ (e.g. London 
Resilience Forum) for the planning evacuation response to identified threats. Lead agency of 
each ESF with an understanding of the inter-connectedness and inter-relationship could 
inform a need-based collaborative evacuation preparedness using OR models.  
 
Though the primary driver for the integrated approach is ‘interconnectedness and inter-
relationships’, there are various benefits by adopting an integrated approach. Household 
demographic data are common across the ESFs. Common collection by a single agency can 
reduce the overall collection cost by reducing redundancy in collection. This can also enable 
consistent data shared across the responders. 
 
The integrated Evacuation Model (iEM) has three modules corresponding to three ESFs. 
Three modules of the iEM use two OR/MS techniques namely ABM and optimization 
developed in NetLogo and MS-Excel, respectively. These models were not integrated into a 
single model. Moreover, it could also be argued that the modules reflect different 
organisations responsible for specific response phase in an evacuation timeline, and hence 
partial integration (data sharing level) of models might reflect the ‘module-organisation’ 
relationship. For example, ‘Transport for London’ (TfL) is an umbrella organisation for 
managing the transport services of London metro. However, TfL’s main focus is likely to be 
on the transportation module (ESF-2) and less on others. Hence, semi-integration of the 
modules could be argued as a possible advantage. 
 
Understanding about the behaviour household during emergency is the foundation to the 
success of evacuation. This thesis does not claim to develop an improved understanding of 
household behaviour or preparedness and influencing the same for improved overall response. 
The thesis has implemented existing household behaviours into OR-based evacuation models 
and measured its sensitivity using evacuation KPIs.  
 
The literature review and feedback interviews within the ERGO countries did not identify a 
comparable integrated product. Most of the models focus on one evacuation phase. At module 
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level, there are much more sophisticated products. UMS is a full-fledged warning 
dissemination product with its forward integration with telecom service providers. OREMS 
and DynaMIT are widely used transportation software that have inbuilt features for modelling 
complex multi-lane road networks. This thesis argues that the provision of multi-agency 
planning through a common platform is a unique feature of iEM. This chapter used zone-wise 
model results as an evidence base for proposing multi-agency multi-phased integrated 
approach. The next chapter reviews the research questions addressed in this thesis, 
contribution and further scope for research. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter begins with the review of research questions and how these were addressed in 
this thesis. The next section presents the main theoretical contributions of the thesis to 
literature. The limitations and further scope of research are presented in the third section 
followed by implication of models to the practitioners. The fifth section summarises the 
conclusions of the thesis. The final section presents reflection on the PhD process. 
 
8.1 Review of research questions 
The research questions were presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis and the following 
paragraphs presents ‘how the thesis has addressed each research question’.  
 
Q1: What is the need for modelling ESFs? 
This question has been addressed by identifying gaps using literature (Section 2.4). Summary 
of models and ERGO findings synthesised the existing models along ESFs (Section 2.8.3, 
2.9.6, 2.10.3). Models have been used for ‘evaluating’ evacuation preparedness of ESFs using 
evacuation KPIs (Perry and Lindell 2003, Altay and Green 2006). However, ‘the impact of 
the household behaviours identified in this thesis in each ESF’ evacuation KPIs has not been 
investigated earlier. A model was needed to illustrate implementing the behaviours and study 
them. Various purposes of models (section 7.1) are ‘testing and experimentation of evacuation 
plan alternatives, implementing response policies, simulation of worst-case scenarios, 
training, exercise and identifying bottlenecks and any scope for capacity development’. 
 
Q2 and Q3: How do household evacuation behaviours impact different phases in evacuation? 
The household behaviours and its uncertainties were identified using literature review. The 
identified behaviour and its impact at the EMA responses are presented below for each ESF. 
In ESF-1, based on literature review, household behaviour as warning informant to 
neighbours (Section 2.8.4) has been identified as a research gap in ESF-1. However, the 
uncertainties in informant behaviour such as defaulter percentage, time to begin, time to 
inform and neighbour selection policy were identified in this thesis and studied through 
sensitivity analyses in prototype model (Table 4.14) and in the ERGO city scale (Table 
4.22a). ABM warning dissemination model provided platform for official and unofficial 
channels based warning dissemination. As there are various forms of failure of official 
channels (Table 4.18), failure categories were identified and model experiments were 
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conducted and the impact on warning KPIs (warning level and notification time) was 
investigated. 
 
In ESF-2, household’s transport behaviours such as departure time and means of transport 
were identified as gap for investigation in this thesis (Section 2.9.7). However, the departure 
time is a function of when household receive the message (ESF 1) and then mobilisation time. 
A multi-modal ABM transportation model developed in this thesis provided platform for 
implementing evacuation road network, transport policies and household travel choice 
behaviour (Section 5.4.2). This model was used to study evacuation clearance times under 
various conditions.  
 The impact of warning dissemination on departure time and hence evacuation time of 
the household has been studied using output of ESF 1 into ESF 2 (Section 5.5.1).  
 Level of transport policy on controlling transient traffic represented as three categories 
{no, low, high} was sequentially studied to identify the impact of transient traffic level 
on ET (Section 5.5.2). This finding could inform the transient traffic control policy. 
 Households choosing evacuation buses as their means of transport queue up in the 
nearest pickup point. There were four bus routes picking up evacuees from evacuated 
zone to shelters/destination. The dynamics of evacuation bus dispatching, household’s 
waiting time for bus and ET for bus users were estimated using model experiment 
(Section 5.5.3). This finding could inform the bus dispatching policies. 
In ESF 3, lack of household shelter choice-based holistic approach of shelter information 
management was identified as a gap in the literature review (2.10.3). The SIMS holistic 
approach provides a generalisable approach for shelter planning (Figure 6.1). The household 
shelter choices categorised as selfish choice, personal choice and allocated choice were 
identified in this thesis (Section 6.3.4). A household shelter choice was set and then a generic 
allocation model was executed repeatedly to study the impact on ET (Figures 6.9, 6.10, 6.11) 
and hopping behaviours (Figure 6.13).  
 
 Q4: How OR-based approach can help GOs in evacuation planning? 
Literature review provided an understanding of state of the art OR models in each ESF 
Sections 2.8.3, 2.9.6 and 2.10.3. Literature review showed wide spread use of OR model for 
evacuation planning to test evacuation plans and measure evacuation performance during 
various scenarios. For the identified household behaviours (Q2 and Q3) in the three ESFs, this 
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thesis has demonstrated ‘how respective ESFs can use OR models for evaluating preparedness 
using KPIs’. The models also helped in studying uncertainties in household behaviour 
parameters and its sensitivity. 
 
Q5: How OR-based approach can provide an integrated evacuation planning environment? 
Consolidated analyses of zone-wise evacuation performance (Table 7.2) and findings from 
ESF chapters indicated inter-linkages among ESFs and corroborate the need for multi-agency 
based planning. The developed model was used to show the inter-relationships and 
demonstrated the model’s use as planning environment using ERGO city. As the ABM and 
SIMS approach is customizable, these serve as a common platform across ESFs for integrated 
planning. 
 
In summary, main household behaviour gaps for each ESF are lack of formal study of 
informant behaviour in warning dissemination, computing departure time for transportation 
model using warning time, uncertainty in means of transport, and uncertainty in shelter choice 
behaviour. The impacts of these behaviours have been studied using the model and are 
described in respective chapters (Chapters 4 to 6). 
 
8.2 Contributions of the thesis to literature 
This thesis has looked from the perspective of evacuation preparedness of supporting GOs. 
Evacuation is supported by different organisations in various evacuation phases, requiring 
separate organisation-level evacuation plans and hence a collective multi-agency response is 
needed.  
 
Contributions on Warning Dissemination (ESF-1) 
Warning system comprises ‘official channels’ (sirens, telephone, etc) and ‘unofficial 
channels’. The role of unofficial warning channel has been highlighted using empirical 
evidences of informing their neighbours (Parker and Handmer 1998, Sorensen 2000, Werrity 
et al. 2007, Hui et al. 2008). However, there are uncertainties in household’s warning 
informant behaviour such as 'whether they will inform their neighbours or not?', 'How many 
neighbours will they select to inform?', 'When will they depart the household?'. EMAs will be 
interested in measuring the warning dissemination effectiveness and the impact of unofficial 
channel. Hui et al. (2008) studied using ABM dissemination of warning between two 
 313 
communities based on trust. However, uncertainties in the ‘household informant behaviour’ 
have not been addressed in the literature, and this has been investigated in this thesis.  
 
A prototype warning dissemination model of a hypothetical community of 1000 households 
was developed in ABM. Household uncertainties such as defaulter percentage, assimilation 
time and ‘time to inform’ were investigated through simulation experiments. It was found that 
even at a low level of informant behaviour, there was considerable increase in the overall 
warning levels in the hypothetical model. Implementation of household’s warning informant 
behaviour is a contribution of this thesis to the literature. 
 
Detailed investigation of warning dissemination and particularly the uncertainties in unofficial 
warning channel in the prototype and ERGO city models provided a greater understanding of 
unofficial channel and warning dissemination KPIs. The model also provides a framework for 
further investigation. Better estimation of household’s warning time and informant behaviour 
enables more accurate estimation of departure time at the household level, which is a key in 
ESF-2. 
 
Contributions on Evacuee Transport Management (ESF -2) 
The use of custom-built models for evacuation transportation planning was found during the 
ERGO interviews. There is widespread use of OR/MS in the transportation phases (Santos 
and Aguirre 2004), using techniques such as optimization (Bretschneider and Kimms 2011, 
Pel et al. 2011, Ben-Akiva et al. 2012), ABM (Lansdowne et al. 2006, Dawson et al. 2011, 
Mas et al. 2012a,).  However, the linkage with the warning dissemination data particularly the 
unofficial channels has not been studied and this thesis illustrated the potential for integrating 
the warning dissemination model with the transport management, factoring the behaviour of 
evacuees. This thesis studied the impact of warning dissemination on ET with/without 
unofficial warning behaviour.  
 
The role of OR/MS models in managing evacuation buses has been studied in Margulis et al. 
2006. However, means of transport choice is made at individual household, and with 
variability in the warning received time, when a household reaches its nearest pickup point is 
uncertain. This thesis has studied the arrival patterns at the destination using buses and 
developed ‘bus evacuation response curves’ using model results. Evaluation of controlling 
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transient traffic management as a policy and their implication on KPIs was illustrated in this 
thesis.  
 
Contributions on Shelter Management (ESF-3) 
Optimization-based location-allocation models have been used for managing shelter demand 
and capacity (Sherali et al. 1991, Kongsomsaksakul et al. 2005, Ng et al. 2010). Historical 
data (Mileti et al. 1996, Brodie et al. 2006) and stated preference surveys (FEMA 2010) 
helped in understanding household sheltering behaviours. SIMS holistic approach synthesised 
the existing knowledge on emergency accommodation planning into series of steps to allocate 
shelters. A generic optimisation model for allocation of shelters was developed. Zone-wise 
analyses helped in understanding the distributiveness of shelter demand and allocating the 
available shelters during response. Mas et al. (2012b) noted that shelter choices are not always 
to the nearest. Even though EMAs provide shelter allocation advice, there were many 
household shelter choice behaviours categorised in this thesis and studied for its uncertainty. 
 
Contributions to Evacuation Planning 
Findings from the ERGO interviews indicated diverse use of models for evacuation planning. 
Synthesis of the evacuation models is a contribution to the OR/MS literature on evacuation 
modelling. This thesis has developed models using two different techniques namely ‘Agent-
based modelling and optimization’ for three ESFs. As ABM is suitable for implementing 
behaviours at household level and ‘optimization’ to find the best strategy at system level, 
‘mixing these two techniques in different ESF models to harness advantages’ is a contribution 
to OR/MS literature. Identifying the inter-relationships between ESFs at an operational metric 
level helped in highlighting the need for multi agency-based planning beyond individual 
ESFs. 
 
The role of OR/MS models for more than one ESF has been found in the existing literature 
(Rogers and Sorensen 1991, Southworth 1991, Lammel et al. 2008, Taubenbock et al. 2009, 
Dawson et al. 2011, Mas et al. 2012a). The model developed in this thesis helped in studying 
the interconnectedness of the GOs, their individual evacuation policies, and studying its 
cascading effects. Instead of restricting preparedness at individual phases, this thesis has 
identified the need for integrated approach, and the role of model as a platform for integration.  
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8.3 Further scope of research 
Evacuation timeline begins with making a decision to evacuate based on forecasted 
information or disaster impact. Making a preventive evacuation decision is complex with 
uncertainty of impact levels, cost, time available before strike and available alternatives. 
Evacuation decision making (Model 3) is a key component of preparedness framework 
(Figure 1.2) and argued to be beyond the scope of this work. The readers are directed to a 
thesis on evacuation decision making Kailiponi (2012). Model 1 of the ERGO framework 
investigates on ‘How the public can be prepared by GOs for evacuation?’ The readers are 
directed to Shaw et al. (2011a). 
 
Model 1 and Model 3 will inform evacuation plans, and the thesis provides a model-based 
approach for understanding the household behaviours ‘after an evacuation decision’. As this 
thesis covers only the three phases of evacuation (warning, transportation and sheltering), 
there is no conflict of interest and contribution with other two researchers in the ERGO 
project. Further, there are vital information related to the phases prior to warning (e.g. 
evacuation decision making, disaster impact), and post sheltering (e.g. relief logistics to 
support shelter operation) are excluded to be beyond the scope of this thesis and readers could 
refer to Altay and Green (2006) and Caunhye et al. (2012) 
 
There are various planning assumptions about the evacuees that form the basis of evacuation 
plans. At times, the GOs hold some beliefs about the evacuee behaviour choices implicitly 
through their experience. Household behaviours are influenced by existing laws (e.g. cannot 
evacuate using cars), policies (e.g. no public transport support) and household preferences. 
These uncertainties in the behaviour of individual evacuating household can have impact on 
the overall evacuation KPIs. This thesis has demonstrated the use of OR evacuation models to 
implement and study the household behaviour uncertainties. 
 
Apart from the conventional official channels, ERGO findings have highlighted the use of 
technology-based sophisticated warning channels as well as community-based warning 
dissemination. The potential for the existing social network as ‘unofficial channel’ can be 
harnessed further. A simulation model that can be used to test warning dissemination for 
various planning scenarios was presented. This thesis contributed to implementing and 
studying the uncertainty of unofficial channel behaviour. 
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ERGO city has been used as an illustration for developing models for three ESFs and also 
illustrating the need for integrated approach. The data used are simplified for illustration. For 
example, transportation model has only single-lane traffic with normal driving behaviour 
without any accidents, change in plans, etc. The simplicity of ERGO city limits the 
generalisation of findings to an actual city. However, the approach taken to model the three 
phases are valid and argued to be generalisable.  
 
This thesis has illustrated OR-based integrated approach for large-scale evacuation planning 
using ERGO city case study. This thesis advocates a multi agency-based integrated approach 
using OR/MS models rather than restricting to individual ESF preparedness as a better 
preparedness strategy.   
 
There are phases of evacuation beyond the three ESFs covered in this thesis like disaster relief 
logistics, making evacuation decision and modelling disaster impact, and the role of ORMS 
models with household behaviours can prove to be a useful toolkit. 
 
The innovative application of model to generate awareness with the public was one of the 
findings in ERGO interviews and has practical implications. EMAs could explore the 
possibility of using visually appealing models to sensitise general public and raise the 
preparedness level. Generating awareness with the public would involve using the OR model 
as an exhibit in exercises or science exhibition centres to explain ‘How will the propagation of 
disaster be for a forecasted scenario’ and persuade them on evacuation preparedness. In 
summary, a ‘visually appealing model’ combined with ‘localised actionable information’ 
presented by subject matter experts to the public has a potential to influence their threat 
perception. 
 
8.4 Model implications to Emergency Management Practice 
Readers need to remember here that the EMAs respond to the life-threatening mass 
evacuation situation by their rich experience including gut feeling and intuition, backed by 
preparedness. The role of models in supporting preparedness has been elaborated with ERGO 
city case study.  
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• The analytical models in this context as a tool in the toolkit of EMAs are considered to 
be helpful by supporting the response plan with identified performance metrics, 
evaluate the implications of the planning assumptions, testing and choosing relatively 
better response option, support during training and exercise of evacuation 
preparedness.  
• Simulated exercises are generally conducted for multi-agencies to test and exercise 
their evacuation plan collectively. The ABMs and SIMS models can be used as a 
platform to conduct multi-agency exercise for strengthening preparedness. 
• Good understanding of the model features, the purpose and limitation of the model can 
evade over-reliance on the model results and encourage harnessing its strength for the 
intended use. The interpretation of the model results to actionable decision, making 
the evacuation decision and the implication of the decision made remain in the hands 
of the experienced EMAs. This entails a need for understanding ‘how validation was 
done in this thesis?’, which was presented in Table 3.2. 
 
8.5 Thesis conclusion 
ABM provides a suitable OR/MS modelling framework for household evacuation behaviours 
in three ESFs. ABM and SIMS demonstrated in this thesis can support ESF preparedness to 
incorporate household behaviours. This thesis does not recommend replacement of individual 
organisation-level preparedness, which is essential. Instead the thesis advocates using OR 
model-based integrated approach to further strengthening preparedness and ‘inter-agency 
coordination’. 
 
8.6 Reflection on the PhD process 
I was working as a research assistant in the ERGO project from May 2008 till the end of 
project, and was also doing my PhD. The initial stage of contacting countries to sign up for 
‘ERGO case study’ was a very intensive period and a new experience to me. Organising data 
collection visits to 10 countries and to encourage as many expert interviews in each were 
challenging. The semi-structured interviews, presentations and reports received from the 
countries served as an important data source for the models. 
 
In parallel, the three models were being developed. Close to four hours of model presentation 
to the ERGO project’s Advisory Board members provided detailed evaluation of the 
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modelling approach and defining the scope of the models. Preparing country-wise feedback 
presentations, master class and receiving feedback on the model demonstrations from the 
practitioners were invaluable for thesis quality. Overall, the experience in the ERGO project 
has been very enriching and also was a great support for my PhD and career aspirations.  
 
The ‘Research Methods Course’ (RMC) provided the foundation for pursuing PhD. The 
dedicated teaching effort shown by faculty members in lectures was inspiring. Feedbacks 
from the qualifying report and the viva exam provided an opportunity to improve the PhD. 
Apart from RMC in the university, I attended skill development courses in NATCOR 
(National Taught Course in Operational Research) and research methods workshop in 
Cambridge, and these were useful. 
 
ESRC seminar conducted in Aston Business School with ‘academics and practitioners’ 
provided critical review on the warning dissemination model presentation. Another 
presentation in the ESRC seminar held in Cranfield University campus was helpful to receive 
critical comments from academics during presentation. All the three models were presented 
during that seminar. This seminar helped in organising a one-to-one model peer review with 
an experienced researcher. Apart from these, presentations in conferences such as ICEM and 
InterCEPT provided an opportunity for receiving feedback on the models. 
 
The experience of writing ERGO project report, a conference paper in POMS and ICEM, a 
journal article in ‘Procedia Engineering’ and an article in ‘European Journal of Operational 
Research’ on the PhD models was very rewarding. Preparation of manuscript for the papers 
and critical feedbacks by Dr. Pavel Albores and Prof. Duncan Shaw was a learning experience 
for improving my writing skills.  
 
Reflection on PhD experience 
My most enjoyable moments were when the idea of household behaviour and modelling it 
was taking shape. I owe a lot to the discussions with Dr. Pavel Albores and Prof. Duncan 
Shaw for shaping the ideas. I enjoyed coding and implementing these behaviours into models. 
Nothing else existed except the model and the code. Those were my most productive days. 
 
I was unemployed for over 1.5 years during PhD. During that period, focusing on thesis and 
making progress was an arduous challenge. Ironically, this was the period of highest expense, 
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with challenges from other fronts when I could not afford to continue. Having good financial 
plans and support during PhD can make the duration short, less stressful and more rewarding.  
 
I feel that social support and networking are important for a researcher particularly during the 
PhD period. Though I tried changing myself on couple of instances, I remained socially 
isolated. I do not know how to, but would encourage other PhD aspirants to seek and give 
support to fellow researchers and enjoy the PhD process.  
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APPENDIX – A 
Table A.1 Evacuation zone details (File: evacuation-zone-coordinates-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Zone-ID Zone code  
2 X-Cor Lower X-Coordinate  
3 Y-Cor Lower Y-Coordinate 
4 X-Cor Upper X-Coordinate 
5 Y-Cor Upper Y-Coordinate 
6 
Pickup 
List 
List of bus pickup points for the 
zone 
 
Table A.2 Household warning response details (File: household-warning-time-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
 1 Sl.No Serial Number 
 2 House-id Agent-ID from Warning dissemination model 
 3 X-cor X-coordinate of the house 
 4 Y-Cor Y-coordinate of the house 
 5 Zone-ID Zone code 
 
6 Recd-Msg 
Whether the household received the warning 
message? 
7 Recd-time At what time the household received first warning? 
 8 Depart-time Time of departure from the house 
 9 Evac-or-not Whether the household will evacuate? 
 10 Family-size What is the size of the family? 
 
11 Means-of-transport 
Whether means house will use to evacuate? {CAR, 
BUS, PEDESTRIAN} 
12 Need-Shelter Whether the house will require public shelter? 
  
Table A.3 Road Network connectivity (File: road-network-connectivity-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
  1 Sl.No Serial Number 
  2 Junc-ID ID of the Junction (e.g. J12) 
  3 Junc-Xcor X-coordinate of the junction 
  4 Junc-Ycor Y-coordinate of the junction 
  5 Outward 
Connectivity 
If it is a junction, specify the array list of outward junctions.
Otherwise FALSE 
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Table A.4 Traffic signal details (File: traffic-signal-details-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Junc-ID ID of the Junction ahead. 
2 Order-Of-Signal 
A sequence number for the signal within 
the same junction 
3 X-Cor 
Starting point (Xcor) of signal visibility 
zone. 
4 Y-Cor 
Starting point (Ycor) of signal visibility 
zone. 
5 X-Cor 
Ending point (Xcor) of signal visibility 
zone 
6 Y-Cor 
Ending point (Ycor) of signal visibility 
zone 
 
Table A.5 Evacuation route to Exit points (File: evacuation-route-to-exits.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Zone-ID Zone code  
2 Origin Origin - Loading point Junction 
3 Destination Destination - Exit point 
4 Route Route Plan 
 
Table A.6 Evacuation route to Shelters (File: evacuation-route-to-shelters.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Zone-ID Zone code 
2 Shelter-ID ID of the shelter 
3 Origin Route plan to shelter - Origin 
4 Destination 
Route plan to shelter - 
Destination 
 
Table A.7 Loading points for each junction (File: evacuation-route-loading-points.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Junc-ID Junction ID 
2 X-Cor X-Coordinate of the loading point 
3 Y-Cor Y-Coordinate of the loading point 
4 Heading Heading at the loading point 
 
Table A.8 Evacuation Bus routes (File: bus-route-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Bus-Route Bus route ID 
2 Origin Origin of the bus 
3 Destination Destination/Final stop of the bus 
4 Route-plan Evacuation bus route. 
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Table A.9 Transient vehicle routes (File: transient-vehicle-routes-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Route-Code Transient vehicle route name 
2 Origin Origin of the transient vehicle route 
3 Destination 
Exit point of the transient vehicle 
route 
4 Route plan Transient vehicle route plan 
 
Table A.10 Shelter coordinates file (File: shelter-coordinates-file.prn) 
Sl.No Variable Description 
1 Shelter-ID Unique ID for the shelter 
2 X-Cor X-coordinate of the shelter 
3 Y-Cor Y-coordinate of the shelter 
4 
Nearest 
destination 
Exit point nearest to the 
shelter 
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APPENDIX – B 
Table B.1 Trip-Sheet from the model for Route – 1 
Trip-
Sheet 
Sl.No Bus-ID 
Departure-
time 
Arrival at 
destination 
Clearance 
time 
Evacuees 
transported 
Houses 
Evacuated  
Vacant 
seats 
1 5168 30 61.16 31.16 31 5 29 
4 5695 40.08 70.76 30.68 27 6 33 
7 6936 50.04 79.66 29.62 55 9 5 
10 7625 60 88.68 28.68 58 10 2 
14 8161 70 97.62 27.62 57 12 3 
15 8453 80 100.98 20.98 32 6 28 
22 8627 90 113.68 23.68 21 3 39 
26 8661 100 125.26 25.26 1 1 59 
31 8709 110 140.34 30.34 0 0 60 
37 8744 120 146.36 26.36 0 0 60 
42 8798 130 161.68 31.68 0 0 60 
48 8809 140 173.84 33.84 0 0 60 
49 8814 150 173.88 23.88 0 0 60 
55 8818 160 192.24 32.24 0 0 60 
60 8822 170 204.22 34.22 0 0 60 
61 8826 180 204.26 24.26 0 0 60 
68 8830 190 222.8 32.8 0 0 60 
69 8834 200 222.84 22.84 0 0 60 
72 8838 210 232.06 22.06 0 0 60 
77 8842 220 246.76 26.76 0 0 60 
79 8846 230 249.64 19.64 0 0 60 
85 8850 240 268.02 28.02 0 0 60 
87 8854 250 274 24 0 0 60 
90 8858 260 280.78 20.78 0 0 60 
98 8862 270 304.44 34.44 0 0 60 
100 8866 280 307.52 27.52 0 0 60 
105 8870 290 319.7 29.7 0 0 60 
109 8874 300 328.8 28.8 0 0 60 
114 8878 310 334.84 24.84 0 0 60 
116 8882 320 343.92 23.92 0 0 60 
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Table B.2 Trip-Sheet from the model for Route – 2 
Trip-
Sheet 
Sl.No Bus-ID 
Departure-
time 
Arrival at 
destination 
Clearance 
time 
Evacuees 
transported 
Houses 
Evacuated  
Vacant 
seats 
2 5169 30 65.62 35.62 59 15 1 
6 5681 40 74.52 34.52 58 12 2 
9 6931 50 82.08 32.08 60 12 0 
13 7626 60 93.76 33.76 59 12 1 
17 8162 70 104.18 34.18 60 11 0 
20 8458 80.1 110.76 30.66 59 11 1 
21 8628 90 113.54 23.54 60 13 0 
28 8662 100 129.78 29.78 60 16 0 
29 8710 110 138.16 28.16 57 12 3 
38 8745 120 147.2 27.2 60 11 0 
44 8800 130.04 165.7 35.66 59 11 1 
45 8810 140 165.76 25.76 57 12 3 
50 8815 150 175.8 25.8 58 12 2 
54 8819 160 191.92 31.92 60 12 0 
56 8823 170 195.42 25.42 60 12 0 
59 8827 180 202.7 22.7 56 11 4 
67 8831 190 221.76 31.76 59 12 1 
71 8835 200 231.18 31.18 59 13 1 
76 8839 210 244.86 34.86 56 12 4 
78 8843 220 249.18 29.18 58 14 2 
81 8847 230 255.92 25.92 56 11 4 
86 8851 240 270.38 30.38 60 12 0 
89 8855 250 278.92 28.92 57 13 3 
93 8859 260 283.26 23.26 60 11 0 
96 8863 270 295.06 25.06 0 0 60 
103 8867 280 315.48 35.48 0 0 60 
104 8871 290 315.54 25.54 0 0 60 
112 8875 300 330.52 30.52 0 0 60 
117 8879 310 343.96 33.96 0 0 60 
118 8883 320 348.78 28.78 0 0 60 
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Table B.3 Trip-Sheet from the model for Route – 3 
Trip-
Sheet 
Sl.No Bus-ID 
Departure-
time 
Arrival at 
destination 
Clearance 
time 
Evacuees 
transported 
Houses 
Evacuated  
Vacant 
seats 
5 5170 30 72.4 42.4 48 11 12 
11 5682 40 89.72 49.72 59 11 1 
19 6932 50 107.16 57.16 57 13 3 
23 7627 60 116.96 56.96 59 10 1 
27 8163 70 129.7 59.7 60 13 0 
30 8454 80 138.76 58.76 60 12 0 
34 8629 90 141.86 51.86 58 13 2 
35 8663 100.02 143.94 43.92 60 13 0 
36 8711 110 146.06 36.06 59 12 1 
39 8746 120 150.56 30.56 56 11 4 
43 8799 130 163.64 33.64 60 15 0 
46 8811 140 168.46 28.46 57 12 3 
52 8816 150 184.4 34.4 58 13 2 
53 8820 160 191.46 31.46 57 10 3 
58 8824 170 197.5 27.5 60 13 0 
62 8828 180 207.36 27.36 57 12 3 
64 8832 190 216.66 26.66 58 11 2 
73 8836 200 234.06 34.06 59 13 1 
74 8840 210 236.34 26.34 59 13 1 
82 8844 220 256.38 36.38 59 9 1 
84 8848 230 263.98 33.98 58 10 2 
88 8852 240 274.28 34.28 60 11 0 
94 8856 250 284.98 34.98 58 10 2 
95 8860 260 285.9 25.9 55 12 5 
99 8864 270 305 35 57 13 3 
101 8868 280 310.34 30.34 59 11 1 
108 8872 290 321 31 59 13 1 
111 8876 300 329.76 29.76 59 12 1 
113 8880 310 334.36 24.36 55 10 5 
119 8884 320 348.9 28.9 48 8 12 
 
